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Introduction
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, Peter J. Chen, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier,
Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga
Australia is a ‘small’ nation of 25 million people occupying a large geographic space.
It is the 53rd most populous country and has the 13th biggest economy in the world.1
Australia continues to play an important role in geopolitical affairs, particularly in
the South Pacific. Importantly, it is home to one of the world’s oldest continuing
Indigenous peoples; these peoples carry wisdom with which to contribute to re-
thinking our conceptions of politics, political subjectivity and sovereignty.
This book is a broad introduction to Australian politics and public policy. This
field of study is important for Australians to understand the exercise of political
power, their history and the scope for change. It is also important for analysts
outside Australia looking for comparative cases. Within this volume are diverse
topics and perspectives, demonstrating that the study of Australian politics and
policy is not ‘fixed’. Rather, it is a contested field of academic scholarship. Indeed,
the volume’s editors do not all agree on the content of this introduction!
Viewed from outside, Australia’s political and policy landscape is both familiar
and unusual. Like many former British colonies, Australia retained Westminster
traditions after it gained independence. Australia’s trajectory was like other
Commonwealth countries: from direct military administration to advisory ‘upper
house’ legislative councils, to expanded councils with partial elected representation,
to expanded elected representation and ‘lower house’ legislative assemblies, and,
finally, to the acquisition of full ‘responsible government’ and the shift of authority
from colonial governors to premiers. As with many settler-colonial states, Australia’s
Barry, Nicholas, John R. Butcher, Peter J. Chen, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh,
Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga (2019). Introduction. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 World Bank 2018.
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history is predicated upon genocidal policies, logics and practices2 that attempted to
erase a people and a culture. Indigenous sovereignties were not ceded, and issues of
sovereignty, history and reconciliation continue to be important and contested fields
of politics.3
Looking at political debate in Australia over the last half-century, there is
much that would be familiar to international observers: particularly the growth and
contraction of the welfare state, economic deregulation and global integration, and
the changing status of women and sexual and ethnic minorities. Australia hews
close to the policy and political currents of those nations with which it shares
strong political and cultural ties within what has been referred to as the political
‘Anglosphere’4: a sphere of interaction wherein history and shared language
increases the tendency for direct policy comparison, learning and transfer. More
recently, Australia’s diverse society has tempered this Anglo-Celtic linguistic and
cultural dominance with influences from the continuing presence of Aboriginal
ways of life5 and from an increasing number of migrants from non-Western nations
arriving after the end of the ‘White Australia’ policy in the 1960s.
Australia was a leader in the development of the welfare state at the turn of the
20th century6 and in undertaking radical re-engineering of public service delivery
as the century came to a close.7 The latter changes, broadly informed by what
some call ‘neoliberal’ public administration, continue to fuel debate.8 Democratic
values, such as universal suffrage, took early root in colonial Australia.9 While
there is a commitment to broad British liberal traditions, nationhood saw the
importation of political ideas from the USA, leading to the creation of an Australian
Federation.10 Yet, there have been enduring social conflicts over who gets to come
to Australia and who gets to participate politically, as seen in the political exclusion
of Indigenous peoples and specific ethnic groups during much of the 20th century
and the countervailing tendencies of ongoing ‘racialisation’ – creation and policing
of racial categories – in the Australian settler state and society.
2 This perspective is contested by some working outside of Indigenous/decolonising political
theories and even within the editorial team itself. Although a number of the policies and practices
of colonial and Australian governments (including state and territory administrations) can be
interpreted as ‘genocidal’ within the meaning of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (UNOHCHR 2019), their portrayal as ‘genocide’ is not universally
accepted.
3 Harrison et al. 2017.
4 Gulmanelli 2014.
5 Watson 2014.
6 Castles and Uhr 2007.
7 Halligan and Wills 2008.
8 Spies-Butcher 2014.
9 Pickering 2001.
10 Maddox 2000.
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The study of politics and policy
The study of politics and public policy in Australia embodies diverse approaches, with
different underpinning objectives and methods for making knowledge claims.
Some of the earliest studies concentrated on the formal institutions that are
the most visible sites of political practice:11 parliaments, bureaucracies, political
parties, unions and businesses. This has been matched in recent decades by the
study of other structures of collective action, such as pressure groups and social
movements.12 While the study of institutions first emphasised the way strict rules
and laws shaped organisational practices, over time it has come to accommodate
more sociological views of how organisations operate, accounting for organisational
norms and culture.
Australian political science increasingly recognises that government power is
becoming distributed throughout society. In some cases, this has been the result
of deliberate choices by politicians and legislatures, such as the outsourcing of
previously state-provided services to charities or private companies. In other cases,
political scientists recognise that the capacity to influence how state power is
realised exists in places that are ‘in between’ formal institutions.
Those who conceive of political power as ‘distributed’ see politics and policy not
simply as government activity, but as the more expansive process of ‘governance.’
A governance perspective focuses on the way power is distributed across different
networks of social actors and organisations, shaping the nature of the policies that
emerge (such as the study of young people’s use of new media to influence politics).13
Governance considers a range of relationships (involving regulation, economic
exchange and collaboration) and often views elected officials as people who are
engaged in ‘steering rather than rowing’ to achieve their objectives, and not in
exercising top-down power.14
The recent National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a good example.
Originally developed under Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard (2010–13), it aims
to ensure that Australians with significant disabilities receive care aligned with their
personal needs. Importantly, the development and implementation of this policy
was not something that a federal government could do alone. The financing and
provision of these services spans federal, state and territory governments, requiring
collaboration and co-funding. This made the policy highly political, involving the
influence of the prime minister, her Cabinet, her party and its allies, but also of a
grassroots campaign by people with disabilities and their supporters to encourage
leaders in the states and territories to sign on to the plan.15 Rather than establish
a centralised bureaucracy to deliver standardised care, an expanded ‘market’ of
11 Crozier 2001.
12 Boreham 1990.
13 Vromen 2017.
14 Rhodes 2016.
15 Al-Alosi 2016.
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commercial and non-profit providers was fostered to compete to provide services.16
Thus, while key ‘institutions’ were critical in initiating the policy, its implementation
sits in the world of politics and governance, with multiple actors influencing and
shaping the eventual welfare model, which was crucial to the lives of over 450,000
Australians.
Australia also has a longstanding tradition of study of individual and group
political behaviour that is less concerned with the role of institutions and
organisations. This ‘behaviouralism’ has asked questions about how individual
citizens conduct themselves as political actors (expressing themselves, voting,
joining organisations), how people are ‘socialised’ into political knowledge and
practices, and how political knowledge and opinion changes over time. Often, this
asks: how do people come to know and express their individual and collective
interests in the political world? This approach to the discipline has interests in
culture, media and the study of public opinion.
The study of Australian politics also has a rich tradition of ‘critical’ analysis.
This broad school includes an array of feminist political theorists,17 Marxist political
economists18 and, more recently, decolonial and indigenising perspectives.19 These
traditions question common assumptions about the political order. Thus, for
example, instead of assuming the inevitable existence of the liberal nation-state and
market economy, they ask about the historical formation of these structures. Critical
scholars are often associated with ‘action research’: not simply analysis, but
developing theory with the subjects of the research, with the aim of empowering
these communities to change the social and political order. These approaches
commonly focus on questions of race, class, gender and intersectionality (where
interlocking systems of power affect individuals and communities).
Politics and the study of power
Politics is commonly defined as ‘the science or art of political government’.20 This
definition highlights the importance of politics as the acquisition, use and effects of
social power across a range of settings. Underlying this simple definition, however,
are at least three different ‘meta’ (high level) concepts of power that are employed
in understanding Australian politics.
The first perspective conceives politics as a practice that both expresses and
explains political conflict and co-ordination as the result of incentive structures that
shape the behaviour of individuals and groups. Individuals, like groups, have their
own preferences, interests and goals that they pursue. But often they are unable to
solve their problems due to barriers to collective behaviour. In this view, human
16 Foster et al. 2016.
17 Pateman 1990; Plumwood 1993; Salleh 2017.
18 Humphreys 2019; Meagher and Goodwin 2015.
19 Harrison et al. 2017; Maddison and Brigg 2011; Motta 2016; Strakosch and Macoun 2012.
20 Macquarie Dictionary 2018.
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nature tends towards individualistic rational calculation. Power is the ability to
explicitly or implicitly shape the behaviour of organisations and groups of people.21
As such, the prospect of the few dominating the many can only be prevented by
broad-scale participation or through contestation between competing elites with
different goals and objectives.
This perspectives sees the ‘public good’ as a by-product of the participation of
and competition between many citizens and groups in the political process, and sees
political institutions as either sites of conflict (consider the famous nickname of the
New South Wales parliament: ‘the bear pit’) or the enduring outcome of previous
battles that provided spoils to the winners.22 While this perspective can be seen
very negatively, it can be argued that, in all its imperfection, competitive politics in
open societies ‘works’ in that it delivers participatory government through which
individuals can act to protect their interests from the risk of an authoritarian state.23
The second view of politics focuses on the role of groups or collectives engaged
in mutual adjustment to act in concert and restrict social conflict, without which
human society would amount to little more than a war of ‘all against all’.24 Conflict is
not seen as automatically constitutive of politics; rather, agreement and compromise
are necessary to achieve any significant objectives and humans are seen as fun-
damentally social creatures.25 Within this conception humans are viewed as able
to engage, in the right contexts, in truly co-operative forms of decision making
to achieve common goals and objectives. This approach tends to assess the extent
to which political practices facilitate or impede collaboration and treats poor
government performance as stemming from failures of decision making, consensus
formation and collaboration.
The third perspective examines how dominant political structures, logics and
rationalities determine who has the capacity to control their lives and futures. It
historicises and critiques the form of organising politics, sovereignty and political
community. In this critical reading, the liberal nation-state and market economy
structurally reproduce systematic exclusions along lines of race, gender and class.
One key example of this critical reading of politics is the indigenising–decolonising
perspective. This perspective challenges taken-for-granted conceptualisations of
politics that can devalue, elide and invisibilise Indigenous and colonised peoples’
epistemologies, ethics and modes of organising political and social life.
Understanding public policy
These perspectives on politics address debates about human nature and about how
political power is organised, acquired, maintained and deployed. Studying politics
21 Dahl 1957.
22 Machiavelli 2014 [1531].
23 Crick 1992.
24 Hobbes 2014 [1668].
25 Arendt 1958.
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without considering the programs and policies of government, however, reduces it
to ‘sport’: calculating winners and losers without ever asking ‘What is at stake?’ The
study of public policy adds an understanding of the outputs of the political process
and asks questions about the historical foundations and reproduction of exclusions
and inequalities.
Just as we can discern different perspectives on politics, we can also identify
different ways of thinking about policy. For some, public policy reflects the dis-
tribution of resources in a society. For others, it reflects wider cultural norms that
tell us a lot about what a society truly values.
A ‘materialistic’ view of public policy sees policy as a set of decisions, rules
and institutions that allocate benefits (and costs) within society. As with news
reporting on the federal budget (‘This year’s winners and losers!’), policy can be
seen as choices about who gets the ‘spoils’ of political victories. Often policy is
about the provision of direct material resources (e.g. industry subsidies), but it
can also include less tangible benefits such as favourable laws or regulations. By
way of example: the rise of the labour movement at the end of the 19th century
saw a corresponding increase in policy designed to redistribute resources towards
the working class (via mechanisms like welfare and progressive taxation systems),
as well as the first significant industrial relations laws regulating the relationship
between employers and employees. From this perspective, policy can be evaluated
in instrumental terms (Did the allocation of resources effectively achieve the
program goals?), and in terms of power (Who benefits from this policy?).
Alternatively, a ‘values’ view of public policy is less concerned with accounting
for the distribution of public resources and more concerned with the social
meaning of policy. Mark Considine highlights the role that the values of voters
and officials play in directing government action. For him, ‘a public policy is an
action which employs governmental authority to commit resources in support of a
preferred value’.26 This recognises that the material aspects of a policy may be less
important than its ‘symbolic’ meaning.
A good example of this view is the heated debate over the implementation of
LGBTIQ+27 education programs in Australian schools. The ‘Safe Schools’ initiative
provided teaching materials to help schools reduce instances of bullying of students
who do not identify with heteronormative standards. From a strictly rationally
calculating perspective, this program represented an infinitesimally small part of
education budgets, yet it became a contentious political issue due to its explicit
acceptance of gender and sexuality as non-binary. It became a lightning rod for
social conservatives and a point of principle for program advocates, who saw
recognition as important in ensuring the physical and psychological wellbeing of
LGBTIQ+ young people.28 While the materiality of the program was small, its
26 Considine 1994.
27 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer/questioning.
28 McKinnon, Waitt and Gorman-Murray 2017.
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existence represented a strong statement of values as to what type of people were
seen as worthy of societal care.
‘Critical’ perspectives look at policy in terms of its impact on extending or re-
mediating systemic power inequalities and exclusions. An example is an indigenising-
decolonising perspective, which interrogates core settler-colonial state structures and
their underlying logics in economic, social, cultural or public order areas. In doing so,
it demonstrates their deeply racialised (as well as gendered and classed) nature and
the role of policy in the (re)production of exclusions, dehumanisation and racialised
interventions.29 A second strand of this research focuses on alternative practices,
processes and understandings of decision making and sovereignty, demonstrating
their survival despite historical and continued attempts at erasure and control, and
raising questions about the possibility of thinking differently about sovereignty,
authority, political subjectivity and political decision making.30
What do Australians think about ‘politics’?
On the surface, it would appear that we know a lot about what the public thinks
about politics. Australia’s political journalists are quick to refer to public opinion
polls to explain the daily currents of political debate and elite behaviour. Polling has
become a near real-time process surveying public attitudes, feeding reports about
‘what the public thinks’ back into political discourse.31 Political elites are quick to
refer to the currents of public opinion to justify their actions (when it suits them)
and to downplay polling in favour of ‘true leadership’ (also, when it suits them).
At the most fundamental level, there is considerable uncertainty about whether
the ‘average’ Australian knows very much about core aspects of the political system,
history and the debates of the day. Rodney Smith has called the average Australian’s
knowledge of the political system ‘sketchy’, at best,32 a problem partially exacer-
bated by the complexity of our three-level political system.
The Australian Electoral Study, a survey of Australian voters undertaken at
each federal election, has found that the public remains comparatively interested in
politics, with 77 per cent reporting they have a ‘good deal’ or ‘some’ interest.33 But
the survey also found that voters may have only partial levels of ‘hard facts’ about
the Australian political system. Indeed, less than half of voters can answer specific
questions about the Constitution and the composition of parliament (see Table 1).
The lack of knowledge with respect to these very specific questions relates to
a broader debate about the ‘competence’ of citizens: to what extent can the public
identify policy issues that are of significance to them and act collectively to put
29 Maddison and Brigg 2011; Motta 2016.
30 Harrison et al. 2017
31 Goot 2018.
32 Smith 2001.
33 Cameron and McAllister 2018.
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Correct Incorrect Not sure/
don’t know
Australia became a Federation in 1901 76.5% 2.7% 20.9%
There are 75 members of the House of Representatives 45.9% 22.9% 31.2%
The Constitution can only be changed by the High
Court
40.4% 27.0% 32.6%
The Senate election is based on proportional
representation
49.5% 13.3% 37.2%
No-one may stand for federal parliament unless they
pay a deposit
25.1% 34.8% 40.0%
The longest time allowed between federal elections for
the House of Representatives is four years
26.5% 56.7% 16.8%
Table 1 Australian political knowledge, 2016.
these on the political agenda (either through voting behaviour or political activities
outside of the electoral cycle)? Evidence on this question is mixed and complex,
demonstrating that the public is sensitive to economic conditions, and acts accord-
ingly, but can be ‘led’ by political elites on other issues (e.g. immigration).34
Importantly, Australians appear to be increasingly cynical about politics. How-
ever, Evans et al. see them as conflicted; many maintain positive views of Australia’s
democratic system in broad terms but question the integrity of many of its core
players (political parties, media and organised interest groups) and the policy
outcomes it delivers.35
Whether or not greater knowledge about the realities of the Australian political
system, its actors and its policy – the type of information contained in this volume
– would positively or negatively affect Australians’ attitude to politics remains an
open and contested question. However, Smith et al. identify a strong normative
argument that links improved political knowledge with enhanced political efficacy
(efficacy is the sense that you have the power to control your life and make
meaningful decisions).36
Conversely, the extent to which any representation of Australian politics and
policy speaks to those who have been excluded and misrepresented, and whether
34 Dowding and Martin 2016.
35 Evans, Halupka and Stoker 2017.
36 Smith et al. 2015.
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it reflects the knowledges and contributions of those on the political and
epistemological margins, are of ethical importance to critical political analysts and
frameworks. From these perspectives, the validity of political analysis and theory
derives from its capacity to be useful to those in movements and communities
struggling for social justice, inclusion and decolonisation.
About the open textbook
The volume you are reading is a customised textbook created from a collection of
chapters on the topic of Australian politics and public policy. This collection was
initially created by a team of 60 authors and editors. To ensure quality, each chapter
has been subjected to peer review, a process in which chapters are anonymised and
evaluated by other scholars who are experts in the field.
The purpose of the project is to:
• enhance the understanding of Australian politics and public policy with an
extensive, well-written, and comprehensive contribution to teaching materials
in Australia
• provide, with a no-cost option, access to high-quality teaching materials to
students of Australian politics
• develop a system for the delivery of bespoke textbooks customisable to the
needs of instructors.
Accessing more materials from this project
This book is only one small part of a larger collection of available materials. The
Australian Politics and Policy website (tiny.cc/australianpolitics) allows you to
access all the available chapters in the project’s database (see Table 2).
Creative commons licencing of this content
All the chapters in this open textbook project are subject to the Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) Creative
Commons licence. Under the conditions of the licence, you may:
• freely redistribute the content in this open textbook at no cost
• revise, update, transform and build upon the material.
A full copy of this licence and its conditions is available at
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
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Section Chapters
Introduction
A short political history of Australia
Introduction
Australian political thought
Executive government
Parliaments of Australia
Electoral systems
The Australian party system
The public sector
Media and democracy
Institutions
Courts
Commonwealth–state relations
Australian Capital Territory
New South Wales
Northern Territory
Queensland
South Australia
Tasmania
Victoria
Western Australia
Federalism
Local government
Political sociology Gender and sexuality in Australian politics
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Section Chapters
Government–business relations
Indigenous politics
Multicultural Australia
Pressure groups and social movements
Religious communities and politics
Voter behaviour
Young people and politics
Making public policy
Communication policy
Economic policy
Environmental policy
Foreign and defence policy
Health policy
Immigration and multicultural policy
‘Law and order’ policy
Regional policy
Social policy
Urban policy
Policy making
Work, employment and industrial relations
policy
Table 2 Complete contents of Australian Politics and Policy.
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Non-Indigenous peoples have occupied land in Australia for 230 years, bringing
different ways of life and forms of government to those of the Indigenous peoples
they displaced. Today, Australia is one of the most multicultural societies in the
world, and its politics focuses on securing high living standards for a diverse
population. But before the Second World War, Australia was overwhelmingly white
and Anglo-Celtic. As a settler society, political conflicts were dominated by disputes
over the distribution of natural resources and, later, political power. Politics in the
colonial and Federation eras established institutions, rules and norms that continue
to shape national government and politics in Australia.
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From Dreamtime to European settlement
Indigenous people first arrived in Australia over 60,000 years ago. They brought
with them customs and law. While Indigenous customary laws varied across tribal
groups, there were some common aspects. Customary law was part of the oral
tradition and reflected Indigenous peoples’ religious beliefs and their connection
with the land. These laws were passed down the generations, from elders to children.
Indigenous laws were sets of rules enforced through social norms and sanc-
tions. They included internal and external mechanisms for maintaining order and
managing disputes. These laws considered kinship relations and stipulated rights
and responsibilities according to individuals’ roles within the community. Decision
making was often collective and deliberative. Customary law shaped Indigenous
lives, from when and how to get married to when and how tribes should go to war.
At the time of first contact Indigenous societies were governed by these laws.1
However, neither Indigenous claims to land nor their laws were recognised
by the British when the First Fleet arrived in 1788. The colony was established
on martial lines and was dominated by men, both in the militia and as convicts.
London was nine months away by ship. This degree of isolation effectively rendered
the governor a dictator.
When New South Wales (NSW) was established, British politics was influenced
by ‘enlightened’ interests that argued (naively) for colonial expansion with minimal
violence. Thus, Indigenous peoples were present in early Sydney, and attempts to
‘gift’ Christian civilisation to Indigenous peoples were simultaneously exercises of
good will and coercion. While early governors often acted as a force for restraint,
the steady expansion of pastoral interests saw the spread of both sanctioned and
unsanctioned violence against the Indigenous population. Indigenous peoples
continued to resist the occupation of their lands and disproportionately suffered the
consequences of war, massacre and disease.2
Politics in NSW was dominated by its governor, the militia and conflicts bet-
ween free settlers and emancipated convicts over access to land. The problematic
links between the militia and government manifested in the Rum Rebellion (1808),
after Governor Bligh attempted to break the militia’s illicit alcohol trade. In res-
ponse, London sent Governor Macquarie and replacement troops to restore order.
Macquarie (1810–21) perhaps did the most to develop early NSW. He built major
public works and introduced the first bank and a currency. Macquarie was also
sympathetic to the former convicts (emancipists) and granted them lands, which
upset the free settlers, many of whom were also members of the militia. Macquarie’s
eventual dismissal highlighted London’s important role in colonial governance.
1 Law Reform Commission 1986.
2 Reynolds 1987.
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Self-government and gold
By 1820, European settlers numbered only 33,000. NSW’s nascent (male-dominated)
civil society generated demands for representation. Naturally, the model for govern-
ment was based upon the British concept of responsible government and developed
in stages. In 1823, an appointed seven-member Legislative Council was created to
advise the governor. Seven elected councillors were added in 1828. The council was
expanded in 1842 with more appointed members. In 1850, the British parliament
legislated for limited democratic self-government in the Australian colonies.
By contrast, South Australia (SA) was established as a free colony in 1834.
Enshrined in its enabling Act were principles of political and religious freedom,
reflecting the settlers’ determination to develop without convict labour. The settlers
used land sales to fund passage for free skilled labourers and guarded against
dictatorial government by dividing political rule between the governor and the
‘Resident Commissioner’. This experiment quickly broke down, and the SA
parliament developed in stages, along similar lines to NSW. However, SA was a
beacon of democratic innovation. In its constitution (1856), it adopted universal
suffrage for all men (including Indigenous men) and low or no property
qualifications to sit in parliament. It continued to innovate, granting propertied
women the right to vote in 1861. In a British Empire first, SA legalised trade unions
in 1876 and granted all (including Indigenous women) the right to vote and to
stand as a candidate for elected office in 1894.
Victoria became a separate colony from NSW in 1851. That same year, large
deposits of gold were discovered, sparking a gold rush. Keen to secure a share of
this wealth, Victoria introduced a much-hated mining license. Resentment against
the licence fee grew on the Ballarat goldfields, resulting in the celebrated ‘Eureka
Stockade’. Under the Eureka flag, a brief pitched battle was fought between miners,
asserting their claimed rights and liberties, and police in December 1854. The result
was 22 deaths. Later, Melbourne juries refused to convict the rebels. This popular
feeling infused Victoria’s self-government debate with a democratic flavour.
However, the most important impact of the discovery of gold was on the
development of Victoria itself, tripling its population between 1850 and 1860. By
the 1880s, ‘Marvellous Melbourne’ was Australia’s largest city. Gold became one of
Australia’s key exports (alongside wool and wheat), and both the revenues and the
influx of young working-age men expanded the economy and fuelled Australia’s
first long economic boom, which lasted until the 1890s crash.
Dividing resources and allotting rights
At the time of self-government, politics in the Australian colonies was shaped by
high levels of immigration of English and Scots. These immigrants were steeped in
the working-class culture of ‘the people’s charter’ and the early union organisation
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of Britain’s ‘hungry 1840s’. This brought an early form of social-democratic politics
and ideas of utilitarianism (a strand of ethical thought emphasising the promotion
of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people) to Australia.
The division of the continent’s natural resources was at the heart of colonial
politics. These political battles were important for establishing the institutions and
principles that Australian democracy would continue to follow.
The British Crown owned all the land and could choose how to distribute it.
Australia’s natural grasslands precipitated the pastoral industry’s rapid expansion
and the rise of ‘squatters’ – illegal occupants of vast grazing estates, who pushed out
the frontier well ahead of the colonial surveyors. Squatters rapidly became wealthy
and powerful ‘wool kings’.
As the numbers of free settlers increased, conflict arose about the distribution
of land. The squatters were eager to secure legal rights to their occupied lands.
Opposing them were the ‘selectors’ – free colonists wanting a farming life on a
‘selection’ of land. Although the following describes NSW, similar events repeated
themselves across the colonies. Squatters used their existing clout to shape suffrage
provisions in several colonies. Voting rights were based on property ownership, and
the squatters successfully locked out ordinary colonist from the upper chambers of
colonial legislatures by setting high property qualifications.
In NSW, the squatters’ liberal-minded opponents were able to dominate the
lower chamber almost from the beginning of self-government. Liberals wanted
to break up the ‘squattocracy’ and release this land to prospective selectors. They
petitioned London to extend voting rights (suffrage) to all men paying a £10 per
year rent. This was an expensive rent in the UK and would safely exclude the
working classes. However, in high-inflation, gold rush Australia, this price was the
norm. The result was that the British legislated near-universal male suffrage in the
Australian colonies in 1855.3
Thus, a wide franchise, a hostile governor and the policy preferences of the
London Colonial Office saw the squatters’ privileges curtailed and some of their
pastoral holdings broken up. Liberal forces were also successful in securing Britain’s
agreement to end transportation during the 1850s (SA never accepted convicts,
while Western Australia [WA] continued taking them until 1868). These changes
illustrate the continued influence of Britain in Australia’s political life during the
19th century.
Australia’s economy was overwhelmingly rurally based, and squatters
successfully kept the best lands for themselves. Land given to ‘selectors’ was too
small and unprofitable. The resulting rural poverty saw the rise of bushrangers such
as Ned Kelly. In 1891, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was formed, centring on
the mining and shearing industries. That year, it succeeded in winning four seats
in SA and 35 seats in NSW. The ALP was the union movement’s political wing,
3 Hirst 1988.
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providing parliamentary representation for its working-class base. It was the first
labourist party in the world to win power – for a week in Queensland in 1899 and
for four months at the federal level in 1904.
Setting the rules of the game: Federation to the World Wars
The decades surrounding Federation in 1901 saw Australians willing to engage in
creative democratic experimentation. Events and decisions made at this time would
shape Australian politics until the 1980s.
The Federation debates
The push for Federation was the result of changing economic and geopolitical cir-
cumstances. The depression of the 1890s – more severe than the Great Depression –
incentivised the creation of a single economic market. Another argument was that a
nation would be better able to defend the mostly empty continent.
Through two constitutional conventions, debate focused on how to manage
so large a land mass while balancing the interests of more and less populous
colonies. Heated debates occurred around the exact powers of the proposed Senate,
ultimately resolved by granting the Senate near equal powers (except the ability to
introduce money bills) to those of the proposed lower house. A bill of rights was
debated but not introduced.4
The final model drew on the bicameral UK, but with significant (federal)
elements adapted from the USA and Switzerland. Narrowly approved on its second
attempt, Australia federated in 1901. But the debate excluded working men, the
Labor Party, virtually all women and all Indigenous people. Indeed, Indigenous
peoples were not counted in the Census until 1967.
Electoral innovation and women’s suffrage
Elections in the 19th century were violent affairs. Winning often depended upon
bribery and the copious provision of alcohol. Australia was no different, until it
pioneered the adoption of the secret ballot (or ‘Australian ballot’) and banned
alcohol. These interventions transformed elections from wild affairs to safe and
dignified ones – socially acceptable events for women to participate in.
SA was a leader on women’s suffrage. WA followed suit in 1899. Federation
was predicated on accepting existing voting rights in the colonies, and this proved
pivotal to granting all white women voting and candidacy rights at federal elections
from 1902. Yet women’s representation was persistently low. The first woman
elected to any Australian parliament was Edith Cowan in WA in 1921. Women
4 Galligan 1995.
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did not enter federal parliament until 1943 (Enid Lyons [Liberal] in the House of
Representatives and Dorothy Tangney [ALP] in the Senate).5 In 2010, Julia Gillard
became Australia’s first female prime minister.
Solidification of the party system
At the time of Federation, politics was split between three political forces: the
Victorian-based ‘Protectionist’ liberals, the somewhat mislabelled conservative
‘Free Traders’ and the working-class ALP. Both the liberal and conservatives forces
were loose coalitions rather than formal parties. They struggled to compete with
the ALP’s discipline – the result of ‘the pledge’, which bound ALP parliamentarians
to vote along party lines on pain of expulsion. At the time, politicians were not paid
and working-class Labor representatives could be easily induced to switch sides.6
At the federal level, three voting blocs produced several short-lived minority
parliaments before 1909. This frustrated politicians like Alfred Deakin (a Pro-
tectionist and three-time prime minister) who were used to the two-party politics
of colonial legislatures. Deakin termed this ‘the three cricketing elevens’, implying
it was ill-suited to Westminster-style politics. Deakin and the Free-Trade/Anti-
Socialist leader Joseph Cook choose to ‘fuse’ their parties to oppose Labor. Deakin
rejected Labor on the grounds of its illiberal ‘pledge’, which offended his belief in
individual conscience. The fusion of 1909 has proved long-lasting, as forerunner of
the Liberal Party of Australia.7
Social laboratory
In the decade after Federation, Australia was considered a leading social and
democratic laboratory. In addition to women’s suffrage, Australia was also at the
forefront in social policy, including the aged pension, child endowment, the
industrial arbitration system and the indexed living wage for male workers. These
payments cemented the idea of Australia as the ‘working man’s paradise’, but they
also placed women at a disadvantage. The living wage was designed for a man to
support a wife and three children in a ‘dignified’ manner, but this standard justified
legislated lower wages for women and stymied attempts at parity until 1969.
At Federation, the Australian economy was in the doldrums because of shifting
global economic conditions and the devastating Federation drought, which
depressed the rural sector.8 Population growth slowed and politics focused on
maintaining high wage levels, which saw the extension of the state into areas of
public health and welfare, but also measures to lock out ‘cheap’ Asian labour.
5 Sawer and Simms 1993.
6 Loveday, Martin and Parker 1977.
7 Brett 2003.
8 McLean 2013.
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Advocacy for the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) was led by the ALP,
but the Act was supported by all parties.9 It drew on earlier colonial practices,
instigated in reaction to the influx of Chinese miners during the gold rushes.
Support was underpinned by racist and nationalist sentiment linked to Anglo-
Australians’ self-identification as subjects of the British Empire and members of the
‘British race’. Under the Act, customs officers could apply a ‘dictation’ language test
to screen out racially, and later politically, undesirable people. This system ended
plantation-style sugar farming in north Queensland, which depended upon the
importation (but often kidnapping and enslavement, known as ‘blackbirding’) of
indentured labour from the Pacific. It also restricted the flow of Asian immigration
until the policy was moderated from the mid-1960s and then formally repealed in
1973.
First World War
When the First World War broke out, Labor Prime Minister Andrew Fisher dec-
lared that Australia would support Britain ‘to the last man and the last shilling’.10
Thousands of volunteers joined up to fight for the ‘mother country’. However,
opponents also mobilised; former suffragists such as Vida Goldstein formed peace
movements. As the war continued, conditions on the home front deteriorated,
including industrial conflict over low wages and shortages. Those that protested
often fell afoul of the punitive War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth), which saw many
activists jailed for public dissent.11
Conflict over whether to introduce conscription became protracted, eventually
splitting the governing Labor Party. Disagreement within the government about
conscription stemmed from religious and ethnic divisions between Protestant
Anglo-Saxon Australians desirous of supporting the Empire and Irish Catholic
Australians hostile to Britain over the issue of Irish independence. Billy Hughes, a
Protestant, led a breakaway group of Labor MPs to join forces with the conserv-
atives, forming the Nationalist Party. Hughes, as prime minister, attempted twice
to introduce conscription via referendums in 1916 and 1917. Both were defeated.
These bitter campaigns entrenched existing sectarian divisions in Australia between
Catholic pro-Labor and Protestant anti-Labor supporters that would persist until the
mid-1950s.
Australia was devastated psychologically and economically by the First World
War. The nation was disproportionately impacted by the war’s effects on British
Empire trade – unable to sell its exports or import the manufactured goods it
required. Many of the men who died during the war were young and well educated.
9 Dyrenfurth 2011.
10 Murphy 1981.
11 Wright 2018.
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Australia took on loans, on top of an existing heavy debt burden, to finance the war,
and this retarded economic recovery into the 1920s.12
Between the wars
In the interwar period, Australia turned away from the world, attracting few immi-
grants and raising tariffs to protect its manufacturing sector. Many Australians
were frightened of the political forces unleashed by the war: namely socialism,
communism and Irish nationalism (Fenianism). The optimism that characterised
the Federation decades was replaced by deep mourning. The Returned Services
League became a major force in politics. Their advocacy of solider settlement
schemes often proved disastrous as inexperienced farmers were given marginal
farming lands with little support.
These interwar years saw major political developments. First was the creation
of new parties on the right: the Country Party (1919; now called the Nationals), the
Nationalist Party (1911–31) and the latter’s successor, the United Australia Party
(UAP) (1931–45). The formation of the Nationalist–Country Coalition in 1922
instigated a century of co-operation between the parties of the right. Second was
the introduction of compulsory voting for federal elections in 1924. Third was
the High Court’s successive rulings in favour of centralising power in the federal
government, as cases were brought to clarify constitutional powers.13
During the interwar years, Labor endured opposition at the federal level until
finally winning government on the eve of the Great Depression. The Scullin Labor
government was quickly overwhelmed and, in 1931, the party split over how the
government should respond. Labor Cabinet minister Joseph Lyons defected and
took up the leadership of the new UAP, winning the 1932 election. The Great
Depression was particularly severe in Australia, with unemployment peaking at 32
per cent in 1932. This laid the foundation of a post-Second World War consensus,
predicated on the principles of full employment and the ‘fair’ distribution of wealth.
War and reconstruction
The Second World War ushered in a new political era. To fight the war, the federal
government asked the states to temporarily withdraw from collecting income tax. The
states lost their challenge in the High Court, which ruled that the Commonwealth
held priority over income tax. In 1946, the Chifley federal government announced
that it would continue ‘uniform taxation’ in exchange for reimbursing the states for
their forgone income tax revenue. These decisions are the origins of contemporary
political conflicts in Australia, where the states are responsible for the provision of
services such as health, education and transport, but the federal government has
12 McLean 2013.
13 Galligan 1995.
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more of the revenue needed to fund them. Although the High Court’s decision was
reversed in 1957, it proved too difficult to change existing arrangements, despite
multiple attempts by state premiers and even prime ministers.
The war was fought on the principle that a new social compact would follow;
postwar reconstruction would see a more equal society and a bigger state. The
Curtin and Chifley Labor governments attempted to deliver on this promise by
continuing the wartime command economy (a government-planned economy) to
direct labour into needed public works. Labor attempted to cement this extension
of the state’s role in the Constitution with the ‘14 powers referendum’ in 1944,
which would have enabled the introduction of a European-style welfare state. Like
its attempt to nationalise the banks, this referendum was defeated.14
In foreign policy, the war remade the geopolitical map, split between the
capitalist West and the communist East. Even before the Cold War, Australia had
shifted towards the US alliance, as a war-exhausted Britain could no longer
guarantee Australia’s security. Japan’s military aggression during the Second World
War had highlighted the vulnerability of a thinly populated Australia. Labor also
required more workers to fulfil its postwar reconstruction plans. This provided
the impetus to commence large-scale immigration in 1947. Attempts to induce
British migrants with assisted passage were not sufficient, and Labor responded by
recruiting from among the millions of refugees in Europe. The initial arrivals were
carefully managed, selecting only young, blond and mostly male migrants to allay
community unease.15 By 1973, nearly three million migrants, including 170,000
refugees, had immigrated to Australia.16
After 1945
The long postwar economic boom made Australia more equal; both the Chifley
Labor and Menzies Liberal governments broadly implemented policies that
reduced relative income inequality and maintained ‘full employment’. At this time,
federal governments exercised substantial powers to manage the economy. Elected
in 1949, Robert Menzies’ Liberals favoured a regulated and subsidised private
sector. The Liberals took risks on extending federal funding to Catholic schools
and opening up trade with Japan, as these had the potential to split the party’s own
base. Menzies’ rejection of the Vernon report in 1965 also signalled that Australia
would not increase technocratic economic planning, which dominated practice
in Western Europe. Broadly, Liberal governments supported the status quo and
Australia’s links with Britain.
14 Macintyre 2015.
15 Persian 2015.
16 Jupp 2002.
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Politics at this time was shaped by the threat of communism at home and
within Asia. Abroad, Australians fought in Korea (1950–52), Malaysia (1964–66)
and Vietnam (1962–72). At home, Menzies failed to ban the Communist Party in
a referendum in 1951 but was able to capitalise on the defection of Soviet attachés
Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov in 1954, winning the subsequent snap election. Inside
the ALP, tensions between communist and anti-communist organisers in the union
movement exploded. The ALP’s organisational wing operated on a delegate model,
with unions accounting for the largest share of delegates. The rival groups fought
for a controlling influence over the party and the result was ‘the split’ in 1955. The
split saw a breakaway party of Catholic anti-communists emerge, the Democratic
Labor Party (DLP), mostly concentrated in Victoria.17
The DLP came to hold the balance of power in the Senate, capitalising on
the switch to a proportional voting system in the upper house in 1949. This was
the beginning of the end for governments’ expectation that they could rely on
a majority in the Senate. This shift was also important to the Senate’s increasing
tendency to utilise its full set of powers.18 The DLP influenced the outcome of
successive elections, advising its supporters to give their second preference to the
Liberals rather than the ALP. This helped to keep the Liberals in power at the
federal level for 23 years.
The Whitlam government
During the 1960s, the economic and social foundations of the postwar consensus
began to corrode, ushering in the political debates we recognise today. The Whitlam
government’s (1972–75) slogan ‘It’s Time’ both encapsulated and prefigured political
forces arising from the women’s and gay liberation, and environmental, ethnic and
Indigenous social movements. Whitlam led a chaotic but transformative govern-
ment, enacting universal health care (Medibank), free university education, multi-
culturalism and equal pay for equal work, establishing the family court, introducing
no-fault divorce and tariff reduction, returning the Wave Hill Station to the Guringdi
people and attempting to legalise abortion, to name a few. The pace of change was
breakneck and the rate of spending ruinously inflationary.
The Liberal Party, unused to opposition, attacked the legitimacy of the
government, using its Senate majority to force it to an early election in 1974. The
Liberals continued to press the government, and a year later the now scandal-
ridden Whitlam administration was locked in a game of chicken with the Senate
over its budget. The ‘Dismissal crisis’ emerged when Whitlam attempted to break
the deadlock by seeking an election from the governor-general, Sir John Kerr. But
before Whitlam could ask for a new poll, Kerr sacked him. Despite the outraged
crowds – typified by those who witnessed Whitlam’s famous quip ‘Well may we
17 Costar, Love and Strangio 2005.
18 Taflaga 2018b.
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say “God save the Queen”, because nothing will save the Governor-General’ – the
Liberals, led by Malcolm Fraser, went on to win the 1975 election by the largest
majority in postwar history.19
Indigenous rights
Indigenous Australians have persistently advocated for their people since first con-
tact. Indigenous peoples defended their lands by force, petitioned Queen Victoria
and government authorities, organised advocacy leagues in the 1920s and undertook
freedom rides (a form of protest where Indigenous and white activists travelled
around regional NSW to survey and bring to public attention the everyday racial
discrimination faced by Indigenous peoples) in the 1960s.20 In 1967, Australians
voted overwhelmingly to remove the prohibition on the federal parliament legislating
with respect to Indigenous people and to count Indigenous Australians in the Census.
The referendum was not about granting voting rights – Indigenous people could
already vote at federal elections if they held the right at the state level.21
Indigenous people continued to advocate for land rights and greater autonomy
over their lives. Two landmark High Court cases, known as Mabo22 and Wik,23
overturned the doctrine of terra nullius. The latter found that pastoral leases did
not extinguish native title claims. These decisions paved the way for Indigenous
groups to seek native title over their land. However, the High Court’s decisions also
produced a backlash, particularly in regional Australia. The Howard government
responded with its ‘Wik 10 Point Plan’, which curbed the scope of the decision and
affirmed pastoral leaseholders’ and miners’ existing rights.
Australia in a globalised world
Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser represented a transition in Australian
politics between the long boom consensus and the new politics of monetarism,
deregulation and globalisation. Fraser retained, or could not unwind, most of
Whitlam’s reforms,24 with the notable exception of Medibank, which was
privatised. Fraser actively extended and cemented Australia’s commitment to
multiculturalism and antiracism, accepting tens of thousands of Vietnamese
refugees. While Fraser set Australia on the path towards economic reform, it was
the Labor Hawke–Keating government (1983–96) that truly grasped the nettle.
19 Hocking 2012.
20 Curthoys 2002.
21 Attwood and Markus 2007.
22 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 (Mabo).
23 Wik Peoples v State of Queensland and Ors; Thayorre People v State of Queensland and Ors [1996]
HCA 40 (Wik).
24 Dowding and Martin 2017.
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In the 1980s, Labor governments relinquished control over several economic
levers (such as the exchange rate) to open the Australian economy to global
competition. They also came to a series of ‘Accords’ with the union movement
over wages. In exchange, these Labor governments extended the welfare state,
introducing the universal health scheme Medicare. Labor navigated a ‘third way’
between the socialism of the postwar left and the neoliberalism of the ‘new right’
in the 1980s. The ALP finally succeeded in winning more than two terms in a row
at the federal level, but at a cost. By 1996, many of the party’s left felt that Labor’s
socialist credentials had been betrayed.25
Labor embraced postmaterial politics, adopting progressive positions on
women, the environment, gay rights, Indigenous affairs and multiculturalism. By
the 1990s, reform fatigue had set in. John Howard’s Liberals harnessed a com-
munity backlash with their 1996 campaign slogan ‘For All of Us’, which rejected
the politics of ‘the elites’ in favour of ‘ordinary Australians’. Howard argued for a
‘relaxed and comfortable’ Australia that celebrated the nation’s history and culture.
This was the forerunner of today’s ‘culture wars’.26
The Howard government (1996–2007) embarked upon major reforms in its
early years, introducing a goods and services tax, industrial relations reforms and
strict gun control. Two events in 2001 came to dominate the government’s later
years. The first was the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, which led
Australia to join the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second was
the Tampa crisis, where the Australian government became involved in a standoff
with a cargo ship that had rescued asylum seekers from a sinking vessel. The
Tampa incident brought to a head a crisis in the immigration detention system,
which had been established by the Keating government. The eventual result was
the beginning of the offshore detention system. The Tampa crisis transformed
immigration into a contestable political issue, where previous attempts in the 1980s
and 1990s invited strong censure as racist.27 Today, both major parties are advocates
of offshore detention and boat turn-backs (despite the Rudd Labor government’s
brief liberalisation).
Finally, the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s crystal-
lised into political action and party formation, first in Tasmania in 1972 and later
federally in 1992.28 Global warming was first raised as a political issue in the 1980s.
Given Australia’s access to cheap coal and its position as an exporter, the Howard
government resisted joining global efforts to combat climate change. The issue has
continued to plague Australian politics, playing a role in the downfall of successive
prime ministers on both sides of the aisle since 2007.
25 Bongiorno 2015.
26 Brett 2003.
27 Taflaga 2018a.
28 Jackson 2016.
A short political history of Australia
29
Conclusions
Contemporary Australia’s colonial and post-Federation political history begins
with the displacement of its Indigenous peoples. The mode of politics reflects, first,
the adaption of British, and the development of unique Australian, institutions.
These institutions have set the ‘rules of the game’ and helped Australia to peacefully
manage the division of natural and political resources among its non-Indigenous
settlers. Second, as Australian society has changed, either through immigration
or by accommodating the demands for access to the public sphere by successive
groups, it has continued to adapt its institutions in order to cope with new
challenges and demands without serious political strife or collapse.
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Australian political thought
Nicholas Barry
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utilitarianism
Ideas are central to politics. Individuals and groups have different ideas about which
values are most important, what kind of society we should live in, how the world
works and what role the state should play. This is what political scientists often
refer to when they use the term ‘ideology’. Ideological disagreements often underpin
disagreements over the laws and policies that should be adopted. For this reason, a
full understanding of politics and public policy in Australia requires an awareness of
the major ideas and ideologies held by Australian citizens, politicians and activists.
In the past, an influential line of thought held that political ideas were relatively
unimportant to Australians who were more concerned with their economic int-
erests than anything else.1 However, this is an oversimplification of Australian
political history.2 As this chapter demonstrates, Australian politics has been shaped
by a range of ideas and ideologies, often resulting from engagement with political
thinkers in other parts of the world. This chapter provides an overview of some
Barry, Nicholas (2019). Australian political thought. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds.
Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 See, for example, Bryce 1921, 244; Collins 1985; Hancock 1930.
2 See, for example, Clark 1980 [1956]; Edwards 2013; Hirst 2001; Rowse 1978; Sawer 2003; Walter
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of the most influential of these ideas and ideologies, focusing on conservatism,
liberalism, socialism, social democracy and nationalism, and explores their impact
on Australian politics.
Conservatism
Conservatism has been a major ideological influence in Australian politics. The
core of conservatism is maintaining past traditions while accommodating small but
gradual social change. In general, conservatives have ‘an essentially pessimistic view
of human nature’.3 They tend to focus on the limits of human reason, given the
complexity of the world and the impact of ‘non-rational appetites’.4 This means they
believe that human beings need stability, hierarchy and tradition to thrive. They
are sceptical about the desirability of rapid social change, believing instead that
there is an accumulated wisdom in traditional customs and social institutions and
that these beliefs and practices should generally be preserved.5 The most famous
expression of this view was Edmund Burke’s critique of the French Revolution,
Reflections on the revolution in France, which warned of the dangers of radical
social and political change in the pursuit of abstract universal ideals.6 Conser-
vatives also tend to emphasise the importance of religion and religious authorities
in guiding individual behaviour. These features of conservatism all have important
implications for the role of the state, and they mean that the state may be justified in
passing laws that restrict individual freedom in order to preserve traditional beliefs
and practices.
Another strand of conservatism is concerned primarily with preserving the
cultural traditions of the community. In Britain in the early 1800s, this ‘cultural
conservatism’ was originally concerned with protecting the traditional English way
of life against the Industrial Revolution and the rise of materialism, which many
believed was undermining traditional cultural practices and loyalties.7 Cultural
issues, including the effect of free market capitalism on human relations, continue
to concern some conservatives.8 But greater concerns, particularly among religious
conservatives in the USA, have been the movement away from the traditional
heteronormative family structure, challenges to traditional gender roles, a more
permissive attitude towards sex and the rise of the welfare state, all of which are
perceived to have led to an erosion of personal responsibility.9
3 Heywood 2004, 22–3.
4 Heywood 2004, 22.
5 Ball and Dagger 2004, 88–9. See also Edwards 2013, 34–5.
6 Ryan 2012b, 619–34.
7 Ball and Dagger 2004, 98.
8 For example, Scruton 2001.
9 Ball and Dagger 2004, 107–10.
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Conservatism has continued be a significant ideological force in Australian
politics since Federation. In parliament, the Liberal Party and its predecessors
have often been strongly influenced by conservative ideas (although, as its name
suggests, liberalism is also an ideological influence on the party, as will be discussed
in more detail in the next section). Liberal Prime Minister John Howard was a
staunch monarchist and drew on the ideas of Edmund Burke to argue against
Australia becoming a republic:
I take an unashamedly Burkean view. I do not support change because I am
unconvinced that a better system can be delivered … Changing the Constitution
in such a fundamental way is not a play-thing of the ordinary cut-and-thrust of
Australian politics. We are dealing here with institutions affecting the long-term
political health and stability of the nation.10
More generally, the desire to preserve political and cultural ties to Britain
has been one of the abiding features of Australian conservatism.11 For example,
one of the most controversial decisions made by Tony Abbott during his prime
ministership was the decision to introduce knighthoods in Australia and to award
one of these knighthoods to Prince Philip.12 This decision reflected a conservative
desire to reintroduce an honours system based on the British model; a belief in
the value of hierarchy, apparent in the desire to establish a system of titles; and a
conservative attachment to the Crown, seen in bestowing the award on a member
of the royal family.
Conservative ideas have also figured prominently in debates over a range of
social issues and policies. For example, until the final decades of the 20th century,
Australia had a particularly strict censorship regime that aimed to place limits on
the literature and films that citizens were able to access to protect ‘Anglo-Saxon
standards’.13 The conservative viewpoint also came through strongly in debates over
the introduction of no-fault divorce and the decriminalisation of homosexuality.
More recently, the major opposition to marriage equality came from conservative
politicians and religious organisations. For example, former Prime Minister Tony
Abbott advocated a ‘no’ vote in the 2017 marriage equality plebiscite on the grounds
that it was ‘[t]he best way of standing up for traditional values, the best way of
saying you don’t like the direction our country is heading in right now’.14 Since
the late 1990s, conservative ideas have also been central to the ‘culture wars’, with
conservatives opposing a variety of trends that they believe are undermining the
dominance of Christian values in Australia, particularly multiculturalism, cultural
engagement with Asia, and more critical accounts of Australian history that draw
10 Howard, cited in Irving 2004, 95.
11 Melleuish 2015.
12 Safi 2015.
13 Moore, cited in Errington and Miragliotta 2011, 121.
14 Abbott, cited in Karp 2017.
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attention to the violence of colonialism and its ongoing effects. The idea that it
is important to preserve Christian values in Australia was reflected in former
Liberal–National Coalition Prime Minister John Howard’s comment that ‘the life
and example [of Jesus Christ] has given us a value system which remains the
greatest force for good in our community’.15
Liberalism
Liberal ideas have also been highly influential in Australia. In fact, liberalism has
sometimes been viewed as the dominant ideology in Australian politics.16 There
are major differences between varieties of liberalism, but they are all committed
‘to individualism, a belief in the supreme importance of the human individual,
implying strong support for individual freedom’.17 Linked to this, liberals are
opposed to the ideas of hereditary aristocracy and natural hierarchy that have often
been associated with conservatism. Rather, the liberal view is that citizens have an
equal moral status, meaning they are entitled to an equal set of rights.
A variety of implications flow from this core idea. First, liberals are opposed to
absolutism.18 The authority of the state – its right to exercise coercive power – is
not natural or the result of religious decree but only justified to the extent that it
has beneficial consequences for the lives of citizens. This idea, which most famously
found expression in John Locke’s Two treatises of government (1689), means that
state power is only justified to the extent that it ‘enable[s] the society to achieve
those limited goals that a political order enables us to achieve – the security of
life, property and the pursuit of happiness’.19 In the liberal tradition, this view has
often been explained with reference to the idea that there is a (hypothetical) social
contract between citizens and the state. Although the idea of the social contract has
taken a variety of forms, it is usually understood to be a thought experiment that
begins by imagining what life would be like in the state of nature – a world without
the state apparatus. A flourishing and orderly society is assumed not to be possible in
the state of nature; hence liberals believe that individuals would agree to give up their
absolute freedom in the state of nature and establish the institution of government
(what we would now refer to as the state). This establishes the basis for citizens’
agreement to respect the state’s authority. In return, the state is obliged to maintain
order and protect citizens. However, under liberal forms of the social contract, there
are limits to the state’s authority: it must respect the core rights of citizens, and, if it
fails to do so, it loses its legitimacy and revolution may be justified.20
15 Howard, cited in Johnson 2007, 199.
16 For example, Rowse 1978.
17 Heywood 2004, 29.
18 Ryan 2012a, 28–30.
19 Ryan 2012a, 28–9.
20 Ryan 2012b, 488–91.
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Although most liberals endorse human rights and individual freedom, there
is great diversity in how different liberals understand these concepts. One of the
major distinctions is between classical liberalism and social liberalism.21 Classical
liberalism is generally associated with a belief in rights to life, liberty and property.
There should also be minimal government intervention in the economy, with the
emphasis instead on freeing up the market forces of supply and demand. This
means that the state should, for the most part, let producers and consumers make
their own economic decisions without the restrictions associated with heavy
government regulation, taxation, tariffs or other forms of interference. Key liberal
thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith are often viewed as falling within the
classical liberal tradition.22
In the 19th century, a different form of liberalism began to emerge, described
variously as ‘social liberalism’, ‘new liberalism’ or ‘modern liberalism’.23 Associated
with the work of J.S. Mill, L.T. Hobhouse and T.H. Green, social liberals drew
attention to the problem of poverty and argued that the state was justified in
assuming a more expansive role in the economy, intervening to provide more
benefits and services for citizens to help ensure that they are able to obtain the basic
necessities of life and to bring about equality of opportunity. This was justified with
reference to the liberal commitment to individualism and individual freedom. The
idea was that for individual freedom to be meaningful, individuals needed more
than the absence of external interference with their actions; they needed a certain
level of material wellbeing to give them autonomy (i.e. control over their lives)
and the means to fully develop their capacities. This form of freedom has been
described as positive freedom, in contrast to the negative freedom (i.e. freedom as
non-interference) that was associated with classical liberalism,24 and it provided a
justification for the emergence of the welfare state.
In the second half of the 20th century, another strand of liberalism emerged
that became known as ‘neoclassical liberalism’ (or ‘neoliberalism’). Linked to the
work of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, among others, this approach argues
against the growing size of the welfare state on the grounds that it is undermining
self-reliance and individual responsibility, as well as distorting the market.
Rejecting the positive account of freedom associated with social liberalism,
neoliberals argue that liberals should return to their classical roots, advocating
minimal government and the free market.
These strands of liberalism have all had – and continue to have – a major
impact on Australian politics. The division between different types of liberalism
was also important in the development of the Australian party system in the late
19th and early 20th centuries. The two largest ‘parties’ (or perhaps more accurately,
21 Heywood 2004, 29–30; Ryan 2012a, 23–6; Sawer 2003, 9–30.
22 Ryan 2012a, 24.
23 Heywood 2004, 29–30; Ryan 2012a, 25–6; Sawer 2003, 9–30.
24 Berlin 1969.
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‘groupings’, given their relatively loose organisational structures) in the first federal
parliament were the Protectionists and the Free Traders. As their name suggests,
the Free Traders, led by George Reid, were strongly influenced by the free market
ideas of classical liberalism.25 Reid associated free market liberalism with the idea
of individual freedom. He thought the free market was essential to economic and
social progress because it encouraged competition: ‘the great destiny of humanity
lies in allowing the genius for competition, for striving, for excelling, for acquiring,
to reach its uttermost latitude consistent with the due rights of others’.26
In contrast, the Protectionists held that the federal government should put
tariffs on goods being imported into Australia in order to protect local industries,
giving them an advantage over international competitors. This went alongside
support for a range of other forms of government intervention in the economy that
were designed to prevent poverty and improve the lives of citizens.27 As the most
influential figure in the Protectionists, Alfred Deakin, put it:
Liberalism would now inculcate a new teaching with regard to the poorest in the
community, that all should have what was their due. By fixing a minimum rate of
wages and wise factory legislation, wealth would be prevented from taking unfair
advantage of the needy, and the latter would be saved from living wretched and
imperfect lives.28
Ultimately, the position advocated by the Protectionists won out. With the
support of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), tariffs were introduced, along with
a range of other policies, including compulsory wage arbitration, which ultimately
meant that workers’ wages were relatively high compared to other countries. These
policies (along with other measures such as the White Australia policy, discussed
below) later became known as ‘the Australian Settlement’ and remained in place for
much of the 20th century.29 There were still major disagreements between political
actors over the extent of government intervention in the economy, and in the
postwar period some critics argued that the Australian welfare state was relatively
underdeveloped, having fallen behind other countries. Nonetheless, the broadly
interventionist approach associated with Deakin’s social liberalism had become
institutionalised, going on ‘to dominate Australian society and politics for the first
70 years after Federation’.30
25 Walter 2010, 24, 97–9.
26 Reid, cited in Walter 2010, 98.
27 Edwards 2013, 68–9.
28 Deakin, cited in Walter 2010, 100.
29 Kelly 1992. Although the idea of ‘the Australian Settlement’ has been highly influential in both
academic and popular discussions of Australian politics and public policy, the existence of such
a settlement, and Kelly’s presentation of its content, has also been challenged. See, for example,
Stokes 2004.
30 Cook 1999, 180.
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By the 1970s, this approach came under challenge as neoliberal ideas became
increasingly influential in Australia. A variety of think tanks argued that the welfare
state had become too large and that there was a need to reduce government
intervention in the economy through tariff cuts, financial deregulation, industrial
relations deregulation, tax cuts and privatisation.31 The Australian economy was
perceived to be underperforming as it faced problems with stagflation (the com-
bination of stagnant economic growth and high inflation). The interventionist
economic ideas embedded in the existing framework, reflecting social liberalism,
were seen to have failed, and a broadly neoliberal approach was believed to offer
the solution.32 These ideas did not fully reshape public policy in Australia until
the Hawke–Keating Labor government held office (1983–96), bringing in a range
of policies that were heavily influenced by neoliberal ideas. It moved to phase out
tariffs, open the economy up to market forces by deregulating the financial system
and privatise major government assets. During this period, the Liberal Party, which
was in opposition, was racked by internal division between social liberals (known as
‘the wets’) and neoliberals (known as ‘the dries’) over the ideological direction of the
party. Ultimately, the dries won out on economic questions;33 the vast majority of
Liberal Party MPs now subscribe to a broadly neoliberal approach to the economy.
Socialism and social democracy
Socialist ideas have also been important in Australia. Socialism is a particularly
difficult ideology to define because of the many different types of socialism that
exist; nonetheless, most accounts of socialism reflect a commitment to principles
of egalitarianism and community.34 The socialist commitment to egalitarianism
involves a more radical understanding of equality than the idea of equal citizenship
or equality before the law, requiring a higher degree of equality in the standard of
living individuals enjoy (going as far as equality of outcome on some accounts). The
commitment to community (or solidarity) reflects the idea ‘that people care about,
and, where necessary and possible, care for, one another’.35 As both these principles
suggest, a socialist society is supposed to lack the social division and competition
that tends to characterise life in a liberal capitalist society.
Despite the importance of egalitarianism and community in socialist thought,
the most influential socialist thinker, Karl Marx, did not explicitly draw on these
ideas in his mature work. Instead, Marx put forward a ‘scientific’ account of
socialism based on the idea that politics and history are driven by the conflict
between different classes, with this conflict in turn reflecting the nature of the
31 Bell 1993; Pusey 1991.
32 Painter 1996.
33 Brett 2003.
34 Cohen 2009.
35 Cohen 2009, 34–5.
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economy and its level of technological development. In a capitalist economy, the
central conflict is between the bourgeoisie (the capitalist, property-owning class)
and the proletariat (the working class who are forced to sell their labour to survive
because they do not own property). In contrast to the positive view of the market
associated with classical liberalism, which tends to view workers as free and equal
in a capitalist society, Marx argued that the proletariat are, in reality, exploited
by the bourgeoisie because they are not paid the full value of their labour.36 This
leads to the impoverishment of the working class. Over time, wealth will become
increasingly concentrated and the proletariat will increase in size. This ultimately
makes it possible for the proletariat to take control of the state and overthrow
capitalism, abolishing private property and exploitative wage labour.37
Socialists have also disagreed over how the transition to socialism is likely to
occur. Revolutionary socialists believed that a revolutionary takeover of the state
was necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie. Other socialists believed that reform
could occur through democratic means if democratic socialist or social-democratic
political parties could contest elections, win government and then use the power of
the state to institute socialism. Although the term ‘social democracy’ was originally
used to refer to political parties advocating the democratic route to socialism, over
time it has come to be associated with a much less radical approach. Instead of
winning government to overturn capitalism and bring about full-blown socialism,
social democracy now generally means a capitalist economy with a strong welfare
state in place that provides a generous level of benefits and services to citizens
(such as unemployment benefits and universal health care), thereby ensuring a high
level of social protection for workers (and others), a higher degree of equality of
opportunity and a lower level of inequality in income and wealth. In other words,
‘it stands for a balance between the market and the state, a balance between the
individual and the community’.38
Both socialism and social democracy have been longstanding influences in
Australian politics. In the late 19th century, key socialist works by Marx and Engels
and by ‘utopian’ socialists such Edward Bellamy, William Morris and others were
being read by both workers and the urban intelligentsia.39 There were also reading
groups to discuss Marx’s Capital, and socialist newspapers and journals. This
climate contributed to the development of the ALP in the 1890s, although the
relationship between the ALP and socialism is complicated and controversial. Key
figures within the Labor Party certainly endorsed socialist ideas and used the term,
while making clear that it should be achieved through electoral victory and gradual
reform rather than revolution. However, the kind of socialism that most figures
within the Labor Party endorsed fell short of the Marxist ideal. This is reflected in
36 Ryan 2012b, 786–8.
37 Cohen 2000.
38 Heywood 2004, 308.
39 Walter 2010, 70-76.
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the qualified nature of the Socialist Objective the Labor Party adopted as part of
its platform in 1921, which committed the party to ‘the socialisation of industry,
production, distribution and exchange’, but not if this property was ‘utilised by its
owner in a socially useful manner’.40 Labor’s commitment to socialism was perhaps
best seen in its support for government ownership, at least until the 1970s and
1980s, but this fell well short of major government control of all key industries.
Often Labor’s policies in office seemed to be closer to the goals of social democracy
in its more moderate form, which focused on building the welfare state to provide
greater security for citizens and to reduce levels of inequality.
Nationalism and exclusion
Australian politics has also been influenced by a number of other ideas that cut
across and interact with many of the ideologies discussed above. Foremost among
these is nationalism. A nation is an ‘imagined community’ into which one is born,41
and often those who belong to such a community are believed to share certain
characteristics. Nationalism is the idea that ‘people who share a common birth –
who belong to the same nation – should also share citizenship in the same political
unit, or state’.42 The development of Australian nationalism is generally traced to the
second half of the 19th century. It was associated with a growing sense that there
was a distinctive Australian identity characterised by egalitarianism, mateship and
distrust of authority.43 This sense of nationalism was linked to the growing desire
for greater independence from Britain and to the ‘progressive’ policy measures
associated with the Australian Settlement, which were supported by social liberals
and the labour movement, particularly labour market regulation.
However, the egalitarianism and mateship associated with Australian national-
ism for the most part applied to white men. Australian national identity embodied
‘a specific model of masculinity – the Lone Hand or Bushman’ – that excluded
women.44 First Nations people were also excluded, being denied the formal rights
and status associated with equal citizenship until well into the 20th century, and
migration was restricted to ‘white’ races through the White Australia policy. The
latter policy was a core part of the Australian Settlement, enjoying support across
the mainstream ideological spectrum. Speaking on the Immigration Restriction Bill
1901 (Cth), which introduced the policy, Alfred Deakin famously stated that ‘[t]he
unity of Australia is nothing if it does not imply a united race’.45 The 1905 federal
Labor Platform called for ‘[t]he cultivation of an Australian sentiment based on the
40 Cited in Bramble and Kuhn 2011, 43. See also Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno 2011, 68–9.
41 Anderson 1983.
42 Ball and Dagger 2004, 14.
43 Brett 2003, 203; Ward 1958.
44 Lake 1997, 42.
45 Deakin, cited in Brett 2017, 265.
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maintenance of racial purity’.46 Thus, although nationalism was linked to relatively
progressive policies in some areas, it was also infused with both sexist and racist
ideas.
It is important to emphasise that racism predated the emergence of Australian
nationalism. In fact, it has been at the heart of Australian politics since 1788. Britain
colonised Australia without the permission or authorisation of the First Nations
people, who had occupied the land for tens of thousands of years and whose own
ways of life and systems of government were violently displaced. One of the ideas
underpinning this colonisation and violence was racial hierarchy – the idea that
some races are inherently superior to others.47 Indigenous peoples were treated and
depicted in dehumanising ways by the colonists, and the idea that they were the
‘lowest race in the scale of humanity’ appears to have been very influential.48 In the
second half of the 19th century, Social Darwinism emerged as the dominant way of
thinking about race, linking racial hierarchy to the idea that there was a constant
conflict between races and that ‘the fittest and the best’ would ultimately survive,
while the others would die out.49 The legacy of these ideas was policies of violence
and oppression towards First Nations people, and assimilation, which assumed
that First Nations cultures would eventually die out. These ideas also shaped the
development of Australian nationalism. As Marilyn Lake has put it, ‘The project
of progressive reform was imbued with settler colonialism’s “regime of race”, which
informed the ascendant politics of “whiteness”’.50
The dominance of sexism and racism in Australian political thought was
challenged by women, First Nations people and people of colour. Key thinkers
challenged their exclusion from accounts of Australian national identity and called
on ‘progressive’ thinkers to apply their ideas more consistently. For example,
suffragists such as Rose Scott appealed to Australian patriotism to argue that the
right to vote should be extended to women,51 while later feminist activists drew
on the ‘enabling state of social liberalism’ in their fight for gender equality.52 First
Nations thinkers have also drawn on social liberal ideas, calling for equality and
freedom to be extended to all people. An early example of this was the Australian
Aboriginal Progressive Association, which formed in 1924 to fight for equal
citizenship for First Nations people.53 These ideas played a role in helping achieve
equal citizenship (at least in a formal sense) for women and First Nations people
and an end to a racially discriminatory immigration policy. However, there are also
significant and ongoing disagreements among these groups over political ideas. In
46 Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno 2011, 43.
47 Reynolds 1987, 110–1.
48 Byrne, cited in Reynolds 1987, 110–1, quotation at 110.
49 Reynolds 1987, 116, 119.
50 Lake 2019, 5 (references suppressed).
51 Lake 1997, 41.
52 Sawer 2003, 165.
53 Lake 2019, 238–41.
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particular, many thinkers have argued that there is a need to move beyond a liberal
framework to achieve gender equality for women54 and justice for First Nations
people.55 It is also clear that, although mainstream politicians now (generally)
profess to support gender equality and racial equality, this is not always reflected
in their policies or rhetoric, as illustrated by Australia’s treatment of (primarily
non-white) refugees who arrive by boat, the demonisation of Muslims and scare
campaigns against African migrants. Combined with the persistence of violence
against women, First Nations people and people of colour, this highlights that
sexism and racism remain major problems in Australia.
Conclusions
This chapter has introduced some of the major ideologies that have shaped – and
continue to shape – Australian politics. It has outlined the Western ideologies of
conservatism, liberalism, socialism, social democracy and labourism, explaining
their key ideas and discussing the ways they have influenced Australian politics.
It has also highlighted some of the common ideas that cut across many of these
ideologies, particularly relating to nationalism, race, gender and human dominance
over the rest of the eco-system. Although much more could be said on each of the
positions discussed here, this brief overview challenges the view that Australian
politics is bereft of ideas and illustrates – for better and worse – the diversity of
Australian political thought.
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Institutions

Executive government
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The executive is one of the three branches of government, alongside the legislature
and the judiciary. As the name suggests, its function is to execute laws and
regulations. In Australia, the executive is the part of government containing the
prime minister, Cabinet, ministerial offices and the head of state, the governor-
general. Thus, while our first thought might be that the executive is ‘the prime
minister’, it is in fact a collection of institutions that are bundled together, with
complementary, and sometimes competing, responsibilities.
In a modern state, the ‘executive’ cannot govern alone – it is bound to other
institutions. Depending on the exact nature of the regime (democratic/authori-
tarian or presidential/parliamentarian), the executive may be constrained by some
institutions (e.g. the judiciary), dominant over others (e.g. the bureaucracy) and
possibly even co-equal with some (e.g. the legislature in a presidential system).
However, the principal relationship that defines how political scientists classify
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regimes is the executive–legislative relationship. In this chapter, we will first
consider how executive regimes can be classified across the world and then examine
Australia in depth.
Executive–legislative regimes
Historically, executive power grew out of a monarch’s governing councils and the
administrative machinery through which they ruled. We can still see evidence of
this in the UK, where the lord chancellor – a role that was created 1,400 years
ago to manage the monarch’s correspondence – was the name for the minister of
justice until 2005. Different approaches to tradition and modernisation mean that
the precise organisation of executives can be idiosyncratic, though there are broad
patterns across different executive regimes.
In the modern world, monarchs have either been replaced by presidents (presi-
dential regimes) or their powers have been displaced and taken up by parliaments
(parliamentary regimes). Exactly how monarchical power was translated into
modern (democratic) governance is important for how government institutions
are organised and how decisions are made. These rules matter for how power
is distributed across government and, in democracies, how citizens hold their
governments to account.
In democracies, what makes presidential regimes distinct is the fact that the
legislative and executive branches are separate and receive mandates through
separate elections. Presidents are not directly accountable to their legislatures, nor
do they sit within them. In turn, presidents have limited capacity to directly
influence legislatures, just as legislatures have constrained capacities to limit the
actions of presidents. Once elected, the president selects her executive, who will
help to run her government; members of the executive are usually recruited from
outside of the legislature. The president is also both the head of state and the head
of government.1
By contrast, in parliamentary regimes only one mandate is sought from the
people, when they elect the legislature. The executive (or just ‘the government’)
is then formed from within this legislative pool. The party or coalition of parties
that can command the greatest (or most stable) number of parliamentary seats
has secured the ‘confidence’ of the chamber and forms the government. Members
of the executive in parliamentary systems retain their positions in the legislature;
they are both legislative representatives and ministers of state. They are able to
directly influence, and even dominate, the workings of parliament. But they are
also directly accountable to parliament. In fact, the (executive) government’s very
survival rests on its ability to retain a majority (or confidence) within parliament.
1 Lijphart 1999.
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This distinguishes parliamentary regimes from presidential systems, in which a
government cannot be dissolved with a legislative vote.
Hybrid systems
To make matters more confusing, the executive–legislative systems of some
countries are hybrids: either semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary systems.2
Semi-presidential systems (e.g. France) are similar to presidential systems, but with
some parliamentary characteristics. The president and the legislature are separately
elected, and the parliament appoints the prime minister. In this model, presidents
and prime ministers share executive powers, and the actual practice of politics can
be significantly shaped by whether or not the president’s party has a majority in the
legislature.
Recently, some scholars have argued that we should recognise the existence of
semi-parliamentary systems.3 Semi-parliamentary systems resemble parliamentary
systems, but the way the legislature and the executive relate to each other means
that the upper and lower chambers can pursue different democratic aims. Put
another way, semi-parliamentary systems are executive–legislative systems where
the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, but the survival of the
executive only depends upon the confidence of one part of the legislature. In
Australia, only the lower house must supply confidence for the Cabinet. The Senate,
which has near equal powers, can and does align itself to different democratic
aims.4 This makes it different from parliamentary systems like the UK and Canada.
It also may go some way to explaining why conflicts between the House and the
Senate endlessly circle around whether or not the Senate’s use of its constitutional
powers is legitimate. It is!5
The Australian executive
Responsible government
When the Australian colonies sought self-government in the 1850s, this meant
‘responsible government’ as practised in Westminster. Responsible government
means that the executive must be formed from within the legislature and is respon-
sible to the legislature. Responsibility is twofold: the executive (the government,
or more specifically the Cabinet) is collectively responsible to the legislature and
each individual minister is also responsible to the legislature. The implication is
2 Duverger 1980; Ganghof 2017.
3 Ganghof 2017.
4 Ganghof, Eppner and Pörschke 2018.
5 Taflaga 2018.
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that if the executive loses the confidence of the legislature, it must resign. Losing
the confidence of the parliament is not the same as losing a vote on a single piece
of legislation. In that case, it would be up to the government to decide if it could
reasonably continue or run the risk of a failed motion of no confidence. In
contemporary Australian politics, this is rare because of party discipline and because
governments have enjoyed majorities in the House of Representatives. However,
the recent hung parliaments in 2010–13 and 2018–19 have demonstrated that this
institutional design is still potent, despite decades of dormancy.
Modern Australia differs from the UK because at Federation the decision
was made to borrow features from the USA and Switzerland. Australia not only
became federal, it also became meaningfully bicameral, creating a very powerful
second chamber, the Senate.6 These institutional differences have proven important
for shaping how the executive relates to the legislature and what powers it can
exercise. As noted, the Senate has near equal powers to the House. Since the
mid-1960s, governments have had their legislative programs thwarted by the Senate
and, more often, have been forced to adopt changes to their policy programs.
However, loss of confidence by the Senate does not see the defeat of the government
– the government rarely enjoys a majority in that chamber. This is because the
executive is only responsible to, and must retain the confidence of, the House of
Representatives. It is for this reason that some scholars argue that Australia is ‘semi-
parliamentary’ or ‘not parliamentary’.7
The governor-general
The governor-general acts as the Queen’s representative in Australia, as outlined
in sections 61 to 64 of the Constitution. The governor-general and her Executive
Council appear both powerful and dominant. Indeed, you might be forgiven for
thinking the governor-general is the most important institution in the Australian
executive. After all, no election can be held and no law can come into force unless
assented to by the governor-general. The governor-general also has the power to
withdraw the commission and terminate appointment of the government – and
Sir John Kerr did so in 1975. But, in practice, the post is largely ceremonial and
‘dignified’. The powers of Crown authority are now exercised by the prime minister
and her Cabinet and, by convention, the governor-general is obliged to follow the
advice of her ministers.
6 Galligan 1995.
7 Bach 2003.
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The prime minister
First among the monarch’s ministers, the prime minister is not mentioned in the
Australian Constitution. The prime minister is the chief executive who leads the
government in the executive and in the legislature. In the executive, the prime
minister is the head of the Cabinet and can draw on the resources of her own
department (Prime Minister and Cabinet [PMC]). Through her ministers, the
prime minister is indirectly responsible for all the actions of her government. But,
as we shall see, this principle doesn’t translate neatly into practice.8 Finally, prime
ministers have the power to ask the governor-general to dissolve parliament, and in
recent times prime ministers have asserted their power to declare war.
Today, the prime minister is also the leader of a formally organised political
party and, by convention only, drawn from the House of Representatives. The
evolution of political parties and their impact upon legislative politics has
influenced the practice of the prime ministership. The prime minister has either
large or total discretion in selecting her Cabinet and has the luxury of relying on
strong party discipline when advancing her program in the legislature. Further,
prime ministers will bring this partisan perspective, and their responsibilities as a
partisan (party) leader, to virtually all aspects of the prime ministerial role.
Powers of the prime minister
We can see that the explicit power and, even more so, the potential influence
of the prime minister extends from the executive and the bureaucracy to the
legislature and to her own party. It is no surprise then that the role of the prime
minister is poorly defined in Westminster systems like Australia. Few specific
rules, laws or handbooks of practice have been written about the role. Instead,
roles and responsibilities are in part a product of tradition and convention and in
part a product of the prime minister’s own creativity. A prime minister’s capacity
to exercise all of this power is influenced not only by the official rules, or even
conventions, but also by other political actors’ perceptions of her power. Strong
prime ministers may expand their role into new domains or appropriate powers to
themselves that were previously executed by other ministers, actors or institutions.
They can do this because the role is not codified and in circumstances where other
actors’ perception of the prime minister’s personal authority is high enough to
overcome internal resistance.
8 Jennings 1966.
Executive government
51
Cabinet
Cabinet is both an administrative and a partisan forum. This team of rivals (even
enemies) is responsible to the parliament but also to their party room. A key principle
of Cabinet government is collective decision making or ‘collective responsibility’.
Cabinet is a deliberative body, where frank discussions about policy proposals,
spending and administrative decisions and political strategies are undertaken.
As prime ministers have historically served at the pleasure of their parties, it
is essential for prime ministers to meet with their colleagues frequently and for
Cabinet to discuss the most difficult issues facing the government. Once a decision
has been made by the Cabinet, all members agree to support the decision – this
is known as ‘Cabinet solidarity’. In this sense, we might think of Cabinet as a
‘corporate person’ because it collectively comes to a decision and then speaks with
one voice to the parliament and the people.
Cabinet makes up the most senior ministers that are responsible for executing
government decisions. As the size of the state has expanded, so too has Cabinet.
In Australia, both citizens’ increasing expectations of the services that the state
ought to provide and the accrual of powers from state governments to the federal
government has seen the expansion of the size of the federal Cabinet. We can
observe this by considering the nine Cabinet portfolios from 1901, compared to the
legal maximum of 30 (currently 23 in Cabinet, seven in the outer ministry) today
(see Table 1).
To encourage strong internal debate, but also to shield members of the Cabinet
who disagree, all Cabinet deliberations are held in secret. It is for this reason that
Cabinet leaks are considered so serious – they signal disloyal dissent from the heart
of government. It is not the dissent that is disloyal, but the act of exposing private
conversations, undermining the secrecy that keeps Cabinet debates robust. Indeed,
members of the Cabinet that feel they cannot publically support the Cabinet’s
collective decision must resign.9
Like several other aspects of Westminster executives, what happens in Cabinet
is largely governed by convention. Prime ministers chair Cabinet and decide how
it will function. Issues are placed on the agenda and submissions supporting or
opposing a policy idea, spending proposal or line of political attack are circulated
beforehand. Smaller subcommittees of Cabinet may also meet to deliberate on
specific policy domains. Some of these smaller committees, such as the Expenditure
Review Committee, make recommendations on spending in the budget and are
consequently very powerful. Exactly how many and who sits on these smaller
subcommittees is determined by prime ministerial discretion.10
9 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018.
10 Weller 2007.
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Cabinet portfolios in 1901 Cabinet portfolios in 2019
Prime Minister and External Affairs
Treasurer
Trade and Customs
Home Affairs
Attorney-General
Defence
Post-master General
Minister without portfolio (×2)
Prime Minister; Public Service
Deputy Prime Minister; Infrastructure and
Transport and Regional Development
Treasurer
Indigenous Australians
Water Resources, Drought, Rural Finance,
Natural Disaster and Emergency
Management
Population, Cities and Urban Infrastructure
Finance
Agriculture
Foreign Affairs; Women
Trade, Tourism and Investment
Attorney-General; Industrial Relations
Health
Home Affairs
Communications, Cyber Safety and the
Arts
Education
Employment, Skills, Small and Family
Business
Industry, Science and Technology
Resources and Northern Australia
Energy and Emissions Reduction
Environment
Defence
Families and Social Services
National Disability Insurance Scheme;
Government Services
Table 1 Cabinet portfolios in 1901 and 2019. Source for 2019 portfolios: Parliament of
Australia 2019.
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Ministers
As government has become more complex, the number of functions it undertakes
has required more ministers (see Table 1). Menzies split the ministry into the
Cabinet (12 members) and the outer ministry (10) by convention in 1956. Whitlam
at first overturned this practice, but later formalised an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ ministry
because of the difficulties he faced in managing his oversized Cabinet. The Hawke
government moved to a portfolio system, which made the executive more clearly
hierarchical. Cabinet ministers would oversee large portfolio domains, like defence,
and be assisted by outer (assistant) ministers who would have responsibility for
a specific domain within the portfolio, such as veterans’ affairs. Several ministers
could work within one portfolio because the prime minister would outline their
specific responsibilities in charter letters. Outer ministers would only attend Cabinet
when matters directly relating to their portfolio were discussed. Reforms in 1987
also added a third tier: parliamentary secretaries (junior ministers), who support
ministers or the prime minister but are not formally sworn in.
Ministers are formally delegated power via the Crown in section 64 of the
Constitution, but in practice via the prime minister. Ministers are responsible for
making decisions and administering their departments. The functions ministers
undertake are varied and include administrative and partisan aspects:
• administering their department
• designing and announcing policies and government decisions
• introducing and shepherding legislation through parliament
• implementing and enforcing legislation, policy programs and regulations
• advocating for and educating the public about government decisions
• managing appointments to government posts and statutory authorities within
their portfolio (e.g. High Court judges, telecommunications ombudsman or
ambassadors)
• making discretionary decisions (e.g. the right of immigration ministers to
overturn visa decisions made by their department)
• establishing inquiries
• submitting to and responding to scrutiny of their and their department’s
activities by parliament, the media, statutory authorities (where relevant) and
the public.
However, in contemporary politics, the prime minister is likely to have a
significant influence over many of the functions listed. In complex policy areas,
multiple ministers may try to co-ordinate their actions across government. Some
functions of the executive are beyond the scope of a single minister, including:
• the overall co-ordination of government
• designing, shepherding and implementing the budget
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• negotiating with the states and managing the Council of Australian Govern-
ments (COAG)
• waging war
• responding to disasters.
Recall that under responsible government, ministers are individually respon-
sible to parliament for the actions of their departments. Ministers may be subject
to questioning in parliament, but this obligation does not extend to parliamentary
secretaries. Ministers can also be held to account through parliamentary committee
activities, statutory authorities such as the Australian National Audit Office,
Freedom of Information requests and, in the most extreme cases, royal com-
missions. Should a minister lose the confidence of the House due to maladmin-
istration within her department, she may resign. Far worse is losing the confidence
of her party room or her prime minister. In the best case scenario, a minister
may be quietly eased out at the next Cabinet reshuffle; in the worst, she may face
the ignominy of being sacked. Individual ministerial responsibility is a principle
underpinned by norms and practised as convention, and is therefore open to
interpretation. Further issues of accountability are discussed below.
Ministerial selection
Chief executives (in Australia, prime ministers) have a large say in ministerial
selection, but they do operate under constraints. In Australia, the principal
constraints on prime ministers relate to party and strategic considerations. In other
executive–legislative regimes, constitutional considerations, such as the way prime
ministers must negotiate appointments with presidents in semi-presidential systems,
may also be important. Before the election of Kevin Rudd in 2007, Labor prime
ministers were unable to directly select their ministry. Instead, Labor leaders had
the power to allocate portfolios among candidates either elected by the caucus or
approved by a smaller advisory committee. However, even where prime ministers
enjoy full powers to hire ministers, they often consider representational constraints,
such as state (well accommodated) and gender (poorly accommodated) balance.
In Australia, party considerations include factional alignment and an appropriate
balance between parties in a governing coalition. Strong party discipline, the role
of factions, the small selection pool and the emphasis on relatively even state
representation mean that Australian prime ministers are more heavily constrained
than they appear at first glance.11
On face value, we might think that prime ministers only want the best
performers as ministers. Yet, strategically, prime ministers need a mix of skills
within Cabinet – some ministers to drive policy agendas, others who can act
11 Dowding and Lewis 2015.
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as steady hands. Then there are those who cannot be ignored because of their
ambition or other party reasons, even if they lack the skills that make strong
ministers. Some ministers may be appointed solely as a reward, to secure loyalty or
to keep enemies under close observation.
Managing the executive
A minister is a partisan and temporary head of department. Ministers only serve
as long as the prime minister retains their services and their government survives.
By contrast, the bureaucracy is the non-partisan and permanent institution that’s
purpose is to serve the government by offering advice and transforming executive
will into reality.
In short, ministers – the principal actors – delegate their authority to their
bureaucracies – their agents. But, in practice, it is not that simple. The principal–
agent problem between ministers (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) is one of
information asymmetry. Even though ministers are in charge, the bureaucrats that
serve them are often more expert and more experienced; through this information
asymmetry, bureaucrats can have a greater influence on the eventual outcome.12
One reason for this is that opposition is only partial preparation for government,
offering no experience in running a large organisation like a government depart-
ment. In cases where information asymmetry is large and a minister is uncritical,
that minister may even be considered ‘captured’ by the bureaucracy.
Politically appointed staff
In Australia, the 1970s saw growing complaints by both major parties that the
bureaucracy was insufficiently ‘responsive’ to the (partisan) needs of ministers.
Similar complaints were repeated in other countries. Politicians identified two prob-
lems. First, governments felt that an overly powerful bureaucracy diluted ministers’
power to implement the political mandate they had secured at the election. Min-
isters were outnumbered in ministerial offices and lacked their own (partisan)
sources of advice. Second, a non-partisan bureaucracy was poorly equipped to assist
ministers with the political aspects of their job, such as advocating and overseeing
the implementation of ideologically compatible policies.13
Today, Australia has around 450 political staff at the federal level. Political
staff have become an institutionalised component of executive office. They offer
both partisan and personal support to their ministers. Staff also support ministers’
executive function by undertaking overtly partisan policy work, such as agenda
setting, bargaining and negotiating within government. They also undertake other
12 The comedy classic Yes, Minister is replete with amusing examples of this problem.
13 Taflaga 2017.
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policy work that overlaps with the roles of the minster and the bureaucracy, such
as meeting with stakeholders and working with the bureaucracy to ‘deliver’
outcomes.14 However, political staff are not accountable in the same manner as
ministers or senior public servants. They are not required to present themselves
before parliament and cannot be called before parliamentary committees.
Executive government and accountability
Governance relies on delegation. In a (semi-)parliamentary democracy we can
conceptualise delegation as shown in Figure 1. This is a simple model of delegation;
the delegation of the authority to act passes from one principal (e.g. voters) to their
agent (e.g. parliament). Functioning accountability measures are what distinguishes
democracy from non-democratic forms of governance.
However, as we have already discovered, the actual practice of executive gov-
ernance in Australia is more complicated. Agency problems arise across the chain of
delegation. One of these problems may relate to a difference of preferences between
principals and their agents; what voters want and what parliament legislates may be
very different.
As we have seen, prime ministers and ministers have developed new instit-
utions – PMC and politically appointed staff – to help them to solve delegation
problems between the prime minister and ministers, and between ministers and
the bureaucracy. However, these new institutions have also complicated the chain
of delegation and, in turn, the chain of accountability. Who is responsible in a
complex policy area when something goes wrong? Given the size of government
departments, with thousands of employees, at what point do ministers or even
prime ministers become responsible if they know an issue has arisen? What is the
precise role of politically appointed staff? To what extent can they speak for their
minister and in what ways should they be subject to scrutiny?
In the last 30 years, these issues have concerned scholars and bureaucrats, who
continue to debate whether or not Cabinet government still exists, whether the
chain of accountability still functions appropriately given the new role of politically
appointed staff and whether the balance between ministers, their staff and the
bureaucracy is appropriate to achieve good government.15
Responsible party government
Executive governance in Australia is a set of practices and norms supported by
institutions both within and outside the executive. As we have seen, the executive
14 Maley 2000.
15 Podger 2007; Shergold 2007; Tiernan 2007; Weller 2003.
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Figure 1 The model of parliamentary delegation.
is subject to the significant influence of political parties, both within the legislature
and outside the official institutions of government. Outside elections, account-
ability to the party room may be more potent than accountability to the parliament.
As outlined above, actors exercising executive roles are partisan, subject to party
discipline and with their eyes always on the next election. Alongside the official
rules and the unwritten conventions of their offices, these partisan considerations
shape executive actors’ choices. Although we officially call our system ‘responsible
government’, currently a better label is ‘responsible party government’ because
power is interpreted and exercised through a party lens.16
Conclusions
Australia’s system of Cabinet government is flexible and open to interpretation. This
has been its primary strength, allowing it to adapt to changing circumstances, such
as the rise of parties, and respond to the needs of creative prime ministers through
the creation of new institutions. However, it has also bred its own problems. These
issues have come to the fore through inquiry along the accountability chain. The
expansion of the committee system in parliament, the development of statutory
authorities like the Australian National Audit Office, the creation of Freedom of
Information laws and the debate around establishing a national integrity commis-
sion are just one set of responses to constraining executive power and keeping the
executive accountable to citizens. As long as accountability remains a priority of our
political system, this discussion will be ongoing.
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Australia’s new national Parliament House opened in 1988. It is one of the most
recognisable and routinely scrutinised workplaces in Australia. Parliament House
is much more than an impressive building. It is a symbol and a link to history, a
meeting place and a debating chamber. It is the building where our laws are made,
where governments rise and fall, where leaders are made and broken and where the
theatre of Australian politics is played out. It is where compromise and consensus
sit, sometimes uncomfortably, alongside partisanship and power. Parliament is a
place of ideas, ideology, debate and deliberation. It is also a place that provides
checks and balances on political power, including the power to impose taxes and
the power to decide who can become a citizen. Parliament makes policies that affect
all our lives.
The Australian parliament has been the setting for some of the most mem-
orable political events in the nation’s history. It is where the will of the people can
triumph, such as in the 2017 same-sex marriage laws, and where historical wrongs
are officially recognised, as exemplified by the apology to the Stolen Generations.
In short, parliament is an important democratic institution. Yet despite its central
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role, many Australians now have a diminished view of parliament. In part, this is
due to the 24-hour media cycle and the rise of social media that focuses on conflict
and intrigue, emphasising the ‘theatre’ of politics and minimising the substantive.
For some, the parliament is seen as nothing more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for a
powerful executive. Others believe parliaments are in decline, no longer relevant in
the modern era.1 While this chapter’s focus is on the federal parliament, the state
parliaments share many similarities, so much of the discussion is also applicable to
state institutions.
This chapter proceeds with a description and summary of the parliament’s
origins, and then moves to discuss the analytical themes that inform the West-
minster tradition. It explores the role and functions of parliament and provides
an overview of the sources of laws, procedures and practices that at times seem
archaic, but that are fundamental to its workings and need to be understood by its
elected members. After reading the chapter you should have an appreciation of the
parliament’s important role in our democracy and of other institutions’ – electoral
systems, political parties and the media – impact on the parliament in practice.
Parliaments in context
There are nine governments in Australia: one national and eight subnational.2 Each
government has its own parliament – namely the national parliament, the six state
parliaments and two territory legislative assemblies. Most state parliaments have two
houses (the lower and upper houses) and are termed bicameral. Queensland, the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory (NT) governments3
have one house and are termed unicameral. In a practical sense, the houses of parlia-
ment are the supreme law-making bodies; they combine to oversee governments and
to provide checks on power. The territory legislatures can make laws but can also
have their laws overturned or restricted by the Commonwealth parliament.4 In the
absence of a second chamber, such as in Queensland, the scrutiny of government falls
to the opposition and to parliamentary committees (see below).
The Australian parliament is representative in so far as its members are chosen
through the electoral process by citizens living across Australia’s 150 federal elect-
orates (House of Representatives) and 76 Senate positions (12 from each state and
two from each territory). The influence of the electoral system on the composition
of parliaments is immense. Single-member preferential voting in the lower house
1 Crick 1970.
2 There are also approximately 500 local governments and shire councils across Australia.
3 The two territory governments were created by legislation passed in the Commonwealth
parliament. The ACT is unique in that its one house (the Legislative Assembly) is both a local
government and a subnational legislative body and has no governor or administrator.
4 In 1997, the self-government Acts of the territories were amended to restrict the territories’
legislative power to prevent them making laws about euthanasia.
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has ensured that major parties (Labor, Liberal and National) dominate.5 This is
why ‘hung’ parliaments or minority governments are historically rare events.
Nonetheless, there is a high level of bicameralism evident in the Australian
parliament. The Senate is rarely dominated by the government of the day because
of the electoral system used. The proportional voting system provides a greater
likelihood of independents and minor parties being elected.6 For details on the
different systems operating across Australia, refer to Table 1.
The origins of the Australian parliament
The parliamentary system in Australia was modelled on the ‘mother of Parliaments’,
located at the Palace of Westminster in England. This enduring legacy contributes
to its traditions, practices and conventions. Independence from Britain began in
the Australian colonies in the mid-19th century. Each colony’s parliament was
established on Westminster principles, characterised by governments formed from
those elected to the lower house. Ministers are appointed from the government side
and are responsible to parliament for their actions. Because the operation of the
Westminster parliamentary system was well understood, there was little in the way
of written constitutions and significant reliance on tradition or convention. While
all Westminster jurisdictions share similar traditions, each has adapted their system
of government to suit their own unique circumstances.
Compromise and pragmatism were needed in order to get each of the colonies
in the 1890s (which later became the states) to overcome their parochialism and
deep-seated suspicion to join together as one nation in 1901. The Australian
parliament met in Melbourne until 1927, when its original building, now called
‘Old Parliament House’ and operating as a museum, was built in Canberra.
While remaining rooted in the British tradition, Australia’s system of government
also reveals influences from other places. Government in Australia combines West-
minster principles of responsible government with a federal structure, consisting of
the six states, with federal responsibilities set out in the Commonwealth Constitution.
The Constitution limits the areas in which the Commonwealth parliament has
exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with the states.7 The Senate was
envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution as a state house, providing each state
with an equal number of elected members, rather than a proportion based on
5 The lower houses in the states and territories generally have one member per seat. In Tasmania
and the ACT, five members represent each state seat. This is an example of multi-member seats,
known in Australia as the Hare-Clark system.
6 Federally, the House of Representatives is elected using the full preference, transferable
single-member constituency vote, while the Senate is elected by a system of proportional
representation.
7 The Commonwealth Constitution preserves the parliamentary powers and the laws in force in
each of the states, but provides that where a state law is inconsistent with a Commonwealth law,
the Commonwealth law prevails (to the extent of the inconsistency).
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Parliament Number of
Members
Voting system Term Sovereign’s
representative
or other
constituting
part of
parliament
Commonwealth Governor-
general
House of
Representatives
150 Single-member
electorates. Full
preferential voting.
Up to three
years.
Senate 76 12 for each state and
four for two
territories. Single
transferable vote.
Proportional
representation.
Election every
three years for
half of the
Senate. Six year
terms.
NSW Governor
Legislative
Assembly
93 Single-member
districts. Optional
preferential voting.
Up to four
years
Legislative
Council
42 Single transferable
vote system. Entire
state is one electorate.
Members are
elected for two
terms (a max-
imum of eight
years), with half
elected at each
general
election.
Vic. Governor
Legislative
Assembly
88 Single-member
districts. Preferential
ballot in single-
member seats.
Fixed four-year
terms.
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Parliament Number of
Members
Voting system Term Sovereign’s
representative
or other
constituting
part of
parliament
Legislative
Council
40 Eight multi-member
electorates, known as
regions, each of
which returns five
members. Single
transferable vote.
Proportional
representation.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Qld Governor
Legislative
Assembly
93 Single-member
constituencies.
Preferential voting.
Fixed four-year
terms.
WA Governor
Legislative
Assembly
59 Single-member
constituencies.
Preferential voting.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Legislative
Council
36 Multi-member
constituencies.
Proportional
representation.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Tas. Governor
House of
Assembly
25 Hare-Clark voting
system of multi-
member proportional
representation. Five
members elected
from each of the five
divisions.
Up to four
years.
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Parliament Number of
Members
Voting system Term Sovereign’s
representative
or other
constituting
part of
parliament
Legislative
Council
15 Single-member
electoral division.
Preferential voting.
Three elect-
orates elected
each year, on a
six year cycle.
SA Governor
House of
Assembly
47 Full-preference
instant-runoff voting
system. Single-
member electorates.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Legislative
Council
22 22 councillors elected
for the entire state.
Single transferable
voting system (with
optional preferential
voting).
Fixed eight-
year terms.
ACT Nil
Legislative
Assembly
25 Hare-Clark voting
system of multi-
member proportional
representation.
Fixed four-year
terms.
NT Commonwealth
Administrator
Legislative
Assembly
25 Single-member
electorates. Optional
preferential voting.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Table 1 Parliaments in Australia – a summary of composition, electoral system and term.
population size. This was to ensure every state had an equal say in decisions and could
block laws that disadvantaged them. The Senate has rarely acted in this way, largely
because of the dominance of political parties. Its powers, which include the ability to
block finance, have led some scholars to argue that it moves Australia away from the
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British notion of responsible government. The term ‘Washminster’ refers to the way
Australia has combined elements of the UK and US systems of government.8
Parliament – the Australian adaptation
In practice, our system of government has distinct elements that form part of the
Westminster ‘chain of responsibility’. At the top, formally, is the head of state –
the monarch – represented by the governor-general or, for the states, the governor
– offices that largely play no role in politics or policy making. Parliament in the
UK was formed as a way to control the powerful monarch in the Middle Ages by
allowing other opinions and views to be represented.
In Australia, parliament gradually became more representative as those elected
were chosen from a broader base and the electoral franchise was extended to include
more people (women, Indigenous peoples). In keeping with British tradition, the
prime minister, who is constitutionally lower-ranked than the head of state, leads the
government. The three branches that form what is called a ‘chain of responsibility’
are the legislature (parliament as a whole), the executive (ministry) and the judiciary
(High Court). As the executive, which is formed by the political party that wins
the majority of seats in the House of Representatives, is both part of the parliament
and accountable to the parliament – the separation of powers that you might hear
mentioned does not fully exist in Westminster systems. The only distinct and
important operational separation of powers is between the judiciary and the other
two branches. So while we have an elected Senate like the USA, our prime minister
(unlike the US president) is not separate from the parliament and is answerable to it.
While the Senate is established in the Constitution, other legacies, such as the
notion of responsible government, are conventions handed down from Britain.
In theory, responsible government means accountable government. Ministers are
responsible individually for the departments they manage and collectively for what
the government does as a whole. During question time in parliament, they ‘must
meet other members face to face, answer their questions, and explain, defend or
excuse their own policies and the actions of the public servants under them’.9 In
practice, ministers almost never resign for departmental blunders or for decisions
they make. The increasing complexity of government makes it almost impossible
for a minister to be held accountable for the actions of their department. Likewise,
as an increasing number of policy and other decisions are made by Cabinet,
ministers shelter behind collective responsibility. While collective responsibility
may be a longstanding convention, it could also be seen as a pragmatic realisation
that ‘if we do not hang together, we will surely hang separately’.10
8 Thompson 2001.
9 Parker 1976, 179.
10 Weller 2015.
Australian Politics and Policy
66
Functions of parliament
There is no exhaustive list of the functions of each parliament. While one of their
most important functions is to make laws, the parliaments are not just legislatures.
Their chief functions are representation, forming government, making laws,
authorising budgets, confidence, raising grievances and scrutiny.
Representation
Members of parliament in the lower house have competing interests. They are
charged with representing the people from the electorate that voted them into
parliament, while at the same time considering the national (or state) interest. As
most belong to a political party, they usually remain loyal to the policies, objectives
and goals of that party. There are a variety of interests and many different types of
people that a member of parliament hears from. These groups often have different
perspectives on what needs to be done about a particular issue, producing tensions
that sit uneasily at times.
Uhr and Wanna describe parliament as a ‘theatre of action … involving a
wide variety of actors who interact around political issues’.11 While a degree of
bipartisanship usually exists around national interest policies, the parties often have
differing views on how these policies are best achieved.
Forming government
After an election, the political party that secures the most votes in the House
of Representatives is asked to form government. An essential characteristic of
the Westminster system is that the government must be able to maintain the
support of parliament (particularly the House of Representatives) on issues of
money and confidence. The requirement for governments to retain the support of
the parliament explains why very close elections that result in a hung parliament
or minority government are particularly problematic. In that case, it is incumbent
upon the government to advise the governor-general that they have the support
of the parliament – which effectively means that they would survive votes of no
confidence and would be able to get their budget passed.
Historically, at the federal level, Australia has had very few hung parliaments
or minority governments. The first occurred in 1940 and the second happened 70
years later, when Julia Gillard’s Labor managed to win government on the back of the
support of three independents and the Greens Party.12 In 2018, the Liberal–National
Party (LNP) lost the Wentworth by-election. Until the 2019 federal election, the
Morrison-led federal government held only 75 of the 151 seat House of Repres-
11 Uhr and Wanna 2009, 12.
12 Before the formation of the party system, most governments did not hold majorities.
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entatives. This made its relationship with the crossbench (the independents and
minor party members) crucial, as every piece of legislation the government wanted
passed had to be negotiated. Smaller parliaments with fewer members are more
likely to have minority governments, as are parliaments where the lower house has
multi-member seats.
Law making (legislation)
One of the principal functions of parliament is making laws. Laws are the guide for
what we can and cannot do in our day-to-day lives. While the process of making
new laws is technical, it is also often acrimonious and heated. For example, in 2017
the Victorian parliament passed laws to allow assisted dying, but not before more
than 100 hours of debate occurred over various clauses of the Bill.13 The process
of making laws begins when Bills are introduced, debated, amended and passed
by each house or chamber or, in unicameral parliaments, by the single chamber. If
the Bill is passed, it is given assent by the sovereign’s representative (the governor-
general or governor) and, at that time, converted to an Act – a new law or an
amendment to an existing law.
Financial appropriation
Just as we have to juggle to pay our bills, so too do governments. But, unlike us,
governments need to seek authorisation from parliament first. They need to pass
their budget in order to continue to pay for the services they are expected to deliver
in areas such as health, education, police, defence and the upkeep of roads, for
programs like the National Disability Insurance Scheme, or to provide drought relief
or disaster assistance to suffering communities. Much of this money is collected
through our ongoing taxes. To ensure it will be spent wisely, all governments need
to inform and seek general approval from the parliament first.
One of the most essential constitutional legacies inherited from Westminster is
the lower house’s control of public finances. The laws and controls can generally be
summarised as follows:
1. Tax cannot be levied without the consent of parliament through legislation.
2. The executive cannot borrow money upon the public credit without legislative
authority.
3. While money raised by taxation and other revenue vests in the executive
(usually the Crown), no money can be paid from the money collected without
a distinct authorisation of parliament.
4. Revenues collected are deposited in a single fund usually called the Consolid-
ated Revenue Fund.
13 Edwards 2017.
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A Bill approving expenditure to be deducted from the Consolidated Revenue Fund
is called an Appropriation Bill. There are usually also laws providing for the audit
and account of public expenditure, including a requirement that at the end of each
financial year the treasurer must forward a statement of all transactions of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund and details of appropriation paid to each department
to the auditor-general for certification.
If the parliament decides to block a government’s budget (this can be played
out for an extended period of time as budget Bills bounce back and forth between
the two chambers), the government will fall or a double dissolution trigger will
be pulled. The most famous example of this process occurred during the Whitlam
government’s term of office in the 1970s.14
Confidence
A successful vote of no confidence means that the parliament no longer has
confidence in the government. It is the parliament’s ultimate expression of power to
withdraw its support for the government. Once support is withdrawn the govern-
ment usually falls or an election is triggered.
Inquisitorial
Each house is able to inquire into all instances of alleged abuse or misconduct and
institute inquiries with coercive powers in order to perform any of its functions
and bring about reform. In practice, the inquisitorial function of each house is
usually exercised through its parliamentary committees. Committees are made up of
a specified number of members delegated a responsibility by the house and provided
powers and immunities to conduct inquiries and report back to the house. In modern
parliaments, committees are increasingly used to review legislative proposals, scrut-
inise the budget and conduct inquiries into areas that may need law reform.
Debate and grievances
An extremely important function of each house of parliament is to act as a forum to
enable members to represent their constituents and allow the views and grievances
of their constituents to be aired. The tabling of petitions is an example of this
function, as is the time allowed for individual members’ statements at adjournment
or other debates.
Scrutiny or accountability
Another important function of the parliament is scrutinising the policies and
actions of the government of the day. This role is largely facilitated through an
14 Parliament of Australia n.d.
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adversarial process whereby the lower house recognises an official opposition that
puts counterproposals to the government and questions the government’s policies
and administration. Procedures such as questions with or without notice to
ministers and institutions such as the parliamentary committee system assist the
parliament in its scrutiny role. The great paradox of the Westminster system of
government is that because government is formed in the lower house based on it
usually having a majority in that house, the lower house becomes less effective in
making government accountable.
Procedures of parliament
Politics is a high stakes game. It is about power, and parliament is the foundation of
that power. While a government needs to maintain support, part of the rules of the
game, well understood by those in the parliament but less obvious to outsiders, is
the adversarial nature of politics. Effectively, this means a key objective is to make
life as difficult as possible for the other side. The other side, be that the government
or the opposition, is after the same thing – to remain or become the government at
the next election. The opposition enjoys formal status and power as the alternative
government. It has equal time in parliamentary debates and in question time, it
can seek meetings with the public service at certain times, and it receives public
funding to resource offices and generally perform in its role.15 Thus the parliament is
where government members stick together in a show of solidarity while opposition
members do their best to highlight the government’s flaws.
The procedures are rules and customs that control how business is conducted
and govern the behaviour of members. News reports on parliament tend to focus
on question time which is where the theatre of politics is on display. The important
thing to remember as you read through the various functions discussed in this
chapter is that politics is about the fight and the procedures are about keeping the
fight fair.
There are many procedures that set out the rules for how members should act
towards one another. In each house the presiding officer (speaker or president),
judges whether the rules have been broken. The speaker or president is assisted by
a clerk, who is a permanent, non-partisan officer with a deep understanding of the
rules and how they should be applied.
There are five sources of laws and rules that govern how the parliament goes
about its work:
1. Statutes, which determine the powers and composition of each house, and its
rights and immunities.
15 Rhodes 2005, 149.
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2. Standing Orders, which lay down the most important source of procedures –
although they can be dispensed with by granting ‘leave’ or permission for the
house to deal with something in an informal way, or to set them aside through
a motion to ‘suspend’.
3. Sessional Orders enable the House to do certain things that are not covered
by Standing Orders. For example, Sessional Orders are passed on the first day
of business of each session, setting out matters such as the days and hours of
sitting, the order of business and time limits for debates and speeches.
4. Rulings are made by the chairs of each house (the speaker in the House of
Representatives or the president in the Senate). They are often interpretations
of the Standing or Sessional Orders.
5. Custom and practice provide the rules the house applies when there are no
rules set down; for example, the rights of the opposition to ask first questions,
address in reply and respond to a government’s budget (budget reply).
Conclusions
Parliament sits at the apex of our system of government. It is where the collective will
of the people, expressed through elections, decides who governs us. It is where laws
are made and the pros and cons of public policies are debated. While parliament is
steeped in tradition, it is also an evolving institution, a reflection of who we are and
what we wish Australia to be at a given point in time.
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Electoral systems are a centrally important aspect of any polity. In the Australian
context, the electoral system explains much of the country’s stability, centrist policies
and conservative political culture. This chapter introduces electoral systems broadly,
with particular focus on the Australian context. How we vote is shaped by three key
features of the electoral system: what ballot papers look like; how ballot papers are
counted and legislative seats allocated; and when, where, and why we vote
Electoral systems need to balance many different, and often competing, goals.
The system we use to choose members of a legislature – that is, to elect legislators –
largely dictates how many parties we have to choose from, the kinds of people who
stand for election, the kinds of people who get elected and the kinds of policies they
produce once elected. There is no aspect of any political system that is not deeply
influenced by the fundamental electoral system.
In Australia, we take much about our electoral system for granted. We vote on
Saturdays, so most voters do not have to take any time off work. The lines to cast
a vote are short, compared to other countries’ elections. Election days are – for the
most part – enjoyable rituals. And if we do not want to vote on election day, we
have ample opportunity to vote beforehand, either in person or by post. Both the
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prime minister and the opposition leader are often ideologically centrist; this is a
fundamental feature of Australia’s electoral system. While we may change prime
ministers, our underlying political system is stable and strong. And we have our
electoral system to thank.
The sections in this chapter take the following format. First, the chapter will
discuss compulsory and voluntary voting. Australians are socialised into accepting
and even embracing compulsory voting; that phenomenon will be examined here.
Second, the chapter will consider the major types of electoral systems, focusing
on consensual and majoritarian systems. It will discuss the advantages and dis-
advantages of each, using contemporary examples.
Compulsory and voluntary voting
Eligible Australian voters are required by law to both enrol to vote and cast a ballot in
all federal and state elections. In 1924, the parliament of Australia amended the Com-
monwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) to make voting compulsory and allow the federal
government to penalise enrolled voters who fail to cast a ballot. In 1924, the penalty
for non-voting was £2 (or approximately $160 in 2018); in 2019, the penalty is $20.
Among other clauses, the 1924 amendments that introduced compulsory
voting state that:
1. It shall be the duty of every elector to vote at each election.
2. The Electoral Commissioner must, after polling day at each election, prepare
for each Division a list of the names and addresses of the electors who appear
to have failed to vote at the election.
3. ... within the period of 3 months after the polling day at each election, each
DRO [Divisional Returning Officer] must:
A. send a penalty notice by post; or
B. arrange for a penalty notice to be delivered by other means to the latest
known address of each elector whose name appears on the list prepared
under subsection (2).1
This legislative measure was passed to address declining voter turnout in general
elections – fewer than 60 per cent of registered electors cast a ballot at the 1922
Australian federal election. At a recent federal election (in May 2019), turnout was
92 per cent of the registered voter population, with the highest number of enrolled
voters on record.2
As it compels voting, the Australian government has consistently legislated
to make it as easy as possible. This has included weekend (Saturday) election
1 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, section 245.
2 AEC 2019.
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days, expansive access to voter registration (although limited to a deadline of one
week prior to an election), ample polling locations and short queues at polling
booths. Recent reforms have expanded voters’ opportunities to cast a ballot before
election day, either by mail or in person. By convention as much as legislative
or institutional design, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has worked
to lower the burdens of voting within the constraints of maintaining electoral
integrity (which explains its the reluctance to introduce election-day registration
opportunities, for instance).
Australian Election Study data since 1967 reveals remarkably high levels of
support for compulsory voting within Australia. Early iterations of the study found
that in 1967 and 1969 three-quarters of the population believed ‘compulsory voting
is better’ than allowing people to vote if they want. By 1979, that number had
fallen slightly, but 69 per cent of Australians still preferred compulsory to voluntary
voting. In 1987, 33 per cent of Australians ‘strongly favoured’ compulsory voting,
31 per cent ‘favoured’ it, 3 per cent did not mind either way, 13 per cent favoured
voluntary voting and 20 per cent ‘strongly favoured’ voluntary voting. Since that
time, support for Australia’s compulsory voting laws has remained remarkably high
(Figure 1).
How ‘compulsory’ is compulsory voting?
While the vast majority of eligible voters in Australia fulfil their legal obligation
to vote at each election, there are two means of easily abstaining from casting
a valid vote. The first method is to attend a polling booth, either on or before
election day (or to request a postal ballot paper), receive a ballot paper and deposit
that paper in the ballot box (or return it via post) without writing a valid vote
on it. Many Australians do this intentionally, either leaving their ballot blank or
marking the paper in ways that do not constitute a valid vote. Others cast a spoiled
ballot unintentionally; Australia’s comparatively complex ballot paper makes voting
formally particularly difficult for voters with poor literacy or English-language
proficiency.
The second means of abstaining is to not enrol to vote. Electoral enrolment is
compulsory under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. The Act mandates that
eligible voters must register themselves as voters with the AEC and maintain their
enrolment by advising the AEC any time they change their residential address.
Since 2012, the AEC has had legislative power to ‘directly update’ the electoral roll.
This allows the AEC to identify eligible voters using data from other federal and
state government agencies – vehicle registration and driver licencing authorities,
welfare agencies and utility providers, for example – and automatically add them
to the electoral roll. The AEC notifies all individuals who are automatically added
to the roll, and these individuals have 28 days in which to object (although there
are almost no grounds for valid objection, besides the individual’s details being
incorrect).
Electoral systems
75
Figure 1 Response to the question ‘Do you think that voting at federal elections should be
compulsory, or do you think that people should only have to vote if they want to?’. Source: Cameron
and McAllister 2016.
These new powers have diminished Australians’ ability to ‘hide’ from the AEC
– and from having to vote in elections – by never enrolling to vote. Eligible voters
who are directly added to the roll are not fined for having abstained previously. In
2018, 96 per cent of eligible Australians were enrolled to vote. In 2011, before the
direct update legislation was introduced, only 91 per cent of eligible Australians
were enrolled. Among eligible young Australians (those aged 18 to 25), enrolment
has increased from 73 per cent in 2011 to 85 per cent in 2018. Direct updating
reversed a trend of declining voter enrolments generally, but particularly among
young Australians. At the beginning of 2019, approximately two-thirds of all
electoral enrolment in Australia occurs via direct update of the roll.
Majoritarian and consensual electoral systems
There are many common ways of categorising and describing electoral systems,
but most approaches identify three broad types based on the type of government
they produce. Drawing on Norris and Lijphart,3 we can distinguish between three
electoral ‘families’: majoritarian, mixed and consensual. This section will begin
by defining and describing majoritarian democracies and the types of electoral
systems that produce ‘winner takes all’ governments. Next, it will discuss con-
sensual democracies and the electoral systems that produce governments where
two or more parties share power in coalition. Finally, it will discuss democracies
that fall somewhere between majoritarian and consensual.
3 Lijphart 1994; Norris 2004.
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Majoritarian (or ‘winner takes all’) systems
In Australian federal elections, we vote for candidates standing for two different
houses: the House of Representatives (lower house) and the Senate (upper house).
Whichever party or group of parties wins a majority of seats in the House of
Representatives is, according to the Constitution of Australia and convention since
1901, given the opportunity to form a government. Much more often than not, one
party (or in the case of the Liberal–National Coalition [the Coalition], a formal
alliance of parties) gets to form a government in its own right. Why? And relatedly,
why do the Coalition and Australian Labor Party (ALP) have such a stranglehold
on government in Australia?
The answers lie in Australia’s system of electing one person to represent each
electoral division in the country. In electoral terms, Australia’s House of Represent-
atives has a ‘district magnitude’ of one (i.e. one member per electoral division).
For example, in the seat of Fenner in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the
candidate who wins the majority of the vote is elected. A second-placed candidate –
even if they attract 49.99 per cent of the final vote – wins nothing.
There are two specific electoral systems that produce majoritarian governments.
The first is plurality, or ‘first past the post’, voting. This is the most straightforward
way of voting, both in terms of the voter recording their preferred candidate and for
electoral commission staff counting votes at the end of election day. Used in the UK
and in most US elections, plurality voting requires voters to choose their favourite
among all listed candidates. They do not need to rank candidates; depending on the
jurisdiction they can use a cross, a number ‘1’ or a tick to designate their chosen
candidate. The simplicity of plurality voting helps to include non-native-language
speakers and those with low literacy in the electoral process.
On the other hand, plurality voting results in the most disproportionate
electoral outcomes of any voting system. Imagine an electorate in London in which
50.001 per cent of voters choose one candidate, Jane Smith. In the unlikely event
that all of Jane Smith’s votes were counted first, there would be no need to ever
count the other 49.999 per cent of votes. In an electorate of 100,000 voters, 49,999
votes would not even need to be counted; we could declare the winner based on
the total votes for Jane Smith. Therefore, 49,999 voters would have left their homes,
lined up and filled in and cast a ballot, just for it not to have mattered. Such votes are
called ‘wasted votes’ in the political science literature; we regularly assess electoral
systems on the basis of the percentage of wasted votes.
The Australian House of Representatives uses preferential voting, a less
common majoritarian electoral system.4 In a preferential system, voters mark their
preferred candidate but also get to rank the other candidates. Voters’ ability to rank
candidates in order can be seen as offering an alternative: if my favourite candidate
4 ‘Preferential voting’ is the commonly used term, while academics and researchers tend to
describe this system as ‘alternative voting’, ‘ranked choice voting’ or ‘instant run-off voting’.
These terms all describe the same system.
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(John Scott) is not popular, then I want my vote to go to my next preferred
candidate (Jessica Shaw), and so on.
When voting closes at the end of election day, electoral staff count up all of
the ‘1’ (i.e. first preference) votes. You might imagine a pile of ballot papers for
each candidate, based on how many voters gave the candidate their number ‘1’
vote. Once this count is finalised, the candidate who received the fewest ‘1’ votes
is eliminated, and their votes redistributed to whichever candidates received the
number ‘2’ votes on these ballot paper. This continues until there are only two
candidates left; you might have heard of ‘two-party preferred’ or ‘two-candidate
preferred’ results – this is exactly that. After unpopular candidates are eliminated
and voters’ preferences distributed, the final two candidates are the ‘two candidates
preferred’.
Preferential voting has one distinct advantage over plurality voting, and one
distinct disadvantage. The advantage is that very few votes are wasted; even if a
voter casts a vote for the least popular candidate in any election, their vote will
transfer to their next favourite candidate, and their next favourite candidate, and
so on. Inevitably, this means that any election comes down to the two candidates
whom voters are least likely to rank last, rather than the candidates they are most
likely to rank first. However, this is quite a complicated electoral system (requiring
voters to place a sequential number next to every candidate or else invalidate
their ballot), which disadvantages voters from non-English-speaking backgrounds
and those with low literacy. This trade-off is an ongoing challenge for electoral
administrators.
In majoritarian systems – whether plurality or preferential – candidates (or
parties) who are ideologically similar usually try to avoid ‘stealing’ votes away
from each other. Imagine, for instance, two socialist-leaning parties nominating
candidates in an American congressional district. If they do not co-ordinate, they
might each win 26 per cent of the vote, leaving a conservative candidate to win
with 48 per cent of the vote. For both socialist-leaning candidates, this is the least
optimal outcome – they lose, and a conservative (i.e. the most ideologically distant)
candidate wins.
Instead, it makes sense for ideologically similar candidates or parties to work
together. While it might be difficult to imagine political rivals working together –
even if they hold very similar ideas or espouse similar policies – we assume that
over the long term candidates and parties with similar outlooks will work together
to exclude common rivals. ‘Working together’ might mean that one candidate or
party withdraws from an election or decides not to nominate in the first place; it
does not necessarily mean that they openly collaborate or campaign together.
This phenomenon is called ‘Duverger’s Law’, named for political scientist
Maurice Duverger (pronounced Doo-ver-zhay).5 It is as close to a ‘universal law’ as
5 See Riker 1982 for a comprehensive discussion.
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anything in political science, although it still has exceptions; for example, Canada
consistently has three major parties despite its plurality voting system. But
commonly, Duverger’s Law correctly predicts that majoritarian voting methods
lead to stable two-party systems. The UK, USA and Australia are the most notable
examples. When the loosely formed ‘Tea Party’ collective of conservative politicians
gained prominence in the USA in 2009, the group’s greatest success was (albeit
briefly) pulling the Republican party to the right, rather than becoming a genuine
third force in American politics. Even a group of activists ostensibly opposed to the
policies of the most ideologically similar party is better served by working within
that party than competing against it.
The combination of compulsory and preferential voting has maintained a very
stable two-party system in Australia. The two major parties – the ALP and the
Coalition – have both enjoyed substantial periods in executive government and are
ideologically proximate. At federal elections between 1949 and 2016, only twice has
either major party defeated the other by ten percentage points or more (Figure 2).
Even though many Australians might express dissatisfaction with the closeness of
the parties and the way the political system works generally (and in 2019 political
dissatisfaction is increasing in Australia), we overwhelmingly still turn up to vote,
and we still mostly vote for one of the major parties.
Compulsory voting means voters at the far left and far right of the ideological
spectrum are still incentivised to vote, even though the parties they end up voting
for (after preferences are distributed) are a long distance from their own positions.
This is one reason that the Australian Greens and – to a lesser extent – right-wing
parties like One Nation have emerged in Australia, despite Duverger’s Law. For
many voters on the left, the Greens are a far more palatable electoral option than
the ALP, who – along with the Liberal Party – have converged on the centre of the
left–right spectrum.
The electoral outcomes of majoritarian systems highlight both their major
strength (political stability) and their major weakness (lack of ideological rep-
resentation). The other major family of electoral systems – consensual systems –
have the opposite problem: their key strength is in representing views across the
ideological spectrum, but they often suffer from political instability.
Consensual systems
In almost all of South America, and northern, central and western Europe, voters
elect more than one candidate to represent their electoral division. Instead of one
local member, they might have two, three or more. The number of representatives
in each district is called district magnitude, and while it may seem a small thing,
it has a large effect on electoral outcomes, the number of parties that contest
elections and win seats, the stability of governments and the kinds of policies that
the legislature and government produce.
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Figure 2 Australian House of Representatives – ‘two-party preferred’ election results, 1949 to 2016.
Source: AEC 2016.
According to Duverger’s Law, parties with similar ideological positions will
inevitably either merge or withdraw from elections to avoid stealing votes from
each other and allowing ideologically distant parties to win. In multi-member
districts (i.e. where the district magnitude is two or higher), ideologically similar
parties or candidates can both nominate for election and plausibly be elected. They
may still ‘steal’ votes from each other, increasing the total vote share of a common
political opponent, but as the vote share required for winning is lower the chance
of either or both candidates winning at least one seat is higher.
Imagine a local election in which five members are being chosen to represent
one division. There are 20 candidates nominated: five centre-left candidates, five
centre-right candidates, five candidates from the far left and five candidates from
the far right. In a plurality (‘first past the post’) election, the far left and far right
candidates might withdraw to shore-up electoral support for the centre-left and
centre-right candidates respectively. With five seats up for grabs, however, the more
extreme candidates are more likely to stay in the contest.
In elections for the ACT Legislative Assembly, voters elect five representatives
in each of the five divisions. The legislature is comprised of 25 representatives,
with any party that can control a majority of members given the right to form a
government. In the 2016 election, two divisions elected three ALP members and
two Liberal members. One division elected three Liberal members and two ALP
members. The other two divisions each elected two ALP members, two Liberal
members, and one Greens member.
The final distribution of seats was 12 to the ALP, 11 to the Liberals and two to
the Greens. Accordingly, neither major party was able to form a government in its
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own right, as neither had a clear majority of seats in the Assembly. Three plausible
outcomes might have followed. First – and least likely, based on historical trends
– the two major parties could have formed a coalition to govern together, with a
23 to two seat majority over the opposition Greens party. Second, the two Greens
members could have joined the 11 Liberals to form a 13 to 12 seat majority over the
opposition ALP.
Finally, and most likely given their ideological positions, the two Greens
members could join the 12 ALP members to form a 14 to 11 majority over the
opposition Liberals. This is precisely what happened, with the Greens and ALP
leaders signing a formal pact to ensure the stability of the coalition government.
The Greens promised to only support any motion of no confidence against the ALP-
led government in the case of misconduct or corruption, and the Greens’ leader
was rewarded with a ministerial appointment. Similar ALP–Greens coalitions have
governed in Tasmania, which uses an identical electoral system to the ACT.
Beyond party list systems, the other common means of electing consensual
governments is single transferable vote (STV). STV is used to elect the Australian
Senate, and variants of it are used to elect the ACT and Tasmanian governments.
The key feature of STV is that voters can rank individual candidates. Once a
candidate reaches a pre-determined quota, any additional votes are transferred to
the candidates ranked second on each ballot paper.
In this way, consensual political systems face the opposite dilemma to majoritar-
ian systems. They provide high levels of representation by opening up government
and ministerial appointments to more than one party (and often to parties
representing a large range of ideological views). On the other hand, parties can
withdraw from a coalition agreement at any time, causing the government to collapse
and new elections to be held. Accordingly, consensual systems can see more voters
changing their mind between elections, and higher rates of government turnover and
of parties emerging and dying.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored how electoral systems can affect political stability,
responsiveness, representativeness and citizen satisfaction. It has also examined
compulsory voting, an aspect of Australia’s electoral system that is often taken for
granted, but one that is integral to the country’s political culture, party system and
electoral outcomes. The combination of Australia’s majoritarian electoral system
(in the federal House of Representatives, where government is formed) and
compulsory voting has led to high levels of political stability and the long-term
dominance of the major parties.
Although compulsory voting is comparatively rare and imposes a small but
important burden on all eligible voters, Australians overwhelmingly support it.
This chapter has described strong public support for Australia’s compulsory voting
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laws, the resulting high rates of voter turnout and the ease with which Australians
are able to cast a vote. Finally, the chapter has given an overview of the two
largest families of electoral systems – majoritarian and consensual – as well as
those systems that combine elements of both. While majoritarian systems, such
as plurality and preferential voting, provide political stability, they offer no
representation for losing candidates and relatively little for opposition parties.
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Figure 6 Sample ballot paper from a New Zealand national election, using mixed member
proportional voting. Source: New Zealand parliament.
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The Australian party system
Zareh Ghazarian
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Political parties are integral to modern political systems. Parties are organised
bodies of individuals that nominate candidates at elections, advancing specific
policy goals.1 They play crucial roles in liberal democratic systems. Parties help
to decentralise power as they compete for electoral support. They provide a link
between government and society and, because they are comprised of ordinary
citizens, advance the notion of government ‘for the people, by the people’.2 Parties
also contribute to the stability of political systems as they aggregate policy demands
and provide alternative policy choices for voters.3 Furthermore, parties are respon-
sible for selecting candidates for election, forming government and opposition and
‘promoting and participating in public debates on major issues’.4 Parties are seen as
so important to modern liberal democracies that some have argued that political
systems could not exist without them.5
Ghazarian, Zareh (2019). The Australian party system. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 See Ghazarian 2015, 1. See also White 2006, 6.
2 See Parkin 2006, 3–24, and Katz and Mair 1995.
3 Ball and Peters 2000, 97.
4 Mayer 1991, 49.
5 Macridis 1967, 9; Schattshneider 1942, 1.
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The electoral system (i.e. the method by which candidates are elected to
parliament) influences the party system.6 In the 1950s, political scientist Maurice
Duverger hypothesised that in a system that elects a single member to represent
each geographic area through a majoritarian electoral method, two parties will
dominate.7 In contrast, Duverger argued that proportional representation would
foster a multiparty system.8
This chapter begins by examining the party system in the Australian House
of Representatives. It explores the major parties that have consistently won rep-
resentation in the chamber, highlighting how their origins, policy traditions and
organisation continue to be important in contemporary politics. The chapter then
considers the party system that exists in the Australian Senate and the shifting type
of minor parties elected to the chamber.
Party system in the House of Representatives
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) and a series of non-Labor parties have dominated
the House of Representatives since Federation.9 In fact, it was not until 2010 that
the first minor party won a seat in the chamber at a general election in the postwar
period.10 The party system in the House of Representatives is an example of a two-
party system, with Labor and the non-Labor parties (currently the coalition of the
Liberal and National parties) taking turns in government.11 The origins, organisation
and policy traditions of the Labor, Liberal and National parties differ and must be
examined in order to understand the Australian party system.
The Australian Labor Party
The ALP is the oldest political party in Australia and one of the oldest trade union-
based parties in the world. Its origins date back to the early 1870s. Labor is a mass
party, which means that it allows ordinary citizens to join as members and, in
theory, influence the party’s decisions.
Three broad policy traditions characterise the Labor Party today. The first is
labourism, which became a prominent feature of the Hawke government during
the 1980s.12 A core characteristic of labourism is managing the economy in order
to benefit salary earners.13 The ALP’s adoption of labourism led to arguments
6 See also Riker 1982.
7 Duverger 1954, 217.
8 Duverger 1954, 239.
9 Aitkin 1977; Jaensch 1989a.
10 The Australian Greens won the seat of Melbourne.
11 McAllister 1982, 68.
12 See Singleton 1990.
13 Manning 1992, 14.
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that it had abandoned its traditional role of advancing the interests of unions in
Australian politics.14 Labourism, however, was a response to changes in society and
the economy that were also apparent in the union movement, which transitioned
from being dominated by blue-collar to white-collar unions.15 Labourism is still a
significant feature of the Labor Party today. It can be seen in the party’s acceptance
that the private sector is critical to creating wealth.16
The second policy tradition is democratic socialism, which regards capitalism
as inherently exploitative. Democratic socialists believe that the primary means
of addressing this exploitation is to allow the government to control economic
resources. In particular, government ownership of private sector companies and
industries (which is often referred to as nationalisation) is sometimes advanced as
a policy goal by democratic socialists.17
The third policy tradition is social democracy, which is also based on the idea
that capitalism can lead to exploitation. Unlike democratic socialists, however, social
democrats are more accommodating of the private sector. They seek to address
the potential exploitation caused by capitalism through policy measures, such as
advancing welfare policies or regulation, rather than through nationalisation.18
These three traditions also underpin the factions in the Labor Party. Factions
are like small parties operating within a larger party. There are two broad factional
groupings in the Labor Party. The right-wing factions tend to adhere to labourism
and social-democratic traditions, while the left-wing factions are more supportive
of democratic-socialist objectives. Just like political parties, factions in the Labor
Party have their own members, organisational structures, leaders and policy
agendas.19 The roles factions play are also similar to those of political parties. While
factions can play a positive role in a party, sometimes the contest between factions
for influence within the party can lead to destabilising power struggles.20
While discipline and unity have been the goals of the Labor Party organisation,
the party has undergone three significant splits (in 1916, 1931 and 1953). These
splits affected the Australian party system, benefiting the non-Labor parties (as
discussed below).
Labor in government
The first Labor government elected after the ‘great split’ in 1953 was led by Gough
Whitlam. In 1972, Whitlam ended Labor’s 23 years in opposition. The Whitlam
14 See, for example, Jaensch 1989b.
15 Manning 1992, 27.
16 Manning 1992, 14.
17 Economou 2006.
18 Economou 2006.
19 See Economou 2006.
20 In 2010, for example, the factions withdrew support from Kevin Rudd and supported Julia
Gillard to become prime minister. In 2013, the factions once again shifted their support and
reinstalled Kevin Rudd to the prime ministership.
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government was characterised by major reforms, including the introduction of
Medicare, free tuition for university students and greater emphasis on Indigenous
land rights, as well as by decisions that offended the union movement, such as the
reduction of tariffs by 25 per cent. The Whitlam government was dismissed by the
governor-general in 1975, following a dispute between the House of Representatives
and the Senate that resulted in the upper house refusing to pass the government’s
budget. The Whitlam government left an important policy legacy on the ALP as it
demonstrated how the party sought to recast itself as one that was responsive to the
needs of the broader electorate and not just those affiliated with the trade unions.
This approach was adopted by the next Labor prime minister, Bob Hawke,
who led the party to government in 1983. Among the Hawke government’s policy
achievements was the Prices and Incomes Accord, which sought to constrain wage
growth in return for government spending on the ‘social wage’ – which included
education and health programs – and promised price restraint. Significant reforms
included floating the Australian dollar, a shift towards privatising previously state-
owned entities, such as Qantas and the Commonwealth Bank, and ensuring that
the level of government spending would not exceed the national economy’s growth
rate. Hawke was replaced as prime minister by his treasurer, Paul Keating, in 1991.
The Keating government emphasised a number of issues that were prioritised
by Prime Minister Paul Keating. In particular, Indigenous affairs, Australia’s
relationship with Asia and moves towards a republic were prominent during this
government’s time in office. The Keating government lost the 1996 election,
marking the end of Labor’s longest period in government. Labor would not return
to government until 2007.
Between 2007 and 2013, the Rudd and Gillard governments were marred by
internal instability. Kevin Rudd became prime minister in 2007 but was replaced
by Julia Gillard – who became Australia’s first female prime minister – in 2010.
Gillard was replaced by Rudd once again in the lead-up to the 2013 election. This
period of government implemented significant reforms, such as the introduction of
the National Disability Insurance Scheme and a short-lived mechanism for carbon
pricing.
The Liberal Party
The Liberal Party is the latest in the line of non-Labor parties that have existed in
Australia since 1901. The non-Labor parties were strengthened in the aftermath
of the first split in the Labor Party. William Morris Hughes led his colleagues
from Labor to join members of the Fusion Liberal Party to create a new political
force that was called the Australian National Federation, often referred to as the
Nationalists. The party won the 1917 federal election and remained in government
until 1929. During that time, the Nationalists entered into a coalition agreement
with the Country Party for support in parliament.
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The Labor split of 1931 again resulted in ex-Labor parliamentarians joining
the non-Labor force to create a new political party – the United Australia Party
(UAP). By 1939, however, the brittleness of non-Labor parties became apparent
again. After losing the 1943 election, the UAP collapsed.
Following yet another failed experiment by the non-Labor side of Australian
politics, Robert Menzies, who had previously been leader of the UAP and prime
minister between 1939 and 1941, began plans for creating a new party. In weekly
radio addresses throughout 1942, Menzies discussed a range of policy issues.21 In
his ‘forgotten people’ speech, he highlighted the need for a new political party
that was not based around the union movement or the wealthy. Menzies quickly
galvanised support from non-Labor forces and launched the Liberal Party in 1944.
It would seek to win executive government by joining forces with the Country Party
in a formal coalition.
Unlike the ALP, which has a centralised organisation, the Liberal Party is made
up of autonomous state and territory divisions that are responsible for running
the campaigns and day-to-day affairs of the party.22 The federal division does not
have the power to intervene in the affairs of state divisions. As a result, the Liberal
Party, unlike Labor, cannot have centralised decisions made on matters such as the
number of females in parliament.
Policymaking is also different in the Liberal Party in that the decisions made by
the extra-parliamentary wing are not binding on the parliamentary wing. In effect,
the Liberal parliamentary leader has the power to decide the party’s policies.
The Liberal Party does not have formal factions, though groupings of like-
minded individuals tend to form. In more recent years, groupings with competing
views on social issues have become prominent. The party has a significant cohort
of members who advance socially conservative positions, such as opposing same-
sex marriage and Australia becoming a republic. They also tend to be sceptical of
unilateral methods for addressing climate change. The party also has members who
tend to favour more socially progressive ideas. This cleft, in addition to concerns
about the popularity of the leader, has been at the core of instability in the Liberal
Party following the defeat of the Howard government in 2007.
The Liberal Party in government
After winning the 1949 election, Robert Menzies led the Liberal Party to consecutive
election victories until his retirement in 1966. Melding conservative and pragmatic
elements was part of Menzies’ repertoire. He committed Australia to supporting the
USA in the Vietnam War and sought to ban the Communist Party of Australia.
Pragmatism was evident in the Menzies government’s approach to issues concerning
economic policy, especially as it implemented protectionist policies to assist
21 See Brett 2007.
22 The Liberal and National parties merged in Queensland in 2008.
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manufacturing and agriculture.23 Menzies was replaced by Harold Holt, who went
missing in 1967 after going for a swim in Portsea, Victoria. The Liberal Party selected
John Gorton to replace Holt. Gorton, in turn, was replaced by William McMahon,
who led the party to defeat in 1972, some 23 years after Menzies’ initial success.
The Liberal Party, along with its coalition partner, returned to government
in 1975, following the dismissal of the Whitlam government by the governor-
general. Led by Malcolm Fraser, the party continued the tradition set by Menzies.
The government was also progressive in other policies, such as supporting
multiculturalism and welcoming Cambodian and Vietnamese ‘boat people’ who
were fleeing the communist regimes in their home countries.24
The Fraser government was defeated in 1983 and the Liberal Party spent 13
years in opposition, returning to power under the leadership of John Howard.
Howard’s government was similar to that of Menzies in that it pursued economic
reform while advancing socially conservative policies.25 Much to the chagrin of
many rural and regional voters, the government succeeded in bringing about a
national firearms agreement following the Port Arthur shootings in 1996. In 2000,
it implemented the Goods and Services Tax (GST). The government also intro-
duced welfare measures, including a first homeowner’s grant and a lump-sum
payment to new parents, known as the ‘baby bonus’. Border and national security
became defining issues for the Howard government, especially in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001.26
The Liberal Party was defeated in 2007 but was returned to power in 2013, with
Tony Abbott as leader. Abbott’s prime ministership combined elements of social
conservatism and economic liberalisation.27
The Liberal Party demonstrated how the gift of leadership could be taken
away by the parliamentary wing when, in 2015, it replaced Abbott with Malcolm
Turnbull. As prime minister, Turnbull advanced a more socially progressive
agenda. One of the most significant policy changes overseen by the Turnbull
government was in 2017, when, after a national public vote, legislation was changed
to allow same-sex marriage in Australia. The parliamentary wing again showed its
capacity to choose leaders at will, replacing Turnbull with Scott Morrison in 2018,
following a series of poor opinion poll results.
The National Party
The National Party (also known as the Nationals), which was originally known as
the Country Party, is Australia’s second oldest political party. It was created with
23 See Brett 2007.
24 Economou and Ghazarian 2010.
25 See Hollander 2008.
26 See McKay, Hall and Lippi 2017.
27 See Talberg, Hui and Loynes 2016.
Australian Politics and Policy
92
the aim of representing the interests of rural and regional areas and contested
its first federal election in 1919. The party was originally underpinned by the
primary producers in the agriculture sector, which was responsible for providing a
significant source of export income.
Like the other major parties, the National Party is a mass party and is open
for individuals to join. Similar to the Liberal Party, the National Party comprises
autonomous state divisions, while the role of the extra-parliamentary wing is to
provide financial and campaign support for the parliamentary wing.
The party changed its name from the Country Party to the National Party of
Australia in 1982 as it sought to appeal to Australians living in cities. Since the
1980s, however, the party has focused on contesting provincial and rural electorates
as it has identified these as being its core constituency.
The National Party (then known as the Country Party) first agreed to form a
coalition with the Nationalists in 1923 in order to defeat Labor and wield executive
power. Today, the National Party has a formal coalition agreement with the Liberal
Party. As part of the agreement, the Liberal Party leader will be the prime minister,
while the National Party leader will be the deputy prime minister. Another condition
of the agreement is that the Liberal and National parties will not stand candidates
against each other unless the seat in question is vacant or held by another party.
The Senate party system
While the major parties also win the bulk of the seats in the Senate, the party system
in the upper house, unlike that in the House of Representatives, has undergone
a significant transformation. Changes to the party system coincided with changes
to the Senate voting system. The Chifley Labor government implemented a
proportional voting system in 1948, in time for the 1949 election. The party system
underwent further changes following additional reforms to the voting system
implemented in 1983.
The early minor parties: products of a major party split
Following the introduction of proportional representation, the Democratic Labor
Party (DLP) became the first minor party to win Senate representation in 1955. It
was created as a result of the ‘great split’ within the Labor Party in the early 1950s.
The party was so focused on stopping the ALP from regaining government that,
once Whitlam won the 1972 election, its reason for existing ceased and the party
collapsed.28
28 The DLP was re-formed and succeeded in winning parliamentary representation in Victoria in
2006 and in 2010 the party won Senate representation. However, the ‘new’ DLP was
qualitatively different to the party that existed throughout the 1950s and 1970s. For further
discussion, see Ghazarian 2013.
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The next minor party elected to the Senate was the Australian Democrats in
1977. Following the 1975 constitutional crisis, there was a growing appetite within
the electorate for alternatives to the major parties. The Democrats emerged in this
climate. The party was led by Don Chipp, a former Liberal minister. Unlike the DLP,
the Democrats sought to reinvigorate the role of the Senate as a house of review by
using their position in the chamber to keep both Labor and the Liberal–National
Coalition (the Coalition) accountable for their performance in parliament.29
This approach resonated with Australian voters, and the party maintained
Senate representation from 1977 and 2007. During this time, it made a significant
contribution to the Australian party system. It was the first parliamentary party to
have a female leader, and it had innovative organisational arrangements, allowing
all members to participate in deciding policy.30 The party, however, appeared
unable to adapt to the competition it was facing from newer minor parties that
would have a significant impact on the Australian party system.
Changes in the Senate party system: electoral reforms and contemporary minor parties
The Senate voting system underwent major changes following the implementation
of the Hawke government’s reforms, which were introduced in 1983 but used
for the first time at the 1984 election. The number of Senators per state rose
from 10 to 12 due to the Hawke government increasing the number of House of
Representatives seats to 148. This triggered the ‘nexus’ provision of the Constitution
(section 24), which states that the number of representatives in the lower house
must be approximately double that in the upper house. This also reduced the
electoral challenges confronting minor parties as the proportion of the vote (or the
quota) they needed to win a seat in an ordinary half-Senate election fell from 16.6
per cent to about 14.4 per cent. A similar fall in the percentage of the statewide vote
needed at full-Senate elections meant that it was now easier for minor parties to
reach the threshold required to win seats in the chamber.
The Hawke government also introduced the group ticket vote (GTV), which
simplified the method of voting for the Senate. Instead of having to number every
box on the Senate ballot paper, citizens could now indicate their first preference
by voting ‘above the black line’. Their preferences would be distributed by the
Australian Electoral Commission as per the instructions lodged by their preferred
party.31 These changes to the Senate voting system coincided with a significant
change to the Senate party system, as shown in Table 1.
As Table 1 shows, there were just three minor parties elected in the 34-year
period between the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the last
election before the introduction of the Hawke government reforms in 1983.
29 Ghazarian 2015, 32–5.
30 Ghazarian 2015, 32–5.
31 See Green 2015.
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Minor party Year first Senate seat won
Democratic Labor Party (DLP) 1955
Liberal Movement 1974
Australian Democrats 1977
Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) 1984
Vallentine Peace Group 1987
WA Greens 1990
Australian Greens 1996
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 1998
Family First 2004
‘New’ DLP 2010
Liberal Democrats Party (LDP) 2013
Palmer United Party (PUP) 2013
Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party (AMEP) 2013
Hinch Justice Party 2016
Nick Xenophon Team 2016
Jacqui Lambie Network 2016
Table 1 Minor parties elected to the Senate since 1949.
Following the implementation of these reforms in 1984, however, 13 minor parties
won Senate representation in 32 years. The parties winning Senate representation
post-1984 have also been qualitatively different to those elected in the period
between 1955 and 1983, as will be discussed below.
The Australian party system
95
‘Green’ parties in the Senate
The first minor party to win Senate representation following the Hawke government
reforms was the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) in 1984. The party opposed
the Hawke government’s pro-uranium mining policies and support for the broad
foreign policies of the USA.32 This was significant as it was the first time that a
party advancing a specific policy agenda concerning environmental, conservation
and humanitarian matters won Senate representation.
The WA Greens, which was created by elements of the NDP, pursued similar
goals and continued to win Senate seats from 1990 onwards but was displaced as
the pre-eminent ‘green’ party by the Australian Greens in the mid-1990s.
The Australian Greens combined a range of conservation movements,
especially from the eastern states, to create a new party. Led by Dr Bob Brown from
Tasmania, the new party was able to win its first Senate seat in 1996. It advanced a
socially progressive agenda and emphasised cosmopolitanism, conservation, social
justice and humanitarian issues.33 By the time of the 2004 election, the WA Greens
(which had been a separate political entity) had joined the Australian Greens
confederation, and the party displaced the Australian Democrats as the third force
in the Senate.34 The party has been able to win and maintain representation in
the House of Representatives at general elections since 2010 – something that has
eluded many other minor parties in Australia – especially as it has been able to
attract disenchanted Labor voters.35 The party’s strongest influence has been in
the Senate, where it has often held the balance of power with other non-major
party senators. In this role, the party has sought to influence government policy,
especially on issues concerning asylum seekers, environmental conservation and
the provision of state services such as health care and education.
Non-‘green’ parties in the Senate
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party first won Senate representation in 1998. From
the outset, One Nation focused on race and immigration issues.36 One Nation can
be regarded as a populist-right type party – it is led by a charismatic leader and
proposes to solve complex social and economic problems through simple policy
changes.37 At the national level, the party won one Senate seat in Queensland in
1998, attracting the support of disaffected Coalition voters in rural and regional
electorates. But it soon unravelled. One Nation’s organisational structures were
specifically designed so that its leader, Pauline Hanson, and not ordinary members,
32 Quigley 1986, 14.
33 See Miragliotta 2006.
34 Charnock 2009.
35 The Greens won the district of Melbourne from Labor in 2010 and were able to defend the seat
in subsequent elections. See also Bennett 2008.
36 See Ghazarian 2015, 117–8.
37 Economou and Ghazarian 2018.
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had the power to decide the party’s policies. This led to much frustration and
caused many members to leave the party. Pauline Hanson was also sentenced to jail
for fraudulently registering One Nation.38 Hanson soon left the party and contested
subsequent state and federal elections as an independent.
By the time of the 2016 federal election, however, Hanson had rejoined One
Nation. Campaigning on race and immigration matters once more, the party was
able to win a total of four Senate seats (two in Queensland and one each in
NSW and WA) thanks to the lower quota required to win seats in the double
dissolution election (the quota needed to win a seat was half that required at a
general half-Senate election). As in the past, however, One Nation experienced
structural volatility, with some Senators resigning from the party. While Hanson
continued to keep a high public profile in Australian politics, her party’s impact on
the national parliament has been hindered by organisational instability.
Other minor parties from the political right followed One Nation. Family First
was elected to the Senate in 2004 but was only able to win a Victorian Senate seat
because of a series of beneficial preference deals it had organised with other parties,
rather than broad support. Family First positioned itself as an anti-Greens party. It
focused on advancing socially conservative ideals, especially by opposing same-sex
marriage and drug liberalisation.
In 2010, the ‘new’ DLP won Senate representation. The party, however, was
qualitatively different to the version that was in the Senate throughout the 1950s
and 1970s. Like the Family First Party, the ‘new’ DLP was mobilised in order to
advance a socially conservative agenda, especially opposing abortion and same-sex
marriage. And like Family First, the party’s ability to win a Senate seat in Victoria
was due to a series of preference deals that allowed it to reach the quota. The party
was unable to consolidate its Senate representation in subsequent elections.
The Senate party system started to change even more rapidly when, in 2013,
three minor parties won seats in the chamber for the first time. These included the
Palmer United Party, led by businessman Clive Palmer, and the Liberal Democrats.
The Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party (AMEP) also won Senate representation
in 2013, even though its primary vote in Victoria as just 0.5 per cent. It was able to
win a Senate seat thanks to preference deals it had made with other parties.
The Senate party system continued to diversify in 2016, even though the
Turnbull government made changes to the voting system in response to the 2013
results. The GTV was removed, and voters had to preference at least six parties
above the line or at least 12 candidates below the line. This reform was designed
to stop minor parties that won a very small primary vote from gaining Senate
representation through preference deals.
Despite these changes, three new parties won seats in the Senate, though it
should be remembered that this was a double dissolution election. The Hinch
38 Hanson was released less than three months later. For further discussion, see CMC 2004.
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Justice Party and the Jacqui Lambie Network were joined by the Nick Xenophon
Team, which won three seats in the Senate in addition to the lower house seat of
Mayo in South Australia.
Conclusions
There are two distinct party systems in Australia. The first is in the House of
Representatives, which is still dominated by the major parties. The origins of the
major parties show how they were able to attract electoral support (labour
organisation in the case of the ALP, primary producers in the case of the National
Party and conservative-oriented non-labour voters in the case of the Liberal Party).
Their longevity has been underpinned by the voting system used to elect candidates
to the lower house and reflects Duverger’s hypothesis that single-member
electorates that use a majoritarian method of electing candidates will produce a
two-party system.
In contrast, the party system in the Senate has undergone significant changes
since the adoption of proportional representation in 1949. Moreover, the type
of minor party elected to the chamber has transitioned – contemporary minor
parties winning seats are advancing specific policy agendas. While the major parties
continue to win a large portion of seats in the Senate, in recent years the use of
proportional representation has contributed to the creation of a multiparty system
that had been hypothesised by Duverger. The rising vote for minor parties shows
that voters are also supporting greater diversity, especially in the upper house.
This changing party system has implications for national policy, especially when
governments must rely on support from these parties to pass legislation.
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The public sector
Isi Unikowski and John Wanna
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Nothing about ‘the public sector’ is ever settled for very long. There are no issues
regarding its scope, size, reasons for being, ways of working, norms, values and
practices that cannot be and have not been contested and debated since the
emergence of the modern state.
Accordingly, rather than summarising a number of static terms and technical
definitions that can be found in any standard textbook on the subject, which we
would then have to qualify with caveats, this chapter considers the most important
questions about the public sector and why these keep coming up. It then shows how
the answers to these questions have changed over time, and how they will continue
to do so.
What is the public sector?
The question of what differentiates the public sector from the private and
community, or not-for-profit, sectors lies at the heart of perennial debate around
Unikowski, Isi, and John Wanna (2019). The public sector. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
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the world about what governments should be doing and, consequently, how big
their public sectors should be.
The easiest way to start is simply to define the public sector as the outcome of a
set of choices citizens and governments make about two questions:
1. What do citizens and communities want and need in terms of public provision?
2. How should governments respond to these expectations?
The public sector’s role and shape can be seen as a collective approach to the things
governments want to provide or impose, including the allocation of resources,
production of goods, delivery of services and regulation of activity in society.
More specifically, we can view these functions of government in terms of the
economic, political and/or legal purposes they fulfil:
1. Economic purposes are achieved by governments performing a rebalancing
function in society by reallocating resources through taxes and charges (e.g.
redistributing from the rich to the poor or aged through social welfare and the
age pension).
2. Governments are often required to provide goods and services that the market
has failed to produce or cannot easily produce. Street lights, public roads,
utilities, telecommunication, navigation across air and sea and, historically,
broadcasting and postal services are all delivered by public provision because
private markets will not generally supply goods or services that benefit people
regardless of whether they have paid for them.
3. Governments sometimes produce monopolistic goods and services (e.g. water,
electricity and sewerage) because the private sector may not provide them at
a price or at a level of efficiency that is in the public interest. Another reason
for this provision is the long-term investment required and the extensiveness of
the costs associated with supply.
4. Governments are compelled to act as a community protector or insurer of
last resort (that is, providing protection against risks that are too great for
the private sector to handle); for example, dealing with terrorism and national
security, conducting wars, dealing with natural disasters and epidemics and
combatting major crises affecting society, such as financial or economic crises.
5. Turning to the public sector’s political purposes, governments respond to
electoral pressures and voter preferences (for more benefits, say, or for extended
services). Political parties channel voter preferences and campaign for office on
policy platforms, with winning parties expected to deliver on their agendas.
6. The public sector fulfils important legal functions and provides administrative
services to ensure the rules and stability a functioning society needs are in
place. These include frameworks for the operation and enjoyment of liberty
and property, particularly law enforcement, courts and tribunals and bodies
protecting human rights. They also include regulatory bodies governing
matters such as safety, commerce and consumer protection.
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Public sector governance
The questions of how much control governments can and should exert over the
public sector, to what ends and in what ways have shaped much of the public
sector’s history. The discussions in the following sections of the appropriate size
of the public sector and how its structures and functions have changed over time
reflect the different views and values on which these questions about roles,
purposes and resources turn.
Two important sets of principles provide the norms and conventions that guide
and shape the structures and functions of the public sector. The first may be broadly
referred to as the Westminster tradition of public service. The tradition includes
the principle that the public service is accountable to ministers, and ministers
are individually and collectively accountable to parliament and the electorate. The
Westminster tradition clearly distinguishes between the political role of ministers,
who ‘have the last word’ on all matters for which they are responsible, and a
bureaucracy that is non-partisan, in that it can only be appointed and removed
according to legislated rules, works loyally for whoever occupies the ministry,
regardless of their political stance, and strenuously avoids active political
participation.1 The principle of ministerial control over the departments and
agencies in their areas of responsibility is a pre-eminent factor in determining how
the public sector is structured, a matter we return to in the next section.
Australia’s federal system provides the second set of norms and principles gover-
ning the public sector. The public sector operates at three levels of government: the
national government, state and territory governments and municipal governments.
Officials work with one another within each of these levels, and across the
Commonwealth–state and state–local levels to develop and implement government
policies and programs, particularly when national policy frameworks are needed
to deliver economic, environmental or other reforms. The federal system shapes
the way policies are designed and implemented by the three levels of government,
including how, when and to what extent the different levels of government engage
with one another, how responsibilities for policy design and delivery are allocated,
how performance is measured and reported and, perhaps most importantly, how the
resources for these functions are collected and distributed.
The structure of the public sector
The relative independence of a public sector organisation from the government of
the day is a fundamental design principle inherited from the Westminster tradition.2
1 Rhodes 2005. The risk of politicisation, or even the appearance of such, has become greater in
the age of social media and the erosion of traditional public servant anonymity.
2 O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna and Weller 1999, 87.
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Within that context, the structures, forms and functions of the public sector at any
time reflect government choices about what public goods and services to supply,
to what extent and in what manner. Accordingly, the way public sector bodies are
set up and function varies considerably along a continuum from the big, traditional
departments that implement government policies in areas like immigration,
transport, the environment and so on, through to ‘corporations’ controlled by
governments but largely managed on a commercial basis.
The core public sector consists of departments and agencies that are under direct
ministerial control. They are mainly financed by taxation, which they redistribute
through subsidies, grants and welfare payments. They may also provide a range of
services directly and free of charge (e.g. defence, education, health) or at prices well
below what the commercial market would charge (e.g. subsidised housing).3
Governments may also set up semi-autonomous statutory agencies and
corporations for reasons of efficiency, to drive innovative delivery or because the
agency needs to be able to make decisions free of ministerial intervention (such
as the Australian Taxation Office, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission or state government environment protection agencies).
Public corporations are agencies that operate independently of government and
may have their own sources of revenue in addition to direct public funding. They
may compete in private markets and make profits. Public corporations include the
Reserve Bank, Australia Post, the National Broadband Network, state government
housing schemes and state-owned bodies that operate power and water supplies.4
Any neat delineation between the public and private sectors is challenged by
increasing collaboration between governments, the private sector and the not-for-
profit sector5 in designing and delivering goods and services. Australian govern-
ments have a long history of relying on the not-for-profit sector, and in some cases
the private sector, to assist with the provision of services and to contribute to their
design. Governments partner with the not-for-profit sector for the delivery of a
range of community, employment, education, health and other services through
contracted networks.
In the private sector’s case, governments transfer risks to companies in return
for financial rewards and incentives, through public–private partnerships for the
delivery of social and economic infrastructure or through contracted delivery of
public programs and services.
3 ABS 2015.
4 ABS 2015; United Nations et al. 2009.
5 That is, organisations that are neither commercial nor government bodies, do not earn profits
for their members and perform a range of charitable purposes.
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How big should the public sector be?
The size and cost of the public sector is often controversial, even though actual
employee numbers have been stable for many years. The appropriate size of the
public sector is regularly tested through reviews conducted by Commonwealth,
state and territory governments, particularly when incoming governments argue
‘the financial cupboard is bare’.6 Reductions in the public sector at all three levels
of government frequently occur in response to such reviews and/or to periods of
international fiscal crisis.
Criticisms of the public sector’s size, in terms of outlays and staff numbers, are
generally based on the effects of government intervention on the economy. These
criticisms are generally based on four key considerations:
• why governments are providing services that the public could choose to pay for
in the private sector
• the requirement for higher taxation and government borrowing to fund public
sector organisations and the goods and services they provide, which may act as
a brake on economic growth
• the possibility of ‘crowding out’ – when businesses find it harder to obtain
finance to invest because government borrowing increases interest rates,
making private borrowing more expensive
• government services are often criticised for being inefficient, such as when
Commonwealth and state government responsibilities overlap in particular
areas of policy.
An overview of trends in public sector employment over the past decade is
provided in Figure 1. This figure shows that there has been an increase overall
in the number of public sector employees, from 1.75 million in 2007–8 to 1.99
million in 2017–18.7 However, as a proportion of the total workforce, public sector
employee numbers declined from 21 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent by the end of
the 1990s, where they have remained, apart from a slight rise in 2007–11. Public
sector workers currently constitute 15.5 per cent of the workforce.8
The relative proportions of those employed across the three levels of
government have also remained stable over the decade. However, the compositions
of the Commonwealth and state/territory public sectors are quite different,
reflecting the significantly greater role the state and territory public sectors play in
direct service delivery to individuals, communities and businesses. Only around
one-quarter of the Commonwealth public service works on service delivery.9
Conversely, the proportion of those in the states and territories working on service
6 Weight 2014, 5.
7 ABS 2018.
8 ABS 2017.
9 Australian Public Service Commission 2018.
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Figure 1 Jurisdictional composition of public sector employment. Source: ABS 2018.
delivery tends to be much larger (around 80–85 per cent), with a correspondingly
smaller number working on policies for these governments.10
At around 36 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), general government
spending in Australia is not large by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) standards;11 this proportion has not changed much over the
preceding two decades. By themselves, however, statistics on the size of and trends
in public sector employment and expenditure tell us very little, compared with how
ideas about the appropriate role for governments change over time and are reflected
in the public sector’s functions. (We will look at this more closely in the next section.)
An overview of recent public sector changes
Developments in how the public sector works reflect the way Australians and
their elected representatives decide the following questions, and how those answers
change over time:
• What are most efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable ways for govern-
ments to design and deliver services and programs that respond to the needs
and wants of their citizens, businesses and communities?
• How should that response involve the private and not-for-profit sectors, and
citizens themselves?
The ‘traditional’ public sector was arguably the dominant model for the public
sector in Australia and New Zealand to the end of the 1980s. This model was
10 Data sourced from state government workforce statistics.
11 OECD 2018. Commonwealth government outlays alone represent around 25.4 per cent of GDP
(Commonwealth of Australia 2018).
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characterised by a number of features derived from the Westminster tradition,
including:
• a politically neutral public service controlled by and accountable to ministers
• government departments that directly provide services, with little outsourcing
and competition, integrating policy and operational functions, from the design
of policies through to their implementation and delivery ‘at street level’
• in order to perform these functions effectively and efficiently, departments
organised in standardised managerial hierarchies in which power and authority
are increasingly invested in correspondingly smaller echelons of senior officials
(as distinct, say, from markets and networks)12
• departments largely designed to implement political directions in discrete,
manageable and repetitive tasks, conducted according to prescribed rules and
technical expertise.13
However, during the 1970s and 1980s, governments were increasingly faced with
economic globalisation, demographic pressures, the role of supranational economic
and political institutions and concerns about the size and cost of their public
sectors. Consequently, they also questioned their capacity to manage these issues
through traditional bureaucratic structures and methods.14 Perceptions that the
public service had become ‘a self-contained elite exercising power in the interests
of the status quo but without effectively being accountable for its exercise’15 led to
reviews and changes that aimed to restore ministerial control.
The most important set of public sector practices and values that emerged
in the 1980s and 1990s is collectively described as the new public management
(NPM), and is still highly influential today. NPM aimed to make government more
efficient and effective, based on ideas derived from economic theory and business
management techniques. Its proponents called for the public sector’s monopoly
over policy making and service delivery to be removed or at least reduced.
Instead, the NPM’s objectives included giving users more choice in the services
they received, making more use of market-type competition, and foreshadowed
a program of widespread privatisations and the separation of service delivery
agencies from their parent policy departments. They called for a greater focus
on financial incentives and transparent performance management in public sector
organisation.16 The classic NPM text Reinventing government17 coined the phrase
12 Osborne 2010, 8.
13 Stoker 2006, 45.
14 Other potential explanations of NPM point to more endogenous developments within
bureaucracies themselves, such as the impact of new technologies that allowed work to be
refashioned along private sector lines.
15 Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (1976), quoted in Wanna and
Weller 2003, 87.
16 Hood 1991, 5.
17 Osborne and Gaebler 1992.
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Figure 2 Public sector employee numbers, June 1990–2017. Source: ABS 2018.
‘steering, not rowing’ to advocate less involvement by the public sector in actually
delivering services and more focus on policy making and on the choice and design
of such services.18
The legacy of NPM
As Figure 2 suggests, the impact on employee numbers during NPM’s heyday was
more in the order of a redistribution from the Commonwealth to state and local
governments, with only a minor downsizing in total numbers in the 1990s, from
1.73 to 1.45 million, and then an increase to just under 2 million currently.19
Commonwealth employees declined from 23 to 12 per cent of the total public
sector workforce between 1990 and 2017, while the proportion of state government
employees rose from 67 to 78 per cent.
The period of NPM largely replaced the highly centralised state, with its
monopoly over policy design and delivery, with a new set of relationships between
government and other societal sectors and players. These relationships gave
governments a choice between traditional delivery via public sector organisations,
market and quasi-market approaches, and networks,20 and hence greater flexibility
in responding to the demands and expectations of citizens, who had been given
choice and agency as ‘customers’ by NPM.
18 Denhardt and Denhardt 2015, 11; Osborne and Gaebler 1992, 32; Pollitt 2002, 276.
19 It is similarly unclear whether outsourcing had a significant effect on public sector expenditure
and employment in other countries (e.g. Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2015, 656).
20 Peters and Pierre 1998.
Australian Politics and Policy
108
By the mid-2000s, NPM was losing its status as the predominant paradigm
for public sector organisation. Key elements of NPM had been reversed or stalled,
amidst concerns about the fragmentation of the public sector and its services
and loss of accountability and capability summed up as ‘the hollowed-out state’.21
Criticism of NPM highlighted its narrow focus on efficiency and its implication that
‘the public nature of what governments do is not particularly important’.22
Nevertheless, many elements of NPM are still in place, such as performance
management and budgeting and market-based competition for some services. The
introduction of market-style mechanisms to procure services via competitive ten-
dering processes led to greater co-option of the not-for-profit sector in delivering
public policies. The latter is now a major partner of the public sector, to an extent,
Alford and O’Flynn argue, that ‘would have been unrecognizable’ forty years ago.23
Beyond new public management
No single paradigm of public sector reform has emerged to dominate the early
decades of the new century in the way NPM dominated the closing decades of the
last. Instead, a number of influential and interrelated directions are emerging that
respond to, and in some cases reverse, NPM’s main tenets.
A new model of public sector organisation that Osborne and others have called
the ‘new public governance’ recognises that the complexity of citizens’ needs is
not well handled by NPM’s separation of policy and service delivery agencies and
widespread adoption of contractual service delivery through the private and not-
for-profit sectors.
Digital era governance harnesses new technologies in service delivery,
administration and communications and the use of social media by bureaucrats
and the public for policy input and service delivery. Advocates argue that
information technology is helping to reintegrate public services; providing needs-
based, simpler and more agile whole-of-client service delivery; and generating
greater productivity through digitisation.24
Public value governance (PVG), the third dominant model of public sector
organisation and development, is less about the means by which governments
govern. Rather, it focuses more on the political and institutional processes by which
public values are identified and inform strategy making, performance management
and innovation.25 One of PVG’s most notable advocates argues that the public
sector creates public value in two ways: first, by producing goods and services
that have been prioritised by the political system, and second, by establishing
21 Bevir and Rhodes 2011; Dunleavy et al. 2006, 468.
22 Peters 2017, 607.
23 Alford and O’Flynn 2012, 8; Butcher and Gilchrist 2016, 5.
24 Dunleavy et al. 2006, 480; Greve 2015, 51.
25 Rainey 2014, 64; Greve 2015, 50.
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and operating institutions that are ‘fair, efficient and accountable’, meeting the
expectations of citizens (and their representatives).26
Public sector values
No discussion of the public sector is complete without examining the distinctive set
of values and norms that guide its work. It may be useful to think of such public
sector values in terms of why the public sector exists, what it does and how it does
this. Longstanding political and cultural conventions and traditions (derived from
both the Westminster model and the federal system) provide the public sector with
a purpose and justification for its services to the community.
The values that inform what the public sector should do or produce at any time
reflect culturally embedded ‘outcomes values’,27 such as ‘growth’ or ‘diversity’, that
dominate political debate over long periods but do change from time to time. For
example, NPM valued private-sector delivery, while cutbacks to welfare programs
reflected higher values being attributed to private, as opposed to collective,
solutions to income inequality. These values inform the immediate policy priorities
of incumbent governments and serve as evaluation standards or design guides for
particular policies.28
A third set of values, often and explicitly linked to the Westminster tradition,29
guides how the public sector carries out its tasks and is managed. These values
apply both to public servants’ personal conduct and to their organisations’ work
as a whole. They may be expressed as rules about responsiveness, impartiality,
procedural fairness, efficiency and ethical behaviour, but may also (controversially)
extend to how public servants should engage with social media.30 These values
are generally set out in enforceable values statements and codes of conduct, which
frequently form part of the relevant public service legislation.
NPM reforms led to some important changes to the relationship between
public servants and ministers. In the Westminster system, this relationship had
been characterised by permanent careers, particularly for senior public servants,
impartial support for the government of the day and a degree of anonymity that
allowed public servants to advise their political masters freely.31 In the 1980s, these
arrangements changed in a number of Western democracies, including Australia
and New Zealand. Department heads were placed on limited contracts that were
26 Moore 2014; Moore 1995, 53. See also Mazzucato’s work on the state’s contribution to public
value through its role in creating and supporting private markets and innovation (Mazzucato
2016; Mazzucato 2013).
27 Stewart 2009, 27.
28 Bozeman and Johnson 2015, 63.
29 Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2008, 469.
30 Quirk 2018, 104; Stewart 2009, 29.
31 Hood and Lodge 2006.
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subject to performance appraisal, and the anonymous role of confidential
ministerial adviser was weakened as special ministerial advisers and private
consultancies played an increasing role in advising on developing policy.32
Conclusions
The present context of economic, demographic, social and technological disruption
is generating calls for a profound rethinking of the public sector’s purpose,
dimensions and approaches, in Australia and internationally. Such debates,
informed by the values we have identified above, are integral to the very nature
of the public sector. As Jocelyne Bourgon, a leading Canadian public servant and
public service innovator, sums it up, the task is ‘to rediscover the irreplaceable
contribution of the state to a well-performing society and economy and articulate
a concept of that state adapted to serving in the twenty-first century’.33 As we have
shown, questions about the nature of that task, how it is to be performed and by
whom, remain constant for citizens, governments, and for those, like you, who are
studying the public sector:
• What do citizens and their communities want and need?
• What role should governments play in responding?
• What are most efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable ways for govern-
ments to design and deliver that response?
• How should that response involve the private and not for profit sectors, and
citizens themselves?
• What capacity will governments and their public administrations need to carry
out this work, and what values will the public sector need to display and
champion?
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Media and democracy
Mary Griffiths
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News media is no longer thought of as a monolithic, homogeneous institution
or actor reflecting the real world from a position of objectivity and authority.
News still strongly determines and anchors public attitudes but the ‘hypodermic
needle’ explanation of communication – which holds that mass media messages are
simply transmitted from a sender to a passive receiver – is no longer persuasive.
Consumers’ characteristics (e.g. age, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, literacy
and so on), as well as the contexts of media consumption, shape audience reception.
For media researchers and students, the key questions endure: who is speaking,
to or for whom, through which conventional formats, on which platforms and for
what purposes?
In transitional times for media, answering these questions is not easy because
the material conditions under which media organisations once operated have
altered with the advent of disruptive technologies. Widespread consumer parti-
cipation, information abundance, hybrid content and converging platforms and
formats are only part of the picture. Harvesting of consumer data makes the
Griffiths, Mary (2019). Media and democracy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
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targeting of specific demographics possible, for commercial and political purposes.
Inevitably, political culture and journalism are changing, with questions regularly
arising about Australian media’s democratic role.
This chapter covers the transformation of media and its impact on political
culture. Mediation and the pre-digital democratising communication technologies
– print, radio and television – are the initial topics discussed. The chapter then
maps the Australian media sector. The mixed economy approach that Australia
takes to media policy and regulation is summarised, before the chapter returns to
the free press concept, concluding with an overview of parliamentary media and
the potential problems inherent in journalist–source relations.
Mediation
Mediation is the core of inquiry in media scholarship. It involves analysis of the
whole or of selected aspects of the material processes of production, distribution
and reception of media content, and the construction of specific audiences, instit-
utions, practices and technology uses.
Mediation theory argues that representations of the world do not unproblem-
atically reflect its realities. Representations are treated as constructs formed by sets
of practices, codes and compositional conventions from which we, as consumers,
actively make meanings. For example, different levels of familiarity with the basic
television news format – authoritative ‘talking heads’ (hard news, sport, weather),
remote vision, voice-overs – veil or partially obscure the myriad forms of agency
and necessary elements that are required to construct a ‘seamless’ flow of news.
Mediating processes combine technical, journalistic, political, ethical, editorial,
commercial and platform- or audience-driven elements. Whatever the technology
(print, telegraph, camera, radio, television, satellite, the internet, mobile, smart),
media are never just mirroring reality. Their forms are implicated in the existence
and survival of cultural, economic and political systems. Thus, questions of power
and agency in mediation processes are critical when considering media.
Technologies: from print to digital disruptions
Communication technology plays a generative role in anchoring normative societal
attitudes in any era. Print technology commanded the flow of political information
through centuries of development in Western democracy, just as, from the
mid-20th century onwards, radio and television helped form mass political
literacies – the ways people understand the world and understand politics. Now,
digital and smart technologies are replacing or colonising heritage media.
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The decline of print news
Print newspapers began to lose their advertising revenue, and then their audiences,
to the internet towards the end of the last century. Print news’ dominance has now
gone, along with the shared ritual of reading the paper at set times of the day –
a practice that had helped individual citizens in a nation-state to see themselves
in a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ with others1 and to form civic competencies.
Though many print mastheads vanished,2 some survivors, such as NewsCorp’s The
Australian, remain politically influential.
Digital disruptions
The internet changed everything for print and broadcast media. Media and
consumers were finally free of the scheduling limitations imposed by print presses
and analogue technology.
But the digital editions of print mastheads face severe competition for eyeballs
from local, national and global online competitors, and especially from start-ups
with no infrastructure renovation costs. Infotainment, clickbait and ads flourish,
competing with front-page ‘hard news’ – stories on politics or international affairs.
News rooms employ online content producers and use tracking tools to detect even
minute changes in reader engagement, while journalists are decreasing in number.
In hard economic times, investigative journalism is expensive. There are gains and
losses to digital disruption. It can be generative and initiate innovation, but it can
destroy legacy media and its workforces if they cannot rapidly adapt.
Across the hybrid digital platforms, media content is created, repurposed and
often categorised as ‘premium content’ behind subscriber paywalls. Journalists
adapt stories while events are unfolding or compete for a unique selling point after
tracking interest in trending stories. The editorial capacity to add and withdraw
digital content may also be partly responsible for the pressure on journalists to
publish first and amend later.
Free digital newspapers, on the other hand, have increased the number and
diversity of voices being heard, as the costs of inclusion and access are low.
Information flows 24/7 on free-to-air and subscription-only platforms, viewed
in private on a range of fixed and mobile devices and as the background noise
and vision in public spaces. Despite media’s ubiquity, consumption patterns are not
shared as they were in the era of mass media.
Individuals are adapting and easily navigating digital media even while mobile,
but their choices are potentially isolating and lack significant points of contact with
others. The segmentation of audiences into ever narrower slices of total audience
‘share’ is altering the nature and quality of political dialogue.
1 Anderson 1983, 6.
2 Kirkpatrick 2012.
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Trust, blame, the ‘Canberra bubble’ and ‘toxic politics’
A transforming media is blamed for the toxic nature of contemporary political
culture in Canberra and for undermining trust in democracy. Dissatisfaction with
democracy, as tracked by the Australian Election Study (AES) since 1997, has reached
an all-time high among voters.3 Fairfax reported AES findings, subsequently
initiating a reader poll on reasons for the state of Australian democracy.4 Blame was
primarily directed at politicians, the electoral system and mainstream media.
The two terms ‘Canberra bubble’ and ‘toxic politics’ are used more frequently since
the 2018 Turnbull leadership spill. The first works as shorthand for a self-interested
governing elite perceived to be out of touch with citizens’ concerns. The second term
has become a recurring narrative in hard news and opinion commentary.
Partisanship
Media organisations are accused of permitting ideological bias to distort news
coverage; of misrepresenting government policy and actions; of being stooges of
or echo chambers for particular parties and politicians; of producing fake news;
of fuelling social divisions; and of crossing the line into political activism. These
assertions are not always supported by substantive evidence and may be put
forward for political reasons, but their repetition contributes to a discourse of
media’s failure to perform its ‘fourth estate’ public interest role. Australian
journalists have been subjected to threats, exclusions, online trolling, police
searches and even violence.
Accusations of political activism on the part of sections of the media have
been voiced by, among others, Nine’s chief political reporter;5 the editor-in-chief
at Guardian Australia;6 and former Liberal7 and Labor prime ministers.8 Whether
objective ‘public interest’ journalism, once the mainstay of mainstream news, can
survive without government funding is a newer concern.9
Consumers’ power
Streams of content originating in separate production processes blend at the point
of consumption as end-users control the news feeds they receive, reproduce and
3 Cameron and McAllister 2018.
4 Harris and Charlton 2018.
5 Knox 2018. Chris Uhlmann launched a passionate attack on the Liberal–National Coalition
leadership plotters, and included News Corp, Sky News, and 2GB staff, arguing that the latter
were no longer observers but ‘players’.
6 Christensen 2014. In an interview with Mumbrella, Guardian Australia’s editor, Katherine
Murphy, commented on rival News Corp’s approaches to public debate.
7 Elton-Pym 2018.
8 Kevin Rudd has continued forthright attacks on News Corp (Rudd 2018).
9 See ‘Media inquiries’ below for further discussion.
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annotate. Consumers become curators when blogs and social media give them the
agency to select and prioritise the content forwarded to newsgroups and niche
publics.
An individual’s power to intervene directly in political debate exists and can
be co-opted. A Facebook user in France posts her frustration about the cost of
living and, 1 million likes later, French protestors, including the gilets jaunes or
‘yellow vests’, tune in to her drive-time live feed. A Twitter or Facebook user may
be regularly annotating and forwarding texts to like-minded groups. Influencers
emerge by remediating content, and the editing process on social networks is rarely
as transparent as Wikipedia’s.
Fake news
Fake news, when it is recognisably sensational clickbait, is familiar to most online
users. ‘Alternative facts’ or covert political bias in a story can be harder to identify.
Well-known individuals and organisations may be regular offenders. Anonymous
content simultaneously emerging across several platforms is another red flag. Other
telling signs relate to missing elements. A professionally produced news story
carries the journalist’s byline and contact details and is date-stamped. Revisions or
corrections on subsequent iterations are recorded and disclaimers explain apparent
bias or any other diversion from hard news protocols of even-handedness, such as
the absence of comment from the subject of a critical story.
Fake news rarely carries such markers. Image altering software can make fakes
on social media very convincing, and yet, perversely, content like this is trackable
through reverse image searches or through more expert algorithmic analyses. A
majority of Australians recognise and make their own choices daily about fake
news.10
Publics
Belonging to a public, or many publics simultaneously, is defined by values, mutual
visibility and shared interests and activities. Publics can be identified by the
communications around an agent, a text or an event. The Institute of Public Affairs’
Twitter feed is an example of a powerful conservative public with a record of
climate change denial and radical commitment to freedom of speech. The operation
of a horizontal public is exemplified by the Guardian’s live blog of the final day
of Australian parliamentary proceedings for 2018. It attracted over 5,500 reader
comments on 6 December.
10 Park et al. 2018.
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Disrupters
An everyday example of disruption is provided by a user’s response to a supportive
tweet sent by Donald Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, which contained an unin-
tended hyperlink – a hackable point for an inventive anti-Trumper, who took
charge of the link, buying a domain. When Trump’s supporters clicked through,
they read unexpectedly negative messages.
Trump’s Twitter feed best illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of a platform
routinely used by Australian politicians and journalists. Social networks give
already powerful politicians and their media advisers even bigger megaphones,
with access to global audiences. Politicians circumvent mainstream media by
speaking directly to those they perceive to be their publics on Twitter, Facebook or
Facebook Live, ignoring journalists and escaping difficult questions.
Regular tweeting can appear to close the distance between government and
governed, but it can cause uncertainty and accountability is limited. When he was
prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull’s Twitter account recorded political events. One
morning he rebutted The Australian’s negative coverage of his post-spill actions.11
Forwarded and receiving attention from other media, the tweet demonstrated
social media’s potential for unsettling dominant media influencers.
The challenges posed by global technology giants
Innovation by end-users is only one way that digital technology is changing
Australian political culture. Mainstream news is also challenged by competition
from non-traditional technology rivals and start-ups in the news and public affairs
marketplace. The social media giants do not pay for the user content that attracts the
growth of their subscription bases and profits, yet some content may be profoundly
damaging to the public good. More importantly, democracy itself can be weakened
by the self-regulated nature and commercial interests of the global platforms.
Calling social media giants to account for the poor quality of the information
distributed on their platforms has proved difficult for nation-states. Governments
have not designed effective checks, of the kind that uphold the civic rights and
responsibilities of a traditional free press, for Facebook and Twitter. The technology
companies do not consider themselves publishers; they are not subject to professional
publishing codes or state regulations governing news and public affairs journalism.
As yet, Facebook has little accountability for the circulation of, for example, hate
speech and fake news on its platform. Like the media organisations discussed in the
next section, the tech platforms track and reward users by employing algorithms to
measure their activity, find ‘lookalikes’ and predict consumer behaviour.12 UK demo-
cracy watchdog Demos, reporting on political marketing, describes the algorithmic
11 See https://bit.ly/2mMJTuZ
12 Tien 2018.
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approaches Facebook uses to make audience segmentation more precise through
tracking similarities in user profiles.13 Facebook’s data granularity makes it very
effective and not necessarily a good thing. A cautionary tale is provided by the har-
vesting and exploitation of raw data from millions of unsuspecting Facebook users
by the now-discredited political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica for targeted
messaging in Trump’s 2016 campaign.
Many kinds of ‘free’ information offered by social media platforms and by
search engines such as Google come at a transactional cost to users. Data on media
consumers is premium information. The new political reality is that information
about consumers, the creation of segmented publics or online clusters, and the
adoption of sophisticated tools for managing that information all shape political
parties’ communication choices.
Mapping the Australian media and communications sector
Australia has a mixed economy approach to media – a combination of private and
public enterprise. That said, the concentration of mainstream media ownership is
very high, as the regularly updated maps and other information provided free by
the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) illustrate.14 Every
large Australian city has at least one daily newspaper, available in print and digital
versions. Even in the bush, where broadband access can be patchy, consumers
have a choice of free-to-air commercial channels, public channels and paid digital
television channels, and sometimes community television. Radio is still important
in people’s lives. Local stations, some with small footprints and tiny publics,
broadcast ‘news and talk’ about public affairs in every state and territory.
Commercial media
At the macro level, commercial, public and government media broadly define
the sector in Australia. Dominant cross-media commercial corporations with
significant concentrated holdings and different business emphases compete for
market share. Two of these are based in eastern Australia – Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corp and Fairfax Media Ltd (now owned by Nine) – though both own
media enterprises or interests across the country. Along with Seven West Media,
Kerry Stokes’ holdings and Bruce Gordon’s family-owned assets, they dominate the
commercial media world.
ACMA’s ‘Media Interests’ images and the word documents relating to
NewsCorp and Fairfax Media are particularly worth scrutinising in detail.
13 Bartlett, Smith and Acton 2018, 10.
14 ACMA 2018.
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News Corp Australia
News Corp Australia’s claim that it is Australia’s number one media company is
based on market share and diverse market offerings, with 16 million monthly con-
sumers for its print and digital products.
Their ‘Find your Audience’ webpage is an excellent illustration of the niche
market segmentation tools that advertisers, including political marketers, regularly
use to match delivery of content to user profiles. News Corp advises that it can
connect advertisers to, for example, a group of 1,756,000 consumers labelled ‘Mums,
36, with kids under 18’ or to a market segment of two million ‘Executive Influencers’.
News Corp routinely opposes the current proliferation of online platforms
when the opportunity arises to make public submissions. It has argued that the
diminishing revenue streams create redundancies and make public interest
journalism unsustainable.
Fairfax Media
News Corp’s major commercial competitor, Fairfax Media, merged with Nine Enter-
tainment in late 2018, after High Court approval. At the time of the merger, Fairfax
had a comprehensive set of media assets, formats and platforms. Its newspapers
include one of the highest-circulation metropolitan ‘broadsheets’, The Age, and The
Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian Financial Review. Fairfax publishes
regional agricultural papers and community newspapers and has continuously
innovated, developing websites and tablet and smartphone apps. In the Australian
capital, digital paywalls have been instituted for The Canberra Times, once freely
available under Fairfax.
The Fairfax business was the subject of news and comment in 2018. Reports
described massive job losses and business strategy issues. The merger with a
different kind of media business generated concerns about the potential loss of
a 177-year-old news tradition. Print and digital newspaper mastheads remain in
place, with stories now unobtrusively branded by Nine. The impact on public
interest journalism is currently unknown.
Public media: Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC or ‘Aunty’) has a national network
of metropolitan and regional stations and offers a range of digital news,
entertainment, sports and specialist channels, such as those for children’s
programming, youth radio and rural communities. Government funding of about
$1 billion annually makes it a significant national enterprise. Commercial media’s
criticisms of platform proliferation and defence of private enterprise are arguably
thinly veiled attacks on the ease and speed with which the national broadcaster
has embraced the digital. At the ABC and elsewhere, workforce contractions and
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a proposed digital transformation project ensure that controversies over
management, funding and direction continue.
The ABC Charter,15 specifically legislated to safeguard the corporation’s indep-
endence from government interference, sets high standards for professionalism
and fairness. It outlines the broadcaster’s national remit to inform, educate and
entertain, and thus animate democracy. Nevertheless, accusations of bias period-
ically arise. Though the ABC has outspoken commercial rivals and political critics,
it remains one of the most trusted institutions in Australian life, as evidenced by
regular independent polls. It has a strong supporter base and a distinctive culture.
Public media: Special Broadcasting Services (SBS)
SBS is Australia’s multicultural, multilingual channel. It is a ‘hybrid’ public
broadcaster as its funding comes partly from direct grants and partly from
advertising revenue. SBS television attracts 13.1 million people monthly and the
downloads from radio are high.16 The SBS streaming service, On Demand, is
available more widely than that of any other broadcaster in Australia and makes
hundreds of international and Australian movies and programs freely available.
SBS is distinctive in its commitment to Australia’s cultural diversity and
strongly promotes intercultural awareness. In 2013, it merged with the media
company National Indigenous Television (NITV), that’s largely Indigenous staff
produce free-to-air content of local and national interest. Reportage of Indigenous
perspectives has deepened and diversified, for example, on the preservation of
Uluru as a sacred site and on the actions of the first ever Indigenous minister for
Indigenous Australians.
Free press in a democracy
Though media operates under pressure within regulatory safeguards, the dynamics
of the sector might make the ‘fourth estate’ concept seem archaic.17 But, in fact,
it still resonates broadly in the community and powerfully with many journalists,
despite the challenges of redundancies and industry change.18
The ‘fourth estate’ view of media rests on the principle of freedom of speech.
The ‘fourth estate’ view holds that the role of a free media in a democracy is
to inform electorates, interpret political events and speak truth to power. Liberal
15 Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (Cth).
16 SBS 2019.
17 The other three ‘estates’ describe the checks and balances appropriate for democratic
governance. In secular Australian governance, the three powers are the executive, the
administration, and the judiciary.
18 New Beats 2018.
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democracies place high value on a fair, strongly independent media – free from
censorship or political influence or attack – that willingly acts as a guardian of the
public interest.
An impartial press watches over the operations and probity of other
institutions, often prompting political action. Stories in 2017–18 about customers’
treatment by Australian banks pressured an initially reluctant government into
holding a royal commission into the financial sector. Media pay close attention
to the administrative arm of government, tracking allegations of misconduct. The
Australian’s ‘Teacher’s Pet’ podcast, an investigative account of the cold case of
missing woman Lyn Dawson, might have encouraged new witnesses to come
forward and led to the subsequent arrest of a suspect and the reopening of criminal
and judicial processes. Excessive media attention can, however, damage the
presumption of innocence.19
The important role of a free media is highlighted during election periods.
Choosing a government that best serves citizens’ interests depends on accurate
information being circulated in a timely, transparent and accountable way.
Journalists use a raft of presentation techniques to refresh people’s memories about
the past performances of parties and politicians: slogans, file footage, report cards,
policy chronologies, infographics, interactive maps and, of course, cartoons.
Limits of press freedom
Absolute freedom of expression for the press does not exist anywhere. Even in
polities considered liberal democracies, there are nuances. Defence of the principle
of free speech was turned into a weapon that several politicians and journalists on
the right of politics used to try to silence opposition to proposed amendments to
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), specifically to section 18C. The proposed
wording aimed to neuter the regulation of racially based hate speech. In 2011,
columnist Andrew Bolt controversially, and unsuccessfully, tested 18C in the High
Court.20
Analysing the fine details of regulatory frameworks and media operational
practices is important when defining a liberal democracy. Details to be considered
include: journalists’ training and citizens’ expectations; security restrictions in
investigating a government, judiciary or administration; freedom of information
processes; defamation law; the existence of legislation protecting journalists; and a
government’s informal practices in dealing with journalists’ dissent. Compared to
regimes where journalists are censored, imprisoned or assassinated, the conditions
for a free press in Australia are generally good, though vigilance is always necessary.
19 Fedor and Cooper 2018.
20 An ABC report on the High Court decision summarises the case: https://ab.co/31Vv8FT
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Media inquiries: monitoring the state of public interest journalism
In May 2018, the report of the Senate Inquiry into the Future of Public Interest
Journalism was published. It first assessed changes to news and public interest
journalism since the Finkelstein Inquiry five years earlier, before turning to the
questions of government funding and a new statutory body with oversight of media
– the latter suggestion largely unpopular with media organisations.
The Senate report focused on changes to news caused by the move to a
predominantly digital environment. Since Finkelstein, the Senate report noted, the
pace of change had exponentially accelerated and, despite the proliferation of new
players, the sector’s capacity to fund public interest journalism was being negatively
impacted. Challenges included the collapse of advertising revenues and business
models, and job losses. Despite recognising media’s challenges, government funding
was not recommended. Government thus reaffirmed its reluctance to intervene
directly in the mixed media economy.
State regulators and self-regulation bodies
Government sets the regulatory framework for the media and communications
sector, and various statutory and self-regulation bodies monitor compliance.
Government regulation
The ACMA is the government regulator for broadcasting, the internet,
radiocommunications and telecommunications. In addition to handling
complaints and monitoring industry compliance, ACMA publishes resources about
media. Its work informs federal legislation to prevent the formation of media
monopolies.
A full list of legislation, other regulatory bodies like the Australian Consumer
and Competition Commission (ACCC) and the Ombudsman, bodies such as the
Press Council of Australia and advocacy groups like the Advertising Standards
Bureau can be found in the guide to media and resources on the parliament of
Australia’s website.21
Self-regulation bodies
The Press Council of Australia, set up in 1976 and funded by volunteer member
organisations, is among the various regulatory bodies dedicated to ensuring that
standards of good practice are upheld, complaints are adjudicated and informed
advice is available on media policy areas. The Media, Entertainment and Arts
Alliance (MEAA), established in 1992, introduces its detailed code of journalistic
21 Jolly 2017.
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ethics by emphasising the rights of the public and journalists’ responsibilities.22
In addition to a strong statement of ‘fourth estate’ purpose, the MEAA website
provides professional codes and resources for media workers and the general
public. The MEAA runs campaigns to protect press freedom, critically engaging
with policy that threatens journalists’ pursuit of the truth.
Parliament House: government and media
Hansard is not the only public record of proceedings in the Australian parliament.
Media is ever-present. But there are different kinds and motivating forces. In the
chambers and committee rooms, parliamentary audio-visual recordings are
published every day without additional interpretation or analysis. Multiple media
organisations operate out of Parliament House; the press watches proceedings from
closed galleries or live feed in media offices. Government ministries and agencies
run policy information campaigns and regularly engage citizens through
mainstream and social media. Party media offices attempt to take control of the
news agenda through press releases, doorstops, supplying talking points and so on.
All this activity and access upholds transparency and accountability. However,
media’s focus and agency are increasingly seen to be tainting politics with the
apparent need to spin and the negative aspects of public relations. The following
section discusses potentially problematic areas.
Controlling the message
Australia’s top political office, Prime Minister and Cabinet, is served by a large
staff dedicated to publishing the government’s good news, burying its bad news,
blocking opposition stories that are seen as ‘cutting through’ with the electorate
and other forms of media management. At party headquarters, staff monitor the
clippings supplied by news aggregators, with circulation figures attached. Talking
points are supplied for spokespeople. Staying rigidly ‘on message’ can be
counterproductive as politicians work from scripts with repeated phrases. Some
politicians leave speech writing, image management and social media outreach to
their media-savvy staff. The rise and fall of governments are shaped through a
public relations-style handing of government information and citizen engagement.
Parliamentary recordings
Details of the business of government are available for forensic scrutiny through
official parliamentary media recordings. Both chambers and committee rooms are
televised, and date-stamped proceedings are viewable online on the Australian
22 MEAA 2018.
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Parliament House website. Strict rules govern what may and may not be recorded in
the private areas of Parliament House. Information on the parliament of Australia
website is available for fair re-use.
The televising of parliament has many critics among older public servants and
political observers. Although its contribution to the transparency of government is
acknowledged, it is also thought to exacerbate some of the worst aspects of politics
– for example, the combative point scoring and insults thrown in question time.
Journalists and sources
The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery
The parliament of Australia makes swathes of information available to watchdogs
(journalists and the general public) and provides offices and services to media
organisations. Journalists are visible everywhere in parliament. Their conduct is
governed by rules and conventions, with the sergeant-at-arms, the usher of the
black rod and officers from Parliamentary Services overseeing compliance and
ensuring media balance.23 Both parliamentary chambers have an enclosed gallery,
where Australian and international journalists photograph, live tweet and write
copy about the day’s events. The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery offices are co-
located on the second level of Parliament House, on the Senate side. Accredited
journalists number over 250 and, as the official website notes, since the first days
of Federation journalists have shared their resources with colleagues. Despite the
news imperative to break stories first, televised news can often include ‘vision’ –
either footage or stills – gifted to the station by another journalist.24 The phrase
‘Canberra bubble’, mentioned earlier, is used when referring to the shared
assumptions, conventions and shorthand said to be shaping political news
produced by and for an elite separated from the concerns of the public. Rather
than acting independently of politics, in a public interest role, media has been
compromised by its focus on the theatre of emotions, rather than the substance of
policy discussions, or so the argument goes.
Co-location
The working lives of political journalists, elected representatives and media officers
are intertwined and mutually dependent. Journalists are hired as media officers
by politicians or stand for election, and politicians are employed by media
organisations. The National Press Club is a short walk from parliament.
Politicians seek media attention to make themselves and their parliamentary
record known to constituents and other party members, and they use media outlets
23 Parliament of Australia 2008.
24 Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery n.d.
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to promulgate policy to as wide an audience as possible. From the moment they
nominate for public office, politicians can expect to have every part of their lives
examined. During election periods, they may be subject to a personalised ‘dirty
tricks’ campaign, as Kerryn Phelps and Dave Sharma were, simultaneously, during
the key loss of the Liberal seat of Wentworth in the 2018 by-election. Managing
media coverage of pertinent questions of eligibility and moral fitness to serve
became a particular problem for some MPs and Senators embroiled in the
controversy over dual citizenship in the 2016–19 parliament.
Journalists vigilantly stay abreast of dynamic events in order to make sense
of them. Ethical issues arise when career success could depend on being the first
to publish stories that are important to readers. Reporters risk being manipulated
when acting on leaks from staffers or politicians with agendas. Relations between
journalists and politicians often become heated, and payback is known to occur.
Controversial decisions made by journalists in 2018 include revealing details of
Barnaby Joyce’s private life and releasing information that confidential government
documents had been found in a second-hand store in Canberra, while the news
organisation concerned (the ABC) perused the documents, presumably to assess
their news value.
Co-location supports anonymous leaks. Politically motivated leaks, while
sometimes revealing inappropriate activity, have an overall tendency to contribute
to distrust in political processes. They lead to instability, can be vexatious and in
some cases may even be criminal; however, even under legal pressure, journalists
remain reluctant to identify their sources.
Conclusions
This chapter has touched on mediation processes, old and new players, the
challenges of transformation and public concerns. It is encouraging that, despite
the loss of trust in contemporary politics, Australians’ interest in political events
remains strong. Nielsen digital ratings show that time spent reading online news
spiked to 44 per cent more than the daily average on the day of Turnbull’s removal,
24 August 2018, with Australians accessing news across all platforms and devices.25
However, trust in media fluctuates. During the Turnbull spill, Chris Uhlmann’s
accusation that some right-wing journalists crossed the line to become ‘players in
the game’ in the ousting of a prime minister is a compelling and timely warning
against such abuses of the privileges enjoyed by journalists. A perceived focus on
click-worthy political content, rather than policy discussion, is also a legitimate
criticism of media.
25 Digital Content Ratings 2018.
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Courts
Grant Hooper
Key terms/names
appellate jurisdiction, common law, court hierarchy, jurisdiction, original
jurisdiction, rule of law, separation of powers, statutory law
The courts (also referred to as the judiciary) are a central and critical part of
Australia’s constitutional system. They are one of the three arms of government, the
other two being the legislature (also referred to as parliament) and the executive.
Due to their lack of independent resources and enforcement mechanisms, the
courts are often called the least powerful arm of government.1 Yet this description
belies their actual importance.
The specific and essential role played by the courts is providing binding and
authoritative decisions when controversies arise between citizens or governments,
or between the government and its citizens, regardless of whether the rights in issue
relate to life, liberty or property.2
Australian courts are modelled on their English counterparts, and before
Federation each colony had a separate court system that was ultimately answerable
on questions of law to the Privy Council in the UK. After Australia’s Federation in
1901 the separate state systems continued, but the court hierarchy was modified
by inserting the High Court of Australia between the state courts and the Privy
Hooper, Grant (2019). Courts. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian
Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Stephen 1982, 338.
2 Huddart, Parker and Co. Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ).
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Council. Recourse to the Privy Council was finally removed in 1986, leaving the
High Court as the apex court and, as such, the ultimate arbitrator of the law in
Australia.3
What decisions do courts make?
Although eluding precise definition,4 the classic starting point for determining
what a court does (i.e. what judicial power is) is the following statement of Griffith
CJ in Huddart, Parker and Co. Pty Ltd v Moorehead:
I am of the opinion that the words ‘judicial power’ as used in sec. 71 of the
Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity
have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects,
whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does
not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative
decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.5
[emphasis added]
This statement can be said to have three key components: controversies, rights and
a binding and authoritative decision.
The controversies that the courts typically decide can be divided into two legal
categories: private law and public law. Private law incorporates disputes between
‘subjects’ or citizens and includes, for example, tort, contract and defamation law.
Public law on the other hand generally involves disputes between government
and its citizens or disputes between governments (e.g. state versus state or state
versus Commonwealth). It typically encompasses constitutional, administrative
and criminal law. However, due to its importance, criminal law is often treated as
its own separate category.
The ‘rights’ that courts adjudicate upon are existing ‘legal rights’ rather than
future rights (the creation of future rights is generally seen as a legislative power).
Such rights are found in the common law or granted by the legislature through
statutes.
Perhaps the most essential power of the courts is to provide a binding and
authoritative decision so that the dispute between the parties is finally determined,
at least once any appeal process is completed. Once authoritatively determined,
the decision, whether private or public in nature, can be enforced by the executive
government if it is not willingly accepted by one of the parties.
3 Australia Act 1986 (Cth), section 9; Australian Act 1986 (UK), section 9.
4 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 597.
5 Huddart, Parker and Co. Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330.
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Although not specifically mentioned in the statement of Griffith CJ quoted
above, other cases emphasise the importance of a fourth feature of the courts’
decision-making process: to adjudicate a controversy by applying ‘judicial process’.6
‘Judicial process’ will be touched upon when discussing the separation of powers
doctrine later in this chapter. It is sufficient for now to observe that ‘judicial process’
is deciding a controversy ‘in accordance with the methods and with a strict
adherence to the standards which characterise judicial activities’.7
Historical development
Australia’s common law system is inherited from England. The term common law
reflects one of this legal system’s theoretical aims: to create a ‘common’ system of
law. That is, a system of law that applies to all, regardless of wealth, station or
political influence. From a practical perspective, common law rules are created by
the courts when they decide a dispute. To explain how it has decided a particular
dispute, the court issues a judgement outlining the rules of law that have been
applied. The rules of law or precedents in these judgements are then developed,
modified or extended by later courts when they decide similar or analogous
disputes. Courts that are lower in the hierarchy must follow the precedents created
by higher courts. The requirement that judges follow the judgements of earlier
courts is referred to as the doctrine of precedent.
The establishment of courts in Australia
Before the First Fleet left for Australia in 1787, legislation and letters patent allowed
for the creation of a criminal court and civil court respectively in New South Wales
(NSW). These courts were established upon the First Fleet’s arrival but were initially
staffed by military officers. Later, when the first judge was appointed, he was
required to follow any order given by the governor who, for all intents and purposes,
exercised both legislative and executive power. It was not until the passing of the
New South Wales Act 1823 (UK) that the colonial judges obtained the same level of
independence and security of tenure held by their English counterparts.8
The New South Wales Act 1823 also established separate Supreme Courts in
NSW and Tasmania and provided for the establishment of inferior courts – that is,
courts below the Supreme Courts. Ultimately, a similar court system was established
in each Australian colony and continues, with some modifications, today (today the
inferior courts are generally called District, Local or Magistrate’s courts).
On 1 January 1901 the Constitution came into effect and the Commonwealth
of Australia was born. As Blackshield and Williams observe:
6 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33, [39].
7 R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builder’s Labourers Federation (1957) 100 CLR 277.
8 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 23–4; Creyke et al. 2017, 45.
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The system of federalism created by the Australian Constitution involves two tiers
of government in which power is divided between the Commonwealth and the
States. Each tier has its own institutions of government, with its own executive,
parliament and judicial system.9
Consequently, the colonial (now state) court systems continued, but there would
now also be federal courts and, in particular, the High Court of Australia, created
under section 71 of the Constitution. Under sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution,
the High Court could hear and decide certain matters involving Commonwealth
power – that is, it would hear the matters in its original jurisdiction. Under section
73, the High Court would also hear appeals from the state Supreme Courts and any
federal courts that would be created.
It was clear that the High Court of Australia was generally to operate in the
same manner as the English common law courts. However, there was one
significant difference. Because England did not have a written constitution, the
English courts accepted that they did not have a constitutional role, in the sense
that they did not rule on the constitutional validity of legislation. In contrast,
borrowing from the USA, which did have a written constitution, it was assumed
that the Australian High Court would declare Australian legislation (whether state
or Commonwealth) invalid if it exceeded the constitutional power of the enacting
parliament or infringed an express or implied limit in the Constitution.10
Court hierarchy
The Australian court system has many different courts with different
responsibilities. The federal courts, including the High Court, are regulated by
an Act of the Commonwealth parliament. The state courts are regulated by their
respective state parliaments. The Australian Capital Territory and Northern
Territory courts are also regulated by their respective parliaments, although they
owe their ultimate existence to Commonwealth legislation.11
Despite the number and different types of courts, there is a reasonably clear
hierarchy, with the High Court at the apex of what can be described as a unified
system.12 It is a hierarchy in the sense that courts are ranked from highest to
lowest. Figure 1 provides a general overview of this hierarchy. The hierarchy in turn
9 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 264.
10 This principle is derived from the US decision of Marbury v Maddison (1803) 1 Cranch 137 and,
subject to some modifications, is accepted as ‘axiomatic’ in Australia: see The Australian
Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262 (Fullagar J).
11 Section 122 of the Constitution enables the Commonwealth parliament to pass laws allowing
for self-government of the territories.
12 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 138 (Gummow J).
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facilitates the operation of three important characteristics of the modern common
law system:
• the balancing of specialist knowledge with more general legal knowledge
• an appeal or judicial review process
• the doctrine of precedent.13
Key constitutional principles
There are a number of fundamental doctrines found in the Constitution. They
include ‘the rule of law, judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty, the separation
of powers, representative democracy, responsible government and federalism’.14
While each principle influences how courts operate in Australia, two principles in
particular can be said to be part of the courts’ DNA. These are the rule of law and
the separation of judicial power.
The rule of law
It is commonly accepted that the rule of law is an essential feature or sign of a
healthy democratic society. Yet, despite its importance, what the rule of law actually
means is highly contested. This is because it can be said to be a political rather
than legal concept or an aspirational rather than legal right. Nevertheless, most
conceptions of the rule of law start with the ideal that there should be known laws
that are administered fairly and that everyone is subject to,15 whether they are poor,
rich, weak, powerful, a private citizen, a public servant or a member of parliament.
While the rule of law is a cultural commitment shared between all three arms
of government, the courts are, and see themselves as, central to its enforcement
in Australia. The courts enforce the law not only by interpreting it and issuing
authoritative and binding judgements but also by applying a process in which
the parties in dispute can be seen to have received a fair hearing. This process
culminates in written reasons. Written reasons are not only necessary for the
doctrine of precedent to operate effectively, they also ensure that the parties and
others who may be affected by the law know why the decision was reached. This,
in turn, supports the presumption that the law is being administered in an open,
public and ultimately fair manner. Importantly, and entwined with the doctrine
of the separation of judicial power, this judicial process is designed to ensure that
the law is administered as it exists and not as the executive government desires or
believes it should be. In this regard, the High Court has emphasised that ‘all power
13 Harvey 2017, 74.
14 Aroney 2018, 1.
15 Burton Crawford 2017, 10–11.
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Figure 1 Generalised Australian court hierarchy.
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Figure 2 Generalised NSW civil court hierarchy.
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Figure 3 Generalised NSW criminal court hierarchy.
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of government is limited by law’ and that it is role of the judiciary to enforce the law
and the limits it imposes.16
The separation of judicial power
A separation of powers exists when the power of government is divided between
the legislature, the executive and the courts. Generally speaking:
the legislature enacts laws; the executive applies those laws in individual cases; and
in the event that a dispute arises about the meaning or application of a law, the
dispute is resolved conclusively by the judiciary.17
A strict separation of powers is enshrined in the US constitution, but it has never
existed in England. However, in England parliament has recognised the importance
of an independent judiciary since at least 1701.18 Australia has adopted somewhat
of a middle ground between the US and English approaches. It only applies a strict
separation of power to federal courts (including the High Court) but still provides
the state Supreme Courts with a significant level of independence.
Federal courts owe their existence to the Constitution, which creates a strict
separation of power between the courts and the other two arms of government.
This separation of powers is commonly known as the Boilermaker’s principle and
means that only courts created under, or given power through, Chapter III of the
Constitution can exercise Commonwealth judicial power and that the same courts
are not to be given or to exercise Commonwealth executive or legislative powers,
with some established exceptions.19 Consequently, not only is the independence
of a federal court guaranteed, their independence and integrity cannot be
undermined by giving them, for example, a political and potentially damaging
function.
State courts, which were created like their English counterparts, are not
protected by a strict separation of judicial power.20 This means that state
parliaments can vest state judicial power in other institutions or require courts to
undertake non-judicial roles. However, as state courts are now part of an integrated
court system under the Constitution and can be vested with federal judicial power,
the High Court has held that there is a limit to what state parliaments can require
them to do as they must continue to bear the essential or defining characteristics of
a court. This is known as the Kable principle.21
16 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33, [46].
17 Creyke, McMillan and Smyth 2015, 313.
18 Act of Settlement 1701 (UK).
19 R v Kirby; Ex parte the Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254.
20 Clyne v East (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 355.
21 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.
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The defining characteristics that have been said to be attributable to all courts,
whether federal or state, include not only the ‘reality and appearance of the court’s
independence and impartiality’22 but also important aspects of the judicial process
traditionally applied by the courts in reaching a decision, such as:
• ‘the application of procedural fairness’
• ‘adherence, as a general rule, to the open court principle’
• ‘the provision of reasons for decisions’.23
Political impact of the High Court
As one of the three arms of government, the role of the courts is inherently political.
This is particularly true of the High Court, which is Australia’s apex court and
the final interpreter of the Constitution. The High Court’s judgements can have,
and have had, a significant and lasting impact on the shape of Australia’s ‘political
system and process’.24 Further, as Turner has observed, the High Court ‘is an
important political forum used to advance or stymie political programs’, its
decisions ‘have significant political and societal implications’ and cases may be
brought before it to try and influence government policy.25
Despite the central role it has played and continues to play in Australian
politics, the High Court inevitably seeks to disavow any direct connection between
politics and what it says it is doing in interpreting and applying the law. This is
reflected in Latham J’s classic and often quoted assertion that:
the controversy before the court is a legal controversy, not a political controversy. It
is not for this or any court to prescribe policy or to seek to give effect to any views
or opinions upon policy. We have nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of
legislation. Such questions are for Parliaments and the people.26
This is, in effect, an assertion that law is separate from politics. It is a form of
reasoning typically described as legalism – that is, the court will decide matters
by reference to existing rules and principles, not policy considerations. However,
this form of reasoning can be said to be astutely political in and of itself as it seeks
to insulate the courts from political controversy by downplaying judges’ ability to
make choices when deciding cases.27 While it is true that judicial methodology
provides some important constraints – particularly the appeal system, combined
with the duties to apply precedent and to provide a rational explanation of how a
22 French 2012, 5.
23 French 2012, 5.
24 Irving 2009, 116, describing observations of Galligan 1987, 1.
25 Turner 2015, 358–9.
26 South Australia v The Commonwealth of Australia (1942) 65 CLR 373, 409.
27 See Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 172.
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decision is reached28 – it does not mean there is only one correct answer that can
be reached. There are inevitably judicial choices that lead to different results. These
choices can have significant political consequences. By way of example, how the
High Court’s ‘choices’ have impacted federalism and protected certain rights will be
briefly considered.
Federalism
The Constitution created a federation with a central federal/Commonwealth
government and state governments. To protect the autonomy of the state
governments, the Constitution listed specific subjects that the federal parliament
could pass legislation on, leaving everything else to the states.29 The Constitution
also allowed the states to continue passing legislation on most subjects allocated
to the federal government.30 However, once there was federal legislation, it was to
prevail to the extent that there was any inconsistency with the state legislation.31
As the arbiter of the Constitution, the High Court was responsible for
determining precisely how the constitutional allocation of power between the
federal and state governments would work. In undertaking this task, the High
Court, at first, interpreted the Constitution in a way that intentionally favoured the
states. But then a choice was made to change course, and the interpretation has
favoured the Commonwealth ever since. These choices will be briefly outlined.
The first doctrine or rule developed by the High Court to help explain how
power was to be allocated between the federal and state governments was the
‘implied immunity of instrumentalities’. Inspired by US jurisprudence, this doctrine
was based on the notion that each government was sovereign and, as such, neither
the Commonwealth nor the states could tell the other what to do unless the
Constitution expressly allowed them to do so.32 This meant, for example, that the
states and Commonwealth could not tax each other33 and a union representative for
a state government agency could not be registered under Commonwealth labour
laws.34
The second interpretative tool developed by the early High Court was the
‘reserved state powers doctrine’. As explained by Blackshield and Williams, this
meant that:
28 Gleeson 2008, 25–6.
29 See in particular sections 51, 52, 106, 107 and 108 of the Constitution.
30 Some subjects are exclusively Commonwealth, such as those set out in section 52.
31 See section 109 of the Constitution.
32 Attorney-General (NSW) v Collector of Customs for NSW (1908) 5 CLR 818 (Steel Rails).
33 Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087; D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR
91; Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585.
34 Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South
Wales Railway Traffic Employees Association (1906) 4 CLR 488 (Railway Servants’).
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the Constitution had impliedly ‘reserved’ to the States their traditional areas of
law-making power, and hence that the grants of law-making power to the
Commonwealth must be narrowly construed so as not to encroach on these
traditional powers of the States.35
This doctrine unequivocally favoured the state governments as it was premised
on the assumption that the states would continue to be the forum in which the
majority of policy decisions were made. Combined with the implied immunity of
instrumentalities, it supported the status quo – the status quo at that time being
powerful state governments with a federal government largely limited to matters of
a genuinely national nature (as the subjects allocated to the federal government in
the Constitution were thought to be).
However, the High Court’s early choice to protect the power of the states
was not universally popular. After the appointment of further High Court justices
and the retirement or death of the three initial judges who had created the two
doctrines, a choice was made to interpret the Constitution in a very different
way. This choice is most clearly seen in the iconic case of Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (the Engineers case).36
In the Engineers case the High Court rejected the implied immunity of
instrumentalities and reserved state powers doctrines. Based on English/Imperial
jurisprudence, it chose to view the Constitution as an Imperial statute (which
it technically was, having been passed by the Imperial parliament in England)
rather than a federal compact. On this view, the Imperial parliament was simply
distributing power between the federal and state governments. The governments
were not in competition with each other, in the sense that the grant of power
to one should not be viewed as diminishing the power of the other.37 While,
strictly speaking, this change in approach did not necessarily favour the federal
government, history has shown that it has. This is because the court has generally
been willing to read the powers given to the federal government expansively, with
the result that the federal government has been able ‘to advance into areas
previously held to be within the powers reserved to the state legislatures’.38
Rights protection
Unlike other English-speaking democracies, Australia does not have a
constitutional or statutory bill of rights at the federal level. This omission was
intentional. With the exception of a few express protections,39 Australia’s founding
fathers wanted to limit the ability of the courts to interfere with legislative decisions
35 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 280.
36 Engineers (1920) 28 CLR 129.
37 Selway and Williams 2005, 480.
38 Selway and Williams 2005, 480.
39 Such as sections 80, 92 and 116 of the Constitution.
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on policy issues, such as, for example, the ability to discriminate on the basis of race
as reflected in the since abandoned White Australia policy. Further, the omission of
a bill of rights can be said not only to reflect a political decision as to where most
policy decisions should be made (the legislature) but also to provide an indication
of what type of rights are likely to be protected (those favoured by the voting
constituents, who were, at the time of Federation, predominantly white males).40
Yet, despite the judgement at Federation that the legislature(s) was primarily
responsible for determining the type of rights that were worthy of protection
and those that may be compromised for the greater good, decisions of the High
Court have nevertheless limited some of the choices available to the legislature.
As discussed, the High Court’s interpretation of the Constitution has meant that
Australian legislatures are unable to pass legislation that takes away the defining
and essential characteristics of the courts. Maintaining these characteristics – such
as the court’s ability to provide natural justice or procedural fairness – not only
protects the ongoing existence of the courts but also has a derivative effect in that it
helps ensure that when a claim is brought before a court, whether by the executive
against an individual or an individual against the executive, the individual receives
a fair hearing (or at least a base level of fairness).
The courts’ role in enforcing the rule of law and, in particular, ensuring that
the executive government complies with the law also saw the High Court at the
beginning of the 21st century introduce a new implication derived from the
Constitution.41 That implication was ‘an entrenched minimum provision of judicial
review’ over executive decision making. It effectively means that the legislature
is unable to pass legislation that prevents the courts from deciding whether the
executive has acted within the law. While the implication helps to ensure that
the courts continue to operate as part of a system of checks and balances against
arbitrary power, it also has the derivative effect of providing a limited form of rights
protection. This protection is found in the fact that an individual will ordinarily
be able to challenge the legality of any executive decision that is made specifically
about them. However, it is a limited protection as the absence of a bill of rights
means the legislature can still pass laws that restrict an individual’s substantive
rights, making it more likely that adverse executive decisions will be lawful.
Perhaps most controversially, and in what can be termed the second major
period of constitutional transformation (after the Engineers case and the cases
that immediately followed it),42 the High Court has more recently found in the
Constitution an implied freedom of political communication43 and an implied right
40 Galligan and Morton 2017.
41 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157). This
implication was extended to state Supreme Courts in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales
(2010) 239 CLR 531.
42 Roux 2015, 1.
43 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News
Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
Courts
143
to vote.44 In effect, the High Court has recognised and enforced a constitutional
commitment ‘to certain fundamental freedoms or democratic values’.45
However, as interpreted by the High Court, the commitment to freedom of
political speech and the right to vote is not without limitations. This is evident in
a number of cases where the High Court has chosen not to hold legislation, or the
regulations made under legislation, invalid even though political communication
or the right to vote was or may have been impeded. The court justified these
decisions on the basis that, in the particular circumstances faced, the legislation
was a proportionate or ‘appropriate and adapted’ means of achieving legitimate
legislative goals. Such goals have included:
• protecting the safety of the public46
• enabling electoral rolls to be up to date prior to the opening of polling47
• providing limitations on the ability of property developers to make political
donations.48
Perhaps somewhat ironically, it is in the cases in which legislation has been upheld
that the inherently political nature of the High Court’s role in formulating and
applying the freedom of political communication and the right to vote is most clear.
This is because in applying the ‘appropriate and adapted’ test the High Court judges
are openly balancing the policy goals that the legislature has sought to achieve
against their own assessment of the effect on, and value of having, an ability to vote
or freedom of political communication.
Conclusions
While the courts’ role in Australia can be simply described as interpreting and
applying the law, in reality it is far more complex. This complexity is due to the
myriad controversies that the courts must adjudicate upon, necessitating a
combination of generalist and specialist courts that all sit within a hierarchy in
which they are ultimately answerable to the High Court. It is also complex because
choices may be made, particularly by the High Court when interpreting the
Constitution, that have far reaching repercussions. These repercussions can extend
to a change in the balance of power between state and federal governments or the
protection of some rights from legislative encroachment.
44 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
45 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 1328. See also Patapan 2000.
46 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579.
47 Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 334 ALR 369.
48 McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178.
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Federalism

Commonwealth–state relations
Alan Fenna
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One of the defining features of Australian government and an important factor in
Australian politics is the country’s federal system. Like other federations such as the
USA, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and India, Australia has two constitutionally
defined levels of government: the Commonwealth and the states. Each is
accountable to the citizens and empowered to make and implement policy. This
distinguishes Australia from unitary countries such as the UK, New Zealand,
France, Sweden and Indonesia, where all sovereign power is held by one national
government.1
Federations also differ greatly from one another, with some, such as Canada,
preserving a quite decentralised character while others, such as Australia, have
experienced considerable centralisation over time.2 The Commonwealth govern-
ment plays a far broader role in Australian governance than it did a century ago or
Fenna, Alan (2019). Commonwealth–state relations. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds.
Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 Hueglin and Fenna 2015. Such unitary states may have significant regional governments – as the
UK has had since ‘devolution’ created parliaments in Scotland and Wales – however, those only
exercise authority delegated to them by the national parliament.
2 Fenna 2019; Lecours 2019.
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than was envisaged when the Constitution was written. This means that Australian
federalism functions not only in a more centralised way, but also in a way that is
messier and more opaque to the public. With both levels of government operating
in many policy fields, who does what and who should be held accountable is often
not at all clear.
Understanding the day-to-day functioning of Australian federalism and the
periodic issues and conflicts that arise means understanding the constitutional
framework; the way that framework has been interpreted over the years by the High
Court; the way financial resources are shared between the Commonwealth and the
states; the attitude of the political parties to the federal system; and the network of
intergovernmental relations that has evolved in response to growing overlap and
entanglement between the Commonwealth and the states.
Origins and design
Australia is a classic example of an aggregative or ‘joining together’ federation,
where a group of independent territories decide that they would be better off in
some kind of union. Delegates from Britain’s Australian colonies met in a series
of constitutional conventions during the 1890s to design a federal system that
would create a new overarching government – the Commonwealth – but leave
the states with the bulk of the responsibilities they had exercised as self-governing
colonies. A draft Constitution was eventually produced, put to the voters in colony-
by-colony referendums and, once approved, sent to London to be passed into law
by the British parliament.3 Australia’s federal system is still composed of the six
original states, though there are now also two territories. While the Australian
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory sometimes participate in the day-to-
day operation of the federation like states, both remain under the authority of the
Commonwealth and have no independent constitutional status.4
The division of powers
Key to the federal system that the framers envisaged was the division of powers.
Which tasks would be assigned to the Commonwealth and which left to the states?
The general consensus was that almost all functions internal to the operation of
each state should remain the responsibility of the states. The Commonwealth was
assigned primarily those powers necessary for cementing the union and managing
relations with the outside world.
Following the American example, which they drew on extensively, the framers
decided to accomplish this by creating, in section 51, a single list of areas in which
3 Birrell 2001; Hirst 2000; Hudson and Sharp 1988; Irving 1997; La Nauze 1972.
4 Statehood for the Northern Territory is mooted from time to time; see Harwood, Phillimore
and Fenna 2010.
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the Commonwealth was permitted to legislate and simply leaving the states with
an open-ended grant of unspecified powers (section 107). Thus, section 51 was a
limited list of powers intended to confine the Commonwealth to a set range of tasks.5
Moreover, section 51 deliberately did not make the powers of the Commonwealth
exclusive. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commonwealth’s powers are held
concurrently with the states. However, another clause, section 109, was inserted
to give the Commonwealth paramountcy in regard to those concurrent powers.
And elsewhere in the Constitution a handful of powers were made exclusive to the
Commonwealth. Among those was the authority to ‘raise or maintain any naval or
military force’ (section 114) and to ‘coin money’ (section 115).
The framers intended that any power not mentioned in section 51 would be
entirely the responsibility of the states. These included a wide range of important
government functions, such as: land management; environmental protection; edu-
cation, social services and health care; transport and infrastructure; law enforce-
ment; and local government.
In summary, then, there was a handful of exclusive Commonwealth powers; a
larger list of concurrent powers, with the Commonwealth enjoying paramountcy;
and an open-ended set of implicitly exclusive state powers. The idea was that the
two levels of government would operate, for the most part, in their own spheres,
with minimal overlap and thus minimal need for co-ordination. It was envisaged
as a relationship between what pioneering federalism scholar K.C. Wheare
characterised as ‘distinct and co-ordinate’ governments.6
Safeguards
A division of powers is not, in itself, a guarantee that the two levels of government
will respect each other’s jurisdiction. The framers included other components to
assist in that task – three most importantly. One was a powerful upper house
(inspired by the US example), the Senate, where the states would have equal
representation. A second was an ‘umpire’ of sorts: the High Court of Australia. The
High Court is empowered to strike down legislation by either level of government
that transgresses the division of powers, and its decisions are ‘final and conclusive’.
A third was a procedure for altering the Constitution that prevents the Common-
wealth from changing the rules unilaterally. Although only the Commonwealth
parliament, and not the states, may initiate an amendment, section 128 requires
that any such proposal be approved by a majority of voters in a majority of states in
a referendum.
That demanding amendment procedure has proven a very effective safeguard,
with 36 of 44 attempts at amendment being rejected at referendum. Not all of those
were proposals to alter the federal balance, but many were. Australians have only
5 Aroney 2009, 276.
6 Wheare 1963, 2; Zines 1986, 79.
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endorsed a clear transfer of authority to the Commonwealth on two occasions:
in 1946 voters supported the proposal to give the Commonwealth authority to
provide a wide range of social service benefits (section 51[xxiiiA]) and in 1967
voters agreed to strike out the prohibition on the Commonwealth makings laws for
‘the aboriginal race in any State’ (section 51[xxvi]).
The other two safeguards have, by contrast, proven feeble. By virtue of being
popularly elected, the Senate has always functioned as a second chamber for contest
between the political parties, rather than as a ‘house of the states’, and has played
little or no role in safeguarding the federal system. Meanwhile, the High Court
has been anything but a safeguard. Rather, judicial review has provided a ‘great
corrective’ to the rigidity of the Constitution represented by section 128.7 We turn
to that now.
The courts and the Constitution: judicial review
Under the Constitution, criminal and civil law are both matters of state jurisdiction;
no authority in respect of either was assigned to the Commonwealth. Thus, the
states have their own criminal codes and their own court systems. However, the
Constitution also provides in Chapter III for ‘a Federal Supreme Court to be called
the High Court of Australia’ and whatever federal judiciary the Commonwealth
parliament decides to create. Under section 73, the High Court is empowered
to hear appeals from state Supreme Courts, thus creating a unified legal system.
And under section 74, the High Court is implicitly given jurisdiction to settle
constitutional conflicts between the Commonwealth and the states.
Although the High Court is tasked with being the ‘umpire’ of Australia’s federal
system, it was not made entirely neutral. Under section 72, the justices of the
High Court are ‘appointed by the Governor-General in Council’ – which effectively
means the prime minister. In other words, appointment is controlled not just by one
side to possible disputes, the Commonwealth, but by the executive branch of that
side alone. Here, the framers departed from the American example, where Supreme
Court appointments have to be approved by the Senate.
Centralisation and judicial review
The High Court has been resolving disputes about the division of powers since
it commenced operation in 1903. For the first decade or more, the court was
made up of leading figures from among those who had drafted the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, an originalist mode of interpretation prevailed, emphasising what
the framers had intended. Most importantly, this meant defending the states’
jurisdiction against Commonwealth encroachment and maintaining the ‘federal’
7 Menzies 1967, 152. See also Allan and Aroney 2008.
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character of the Constitution, as the judges knew was intended. In the process,
the court developed doctrines such as those of ‘implied immunities’ and ‘reserved
powers’, asserting that even if the Constitution did not explicitly protect the states,
its federal nature required and implied such protection.8
All of this changed in 1920, with the watershed decision in the Engineers case.9
In this case, the court declared that interpretation had to rely on the words of the
Constitution alone, read like any other statute. Implications were out. Because the
Constitution was not fortified with explicit statements about its federal character,
this new approach opened the door to an expansive interpretation of Common-
wealth powers that has prevailed ever since.10
Fiscal federalism
Much – though not all – of what government does requires money, sometimes large
amounts of it. Having constitutional licence or even responsibility to do something
is not the same as having the capability to do that thing. Governments need financial
resources to fulfil their responsibilities and to enjoy an autonomous existence. One
of the principles of federalism is that the different governments have a degree
of financial independence that allows them to make their own decisions and be
accountable for those decisions to their own voters. This operates vertically and
horizontally. In the vertical plane, does each level of government have access to
resources commensurate with its responsibilities? In the horizontal plane, are there
measures in place to ensure a common standard of capability in all the different
states? As it turns out, in Australia the answer to the first question is ‘no’ and the
answer to the second question is ‘yes, but there can be conflict’.
Controlling the revenue
The Constitution gives both levels of government full access to all revenue sources
except ‘duties of customs and of excise’ (section 90). Customs and excise were made
exclusive to the Commonwealth to ensure that Australia enjoyed the economic
benefits of internal free trade.11
However, things turned out a bit differently. First, the High Court started
interpreting the prohibition on state ‘excise’ taxes in a way that covered any sales
tax, depriving the states of a major and quite economically efficient revenue base.12
8 Aroney 2017, 53.
9 The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR 129
(Engineers).
10 Aroney 2017, 54.
11 For an overview of the dilemmas faced by the founders, see Saunders 1986.
12 Culminating in the decision in Ha and Another v The State of New South Wales and Others
(1997) 189 CLR 465, which prompted the Commonwealth to compensate the states by
hypothecating the total net revenue of the proposed GST to them. Saunders 1997.
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Then, in 1942, the High Court endorsed the Commonwealth’s takeover of personal
and corporate income tax in the Uniform Tax case. Since then, the Commonwealth
has enjoyed a stranglehold over revenue in the federation. This is why, in contrast
with the situation in Canada or the USA, Australians pay no state income tax
and no state sales tax. It is also why the states impose socially and economically
inefficient taxes, such as stamp duty, and it helps explain why they are generally so
willing to condone gambling.
The result is a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), where the
Commonwealth collects far more in tax than it requires for its own purposes and
the states have expenditure needs far in excess of their tax revenue. This lead to the
states being dependent on annual transfers from the Commonwealth for roughly
half of their revenue. Occasionally, proposals are made to restore some financial
balance to the federation, but so far none have generated any momentum.13 In
1999, the Commonwealth and the states did agree that the proceeds from the
Goods and Service Tax (GST) that the Commonwealth was introducing would go
to the states.14 However, this merely replaced one set of Commonwealth transfers
with another.
Commonwealth grants
The Commonwealth could simply hand back to the states the surplus revenue
it collects, and, indeed, a substantial amount is transferred in that way (GST
revenues). However, it was not long before Commonwealth governments realised
that by making grants to the states for certain defined purposes, or with certain
conditions attached, they could start to influence or even control what the states did
in their own areas of jurisdiction. By such means, they would be able to circumvent
the limitations imposed by the federal division of powers. Since the early 1970s,
these specific purpose payments, or ‘tied grants’, have proliferated and made possible
the expansion of Commonwealth power across a wide range of policy fields, the
largest being health and education. Today, just over 50 per cent of Commonwealth
transfers to the states come in the form of unconditional revenue from the GST and
just under half come in the form of grants for specified purposes. Reforms have
occurred, but it is not clear how profound they have been.
The equalisation system
All federations are torn between the principle that each of their constituent units
has some responsibility for its own economic and financial success and the
principle that citizens should receive a comparable quality of public services
regardless of where in the country they live. In Australia, the latter principle has
13 Fenna 2017.
14 A New Tax System (Commonwealth–State Financial Arrangements) Act 1999 (Cth).
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dominated. A highly developed system of horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE)
allocates GST revenues to each state according to their respective needs and
capabilities.15
The Commonwealth Grants Commission uses a complex formula to make
recommendations to the federal treasurer for GST distribution each year. That
formula takes into account the particular spending needs of each state and territory
– a jurisdiction with proportionally larger disadvantaged populations, for instance,
will have greater spending needs. And on the other side, the formula takes into
account each jurisdiction’s revenue-raising capacity. As long as the differences are
not great, the system works reasonably well. However, when, as in the last decade,
they have widened and shifted, conflicts arise.
Intergovernmental relations (IGR)
Almost a century now of centralisation since the Engineers case has left Australia
with a federal system where, instead of operating in their own spheres, the two
levels of government are deeply entangled. The states have retained most of their
original responsibilities, but the Commonwealth now plays a role in almost all of
those areas. There are now education, health, local government and social service
departments, as well as environmental protection agencies, at both levels of
government although each of those was originally state jurisdiction. As we have
seen, this high degree of overlap has resulted, most importantly, from the
Commonwelath’s financial superiority and the ability that gives the Commonwealth
to provide conditional grants to the states. In such a deeply entangled system,
mechanisms for co-ordination and collaboration between the two levels of
government are essential. The general term for this is co-operative federalism –
meaning that ongoing co-operation is required, but not meaning that it is achieved
without conflict.
Australia’s IGR system
Since 1991, in particular, Australia has developed a sophisticated network of co-
operative mechanisms. At the apex is COAG, the Council of Australian Govern-
ments. COAG is a periodic meeting of the Commonwealth and the state and
territory heads of government (along with the president of the Australian Local
Government Association) where major intergovernmental issues are considered.
Answering to COAG are a clutch of ministerial councils bringing together all
the responsible ministers in the main portfolio areas from across the country. In
addition, a number of statutory agencies have been established to administer joint
programs or oversee joint policies. Many of the new and complex relationships
15 Commonwealth Grants Commission 2017.
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between the two levels of government in different policy fields are regularly
formalised in intergovernmental agreements. While legalistic in style, these are not
legally binding or enforceable.
COAG, it must be remembered, is only a brief and occasional meeting held
when the prime minister decides, and the Commonwealth dominates. For a few
years, there was an organisation through which the states tried to co-ordinate
joint action and positions on national issues: CAF, the Council for the Australian
Federation.16 Joint action by the states would have provided some counterweight
to that Commonwealth dominance. However, such joint action has proved very
difficult to maintain.
Co-operative federalism
The formalisation of Australia’s longstanding practice of summit meetings between
the prime minister and the premiers as COAG in 1991 was the beginning of a
new and much more active period in Australian intergovernmental relations. Since
then, co-operative federalism has waxed and waned. Through the 1990s, Australian
governments worked more closely and sometimes collaboratively in an effort to
make Australian federalism operate more effectively and efficiently.17 Enthusiasm
for co-operative federalism faded somewhat under the Coalition government of
1996–2007, in part because of partisan differences with Labor governments at the
state level. However, it surged to a new highpoint with the election in 2007 of the
Rudd government, when, for a brief time, it was ‘wall-to-wall’ Labor governments
across the country. COAG met frequently and the two levels of government worked
energetically to improve the functioning of Australia’s federal system.
Generally, a well-functioning system of executive federalism is seen as a good
thing. However, questions are sometimes raised about the extent to which it
removes political decision making from the purview of the people’s representatives
in parliament.
The future of Australian federalism
Despite the enormous change that has taken place in Australian federalism over
the past century, the states still play a large role, particularly in delivering public
services. State governments manage their respective hospital and government
school systems, plan and construct transport infrastructure, manage their state’s
energy utilities, and control most of the policing and criminal law. However, they
are dependent on Commonwealth funds for a good part of that and carry out
those tasks in ways greatly influenced by Commonwealth policy decisions. The
16 Phillimore and Fenna 2017; Tiernan 2008.
17 Painter 1998.
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result is a system that is anything but ‘distinct and co-ordinate’. The entanglement of
the two levels of government regularly elicits criticisms and complaints of overlap
and duplication, blame- and cost-shifting, blurred lines of accountability and
inefficiency. It raises the question of whether Australia should rehabilitate, re-
engineer or retire its federal system.
Numerous inquiries and commentaries have suggested that Australian
federalism be ‘reformed’ by rationalising the roles and responsibilities of the two
levels of government. Ideally, overlap and duplication would be minimised and
each level of government would take responsibility for the tasks to which it is best
suited. There has even been suggestion that Australia should return to a simpler age
of a more co-ordinate style where clearer lines of division between the two levels
of governments are re-established.18 In 2014, incoming Coalition Prime Minister
Tony Abbott announced a high-level and comprehensive inquiry into the matter.19
That inquiry got as far as releasing a preliminary report but was terminated by
Abbott’s replacement before the process could finish.20 This typified the start–stop
experience with federalism reform in Australia, a process that is heavily constrained
by the dominant position of the Commonwealth.21
Conclusions
The union of Britain’s six Australian colonies in 1901 created a federal system where
a constitutional division of powers allocated much of the work of government
to the states while assigning certain specific functions to the Commonwealth.
That system exists to this day, but has changed significantly in its operation. The
Commonwealth has taken on new responsibilities and extended its influence into
a wide range of areas that were originally exclusive to the states. As a consequence,
Australian federalism has been transformed from the original model, in which the
two levels of government operated independently of each other, to one where there
is endemic concurrency.
The Constitution lays out the legal architecture of Australia’s federal system.
This is most notable in section 51, enumerating the Commonwealth’s powers;
section 90, prohibiting the states from levying duties of customs or excise; section
96, allowing the Commonwealth to make conditional grants; sections 107 and
108, guaranteeing the states their continued existence and authority; section 109,
establishing the superiority of Commonwealth law within its assigned jurisdiction;
section 74, making the High Court the umpire of the federal system; and section
128, requiring support in a majority of states for constitutional change.
18 For example, NCA 2014; NCA 1996.
19 Prime Minister 2014.
20 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015.
21 Fenna 2017; Tiernan 2015.
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Although Australian federalism has changed greatly over the last century, with
a couple of notable exceptions, it is not because these key provisions have been
changed. Indeed, section 128’s strict requirements have helped ensure that very
little has been altered in the Constitution itself. Rather, change has occurred as a
consequence of the way some of those provisions have been used and the way they
have been interpreted by the High Court. Since the Engineers decision of 1920, the
High Court has followed an interpretive approach supporting an expansive reading
of Commonwealth powers. This has facilitated assumption of fiscal dominance by
the Commonwealth, which, in turn, has given it enormous financial leverage over
the states.
Whether it be in education, housing, health care, environmental protection,
infrastructure or a range of other areas of governance that were originally state
matters, the two levels of government are now inextricably intertwined. In tandem
with that development has come the rise of co-operative federalism, where the
Commonwealth and the states work to negotiate over policy and co-ordinate their
actions. At the apex of that system of intergovernmental relations is COAG.
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Australian Capital Territory
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It is paradoxical that the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), as the national capital
and seat of the federal parliament, should have the least political representation
of any state or territory jurisdiction in the country per capita. Despite having
a population similar to that of Tasmania, the ACT currently has two federal
electorates, two senators and a 25-member Legislative Assembly. Tasmania, by
comparison, has five federal electorates, 12 senators, a 25-member lower house and
a 40-member upper house, as well as 29 local government areas.
This chapter will explores the ACT’s history and process of government – what
can be described as Australia’s only ‘city state’.1 In doing so, it asks a number of
questions. Given the disparity in representation, is the ACT more or less effectively
governed than other jurisdictions? Is its relationship with the Commonwealth
government different from that of other states and territories? Situated within New
South Wales (NSW), what is its political and policy relationship with that state? Are
Tennant-Wood, Robin (2019). The Australian Capital Territory. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John
R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 Halligan 2015, 6.
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there constitutional provisions for its government? What level of autonomy does
the ACT possess for policy?
Historical context
The ACT is a creature of Australia’s adoption of federalism in 1901. At Federation
there was no officially proclaimed national capital. The first federal parliament met
in Melbourne while the government decided on where to locate the capital to
provide it with security and also not ‘favour’ either Sydney nor Melbourne. The
search for a suitable place was narrowed down to a spot mid-way between the two
rival cities, and the site for Canberra – on the land of the Ngunnawal people – was
chosen in 1908. The territory was formally ceded to the Commonwealth by NSW in
1909. Work on the city was interrupted between 1914 and 1918 by the First World
War, and parliament finally moved into its ‘temporary’ Parliament House in 1927;
it would remain there for a further 61 years before the permanent one opened in
1988.
As a planned city that embraced modern concepts like private car ownership
and suburban living, Canberra was always intended to be a showpiece – the nexus
of national government in a garden city. It is the site of various national institutions
and monuments, as well as the instruments of government: government depart-
ments, agencies and related bodies. During the construction of the city, most
of the public service departments remained in Melbourne, but as Canberra was
completed, stage by stage, the departments moved to the seat of government. This
process explains why, even today, many peak bodies and lobbying organisations
are still headquartered in Melbourne.2 The post–Second World War years saw a
very rapid increase in population with the expansion of the departments and the
associated construction of housing and city amenities. Between 1955 and 1975, the
population of the ACT increased by 50 per cent every five years.
During the 1970s, the population of the ACT increased to 224,0003 and there
was a growing push for self-government. According to Halligan and Wettenhall,
there were largely two schools of thought regarding this proposal: self-government
advocates believed that Canberrans, with no state or territory level of government,
did not have the same democratic rights as other Australians; opponents to self-
government ‘preferred to trade these rights for the financial benefits that came from
being a federally protected and heavily subsidized enclave within the nation’.4
In 1978, an advisory referendum was held for ACT residents on self-
government. Voters were given three choices on the ballot form: retain the current
arrangements; self-government; or a local council arrangement with legislative
2 Fitzgerald 2006.
3 ABS 2012.
4 Halligan and Wettenhall 2000.
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Proposal % Votes
Self-government 30.54 33,480
Local government 5.72 6,268
Present arrangements 63.75 69,893
Table 1 Results of the 1978 advisory referendum on self-government. Source: ACT
Legislative Assembly 2015.
and executive responsibility. The result of the referendum was overwhelmingly in
favour of retaining Commonwealth administration (see Table 1).
By the late 1980s, however, the ACT population had grown to almost 300,000,
and the Commonwealth, despite the results of the referendum, decided that the
ACT should become a self-governing jurisdiction. This required four separate Acts
of the Australian government:
• Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth)
• Australian Capital Territory (Electoral) Act 1988 (Cth)
• Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land Management) Act 1988 (Cth)
• Australian Capital Territory Self-Government (Consequential Provisions) Act
1988 (Cth).
These Acts were signed into law on 6 December 1988. The first of these is essentially
the constitution of the ACT and sets out the framework for government and
the system of governance. The Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land
Management) Act 1988 oversees the ACT Plan and the Spatial Plan, which set out
the development provisions for the ACT, and comes under the auspices of the
National Capital Authority.
Self-government in the ACT
Today, the ACT is governed by a unicameral 25-person Legislative Assembly,
elected under the Hare-Clark electoral system (see below). The ACT does not have
its own police service; instead, general policing is carried out by the Australian
Federal Police.
The government of the ACT is a hybrid organisation.5 Like a state government,
it is responsible for developing and implementing policy across the normal terri-
5 Halligan 2015.
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torial responsibilities: finance and economy, justice, environment, education,
health, housing and development, transport and employment. In addition, it has
responsibility for municipal functions: waste management, sportsground main-
tenance, kerbing and guttering, development applications, and parks and gardens.
Developments in self-government
The first ACT election was held on 4 March 1989. It was conducted under a
modified d’Hondt (party list) electoral system, the whole of the ACT comprising
one 17-member electorate. The election was contested by 117 candidates, repre-
senting 22 political parties and independents.
A measure of the somewhat jaundiced view of residents towards self
government in 1989, and also reflecting the results of the earlier referendums,
was that the parties contesting the election included the Surprise Party, the Sun-
Ripened Warm Tomato Party and the Party! Party! Party! Further, the first House
of Assembly included eight representatives from anti-self-government parties: No
Self-Government, the Abolish Self-Government Coalition and the Residents Rally
Party. It took almost two months to finalise the counting of votes, and the final
result was a minority Labor government led by Rosemary Follett.
While Follett’s government managed to navigate the first tentative steps of
government, a key player in the transition to self-government was William Harris,
the secretary of the Chief Minister’s Department. Harris was the architect of the
ACT’s first budget, a ‘task that involved identifying all federal government spending
on the territory by dozens of departments and agencies, and then overseeing the
design and establishment of a purpose-made public service to operate at both state
and municipal levels’.6 Over time, the ACT has managed to navigate autonomy well,
consolidating its administrative functions and moving to a more stable electoral
system.
Until the 2016 election, the Assembly had 17 members elected from three
electorates: Molonglo, Ginninderra and Brindabella. In 2013, ACT Electoral
Commissioner Philip Green held a review of the size of the Assembly. This was
motivated by the expanding population, and because the ministerial responsibilities
of minority government members had expanded, reducing the degree to which
ministers could undertake all their duties. The report recommended that:
• the ACT Legislative Assembly be increased to 25 members at the 2016 election,
with five electorates each returning five members;
• the Assembly be increased to 35 members at the 2020 election, with five elec-
torates each returning seven members.7
6 Cooke 2016.
7 ACT Reference Group on the Size of the Legislative Assembly 2013.
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The government accepted the first recommendation, and, in 2015, a redistribution
of electoral boundaries was held, increasing the number of electorates to five, each
electing five members.
Electoral system
The modified d’Hondt system under which the first Assembly was elected was
superseded by the Hare-Clark system. The Hare-Clark system is also used to elect
the Tasmanian lower house, and is a proportional representation system using a
single transferable vote (STV), where the vote transfers from candidate to candidate
according to the preferences of the voter. In a five-member electorate, voters must
number a minimum of five squares on the ballot paper.
The ballot form itself follows the Robson rotation system, meaning that the
candidates’ names in the party lists on the ballot form are rotated so no single
candidate is listed at the top of every form. The 2016 election, the first with the
extended assembly, attracted 10 registered political parties and a total of 141 indiv-
idual candidates. The result was a minority Labor government supported by two
Greens members.
Intergovernmental relations
Commonwealth–ACT relations
With slight representation in the national parliament, the ACT has a complex and
often fraught relationship with the federal government. Self-government saw the
ACT better able to participate in Australia’s system of federal intergovernmental
relations, through inclusion in the peak intergovernmental relations body, the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG). But the ACT suffers from ‘co-location’,
being both Canberra-as-national-capital and Canberra-as-distinctive-entity in its
own right.8
Upon self-government, the National Capital Development Commission was
superseded by the National Capital Authority (NCA). The NCA is an agency of the
federal government with responsibility for the ongoing development of Canberra.
This authority extends to land to be released for development, the preservation of
the Burley Griffin plan for the city and the maintenance of the historical integrity
of the capital. The ACT government, therefore, must operate under the auspices of
the NCA for all planning and development decisions.
Complicating the relationship between the ACT and federal governments is
the fact that the Parliamentary Triangle comes under federal control. This area
8 Wettenhall and Warrington 1998.
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(the apex of which is Parliament House, and which is bounded by Commonwealth
and Kings Avenues and the northern shore of Lake Burley Griffin) contains Old
and New Parliament House, the National Library, Science Centre, Art Gallery and
Archives, the High Court and several major public service buildings (including
Treasury and Department of Finance, and the Australian Electoral Commission
offices). It is positioned close to the centre of the city, which has considerable
implications for territory planning. The ACT government has no jurisdiction
within this area, with the exception of the delivery of municipal services.
ACT–NSW relations
NSW surrounds the ACT on all sides. As such, the territory must retain working
relations with that state to deal with a variety of cross-boundary issues (Canberra is
increasingly a conurbation that includes the town of Queanbeyan in NSW). As the
largest metropolitan area in its region, Canberrans also see large numbers of people
from the surrounding state using its services.
In 2016, the two jurisdictions signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
Regional Collaboration to provide a structure for the joint development and imple-
mentation of policy (including co-operative consultation with stakeholders) for the
region.9 This builds on structures set up over recent decades, such as the NSW
Cross Border Commissioner in 2012.
Policy issues of salience in the ACT
With a highly educated and comparatively wealthy population,10 the ACT is
generally held to be socially progressive.11 It has led the way in recognising same-
sex partnerships, waste minimisation policies and renewable energy initiatives.
Greens members have been elected to the ACT parliament consistently since 1995.
Except for one term (2004–08), the ACT has always had minority governments,
dependent upon minor parties and independents for support in the Legislative
Assembly to pass legislation and retain confidence. While tending to support Labor
in government, the presence of the Greens has been significant in promoting
socially and environmentally progressive policies, reflecting the ACT Greens’
origins in wider social justice issues.12
The ACT’s progressiveness in pursuit of public policy, however, has often been
at loggerheads with more conservative federal administrations due to the
subordinate position of territories in Australian federalism. The Australian
9 ACT and NSW 2016.
10 ABS 2017.
11 Stewart 2014.
12 Miragliotta 2012.
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Constitution is unambiguous in handing the right to make laws for the territories
to the Commonwealth:
The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered
by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any territory placed
by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or
otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of
such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms
which it thinks fit.13
Two recent policy disputes – one now resolved, one ongoing – illustrate this limit
to territorial self-government.
Same-sex marriage and civil unions
In March 2004, the ACT proposed legislation to enable civil unions for same-
sex couples. The legislation, which would permit civil unions to be conducted by
marriage celebrants and would give same-sex couples the same legal rights and
standing as heterosexual married couples, was vigorously opposed by the then
federal government under Prime Minister John Howard. The attorney-general wrote
to ACT Chief Minister Stanhope saying that, while the Commonwealth considered
the status of same-sex relationships to be within the jurisdiction of the states and
territories, it opposed any altering of the ‘status of marriage’.14 Stanhope responded
by amending his proposed legislation so that civil unions could not be performed
by marriage celebrants, but the federal parliament, fearing that the ACT’s legislation
was a step towards legalising same-sex marriage, promptly blocked it by amending
the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) so that the definition of ‘marriage’ changed from ‘a
union between two consenting adults’ to ‘a union between one man and one woman’.
In 2013, under Chief Minister Katy Gallagher, the ACT passed the Marriage
Equality Bill 2013 (ACT) in defiance of the Commonwealth.15 At the time, the chief
minister stated that:
We would prefer to see the federal parliament legislate for a nationally consistent
scheme, but in the absence of this we will act for the people of the ACT. The
Marriage Equality Bill 2013 will enable couples who are not able to marry under
the Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961 to enter into marriage in the ACT. It
will provide for solemnisation, eligibility, dissolution and annulment, regulatory
requirements and notice of intention in relation to same-sex marriages.16
13 Constitution of Australia 2010, section 122.
14 Zanghellini 2007.
15 Karvelas 2013.
16 Gallagher, quoted in Karvelas 2013.
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Attorney-General George Brandis announced that the Commonwealth would
appeal in the High Court to have the legislation overturned, but the ACT’s Act came
into force on 7 December 2013. Over 30 couples immediately married under the
new law before, a week later, the High Court ruled in the Commonwealth’s favour
on the grounds that the ACT law contradicted the federal marriage legislation
and was therefore unconstitutional. While this ended the progressive experiment
in same-sex marriage, the conflict did much to put the issue on the national
agenda and placed pressure on successive national governments to expand access
to marriage.
The right to die: euthanasia
The Northern Territory paved the way for euthanasia laws in 1995, when it became
the first Australian jurisdiction to legalise assisted suicide for the terminally ill. The
ACT was to follow suit until the Commonwealth passed legislation overriding any
move by either territory to pass euthanasia laws in 1997.
In December 2015, Liberal Democrat Senator David Leyonhjelm proposed
the Restoring Territory Rights (Assisted Suicide Legislation) Bill 2015 (Cth), with
senators of all parties being given a conscience vote. The purpose of the Bill was
to repeal the Commonwealth’s prohibition of the territories legislating for assisted
suicide. Leyonhjelm is an outspoken supporter of both the rights of the territories
to determine their own laws, and the rights of the terminally ill to choose to die.
The debate, therefore, was as much about territory rights as it was the rights of the
terminally ill.
The Bill went to a second reading in 2016; however, it lapsed at prorogation of
the parliament in the lead-up to the election and was not reinstated to the notices
until later in 2016. It finally went to its second reading debate in February 2018.
After several months of debate, it went to a vote on 14 August 2018. The Bill was
expected to pass the Senate with a narrow margin; however, last minute lobbying
on the part of those opposed to the Bill changed the votes of enough senators to see
it defeated by two votes.
Conclusions
The government of the ACT is in a unique position, being the jurisdictional
authority over the territory wherein resides the federal government. It faces a
number of challenges: administering a territory whose core ‘industries’ are
government and (predominantly publicly funded) education; providing municipal
services for a rapidly growing city; providing health, education and public transit
services for a growing population; maintaining a healthy and productive
relationship with the NSW government and the local government authorities of
the ‘Australian Capital Region’; and maintaining both its character and integrity
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while forging a good working relationship with the federal government, regardless
of which political party is in power.
The expanded Assembly should ensure a better coverage of the issues and
more equitable representation of the population. It is not known whether the ACT
government will act on the second recommendation of the Reference Group on the
Size of the Legislative Assembly and expand the Assembly to 35 members in the
future.
Given the demographics and political inclination of the ACT’s population, it
is likely that the ACT government will remain progressive in its policy outlook;
however, the issue of territory rights remains unresolved.
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New South Wales
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New South Wales (NSW) politicians tend to see their state as ‘the premier state’, a
claim once emblazoned on NSW vehicle number plates. This contentious claim of
pre-eminence rests on two main strands. One strand is cultural centrality: in 1788,
the convict colony in NSW initiated the ‘defining moments and symbols’ of the later
Australian nation.1 The second strand has to do with the size of NSW. Although
it is not physically the largest of the six Australian states, NSW has the biggest
population, the greatest wealth and the most government activity.
NSW’s potential to dominate national politics, as well as the fears this potential
has generated in other parts of the country, have been clear since the Federation
debates over the Australian Constitution. NSW has played a major role in national
politics and is often seen as the state that is politically closest to the national centre.
It sends about one-third of the members to the House of Representatives (currently
47 out of 150) and has provided almost half of the country’s prime ministers (14
Clune, David, and Rodney Smith (2019). New South Wales. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John
R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 Hirst 1998, 464.
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of 30). The state’s citizens have identified more closely with the centre and have
possessed weaker state loyalties than citizens of other states.2
Perhaps for this reason, NSW has rarely been a leader of the states in
Commonwealth–state conflicts and has not been particularly innovative among the
states in developing new directions and approaches in public policy.3 As Elaine
Thompson comments in her survey of NSW governments, ‘Pragmatism seems
to be the order of the day rather than bold visions from either the Left or the
Right’.4 Politics within NSW has been dominated by practical problem-solving
administration, tinged with anxiety about whether the performance of the state’s
government and public sector match its claims to premier status.
The constitutional framework
Over a period of a century or so after 1788, NSW developed a pattern of represent-
ative and responsible government – including strong bicameralism, entrenchment
of key constitutional provisions and judicial review – that later helped to form
expectations about the Australian Constitution.5
The following sections of this chapter outline the most important elements
of representative government in NSW: the Legislative Assembly, the Legislative
Council and the electoral system.
The Legislative Assembly
The 19th-century Legislative Assembly was not dominated by disciplined political
parties. Governments often rose and fell in the house, rather than at elections, as
premiers gained and lost support from other members of the Legislative Assembly
(MLAs) (see Table 1). The Assembly occupied a more central position in the
democratic process than it ever would again. In the early 20th century, Labor and
non-Labor parties began to control the Assembly. The house’s deliberation and
scrutiny functions atrophied as governments gagged debate and rushed legislation
through.6
The main exception to majority party control of the Assembly occurred after
the 1991 election, which left the Liberal–National Coalition government of Nick
Greiner in a minority. In return for support from three independent members,
Greiner implemented a charter of reform that led to a revival of the Assembly’s
deliberative and scrutiny processes.7 With the return to majority government at the
2 Smith 2001, 281–2.
3 Deane 2015; Hughes 1984; Nelson 1985.
4 Thompson 2007, 361.
5 Sharman 1989.
6 Clune and Griffith 2006.
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1995 election, the Assembly reverted to government dominance, a situation that
remains today.8
The Legislative Council
After 1856, the appointed Legislative Council was intended to be a house of review
and a conservative check on the popularly elected Assembly. Until 1934, members
of the Legislative Council (MLCs) were appointed by the governor. From 1934 until
1978, all MLCs were elected by members of both houses of parliament.9
Labor Premier Neville Wran was determined to reform a Council he could not
abolish. After much negotiation, the opposition agreed to a reform proposal that was
then overwhelmingly passed by a referendum in 1978. It provided for a house of
45 members elected by proportional representation on a statewide basis. One-third
retired at each general election.10
Further change came under Liberal Premier Nick Greiner. In 1991, the Council
was reduced to 42 members and the term of office reduced from 12 to eight years,
with half the MLCs ending their terms at each election. The quota required for
election was consequently lowered, increasing the opportunities for minor party
and independent representation. No government has controlled the upper house
since 1988, during which time the Council has largely exercised parliament’s roles
of reviewing legislation, scrutinising the executive and holding it accountable.11
The electoral framework
The current NSW electoral system developed from the late 1970s. In 1979, the
Wran Labor government provided for optional preferential voting (OPV) in single-
member districts. This method has continued since, allowing voters to allocate
preferences to as many or as few candidates as they wish.12
Since 1978, Legislative Council elections have used OPV, with ‘above-the-line’
or ‘group ticket’ voting introduced from 1988 to simplify the process. The rules
about upper house preferences have been altered over time to reflect changes in the
size of the Council and to prevent minor parties with little support being elected.13
Further reforms in 1979 abolished the long-term over-representation of rural
voters in the Assembly. In 1991, the government’s right to call an early election
7 Clune and Griffith 2006; Smith 1995.
8 Clune and Griffith 2006; Smith 2012.
9 Clune and Griffith 2006; Turner 1969.
10 Clune 2017.
11 Clune and Griffith 2006; Smith 2006; Smith 2012.
12 Smith 2003.
13 Green 2012.
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was replaced by a fixed four-year electoral term, with elections held every four
years on the fourth Saturday in March. These changes were entrenched in the NSW
constitution, so they cannot be repealed without a referendum.14
Until the 1980s, election candidates raised their own campaign funds and were
not required to reveal who had provided them with funding. In 1981, NSW passed
the first laws in Australia providing for public funding of elections and public
disclosure of political donations. More recently, campaign donations from property
developers and some other sources have been banned.15
The political contest
The political contest in NSW since the advent of representative and responsible
government in 1856 can be divided into five broad eras: faction politics in the
early colonial period; a late colonial period dominated by Free Traders and Protec-
tionists; an unstable contest between Labor and anti-Labor parties from the 1900s
to the 1940s; a Labor versus Coalition contest from the 1940s to the 1980s, domi-
nated by Labor; and a period from the late 1980s when Labor versus Coalition
competition has been modified by minor party and independent challengers.
The Labor Party changes the contest
The competition for government in the colonial era was between loose factions
gathered around dominant political leaders (such as Charles Cowper, John
Robertson, James Martin, Alexander Stuart and the greatest of them all, Henry
Parkes), and later between Free Traders and Protectionists (see Table 1).
A stronger challenge to the colonial pattern of political competition came from
the formation of the Labor Party. In January 1890, the NSW Trades and Labor
Council decided to elect representatives to parliament to protect and further its
interests. The initial platform was a practical, down-to-earth document, mainly
concerned with matters such as industrial, electoral, land, educational and social
reform. The new party drew support not only from the urban working class but
also from small farmers, shopkeepers and intellectuals. It had socialist elements but
these were never predominant. From its inception, Labor was committed to the
parliamentary road to reform.16
Labor constructed its organisation on the innovative basis of grassroots control.
In practice, these democratic ideals were often subverted by dominant factions that
ruled with an iron fist. The early electoral successes of the Labor Party pushed non-
Labor forces together into a single party, the Liberal Party, in the 1900s, creating the
14 Twomey 2004.
15 Gauja 2012.
16 Nairn 1973.
New South Wales
173
Election* Premier/s
between
elections**
Main support in Assembly Government
status
1856 Stuart Donaldson
Charles Cowper
Henry Parker
Charles Cowper
Independents
Cowper faction
Independents
Cowper–Robertson faction
Minority
Minority
Minority
Minority
1858 Charles Cowper Cowper–Robertson faction Minority
1859 Charles Cowper
William Forster
John Robertson
Cowper–Robertson faction
Independents
Cowper–Robertson faction
Minority
Minority
Minority
1860 John Robertson
Charles Cowper
James Martin
Cowper–Robertson faction
Cowper–Robertson faction
Martin and Forster factional coalition
Minority
Minority
Minority
1864 James Martin
Charles Cowper
James Martin
John Robertson
Martin and Forster factional coalition
Cowper–Robertson faction
Parkes and Martin factional coalition
Cowper–Robertson and Forster
factional coalition
Minority
Minority
Minority
Minority
1869 John Robertson
Charles Cowper
James Martin
Cowper–Robertson and Forster
factional coalition
Cowper–Robertson and Forster
factional coalition
Martin and Robertson factional
coalition
Minority
Minority
Minority
1872 Henry Parkes Parkes faction Minority
1874 John Robertson
Henry Parkes
John Robertson
Robertson faction
Parkes faction
Robertson faction
Minority
Minority
Minority
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Election* Premier/s
between
elections**
Main support in Assembly Government
status
1877 John Robertson
James Farnell
Henry Parkes
Robertson faction
Independents
Parkes and Robertson factional coalition
Minority
Minority
Majority
1880 Henry Parkes Parkes and Robertson factional coalition Majority
1882 Alexander Stuart
George Dibbs
Stuart–Dibbs–Jennings faction
Dibbs–Jennings faction
Minority
Minority
1885 John Robertson
Patrick Jennings
Henry Parkes
Robertson faction
Dibbs–Jennings faction
Free Trade
Minority
Minority
Minority
1887 Henry Parkes
George Dibbs
Free Trade
Protectionist
Minority
Minority
1889 Henry Parkes Free Trade Minority
1891 Henry Parkes
George Dibbs
Free Trade
Protectionist
Minority
Minority
1894 George Reid Free Trade Minority
1895 George Reid Free Trade Minority
1898 George Reid
William Lyne
John See
Free Trade
Protectionist
Progressive
Minority
Minority
Minority
Table 1 Elections, premiers, Assembly support and government status in the colonial
period.
*Year of first day of voting if voting occurred on multiple days.
**The first premier listed next to each election date is the first leader who secured office as
a result of the election. Premiers who continued to govern for short periods after losing an
election until a successor was sworn in are not included.
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Labor versus Liberal dynamic of party politics that has dominated NSW politics ever
since.17
In 1910, Labor formed its first NSW government; it was re-elected in 1913.
This level of success proved impossible to repeat throughout the next few decades,
with Labor only governing for two-fifths of the period from 1910 to 1941 (see Table
2). Although Labor governments had some important achievements to their credit
in this period, they were repeatedly brought undone by internal divisions.
The most bitter division centred on Jack Lang, who became Labor leader in
1923. He plunged the party into an internal war, and his inflammatory style as
premier led NSW close to major civil disorder. In 1932, Governor Sir Philip Game
used his reserve powers to dismiss Lang. At the ensuing election, Labor suffered a
crushing defeat and remained in the wilderness for much of the next decade.18
In the period after 1910, the major non-Labor party went through two
realignments, absorbing the Labor conscription defectors to become the National
Association of NSW (the Nationalists) in 1917 and then reforming as the United
Australia Party (UAP) in 1932. Although electorally more successful than not, the
Nationalists and UAP were both organisationally weak parties, heavily reliant on
strong parliamentary leaders. Disastrous election losses in the early 1940s led to the
UAP’s dissolution.19
Apart from facing Labor’s challenge, the Nationalists had to deal with farmers,
graziers and rural business people who were angered by what they saw as the
Nationalists’ neglect of ‘the bush’. Disaffected conservative rural politicians ran under
the Progressive banner at the 1920 election, winning 11 seats in rural NSW. A split
among the Progressives over how closely to support George Fuller’s Nationalists
led to the formation of the NSW Country Party in 1922. A workable relationship
between the conservative parties of town and country was not resolved until after the
1927 election, when the Country Party won 13 seats and negotiated five ministries,
including the deputy premiership, as junior partner in a Nationalist–Country
Coalition government. This established the long-term pattern of Coalition relations
whenever the major non-Labor parties governed in NSW.20
Postwar Labor dominance
William McKell, who replaced Lang as Labor leader in 1939, won a landslide
victory in 1941. Labor would dominate NSW politics over the following eight
decades, governing for more than two-thirds of that time, over three lengthy
periods: 1941 to 1965, 1976 to 1988 and 1995 to 2011 (see Table 3).
17 Hagan and Turner 1991; Nairn 1973.
18 Hagan and Turner 1991; Nairn 1986.
19 Hancock 2007.
20 Aitkin 1972; Davey 2006.
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Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1901 John See
Thomas Waddell
Progressive
Progressive
Minority
Minority
1904 Joseph Carruthers Liberal Minority
1907 Joseph Carruthers
Charles Wade
Liberal
Liberal
Minority
Minority
1910 James McGowen
William Holman
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1913 William Holman Labor then Nationalist Majority
1916 William Holman Nationalist Majority
1920 John Storey
James Dooley
George Fuller
James Dooley
Labor
Labor
Nationalist–Progressive Coalition
Labor
Minority
Minority
Minority
Minority
1922 George Fuller Nationalist–Progressive Coalition Majority
1925 John Lang Labor Majority
1927 Thomas Bavin Nationalist–Country Coalition Majority
1930 John Lang
Bertram Stevens
Labor
United Australia–Country Coalition
Majority
Minority
1932 Bertram Stevens United Australia–Country Coalition Majority
1935 Bertram Stevens United Australia–Country Coalition Majority
New South Wales
177
Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1938 Bertram Stevens
Alexander Mair
United Australia–Country Coalition
United Australia–Country Coalition
Majority
Majority
Table 2 Elections, premiers, Assembly support and government status from Federation to
the Second World War.
*The first premier listed next to each election date is the first leader who secured office as a
result of the election. Premiers who continued to govern for short periods after losing an
election until a successor was sworn in are not included.
McKell and many of his colleagues had been scarred by the Lang years and
were determined to create a new style of Labor government. McKell’s emphasis
was on internal unity, political moderation and efficient administration. During his
two terms, he implemented significant social, industrial and environmental reforms
and established a model of negotiated compromise between the ALP machine and
Labor governments that continued under his successors. This model, along with
political skill and continuous prosperity in the long postwar boom, helped Labor to
retain office until 1965.21
Labor won the 1976 election under Neville Wran, who was premier for the next
decade. As well as maintaining the McKell model, he took account of the emergence
of new policy issues concerning quality of life and equality of opportunity. Wran was
re-elected with record majorities in 1978 and 1981, and less easily in 1984.22
Bob Carr led Labor back to office with a narrow victory in 1995, before winning
easily in 1999 and 2003. Economic efficiency and environmental sustainability were
the key elements of the Carr model. He became the longest continuously serving
NSW premier, remaining in office for 10 years and four months. Carr’s premiership
was followed by a period of instability and rapid leadership change. The ALP’s
organisational wing clashed with the government over electricity privatisation.
The influence of back-room figures such as Eddie Obeid, who was subsequently
imprisoned for corruption, was a major issue. At the 2011 election, Labor suffered
its worst defeat since 1904, winning just 36 per cent of the two-party preferred
vote.23
Why was NSW Labor so dominant after 1941? Part of the answer lies in the
sheer extent of the NSW UAP’s collapse in the early 1940s and the difficulty of
21 Cunneen 2000.
22 Bramston 2006; Chaples, Nelson and Turner 1985; Steketee and Cockburn 1986.
23 Clune 2005; Clune and Smith 2012; Dodkin 2003; West and Morris 2003.
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Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1941 William McKell Labor Majority
1944 William McKell
James McGirr
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1947 James McGirr Labor Majority
1950 James McGirr
John Cahill
Labor
Labor
Minority
Minority
1953 John Cahill Labor Majority
1956 John Cahill Labor Majority
1959 John Cahill
Robert Heffron
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1962 Robert Heffron
John Renshaw
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1965 Robert Askin Liberal–Country Coalition Majority
1968 Robert Askin Liberal–Country Coalition Majority
1971 Robert Askin Liberal–Country Coalition Majority
1973 Robert Askin
Thomas Lewis
Eric Willis
Liberal–Country Coalition
Liberal–Country Coalition
Liberal–Country Coalition
Majority
Majority
Majority
1976 Neville Wran Labor Majority
1978 Neville Wran Labor Majority
1981 Neville Wran Labor Majority
1984 Neville Wran Labor Majority
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Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
Barrie Unsworth Labor Majority
1988 Nicholas Greiner Liberal–National Coalition Majority
1991 Nicholas Greiner
John Fahey
Liberal–National Coalition
Liberal–National Coalition
Minority
Minority
1995 Robert Carr Labor Majority
1999 Robert Carr Labor Majority
2003 Robert Carr
Morris Iemma
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
2007 Morris Iemma
Nathan Rees
Kristina Keneally
Labor
Labor
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
2011 Barry O’Farrell
Michael Baird
Liberal–National Coalition
Liberal–National Coalition
Majority
Majority
2015 Michael Baird
Gladys Berejiklian
Liberal–National Coalition
Liberal–National Coalition
Majority
Majority
Table 3 Elections, premiers, Assembly support and government status since 1941.
*The first premier listed next to each election date is the first leader who secured office as a
result of the election. Premiers who continued to govern for short periods after losing an
election until a successor was sworn in are not included.
establishing a competitive Liberal organisation.24 The initial Liberal Party leaders
were also no match for able ALP premiers like Joe Cahill. The parliamentary party
was internally divided and was often in conflict with the machine. The NSW
Party finally found a successful leader in the long-serving and popular Robert
Askin (deputy leader 1954–59; opposition leader 1959–65; premier 1965–75). A
24 Hancock 2007.
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later period of Liberal-led government (1988-1995) saw the premiership of Nick
Greiner (1988-1992) cut short following an ill-advised government appointment,
after which much of the government’s reformist zeal was lost.25
Since their landslide election win in 2011, the Liberals have had three premiers,
with the transitions being smoothly managed. Barry O’Farrell (2011–14), after
a capable and reformist beginning, was forced to resign over a minor scandal
involving a gift. His successor, Mike Baird (2014–17), for a time the most popular
premier in Australia, retired from politics after less than three years because of a
backlash over decisions to ban greyhound racing and amalgamate local councils.
His replacement, Gladys Berejiklian (2017–) halted the government’s sliding
fortunes in 2019 and became the first woman to lead a party to election victory in
NSW.
Throughout the postwar period, the ‘country’ partner in the NSW Coalition
has proved remarkably resilient in the face of a declining rural economy, long-
term population drift to urban centres and periodic challenges from independents,
minor parties and even its Liberal ally. The postwar vote share of Country/National
Party candidates in Assembly elections has remained stable, and the party’s share
of Assembly seats has fluctuated within a narrow band (12.9 to 19.4 per cent). Its
lowest Assembly seat return occurred at the 2003 election but the party bounced
back to record its highest postwar share of seats at the 2011 election.26
Minor party and independent challenges since the 1980s
The electoral support of Labor and the Coalition parties has softened since the
1980s. As noted earlier, the Coalition was forced into minority government between
1991 and 1995 with the support of several independents. More recently, independ-
ents, the Greens and the Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party (SFFP) have all won
Assembly seats.
Single-member districts make winning Assembly seats difficult for minor part-
ies. The proportional representation system used for Legislative Council elections
provides minor parties with more encouragement, since they only need to win
a relatively small vote across the state to win a seat. Since the democratisation
of the Council, 10 minor parties have won Council seats and minor parties now
command one-quarter of the vote at every Council election (see Table 4). The
longest standing of these parties is the socially conservative Christian Democratic
Party (CDP), whose leader, Fred Nile, first won a seat in 1981, when the party
was named Call to Australia (CTA). CTA was frequently opposed in the Council
by the socially and environmentally progressive Australian Democrats, with both
25 Hancock 2013; Laffin and Painter 1995.
26 Davey 2006; Green 2012; Smith 2003.
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parties critical to the passage of government Bills at different times between 1988
and 1995.27
After 1995, other minor parties became important players in the Council
at various times. Of the minor parties currently represented in the Council, the
Greens have the strongest organisation. The CDP relies on support networks within
the churches, the SSFP mobilises through gun clubs and hunting associations, and
the Animal Justice Party has strong connections to animal rights groups. Pauline
Hanson’s One Nation Party (PHON) won two Council seats at the 2019 election
with former federal Labor leader Mark Latham as its lead candidate.
The continued success of minor parties has changed the dynamic of NSW
electoral and parliamentary politics. The Labor Party now competes with the
Greens for left of centre votes, while the Coalition parties face electoral challenges
from right of centre minor parties such as the SFFP and PHON. Governments still
initiate almost all legislation that is passed by the NSW parliament; however, they
often need to take the views of minor parties into account to prevent contentious
Bills being defeated by a combination of opposition and minor party MLCs.28
Conclusions
NSW has a well-established set of formal political institutions that have adapted to
changing pressures over two centuries. This adaptability is perhaps best illustrated
by the development of the Legislative Council from an appointed to an elected
house of review. The institutional framework of NSW politics currently appears to
be relatively settled; however, the major political parties face challenges to adapt
their traditional outlooks and operations to new circumstances. Recent revelations
by the Independent Commission Against Corruption of political corruption
involving both the Labor and Liberal parties point to integrity and transparency
as key concerns for future governance in NSW. NSW Labor is yet to overcome
the legacies of the post-Carr era, while the Coalition government has staked its
reputation on a massive infrastructure spending program. This program is intended
to address Sydney’s growth and the economic development of regional NSW. Even
if the government succeeds in completing the promised roads, rail lines, stadiums
and so on, it may face a legacy of unresolved issues, such as population growth,
overdevelopment, environmental damage, the merits of private versus public
provision of services, lack of consultation and disruption to local communities.
A key question is whether the old laws of NSW politics – when the ‘pork barrel’
ruled – still apply or whether NSW is moving into an age in which tolerance,
sustainability, quality of life and access to social capital are more central to citizens’
perceptions of what it means to live in the ‘premier state’.
27 Smith 2006.
28 Smith 2012.
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Election First preference votes (%) Seats won (n)
Labor Liberal–National Other Labor Liberal–National Other
1978 54.9 36.3 8.2 9 6 0
1981 51.8 33.8 14.4 8 5 2 (CTA; AD)
1984 46.9 42.6 10.5 7 7 1 (CTA)
1988 37.5 46.2 16.3 6 7 2 (CTA; AD)
1991 37.3 45.3 17.4 6 7 2 (CTA; AD)
1995 35.3 38.5 26.2 8 8 5 (CTA; AD;
Gns; SP; BFC)
1999 37.3 27.4 35.3 8 6 7 (CDP; AD;
Gns; PHON;
RLS; UP; ORP)
2003 43.5 33.3 23.2 10 7 4 (2 Gns; CDP;
SP)
2007 39.1 34.2 26.7 9 8 4 (2 Gns; CDP;
SP)
2011 23.8 47.7 28.5 5 11 5 (3 Gns; CDP;
SP)
2015 31.1 42.6 26.3 7 9 5 (2 Gns; CDP;
SP; AJP)
2019 26.7 34.8 38.5 7 8 6 (2 Gns; 2
PHON; SP; AJP)
Table 4 NSW Legislative Council elections: vote and seat shares. Source: Australian Politics
and Elections Database, University of Western Australia. http://elections.uwa.edu.au/.
CTA = Call to Australia (later renamed Christian Democratic Party [CDP]); AD =
Australian Democrats; Gns = Greens NSW; SP = Shooters Party (later renamed Shooters
and Fishers Party and then Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party); BFC = A Better Future
for Our Children; CDP = Christian Democratic Party; PHON = Pauline Hanson’s One
Nation; RLS = Reform the Legal System; UP = Unity Party; ORP = Outdoor Recreation
Party; AJP = Animal Justice Party.
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Northern Territory
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The Northern Territory (NT) comprises one-fifth of Australia’s land mass and
has a population of 244,300,1 of which one-third is Aboriginal. Representative
government is a relatively recent phenomenon for residents of the NT, who endured
government from afar until the 1970s and, to a certain extent, still do.
Like other parts of the country lying north of the Tropic of Capricorn, it has
fleeting moments at the top of the national political agenda – most notably at times
of disaster – before resuming its status as a somewhat awkward remote irritant.
The NT Legislative Assembly is a unicameral parliament, established after the
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) (Self-Government Act) of the
Smith, Robyn (2019). Northern Territory. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 ABS 2016. Note that the population has been in decline since then as mining projects have been
completed. Further, there is a significant ‘fly-in, fly-out’ (transient) workforce on mining projects.
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federal parliament conferred limited self-governing powers on the NT. The Ass-
embly is comprised of 25 representatives of single-member electoral divisions; each
division has an average 5,140 electors.2
History
The NT was part of the colony of New South Wales (NSW) from 1849 until 1863.
It then became part of South Australia (SA) until 1911,3 making it part of SA at
Federation in 1901.
Under the Northern Territory Representation Act 1888 (SA), the NT was a single
electoral district that elected two members to the SA House of Assembly and,
proportionately, membership of the Legislative Council. From 1901 until 1911, NT
residents, who had been extended full adult suffrage,4 voted for the six senators
representing SA and, from 1903, the NT was included in SA’s federal division of
Grey.5
In 1911, the NT was ceded by SA to the Australian government. Under this
regime, the NT had no representation at all in the federal parliament and no
state-like legislature. It is arguable that this disenfranchisement was the result
of the White Australia policy, enacted in 1901, because the non-Indigenous NT
population was overwhelmingly dominated by Asians,6 which would inevitably
have resulted in non-white representation in the federal parliament.7
In preparation for the change to Commonwealth control, the federal parliament
enacted the Northern Territory (Administration) Act 1910 (Cth), which provided
for government in the NT headed by an administrator appointed by the governor-
general.8
After bitter objections from NT residents, a single member of the House of
Representatives was granted by the Northern Territory Representation Act 1922
(Cth). That representative had no vote. In 1936, the NT representative was granted
a vote, but only on ordinances setting down laws for the NT.
Legislative Council
A 13-person Legislative Council was established in 1947. The Commonwealth
retained absolute control by providing for the election of six members and the
2 Redistribution Committee 2019.
3 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xi.
4 This included Aboriginal people – possibly as an administrative oversight – although they were
unaware of their right and not at all familiar with the electoral process.
5 National Archives of Australia n.d.
6 Principally Chinese, engaged in mining and commerce, but also Japanese, engaged in the
pearling industry, and Malays, Filipinos and Indonesians, engaged in fishing enterprises.
7 See, for example, Egan 2017, 27, 43.
8 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xi.
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appointment of seven members. The Council had the power to make laws for
the ‘peace, order and good government of the Territory subject to assent by the
Administrator and/or the pleasure of the Governor-General’.9 The Council met for
the first time in 1948.
Disaffection with the lack of autonomy remained, and, in April 1958, all six
elected members of the Council resigned in protest. All were re-elected, five
unopposed, in June 1958.10 In the same year, the NT’s member of the House of
Representatives was allowed to vote ‘on any proposed law or matter relating solely
or principally to the Territory’.11
The following year, the composition of the Legislative Council was changed
to eight elected members, six official members and three non-official members.
Commonwealth control was retained by appointing the administrator to be the
president of the Council with two votes, a deliberative and a casting vote.12 At
the same time, an Administrator’s Council was created as an advisory body and
comprised two official (appointed) members and three elected members.
In 1965, the administrator was replaced as a member and president of the Legis-
lative Council. The president was, for the first time, an elected member of the Council.
In 1968, composition was changed again: non-official appointed members were
replaced by elected members, resulting in 11 elected members and six appointed
members. For the first time, the Legislative Council was under NT control. In that
year, the NT’s member of the House of Representatives was granted full voting rights.
Legislative Assembly
On 20 November 1974, the first fully elected Legislative Assembly, comprising 19
members, convened. This resulted in the NT’s first executive. In 1977, the federal
parliament enacted the Self-Government Act. On 1 July 1978, the NT became self-
governing and the NT government was given authority and responsibility for the
finances of the territory. In 1982, membership of the Legislative Assembly was
increased to 25.
Limitations of self-government
When the Commonwealth ceded control of the NT to the Legislative Assembly,
certain state-like powers were not transferred. These were: Aboriginal land rights,
industrial relations, national parks and uranium mining. Those limitations remain.
9 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xii.
10 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xii.
11 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xii.
12 This anomaly was carried over at the time of self-government. The speaker of the Legislative
Assembly, unlike speakers of other parliaments, has two votes: a deliberative and, in the event of
a tied vote, a casting one.
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This situation, however, is fluid. The NT’s Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995
(NT) (ROTI), passed by the Legislative Assembly in May 1995, was overturned by
the federal parliament’s Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth),13 which amended the Self-
Government Act by inserting section 51A to prohibit laws in relation to voluntary
euthanasia. ROTI has never been repealed by the Legislative Assembly and remains
an impotent instrument in the statutes of the NT. Statehood was first mooted for the
NT during the 1975 federal election, but this amendment to the Self-Government
Act resulted in a grievance to the Australian parliament and an invigorated debate
about the NT’s inequality within the federation.
Similarly, the federal parliament’s Northern Territory National Emergency
Response Act 2007 (Cth) (the Intervention) allowed for a federal ‘invasion’ of the
NT and the suspension of some NT and federal laws. The $587 million emergency
response followed publicity arising from the Little children are sacred report,
commissioned by Chief Minister Clare Martin in 2006, and was an initiative of
the Howard government in the lead-up to the 2007 election, at which it was
defeated. The Intervention suspended federal laws in relation to discrimination,
social security, taxation and Aboriginal land, and NT laws in relation to alcohol
and pornography, removed customary law and cultural practice considerations
from bail applications and sentencing in criminal trials, and introduced mandatory
health checks for children. Directed at Aboriginal communities, the haste with
which it was introduced allowed ‘little time for consultation with Indigenous
communities’ and it included ‘army troops being deployed to Indigenous
communities in the Northern Territory’.14
Neither action could happen in a state because state constitutions provide
entrenched powers and legislative independence from the federal government. The
NT is without a constitution; in its absence, the Self-Government Act is effectively
the constitution.
Financial arrangements and economy
The NT has been funded as a state by the federal government since 1988.15 Funding
arrangements apply:
on the principle of ‘horizontal fiscal equalisation’ meaning that funding is provided
on the basis of what it costs to deliver a service per person in the NT. Distance
is factored in to the Commonwealth’s formula, often to the chagrin of the more
populous states.16
13 Also known as ‘the Andrews Bill’ because it was sponsored by the Member for Menzies
(Victoria) Kevin Andrews MHR.
14 Castan Centre, Monash University n.d.
15 Smith 2013, 25.
16 Smith 2013, 93.
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Funding for Aboriginal disadvantage, however, has been a contentious matter
since self-government was established in 1978. Speaking at the 2017 Garma Festival
of Traditional Culture, former Chairman of the NT Grants Commission and former
Coordinator-General Bob Beadman said that while the reason for the dearth in
funding is multifaceted, a fundamental reason is that ‘The Commonwealth Grants
Commission carve-up provided no catch-up to address the infrastructure deficit
dump passed to the NT at the time of Self-Government’.17
Because of the small population, there are limited revenue-raising oppor-
tunities for NT governments. Taxation revenue is limited to payroll, motor vehicle
registration and stamp duty–type revenue. The boom and bust nature of the NT’s
resource-based economy means there is some income from mining royalties, but
these are subject to minimisation by the companies concerned and don’t contribute
a great deal to the NT budget.18 Thus the NT is heavily reliant on federal govern-
ment funding.
Notwithstanding that 30 per cent of the population is Aboriginal, the NT is
losing ‘Indigenous funding’ to other states because increasing numbers of people
in those states are identifying as Aboriginal. This is complicated by the Common-
wealth Grants Commission’s failure to assess relative need between Aboriginal
populations in Australia19 since its creation in 1933.
The enduring lack of comprehensive federal policy in relation to northern
Australia has been lamented by Megarrity20 as the ‘politics of neglect’ based on
viewing the nation’s north as an economy rather than a society, and failing to
consider intellectual contributions from a range of community members. Historical
neglect, he noted, means that the north is still considered a wild, frontier land for
which visions of wealth and splendour are a product of east coast metropolitan
‘white fella Dreaming’.
Political parties
There are two dominant political parties in the NT: the Country Liberal Party
(CLP) and the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The CLP was formed in 1974, when
the Liberal Party, which was concentrated in Darwin, and the Country Party, which
was concentrated in regional bush centres, merged to become the sole conservative
force. The NT branch of the ALP was formed in 1973 and has traditionally been
regarded as ‘weak’ because:
17 Beadman 2017.
18 See Northen Territory Government 2019.
19 For example, there is no distinction between the remote community of Papunya in Central
Australia and Parramatta in urban NSW so the same ‘loading’ applies to both communities. See
also Beadman in Productivity Commission 2017.
20 Megarrity 2018, 183.
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The small size of the urban centres and the almost total lack of any large-scale
industrial development has meant that the Labor party has no ‘natural’ base of
membership and money. [Additionally,] organization of an industrial wing and
a branch structure was made difficult by the vast distances, the poor communi-
cations and the costs of transport.21
This difficulty was well demonstrated when the CLP held power in the NT from
1974 until 2001, when the ALP experienced its inaugural victory.
Aboriginal representation in the Legislative Assembly
Electoral laws applying at the 1974 and 1977 elections provided for voluntary
enrolment of Aboriginal people, although, if enrolled, voting was compulsory.
By the 1980 election, enrolment and voting were compulsory for all qualified
residents. Prior to 1980, remote Aboriginal people were obliged to use the postal
vote system; however, this was replaced with mobile polling booths in remote
communities22 and candidates identified both by name and photograph on ballot
papers, recognising that English was a second or subsequent language in many
communities. This more inclusive practice remains the case.
Aboriginal electoral enrolment is comparatively low,23 particularly in remote
regions. The reasons are complicated and include language difficulties, relevance
of the electoral system, electoral roll accuracy and the logistical difficulties of
undertaking remote enrolment drives.
There has been Aboriginal membership of the Legislative Assembly since 1974,
although membership of more recent Assemblies better reflects the NT’s 30 per
cent Aboriginal population. There have been several Aboriginal ministers – men
and women – in NT governments.
Elections
Four-year fixed-term elections were introduced in the NT in 2009. Table 1 lists the
results of each general election since the Legislative Assembly was created in 1974.24
21 Jaensch 1981, 64.
22 Jaensch and Smith 2015, 62–3.
23 See, for example, James 2016.
24 More detailed results and those relating to by-elections can be found at Jaensch and Smith 2016,
73–81, or on the NT Electoral Commission website.
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Election Enrolment Seats won Leaders Government
Ind/
Other
ALP CLP ALP CLP
1974 39,027 2 (Ind) 0 17 NA Goff Letts CLP
1977 43,284 1 (Ind) 6 12 Jon Isaacs Paul
Everingham
CLP
1980 53,218 1 (Ind) 7 11 Jon Isaacs Paul
Everingham
CLP
1983 62,178 0 6 19 Bob Collins Paul
Everingham
CLP
1987 74,633 2 (Ind)
1 (Nat)
6 16 Terry Smith Steve Hatton CLP
1990 82,261 2 (Ind) 9 14 Terry Smith Marshall
Perron
CLP
1994 95,007 1 (Ind) 7 17 Brian Ede Marshall
Perron
CLP
1997 101,886 0 7 18 Maggie
Hickey
Shane Stone CLP
2001 105,506 2 (Ind) 13 10 Clare Martin Denis Burke ALP
2005 111,954 2 (Ind) 19 4 Clare Martin Denis Burke ALP
2008 119,814 1 (Ind) 11 13 Paul
Henderson
Terry Mills ALP
2012 123,805 1 (Ind) 8 16 Paul
Henderson
Terry Mills CLP
2016 135,506 5 (Ind) 18 2 Michael
Gunner
Adam Giles ALP
Table 1 Northern Territory general election results, 1974–2016. Source: ntec.nt.gov.au
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Land rights
During the 1960s, Aboriginal political activism accelerated. The Yirrkala Bark
Petitions, protesting against the granting of mining leases over Yolŋu land without
consultation, were presented to the federal parliament in 1963. Vincent Lingiari
led the historic Wave Hill walk-off in 1965 to press for equal wages for Aboriginal
stockmen. A 1967 referendum, which sought a mandate to remove sections of the
Constitution that discriminated against Aboriginal people,25 was supported. Prime
Minister Gough Whitlam introduced a Bill for the Land Rights Act and, after the
Whitlam dismissal in 1975, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 (Cth) (ALRA) was passed by the federal parliament with bipartisan support
in December 1976.
The Self-Government Act is at loggerheads with ALRA, however, because:
very little thought was given back in 1978 to what legal and institutional relation-
ships needed to exist between the new government, land councils and traditional
owners to allow for a smoothly functioning polity. Those relationships remain
confused and ill-defined.26
At issue is the fact that 51 per cent of the NT’s land mass is designated Aboriginal
land over which the NT government has no control. Equally, Aboriginal people
have limited direct control over their land because power in relation to decisions
about Aboriginal land is vested in Aboriginal land councils27 to act in the interests
of traditional owners. This, said Parish, has resulted in a ‘largely unplanned system
of separation of powers’, with no constitutional foundation, between the federal and
NT governments.
The two largest land councils – the Northern (NLC) and Central (CLC) – are
often criticised for not representing the wishes of some or all traditional owners. In
a 1998 review of ALRA by John Reeves QC, the Act was found to have ‘generated
internal disputes by concentrating benefits in the hands of individuals’ and resulted in
‘selected individualism’ that also affected royalty distributions. The absence of a more
productive partnership, he said, was ‘to the detriment of … Aboriginal Territorians’.28
Most recently, these land councils have been criticised for entering into a
memorandum of understanding with the chief minister in relation to treaty nego-
tiations. Groups such as the Yolŋu of Arnhem Land, represented by the inde-
pendent member Yingiya Guyula, claim to have been left out of the process.
25 Note that the referendum did not confer voting rights on Aboriginal people. The federal
parliament provided for Aboriginal people to vote in 1962.
26 Parish 2018.
27 There are four land councils in the NT: the Northern Land Council, Central Land Council, Tiwi
Land Council, and Anindilyakwa Land Council.
28 Brennan 2006, 3.
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The Self-Government Act and ALRA are products of the Australian parliament
over which the NT has no control.
Federal representation
Section 122 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) provides
the NT with two senators and two members of the House of Representatives. This
has been the case since 1975; however, ‘the legislation to enable this representation
was the subject of great rancour, only passing the Commonwealth parliament
following affirmation at a joint sitting of the two houses and subsequently surviving
two High Court challenges’.29
The rancour, Michael Sloane says in his paper on representation of the
territories in the Senate, was caused by the potential ‘Constitutional imbalance’ it
would unleash on the Senate. He points out that the Constitution preserves the
rights of ‘original States’ and stipulates that changes to Senate representation, which
in turn affect House of Representatives numbers, must ‘maintain parity in the
representation of the original states’.
Statehood
The issue of whether the NT should be admitted as the seventh state of the
Australian federation has been contentious for a variety of reasons, including the
relatively small population, negotiations with the federal government on terms and
conditions of admission30 under section 106 of the Constitution31 and internal
wrangling within the NT about whether statehood is a priority, the mechanics of
how to proceed and, at a very local level, whether residents will lose open speed
limits and their annual cracker night – two issues that were identified in NT-
wide surveys undertaken by the Statehood Steering Committee. The latter concerns
resulted in a dedicated fact sheet32 explaining that these matters are not subject to
Commonwealth laws and are the responsibility of the NT government.33
The Legislative Assembly appointed a Select Committee on Constitutional
Development in 1985, which was superseded by a Standing Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs. Following the overturning of ROTI in 1997, the impetus
for statehood was invigorated.
A constitutional convention was held in 1998, but Aboriginal people and some
trade union representatives walked out in protest. Aboriginal people held their own
29 Sloane n.d.
30 Including Senate representation (see also federal representation).
31 Horne 2008.
32 Northern Territory Statehood Steering Committee 2005.
33 It is the case, however, that the Commonwealth government made abolition of open speed
limits a condition of federal funding. The NT complied.
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conventions in the same year, which resulted in two statements: the Kalkarindji
Statement of August and the Batchelor Statement of December. The message from
both statements was clear: there would be no discussion about statehood unless
Aboriginal Territorians were consulted and included in negotiations.34
Meanwhile, a referendum on statehood was held on 3 October 1998 and
narrowly lost, with a 51.31 per cent ‘no’ vote. Aboriginal people voted in a solid
bloc against the proposition. Three questions had been recommended by the
constitutional convention, but Chief Minister Shane Stone rolled them into this
single question, as Smith describes:
Now that a constitution for a state of the NT has been recommended by the
statehood convention and endorsed by the NT parliament, do you agree that we
should become a state?
The ‘constitution’ referred to in the referendum question provided for the
Premier to sack the Governor, which would render a Governor little more than
a public servant and would potentially establish the state of the NT as a benign
dictatorship.35
The ALP resurrected the idea in 2003, after its election in 2001, with bipartisan
support. Despite considerable expense and an extraordinary amount of work, the
matter lapsed in 2016 after political wrangling about the timing of an election for
a fresh constitutional convention. Chief Minister Adam Giles raised the issue at
the Council of Australian Governments in 2016, when the idea was supported in
principle and the onus returned to the NT to formulate a proposal. The matter has
not seriously resurfaced since.
Conclusions
The NT enjoys a peculiar position in the Australian federation, but essentially
functions as a state to the extent that the Self-Government Act allows. Friction
arises – usually resulting in debates about ‘states rights’ – when the Commonwealth
intervenes in NT matters, as was the case with the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 and
the Intervention.
The NT is characterised by intergenerational Aboriginal disadvantage, giving
rise to complex social problems requiring considered and enduring policy res-
ponses, which, in turn, require significant funding. Principal among these are
generations of Territorians suffering from foetal alcohol spectrum disorder.
Commonwealth funding arrangements, particularly in the area of Aboriginal
disadvantage, have been contentious since the advent of self-government. Similarly,
34 Smith 2008, 265.
35 Smith 2008, 264. See also Smith 2013, 27.
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Goods and Services Tax distribution between the states under Grants Commission
relativities is regarded as inadequate.
Whether or not the NT becomes Australia’s seventh state is a matter for
residents, the NT and federal governments. Key among the issues to be resolved
is representation in the Australian parliament. At a broader level, recognition of
Aboriginal people as the first inhabitants of the NT is a matter for both the NT and
federal governments and will be crucial to any negotiations in relation to statehood.
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Political culture and populism
While each of Australia’s states and territories enjoys its own political culture, it
has been argued that Queensland’s varies from the norm more than any other
Australian state, largely due to its regionally centred industries, heavily decentralised
population and huge variations in topography, climate and natural resources.1
It has been further argued that ‘populism’ – a political movement that mobilises
a ‘common people’ against a vilified ‘elite’ – sits at the core of Queensland political
culture. Populist leaders – notable Queensland examples include William Forgan
Smith, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Pauline Hanson and Clive Palmer – harness support
by appealing directly to (often less educated) voters who, usually located in the
regions, regard themselves as ‘outsiders’ who feel ‘dispossessed by technology or
other social or economic change’.2
Williams, Paul D. (2019). Queensland. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune,
Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Smith 1985; Williams 2009.
2 Canovan 1981; Wear 2008; Williams 2009.
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Queensland’s special brand of populist political culture consists of five mutually
reinforcing elements: strong (often authoritarian) leadership that allows premiers
to dominate party, Cabinet, parliament and public opinion; political pragmatism
(from bypassing due process to policy flexibility); regionalism (appealing to the
‘country-mindedness’3 of rural Queensland); state development (a mission to
develop Queensland’s wilderness); and a state ‘chauvinism’ that asserts Queens-
land’s economic, cultural and moral difference from other jurisdictions.4
Queensland’s historical themes
Queensland’s populism is a function of at least seven core themes that have come
to define the state’s history. These are: a heavy emphasis on regionalism borne
from the dominant primary industries of pastoralism, agriculture and mining; a
propensity to pit one group against another for base political gain; a propensity to
re-elect, often for decades on end, strong governments with huge parliamentary
majorities to create ‘electoral hegemonies’;5 the mission to pragmatically develop
the tabula rasa6 (or ‘blank slate’) of the state’s regions; a propensity for governments
to manipulate the checks and balances on executive power;7 a tendency for
Queensland politics to polarise into extremism, from Labor’s early state socialism
on the left to One Nation’s reactionary conservatism on the right; and, last,
Queenslanders’ longstanding support for the public ownership of state assets.8
Periodising Queensland history
The ‘pre-party’ period, 1860 to 1890
Queensland’s ‘pre-party’ period (1860 to 1890), saw MPs elected as independents
without party affiliation, but almost always on the converged political interests of
rural and urban capital under loosely defined labels of ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’.
Consequently, MPs frequently ‘crossed the floor’ as governments rose and fell
with alacrity. Between 1860 and 1890, for example, Queensland saw 14 discrete
premierships.
3 Aitkin 1985.
4 Williams 2009, 18–29.
5 Williams 2011; Williams 2004.
6 Waterson 1990, 139.
7 Wear 2002.
8 Williams 2010, 299.
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‘Proto-party’ period, 1890 to 1910
A second ‘proto-party’ period (1890 to 1910) saw the major parties find early
form without modern definition. This period was dominated by the ‘Continuous
Ministry’ that saw the conservative McIlwraith and the liberal Griffith unite to
create a powerful proto-party – the ‘Griffilwraith’ arrangement.9 Interrupted by
the short-lived Dawson Labor government in 1899,10 the Continuous Ministry
endured until 1903. In 1908, the dissident Labor premier William Kidston ‘fused’
with Robert Philp to form the first Liberal Party to produce the state’s first two-
party system.
‘Pre-Fitzgerald party’ period, 1910 to 1990
The landmark 1989 Fitzgerald Inquiry into police and government corruption
in Queensland (1987–89) proved so traumatic that its recommendations to
completely overhaul the state’s political, electoral and public administration
institutions have cleaved the state’s history between a ‘pre-accountability’ period
before 1990 and a ‘post-accountability’ period since. Consequently, we can describe
Queensland’s third political phase as a ‘pre-Fitzgerald party’ period (1910 to 1990)
that saw the major parties emerge as mass-based professional organisations capable
of stable, long-term government and, critically, enormous power with few checks
and balances.
This period saw just two electoral ‘hegemonies’: Labor from 1915 to 1957 (with
a single interruption 1929–32) and the Coalition from 1957 to 1989. Labor, under
the governments of T.J. Ryan11 and Edward ‘Red Ted’ Theodore,12 found early
support by bridging urban and regional interests in, for example, the establishment
of the eight-hour day and compensation for injured workers. Indeed, Labor
practised a form of ‘state socialism’ in the early part of the period when state-
owned sugar refineries, butcher shops, hotels and even an insurance company were
founded.13
By contrast, the Coalition ‘hegemony’, dominated by just two Country (later
National) party premiers – ‘Honest’ Frank Nicklin (1957–68) and Joh Bjelke-
Petersen (1968–87) – was marked not only by stability but by rapid economic
development in the state’s south-east. It also saw the cultivation (via an electoral
malapportionment that saw Country Party–voting regional seats with far fewer
voters than Labor- and Liberal-voting urban seats) of systemic corruption within
senior ranks of police and Cabinet. By the time of Bjelke-Petersen’s premiership
in the 1970s, mining had replaced agriculture as the state’s major export sector
9 Joyce 1977, 119.
10 Fitzgerald 1999.
11 Murphy 1990.
12 Fitzgerald 2002.
13 Fitzgerald 1984, 6–8.
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and Queensland had become synonymous with arch-conservative authoritarian
leadership.
‘Post-Fitzgerald party’ period, 1990 to present
The state’s fourth era, a ‘post-Fitzgerald party’ period (1990 to present), has seen
the major parties continue to dominate politics – with increased competition from
minor players – but within the constraints of such key institutions as an
independent Crime and Corruption Commission, a non-partisan Electoral
Commission, a Right to Information Commissioner, an Integrity Commissioner, an
Ombudsman, and reformed public service, Cabinet and parliamentary practices.
Importantly, this period also saw economic rationalism steer the state into
administrative efficiency.14 Indeed, reforms in agriculture and pastoralism caused
such significant economic (and consequently political) dislocation in regional
Queensland that populist minor parties were empowered to seize significant vote
shares.15 Given this looming economic backlash, the reformed National–Liberal
coalition under Rob Borbidge and Joan Sheldon assumed minority government in
1996.16 Debilitated by the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) – itself
fuelled by regional anger over gun control and the High Court’s Mabo and Wik
decisions – Labor returned to (briefly minority, and later majority) government
in 1998 under Peter Beattie, whose inclusive populism,17 affable leadership and
ubiquitous media presence18 complemented his penchant for mea culpa and policy
backflip.19 Indeed, Labor under Beattie in 2001 attained its largest parliamentary
majority since 1935.20 Anna Bligh, succeeding Beattie as Queensland’s first woman
premier in 2007, was popular for her handling of the 2011 Queensland floods, but
asset privatisation and public policy failures saw Labor suffer its worst ever defeat in
2012.21 When Annastacia Palaszczuk assumed leadership of the Labor Party most
expected that the party would be in opposition for a generation, but the Newman
government’s own unpopular privatisation policies saw the LNP defeated after a
single term.22 Palaszczuk’s Labor Party won government in its own right in late
2017, largely on voters’ fears of political instability in any LNP–PHON coalition.23
14 Walker 1995; Wanna 2003.
15 Leach, Stokes and Ward 2000, 9.
16 The 1995 Queensland election saw Labor retain government by a single seat. Labor’s result in
Mundingburra was later overturned in the Court of Disputed Returns and, after the Liberals
won the early 1996 re-election, the Goss government resigned.
17 Preston 2003; Wanna and Williams 2005.
18 Wanna and Williams 2005; Williams 2007.
19 Williams 2005.
20 Williams 2001.
21 Williams 2012, 643.
22 Williams 2018a.
23 Williams 2018b.
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Key institutions and actors
Australian Labor Party
Queensland Labor has governed Queensland for 75 of the 110 years between
1910 and 2020 and, consequently, has been labelled Queensland’s ‘natural party
of government’ (see Table 1).24 Labor remains a ‘labourist’ party based on trade
union membership – the Australian Workers’ Union (formed by sheep shearers)
has comprised a key powerbase within Queensland Labor for more than a century
– and has enjoyed enormous success for several reasons, including strong populist
leadership, balancing urban and regional interests, a comprehensive branch
structure, close union affiliation and support, delivery of social services, and a
commitment to the ownership of public assets. Since 1989, Labor’s success has also
been found in its ability to manage internal dissent through an organised factional
system.
Prior to 1980, Queensland Labor resembled a blue-collar trade unionist clique
that, prone to internecine warfare under Trades Hall control, proved electorally
unappealing. After federal Labor removed this cabal and introduced internal
democratic practices, a transparent ‘consociational’ (formal power-sharing)
factional system developed where the conservative ‘Old Guard’ (now Labor Unity)
would share power with the right-leaning Australian Workers’ Union (now Labor
Forum) and the Socialist Left.25 Labor Forum proved the strongest faction between
1989 and 2012; since 2015 the Socialist Left has controlled both caucus and
Cabinet. Consequently, women, middle-class white-collar workers and migrants
joined the party in significant numbers. Labor today demands at least 40 per cent
of its candidates should be women, and aspires to have 50 per cent women MPs by
2025.
National Party
The conservative National Party owed much of its heritage to 19th-century
pastoralists, with Thomas McIllwraith as arguably the party’s spiritual father. But
the party itself began life – as Labor did – as a sectional pressure group designed
to enhance members’ conditions. Faced with a growing Brisbane ‘liberal’ faction
in the Ministerialists, a few farmers in 1895 formed a Farmers’ Union ‘to watch
over, encourage, and endeavour to develop agricultural interests’.26 By 1902, the
organisation had unsuccessfully contested elections; most farmers remained loyal
to the Ministerialists. By 1909 the Farmers’ Parliamentary Union had formed, then
reformed in 1913 into the Country Liberal Party (CLP), and again into the more
successful Country Party in 1920.
24 Costar 1988.
25 Wanna 2000.
26 Bernays 1919, 147.
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Wearied by successive defeats by Labor through a splitting of support between
Country and Nationalist (Liberal) candidates, the two non-Labor parties merged
into a single Country and Progressive National party (CPNP) in 1925. After
winning government in 1929, the CPNP was despatched to opposition after a
single term in 1932, and dissolved in 1935. The revived Country Party, anxious to
modernise its image and capture urban votes, became the National–Country Party
in 1974, and the National Party in 1982. The transformation worked: the National
Party (now known colloquially as ‘The Nationals’) under Joh Bjelke-Petersen – who
married rural agrarianism to urban development while exercising authoritarian
leadership under a law-and-order mantra – won government in their own right at
the 1983 and 1986 elections.27
Part of the National Party’s success during those years lay in its organisational
wing’s power – less than Labor’s but exceeding the Liberals’ – to set party policy and
direct MPs. The Nationals lost the electorate’s confidence after 1987, however, as
Bjelke-Petersen embarked on an ill-conceived campaign to become prime minister,
and after the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed widespread government corruption.
Forming government only briefly with the Liberals (1996–98), the Nationals
struggled for both credibility and identity and, in 2008, dissolved.
Liberal Party
The Queensland Liberal Party owed its heritage to a rural (agriculturalist) and
smaller urban (business and professional) middle class, with Samuel Griffith a
guiding force. Long before formal organisation, however, numerous MPs adopted
an ill-defined ‘liberal’ label despite sharing many ‘conservative’ values. Liberals and
conservatives pragmatically set aside their difference in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries to form the ‘Ministerialists’. But, by 1909, progressives had merged with
Labor defectors to assume the name ‘Liberal’ and, in 1917, ‘Nationalist’. By 1923
the party had become the Queensland United Party, and in 1925 renamed again
when merging with the Country Party to become the CPNP. After dissolution it
became the Queensland’s People’s Party in 1943, and the Liberal Party in 1949,
and remained in opposition as junior coalition partner with the Country Party
until 1957. Hampered by the zonal electoral system that benefitted the Country
(National) Party, the Liberals also suffered from the absence of a large urban middle
class. Only as Liberal-voting migrants from southern states resettled in Queensland
did party support reach critical mass, despite the Liberals being often accused of
meekly acquiescing to the Nationals’ authoritarianism.28 When progressive Liberals
demanded the Nationals install key accountability reforms, Bjelke-Petersen
acrimoniously ended the coalition in 1983.
27 Metcalf 1984.
28 Fitzgerald, Megarrity and Symons 2009, 177.
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Liberal–National Party, 2008–present
Confounded by repeated defeats at Labor’s hands during the Beattie era – and
concerned that dwindling rural populations would eventually extinguish the need
for a stand-alone National Party – the then Nationals leader Lawrence Springborg
united the Liberal and National parties under a single constitution in 2008. The
LNP – technically a branch of the federal Liberal Party – enjoyed limited success
in 2009 before winning the largest parliamentary majority in Australian history
in 2012. The party lost the 2015 election, and the loss of 16 percentage points
in primary vote between 2012 and 2017 – largely due to the party’s former
privatisation agenda and tensions between ‘Liberal’ and ‘National’ tribes – have
prompted calls for the party’s dissolution.
Queensland Greens
The Queensland Greens – drawn from the Brisbane Green Party founded in 1984 –
were formed in 1991 as a party dedicated to ‘non-violence, social justice, grassroots
democracy [and] ecological sustainability’.29 Initially slow to find traction in a
conservative state committed to development and the extractive (especially coal)
industries,30 the Queensland Greens now poll 10 per cent of the state primary vote
(and much higher in inner Brisbane), saw their first state MP elected in 2017,
and have enjoyed Senate representation since 2010. The Greens’ commitment to
internal democracy sees leaders elected – and major policy questions settled – by
postal ballot among all branch members.31
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON)
The economic rationalism of the 1990s placed much of Queensland’s regional and
rural population under pressure. Additional fears over Indigenous rights and gun
control – and the National Party that many saw as abandoning traditional Country
Party values – created a vacuum on the right of Queensland politics that was filled
in 1997 by PHON. Hanson, whom the Liberal party disendorsed shortly before
before the 1996 federal election for alleged racism – and who would go on to
win her seat of Oxley as an independent – galvanized the fears of regional and
urban fringe ‘outsiders’ who felt Coalition and Labor governments each pandered
to ‘elites’ and ‘special’ interests. PHON was immediately successful in winning
almost 23 per cent of the primary vote and 11 seats at the 1998 Queensland election.
But party unity and a coherent ideology proved elusive for the fledgling party
and, within a year, all sitting MPs had resigned from PHON.32 With Hanson and
29 Queensland Greens 2019.
30 Williams 2006.
31 Queensland Greens 2019.
32 Six MPs resigned to sit under the newly formed City–Country Alliance; five resigned to sit as
independents.
Australian Politics and Policy
204
Election Labor Liberal–National* Other
Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats
1989 50.3 54 45.1 35 4.6 0
1992^ 48.7 54 44.1 35 7.2 0
1995¥ 42.9 45 49.0 44 8.1 0
1998 38.9 44 31.3 32 29.8# 13
2001 48.9 66 28.5 15 22.6 8
2004 47.0 63 35.5 20 16.5 6
2006 46.9 59 37.9 25 15.2 5
2009 42.3 51 41.6 34 16.1 4
2012 26.7 7 49.7 78 23.6± 4
2015 37.5 44 41.3 42 21.2 3
2017** 35.4 48 33.7 39 30.9 6
Table 1 Queensland election results, primary vote and seat share, 1989–2017. Source:
Electoral Commission of Queensland n.d.
Notes: * The 1989 and 1992 elections saw the stand-alone Liberal and National parties
compete independently; between 1995 and 2006 the Liberal and National parties contested
elections under a formal coalition; the two parties merged into a single Liberal–National
Party in 2008. ^ 1992 was the first election conducted on fair boundaries without a zonal
system. ¥ The 1995 election saw Labor win 45 seats to the Coalition’s 44, with the Court of
Disputed Returns later overturning the Mundingburra result; the subsequent 1996 re-
election saw the Liberals win; the Goss government resigned in February, 1996. # One
Nation’s 22.7 per cent and 11 seats comprised most of the ‘Other’ vote in 1998; ± Katter’s
Australian Party (11.5 per cent and two seats) comprised most of the ‘Other’ vote in 2012.
** The 2017 election was for 93 seats.
her senior advisers accused of undemocratic leadership, party support collapsed
and PHON all but disappeared. Amidst more recent debates over (Muslim)
immigration, PHON support returned.33
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Parliament
The Queensland parliament, comprised of a single Legislative Assembly chamber,
is unique among Australian states.34 Critically, Queensland’s unicameral status
since the abolition of the Legislative Council in 1922 has arguably facilitated
authoritarian leaders and undemocratic practices, and compromised the checks
and balances of public accountability to produce in the 20th-century systemic
institutional corruption. The Council was abolished by Labor partly because of its
inherently undemocratic nature – councillors were not elected but appointed, for
life, by the governor on the advice of the premier; Labor was also pragmatically
committed to abolishing a Council that consisted almost entirely of wealthy,
conservative pastoralists who frustrated most of Labor’s reforms. Premier Theodore
eventually flooded the Council with his own sympathetic councillors, who, in early
1922, immediately passed Labor’s abolition Bill.35 A referendum is constitutionally
required to reinstate the Legislative Council but, despite minor parties occasionally
proposing the idea, strong opposition from the major parties and the public make
restoration improbable. Despite this, it can be argued that the absence of a
Queensland upper house has produced the most powerful Cabinet system in
Australia, and the weakest parliament; law making in Queensland is therefore more
a function of Cabinet than of parliament.
Notwithstanding the above, Queensland’s post-Fitzgerald parliament is hardly
recognisable from that before 1990. Before the late 1980s, Queensland’s few
parliamentary committees performed only mundane domestic tasks;36 only after
the Fitzgerald reforms did Queensland gain such powerful instruments as scrutiny
of legislation committees, budget estimates committees, a public works committee,
a public accounts committee and an ethics committee. But even those committees
do not function as intended: governments enjoy majorities on committees, thus
compromising any claim to objective scrutiny. Question time is also controlled,
as government MPs ask soft and contrived ‘Dorothy Dixer’ questions. In 2016 the
Legislative Assembly was increased from 89 MPs to 93.
Premier and Cabinet
Ideally, the Legislative Assembly will check Cabinet’s authority but, in reality, the
absence of a Legislative Council gives Queensland’s Cabinet enormous powers,
limited somewhat after 1990 by various anti-corruption commissions, parlia-
mentary committees and freedom of information requirements. Even so, Cabinet
remains the ‘engine room of government’.37 Until 2014, Labor Cabinets were elected
33 Williams 2018b.
34 ACT and NT are also unicameral.
35 Fitzgerald 2002, 144–5.
36 Wanna and Arklay 2010, 24.
37 Scott et al. 2002.
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by caucus ballot, with portfolios allocated by the premier. Since then, Labor
premiers have handpicked their ministers. But both Labor and LNP premiers must
ensure Cabinet reflects a balance between women and men, youth and experience,
ideology (in Labor’s case, factional representation proportional to caucus repre-
sentation) and geographic location.38 The size of Cabinet is entirely the premier’s
prerogative – the opposition leader will appoint the same number of ‘shadow’
ministers as portfolio ‘spokespersons’ – and, in recent years, ‘assistant ministers’
have also been appointed to create a broader frontbench.
Much of Cabinet’s work is done by Cabinet subcommittees, with the Cabinet
Budget Review Committee (comprising the premier, treasurer and two other senior
ministers) the most important. While the power of premiers is today theoretically
constrained, in reality an electorally popular premier can exercise enormous
influence over party, policy and public debate.
Electoral system
Queensland has seen governments manipulate electoral systems for significant
political advantage that, in turn, has seen electoral hegemonies extend far beyond
that normally expected. A Queensland government first manipulated election rules
in 1892 when the Continuous Ministry changed the method of voting from ‘first
past the post’ (FPTP) – where voters check a box against their favoured candidate,
and leave all others blank – to a form of optional preferential voting (OPV) known
as ‘contingent voting’ in which voters could number additional candidates, with
those ‘preferences’ (if no candidate enjoyed a simple majority of 50 per cent plus
one vote) distributed to the two highest scoring candidates. The system is ostensibly
more democratic than FPTP as it mitigates the risk of electing candidates with less
than half the public’s support. The Continuous Ministry’s motivations, however,
were instead driven by a fear of a burgeoning Labor Party splitting conservative
support.39
The year 1905 saw the enfranchisement of women aged 21 and over and, from
1915, women could stand for election. In 1942, the Cooper Labor government
returned the state to FPTP, again to split support between non-Labor parties. In
1949 the Hanlon Labor government legislated the first zonal electoral system – a
malapportionment commonly but incorrectly referred to as a ‘gerrymander’ – that
created additional small rural districts, each with fewer voters than Brisbane seats,
ostensibly because they were distant from the state’s capital. Expediently, the zonal
system also maximised Labor’s rural support.40
In 1958 the coalition Nicklin government introduced its own malapportioned
zonal system that advantaged the Country Party over both Labor and the Liberals
38 Hughes 1980, 154–99.
39 Hughes 1980, 86.
40 Knight 2003, 255–6.
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– the Country Party frequently controlled government with as little as 20 per cent
of the primary vote – and, in 1962, introduced compulsory preferential voting
(CPV) to ensure the Country and Liberal parties fully benefitted from preference
exchanges. Indigenous men and women were enfranchised in Queensland in 1965
– the last state to do so. In 1973, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18. After
the Fitzgerald Inquiry found in 1989 that Queensland’s unfair electoral system
helped shape an undesirable political culture of authoritarian leadership and a lack
of accountability, a temporary Electoral and Administrative Review Committee
oversaw a permanent Electoral Commission of Queensland that today serves as an
electoral ‘umpire’. Queensland returned to an OPV system and the principle of ‘one
vote, one value’,41 then returned to CPV in 2016. Other significant electoral reforms
include strict electoral donation laws: as of 2018, all electoral donations of $1,000
or more must be publicly declared, and property developers are banned as donors.
Fixed, four-year terms now see elections scheduled for the last Saturday in October.
Conclusions: plus ça change – major issues in Queensland, then and now
The history and nature of Queensland politics evokes the adage plus ça change,
plus c’est la même chose – the more things change, the more they stay the same
– perhaps more than any other Australian polity. After almost two centuries of
European settlement, 160 years of self-government and three decades of post-
Fitzgerald reform, much has changed in Queensland. But so much more remains
the same. While accountability initiatives since 1990 have wholly transformed
many of the state’s Cabinet, parliamentary, public service and electoral practices,
unchanging industrial and social forces suggest the state’s political culture has
only partially transformed. A predilection towards populism, strong leadership,
regionalism, state development and parochial state chauvinism, for example, all
remain key hallmarks of Queensland politics, largely because pastoralism,
agriculture and mining still dominate a state economy underpinned by a heavily
decentralised population – with educational standards often below the national
average – living far from the state capital. In that sense, much of Queensland
politics remains the conservative politics of regional materialism and not the liberal
politics of urban idealism. Despite this, a rapidly transforming southeast – home to
two-thirds of the state’s population – has produced in the past 30 years a distinctive
political subculture that boasts an increasingly multicultural and cosmopolitan
set of values. Problematically, this development has divided the state even more
profoundly along geographic, economic and cultural cleavages, with those divisions
now signposting the key policy terrain of 21st-century Queensland.
41 Stevens 1993.
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South Australia (SA) is something of a curious paradox within Australia’s federation.
With a population of 1.67 million, it often remains peripheral to wider political
debates in Australia. In 2018, due to lack of population growth in proportion to
the rest of the country, it had its overall number of federal MPs in the House
of Representatives reduced from 11 to 10, thus further diminishing its voice on
the national stage. Federal elections tend not to be decided by outcomes in SA.
Economically, SA has been perceived to be a ‘rust-bucket’ state – economically
backward with a critical skills shortage, and an ageing population. According to
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, it comprises just over 6 per cent of the nation’s
economy. In 1991, the collapse of the State Bank was a significant blow to the state’s
economy. It has often taken SA longer to recover from national economic downturns
and usually ranks just above Tasmania in terms of many economic metrics. More
recently, with the closure of the Holden car plant in 2017 – and the de facto end of
car manufacturing in Australia – there remain ongoing concerns about the future
and vitality of the state. There is a lingering perception that SA is, to quote a
former premier of Victoria, a ‘backwater’.
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Yet, paradoxically, these perceptions and economic realities tend to mask a
more complex and rich political history. SA has a stable political system, strongly
influenced by the Westminster parliamentary system. Aside from the State Bank
collapse, it has lacked the scandals and corruption that have blighted other states
and territories like New South Wales and Western Australia. Its political system and
workings can appear, on first glance, quite mundane. However, SA has a unique
and radical history. It was established as a planned ‘free settlement’ on terms
quite different to the other Australian colonies. It was, and continues to be for
some, a ‘social laboratory’ with a rich history of political and social innovation.1
It has pioneered legislation and political innovations, particularly throughout the
1970s.2 While SA, like the rest of the nation, has been dominated by the Labor/
non-Labor axis, it is the birthplace of a range of political movements and parties,
including the Australian Democrats, the Family First party and, most recently, the
Centre Alliance (which was the creation of key SA political figure and former
state and federal MP Nick Xenophon). While an Australian prime minister has
never represented a SA constituency, the state continues to influence and shape
Australian political debates, especially most recently in the areas of water and
energy policy. In 2018, Adelaide became the home of the new Australian Space
Agency – perhaps reflecting a state that can often ‘punch above its weight’ in the
federation.
Governing South Australia
The Constitution Act 1934 (SA) is the foundation of SA’s political system, setting
out the main framework and its core constitutional features. SA, like many of the
other states and territories, has a bicameral system with power enshrined in two
houses of parliament: the lower house (the House of Assembly) and an upper house
(the Legislative Council). In the Westminster system, government is formed by the
group winning a majority of seats in the lower house. The leader of the winning
party becomes Premier of SA. Since 1970, the House of Assembly has 47 members,
and 24 votes are required to gain a majority in the lower house. It is worth noting
that the lower house in SA has far fewer MPs than the same chambers in either New
South Wales (93 MPs) or Victoria (88 MPs), which has arguably had an impact on
election results (see below). The Legislative Council has 22 members (MLCs), each
serving eight-year terms, with half the upper house facing election on alternate
cycles.
While the SA political system is broadly grouped within the Westminster
tradition across Australia, there are some distinct features, not least the issue of
electoral boundaries and boundary redistribution. SA has had a long history of
1 Rann 2012.
2 Parliament of South Australia n.d.
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‘malapportionment’ or what was termed the ‘Playmander’ – with highly dispro-
portionate electorate sizes.3 Election apportionment is the idea that each electoral
district, division or constituency should have broadly the same number of voters.
This is a key principle that underpins liberal democracy – the idea of ‘one vote,
one value’. Electoral malapportionment occurs when electorate sizes vary for geo-
graphic, demographic, or political reasons. The effect of the Playmander in SA was
to give substantial and disproportionate voice to rural constituencies, violating the
principle of ‘one vote, one value’. It should be noted that malapportionment is not
the same as ‘gerrymandering’, which in the latter case is a systematic attempt to
manipulate the electoral boundaries for partisan advantage. While the Playmander
ended in the 1970s, the issue of electoral boundaries has remained contentious in
SA politics.
The political history of South Australia
Political stability is one of the defining features of SA political history in the 20th and
21st centuries. By as early as 1905, a Labor versus non-Labor two-party contest came
to dominate the state’s politics, mirroring the dynamics emerging at the national
level. Since the 1930s, SA voters have also been prepared to return incumbent
governments at successive elections, creating a series of distinct eras of political
leadership – several of which we explore below. What these periods of alternating
long-term Liberal and Labor government hide, however, are considerable shifts in
voting patterns (including for the House of Assembly) and the significant influence
of electoral systems. Further, focusing on the Labor versus Liberal contest alone
obscures the enduring impact of independent members of parliament, the presence
of which has contributed to several minority governments. More recently, as well,
minor parties have expanded their influence in the Legislative Council – the
powerful upper house of parliament.4
The Playford era (1938–65)
As Figure 1 displays, SA began the postwar period during the Playford era. Sir
Thomas Playford was the longest-serving premier in SA history, leading the Liberal
Country League (LCL) government from 1938 to 1965 and steering his party
through eight election wins. The Playford era is most notable for its ‘forced
industrialisation’ of the SA economy. The Playford governments frequently inter-
vened in markets, established publicly owned utilities and housing, and led a
transformation of the state’s economy from a rural-agricultural to a predominantly
industrial base. Nonetheless, public spending on health and education was often
3 Orr and Levy 2009. The term ‘Playmander’ is derived from Thomas Playford (SA premier
1938–65, and leader of the Liberal and Country League) and gerrymander.
4 Jaensch 2011; Jaensch 1977; Jaensch 1976.
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Figure 1 South Australian governments and premiers by party.
lower than in other states, while the paternalism and conservatism of Playford’s
LCL meant that SA also significantly lagged behind in social and cultural policy
reform.
The Dunstan decade (1970–79)
Though not the first Labor government of the postwar era, the Dunstan decade
of 1970–79 nevertheless represents the clearest break with the long dominance of
the LCL through the mid-20th century. Don Dunstan’s governments represented a
highly activist brand of social democracy, and a new type of Labor government –
‘electorally successful, effectively reformist, and unashamedly appealing to middle-
class voters’.5 Dunstan brought about a technocratic shift for Labor, elevating the
role of technical expertise and evidence in policy making, but later also increased
public participation in some aspects of decision making. The social reforms (e.g.
Aboriginal land rights, decriminalisation of homosexuality, first female judge
appointed) and expansions to individual liberty (e.g. easing censorship, reforming
liquor licensing, establishing a nude beach) were, in many cases, nationally
significant, and in some cases world firsts.6 The Dunstan government, however,
occasionally struggled with the challenges of economic management, albeit in the
context of a narrow economic base in the state and worsening global economic
conditions.
The Bannon decade (1982–92)
As Figures 1 and 2 show, the Labor Party quickly bounced back from the loss of
government in 1979, returning to power just three years later. But Premier John
Bannon was a Labor leader substantially different to Dunstan. Where Dunstan
5 Parkin and Jaensch 1986, 100.
6 Macintyre 2005; Manwaring 2016.
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Figure 2 Party shares of the first preference vote in the House of Assembly.
Note: the spike in the vote of ‘others’ in 1975 is due to a split in the Liberal Party.
was charismatic, ostentatious and a zealous reformer, Bannon was cautious,
mainstream, and sought incremental change. Where social and cultural trans-
formations were the aim of Dunstan’s Cabinets, Bannon’s governments focused
more on careful economic management.7 Labor under Bannon recorded consi-
derable successes, seeing the opening of the Olympic Dam mining project,
expansion of the defence industry, development of the public transportation
system, greater environmental protection, and reforms in the school and criminal
justice systems. But the collapse of the government-owned State Bank, one of
the largest economic crises in SA’s history, brought about the end of Bannon’s
premiership and, soon after, a decade in opposition for the Labor Party.
Interpretations differ on Bannon’s record in office.8 Critics see a decade of missed
opportunities (especially in contrast to Dunstan’s record), while others laud modest
reform in much more economically constrained times.
The Rann/Weatherill era (2002–18)
Mike Rann emerged as leader of the Labor Party following its landslide election loss
in 1993, where Labor’s primary vote was reduced to just 30.4 per cent (see Figure
2). However, Rann benefitted from a Liberal Party in disarray, and after just two
terms in opposition, led Labor to victory in 2002, forming a minority government.
7 Parkin and Patience 1992.
8 See concluding chapters in Parkin and Patience 1992 for different views on Bannon’s record in
office.
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Through much of the Rann era, SA experienced sustained economic expansion
and relatively low unemployment, helping Labor rebuild its economic credibility
after the crises of the later Bannon years. Substantial inequality and economic
disadvantage remained, however, and Rann often clashed with local trade unions.
Nonetheless, the Rann era saw considerable achievements, including increased
funding for health and education, the growth of the mining and defence industries,
considerable infrastructure and tourism site development, and innovations in
participatory democracy and governance.9 Some view the Rann era as a variant of
the emerging ‘third way’ politics in the renewal of social democracy.10
As popular opinion began to shift against Rann, leading union and Labor Party
figures moved to replace him. Public fatigue with a third-term government, coupled
with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis placed greater constraints on Rann’s
government. Rann, knowing he lacked the numbers to withstand any leadership
challenge, stood down in October 2011, with Jay Weatherill elected unopposed by
the party as his successor. Weatherill faced considerable economic challenges in
his first term, including the closing of prominent manufacturing sites and aborted
plans for mining projects. Early budgets made large cuts to spending and privatised
public assets and services. Yet, following a surprise win in the 2014 election, Labor’s
agenda under Weatherill substantively changed. Weatherill led significant social
reform (e.g. removing discriminatory laws against the LGBTIQ+ community), and
demonstrated a capacity for policy innovation in economic management. Perhaps
most notable is Weatherill’s proposed reform of the electricity sector, arguing for
the construction of a government-owned gas-fired power station alongside the
expansion of renewable energy and grid-connected battery storage.
The influence of independents and minor parties
Examining governments only provides us with part of the story of SA politics.
Independent MPs have long been a fixture of the SA parliament, usually elected to
the House of Assembly, and often representing rural, regional and outer suburban
electorates. In many cases, independent MPs were often elected as members of
one of the major parties (or were members of major parties denied preselection).
The most significant impact of these independents has been in the process of
government formation. Elections in SA regularly produce ‘hung parliaments’ where
neither major party commands the majority of lower house seats needed to form
a government. In these instances, independents and parties on the crossbench
hold considerable sway over which party can form government. Since 1944,
independents have played this role seven times, following elections in 1962, 1968,
1975, 1989, 1997, 2002, and 2014.
9 Spoehr 2009; Spoehr 2005.
10 Macintyre 2005.
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Figure 3 Party first preference votes for the Legislative Council.
Note: the rise in the vote of ‘others’ in 1975 is due to a split in the Liberal Party.
Key South Australian institutions and social actors
We group SA’s key institutions and actors into three main traditional types:
governmental/public, private and ‘third sector’ (or non-governmental). The distinc-
tiveness of SA’s institutional ecology is strongly shaped by its political history. The
different political eras, as sketched out above, have been fundamental in shaping SA’s
development. In its early years, the political system was infused with a radicalism
and democratic innovation.11 Given the historic economic challenges facing SA, a
key focus of government (and the creation of related public institutions) has been
active involvement in the economy. Though it has been a contested approach, the
growth of SA’s economy has in major periods reflected the institutionalisation of
government’s key role in development.12 Beyond the immediate political institutions
of Cabinet government, and the parliament, there has been an increase in reach and
influence of statutory agencies and other public institutions.
Second, the private sector remains a critical actor in the development of
the state, and it is institutionalised through key actors. Pre-eminent among them
is the SA Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Trading today as Business SA,
this institution represents the interests of businesses in the state, chiefly in terms
of managing industrial relations with employees and lobbying for institutional
changes favourable to business, such as the removal or changing of regulation.
11 Payton 2016.
12 See Stutchbury 1986 and Wanna 1986.
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Figure 4 Balance of seats in the Legislative Council.
At times it has played a significant political role, developing policy positions,
commenting on state budgets, but also running campaigns – most notably leading
the charge against a new proposed State Bank levy in 2017.
A third set of institutions are those often categorised as ‘third sector’ or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). SA, like many other parts of Australia, has
a vibrant set of institutions that emerge from and seek to represent part of civil
society. An important social institution is that made up of the array of organisations
that fall within the SA labour movement. In 1876, SA was the first place in the
British Empire to legalise trade unions, and they remain key actors in the SA
political system. Today, SA Unions is the peak body of the union movement in
the state. The key powerful trade unions remain affiliates of the state Labor Party.
Outside of the union movement, one of the most prominent social actors is the
SA Council of Social Services which is an umbrella organisation for a suite of
community sector NGOs and bodies. In common with other parts of Australia,
increasingly social services are often contracted out to large-scale third party
providers.
Key controversies in South Australia
Democracy and accountability
The health of SA democracy remains in question in at least three key areas:
deliberation, accountability and governance.
In recent years, there has been a focus on ‘deliberative’ democracy.13 The main
claim made here is that voters should have more influence in between elections,
13 Dryzek 2002.
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and the quality of government decisions can be enhanced by better deliberation
or discussion. Labor Premier Jay Weatherill was a noted fan of this movement
and instigated a range of ‘new’ deliberative techniques, including citizens’ juries.
The effect of this has been mixed, with particular criticism directed at the citizens’
jury on the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, it showed a rare willingness to enhance SA’s
democratic institutions.
A second area of concern has been the issue of accountability – especially
the mechanisms for holding the government to account. In the Cabinet system of
government in the Westminster tradition the doctrine of ministerial responsibility
is critical.14 This has two dimensions: collective and individual. In the case of the
latter, the convention is that ministers are responsible for the workings of their
departments, and, when things go wrong, they should resign (or more commonly
be dropped or reshuffled). A number of scandals in SA, notably the Oakden abuse
scandal, have drawn repeated attention to the growing ineffectiveness of individual
ministerial responsibility.15
A third area of concern, and not limited to SA, is the fragmenting nature of
governance. Traditionally, the government and public sector (especially the main
departments, e.g. education, health) were the main political and policy actors. The
shift from government to governance, however, entails a growth of statutory boards,
commissions and councils (and the like) to deliver and oversee the outsourcing of
public goods. Yet, there remains a concern about the effectiveness of these boards,
their accountability and their relation to democratic institutions. For example, a
number of scandals in health and the TAFE sector raise concerns about ‘arms-length’
institutions and their role.
Energy and nuclear power
Recent economic developments in SA have focused on debate around securing
the state’s economic and energy futures as the pressing need to respond to climate
change heightens. Following an extreme weather event in October 2016 that left the
entire state in blackout for hours, the Weatherill Labor government developed an
energy industry policy to ensure energy supply to homes and businesses would be
safeguarded in the event of future breakdowns in the existing energy grid. Through
public–private partnerships with international energy companies Tesla and Neoen,
the government has developed renewable energy infrastructure, further increasing
SA’s national leadership on renewables and energy innovation. The initiatives under
Premier Mike Rann institutionalised a nation-leading renewable energy policy and
14 Thompson and Tillotsen 1999.
15 The Oakden nursing home was a state-run mental health centre for older people, which was
eventually shut down in 2017 after allegations of abuse and neglect of residents. The Oakden
scandal was one of the drivers for the federal government to begin a royal commission into aged
care quality and safety in 2018.
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objective to increase renewable energy as a major source of supply. As at 2018,
approximately 50 per cent of the state’s energy comes from renewable sources.
Privatisation and state ownership
Privatisation refers to policies ranging from outsourcing of government services to
the absolute sale of public assets. Privatisation in Australia, and SA in particular, has
a poor record, with questionable economic benefit and considerable social cost.16 As
governments began the process of privatisation in the 1980s, many voters responded
with a relatively open mind. After all, there were inefficiencies and poor quality
of service provided through some government-owned operations. Several decades
on, public opinion tends towards scepticism of privatisation, with asset sales and
outsourcing electorally risky. In particular, many voters appear unconvinced that
privatisation leads to lower costs for consumers, and are cynical about governments’
underlying rationale. Indeed, there are often different motivations underpinning
calls for privatisation. Aulich and O’Flynn distinguish, for instance, between
pragmatic privatisation where public assets are divested in a drive for greater
efficiency and a means of technical problem solving, and systemic privatisation
which derives from an ideological commitment to reducing the role and size of
government.17 Privatisations under both Liberal and Labor governments have been
propelled by both of these motivations at different times.
Conclusions
SA remains at a political and economic crossroads. After 16 years of Labor, Steven
Marshall led the Liberals to government at the 2018 election. Marshall’s government
faces a range of political and policy dilemmas, including in the crucial areas of
health, the TAFE sector, and the wider economic environment. There remain con-
cerns that this populously small but geographically large state could be heading back
to how it has often been traditionally viewed – as an economic ‘backwater’. The
Marshall government is seeking to counter Labor’s more interventionist agenda, by
focusing on creating a smaller state, scaling back public spending, and focusing on
private-sector entrepreneurship.
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Although Tasmania is a natural Labor state, there are increasing institutional and
political challenges to traditional Labor dominance. Tasmania’s politics are pro-
foundly affected by a sense of economic fragility and the consequent influence
of large industries. The state has been both a national and global focus for envi-
ronmental politics and originated the world’s first green political party. Tasmania’s
voting system is unique, as are the electoral arrangements for both of its state houses
of parliament. As part of the Australian federation, it is represented by 12 senators –
the same number as other states.
Historically, Tasmania’s underperforming economy was a central issue. The
resulting push for development of the state’s resources to create jobs has led to
many environmental clashes over hydro dams, logging of native forests and, more
recently, concerns about the location and scale of tourism developments.
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Political history
Tasmania’s political history has been shaped by its geography and is defined by
six broad eras: Aboriginal settlement; European exploration and convict settlement
at the time of the early Industrial Revolution; the end of convict transportation
followed by self-government during the mid-19th century; Federation and
statehood followed by hydro-industrialisation for much of the 20th century; the
rise of the Green movement and the decline of manufacturing from the 1970s; and
the rise of tourism and the services sector from the 1990s.
Tasmania, known as lutruwita1 by its Indigenous inhabitants, the palawa
people, was first settled between 30,000 and 40,000 years ago, when there was
a land connection with the Australian mainland due to lower sea levels during
the last ice age. Subsequently isolated by rising sea levels, there were nine tribes
spread throughout the area. However, immediately before European settlement, the
palawa population was estimated at less than 15,000.
The first European settlement on the Derwent River, near present-day Hobart,
in 1803 was based partly on fear of French ambition, especially as George Bass and
Matthew Flinders had shown in 1798 that Van Diemen’s Land was separate from
the mainland and therefore might be distinct from the British claim to New South
Wales (NSW).2 Tasmania’s usefulness as a jail for convicts and political prisoners
was also important as it was realised that, as an archipelago of remote islands,
escape was almost impossible.3
The Bass Strait islands were used by sealers from the late 18th century, and
intermarriage between Aboriginal women and European sealers was common.
However, a clash between the palawa and the first European settlers near modern-
day Hobart led to a massacre and continuing intercultural violence, when a large
hunting party of palawa were fired upon by frightened troops. Later, the ‘Black War’
(1824–31), the ‘most intense frontier conflict in Australia’s history’, led to the near
decline of the palawa and their culture. About 1,000 Aboriginal people and 200
settlers were killed during the conflict.4 By 1830, there were 24,000 settlers, but only
about 250 Aboriginal people remained alive.5
The independent settlement of northern Van Diemen’s Land was established on
the Tamar River in 1804 at Launceston, which has since tended to look northward
more than the southern capital. In fact, its establishment led to the founding of
1 The written form of the Tasmanian Aboriginal language, palawa kani, has only lower case letters
following a decision by the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre to discontinue capitals (Harman
2018).
2 Clements 2014.
3 Although, in 1834, ten audacious convicts managed to build a boat, commandeer it and sail to
Chile (Courtenay 2018).
4 Kippen 2014.
5 Clements 2014.
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Melbourne in 1835 by the entrepreneur John Batman, whose party sailed across
Bass Strait in the Hobart-built schooner Enterprize.
The fragility of the isolated southern colony was made stark in 1809, when
Governor Bligh from Sydney and Lieutenant-Governor Collins from Hobart Town
met after Bligh had been deposed by the Rum Rebellion and subsequently released.
Bligh sailed for Hobart Town, where Collins refused to help him re-take the post
of governor of NSW. Their relationship further soured when Bligh had one of
Collins’ sons, a crewman on his ship, flogged for insubordination.6 During Bligh’s
subsequent vengeful blockade of the Derwent aboard his 12-gun7 HMS Porpoise,
all ships entering the river were ‘taxed’ some of their cargo, which contributed
to the fledgling colony’s economic woes. After several months, Bligh eventually
returned to Sydney upon hearing that a new governor, Lachlan Macquarie, had
been appointed from England.
An 1823 Act of the British parliament separated Van Diemen’s Land from
NSW, and the Legislative Council was established in 1825 to advise the lieutenant-
governor. It consisted of six members chosen by him, expanding to 15 members
in 1828. By 1851, it had 24 members, 16 of whom were elected. Consistent with
similar jurisdictions, only men over 30 who owned a certain amount of property
were eligible to vote.
The colony’s value as a remote jail faded as the local economy developed.
Up until transportation ceased in 1853, nearly half of all convicts throughout the
Australian colonies had been sent to Van Diemen’s Land, which was increasingly
resented by the resident populace.8 The end of transportation followed the
formation of an Anti-Transportation League, supported by all elected members of
the Legislative Council. Many former convicts found their way to Victoria, lured
by the gold rush of the 1850s, as labour was in strong demand. This brought about
depopulation and economic stagnation in the southernmost settlements.
The global depression of the 1890s affected Tasmania’s export-based economy
significantly, and there was considerable support for combining in a federation
with other colonies and the promise of greater interstate trade that would follow.
In the first referendum of 1898, Tasmanians voted overwhelmingly in favour of
federation, with more than 81 per cent voting ‘yes’. At the second (1899) refe-
rendum, the ‘yes’ vote was even higher, with nearly 95 per cent in favour. Both ‘yes’
votes were the highest of any jurisdiction, considerably higher than NSW, where
fear of a loss of influence saw ‘yes’ votes of 52 and 57 per cent respectively.9 Clearly,
Tasmanians thought that they would benefit from closer economic relations with
the wealthier mainland states.
6 Clark 2012.
7 Winfield 2008.
8 Boyce 2008.
9 Australian Electoral Commission 2011.
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The state’s key economic transformation, hydro-industrialisation, enabled
electricity generation based on central highland dams. Said to be inspired by later
Premier Walter Lee’s visit to the pre-war German Ruhr Valley, where the economy
was booming, the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Department (later Commission or
HEC) was created from private companies in 1914 and continued building dams
until the 1980s. Industries attracted to the state as a result included paper, chocolate,
zinc and aluminium production, as well as wool and carpet mills throughout the
state.
However, the HEC’s decision to flood the iconic Lake Pedder in the south-
west so horrified a growing number of conservation-minded people that it led
to the creation of the world’s first green political party in 1972 – the United
Tasmania Group, later the Tasmanian Greens and subsequently the Australian
Greens. Lake Pedder was flooded, but another attempt to dam the Franklin River in
the early 1980s led to global protests, a blockade and the intervention of the federal
government, backed by the High Court, to prevent the dam being constructed.
The Franklin River dispute marked the end of the hydro-based industrialisation
strategy and confirmed the importance of tourism-related industries to the state as
large-scale manufacturing employment continued to decline. A legacy of the dam-
building period is that Tasmania has Australia’s highest level of renewable energy
production, at 93 per cent, and is poised to export more renewable electricity to
mainland Australia.10 During the 1990s, tourism marketing and air and sea access
were improved, leading to a strong increase in visitor numbers, making tourism
and hospitality a driver of economic growth.
Politically, the rise of the Greens on the left of the Labor Party changed the
complexion of representative politics in Tasmania as well as nationally.
Key institutions and actors
Tasmania’s political practice has several distinctive features, which have evolved
over time, contributing to a unique political culture. The relationship between
electoral systems and the success of political parties has been long studied, and
Tasmania is an interesting case study in this regard.11 Tasmania (like the ACT)
is unusual in that it uses a proportional electoral system to elect its lower house,
having five electorates each of five seats for a House of Assembly (lower house) of
25 members. The Legislative Council (upper house) consists of 15 single-member
electorates. The multi-member lower house and single-member upper house is the
inverse of all other state electoral systems.
The ‘Hare-Clark’ electoral system, used in Tasmania since 1909, allows inde-
pendents and minor parties to more easily secure representation in the House
10 Climate Council of Australia 2014, 31–2.
11 See, for example, Bennett and Lundie 2007 on the effects of Hare-Clark in Tasmania.
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Figure 1 Tasmanian House of Assembly seats won in election years 1934–2018 by government party
and other parties.
of Assembly. In the 34 elections since it was introduced, independents or minor
parties have won seats in all but nine. In two of the nine elections where no
independent was elected, Labor and the Liberal Party each won 15 seats. Since
1989, when five Greens were elected to the House of Assembly, Tasmania has had
three ‘hung’ parliaments, which resulted in minority governments. It is fair to say
that all Tasmanian elections are close, and there has been a long-running argument
about the prospects and benefits – or otherwise – of majority government.
The number of members in the House of Assembly has changed over time. The
House had at least 30 members from its origins in 1856 until 1998, when it was
reduced from 35 to 25, as shown in Figure 1. This arose as a productivity offset
to justify a controversial 40 per cent pay rise for MPs as a reaction to union and
public pressure at a time of austere state budgets and restrictions on public sector
pay rises. But it especially suited the two major parties, which saw it as a chance to
make it harder for the Greens by lifting the quota required to win a seat from 12.5
per cent (one eighth) to 16.7 per cent (one sixth). A quota under Hare-Clark is the
total number of votes divided by the total number of seats per electorate plus one,
plus one vote.12
The nearly 200-year-old upper house – the Legislative Council – was reconstituted
as part of the bicameral parliament in 1856. Along with the House of Assembly,
its size was reduced in 1998 – from 19 down to 15 seats, based on single-member
electorates. It is reputedly one of the most powerful upper houses under the
Westminster model of government due to its power to reject money Bills (budgets)
12 Where there is only one seat, the quota is therefore half the number of votes, plus one vote –
which is the same as used throughout Australia in all single-member electorates.
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and thus send the lower house to an election. The government has no power
to dissolve the upper house. Further, elections for its single-member electorates
are staggered. Members are elected for six-year terms with elections alternating
between three divisions in one year and two divisions the next year. This quirky
electoral system means that, unlike other state upper houses and the federal Senate,
the Legislative Council never has to face either a full or half-house general election.
Further, it is the only parliamentary chamber in Australia in which, historically,
most of its members have been independents and therefore not subject to party
control.
Beyond the two-party system
Tasmania’s Hare-Clark electoral system has allowed emerging social movements
to secure parliamentary representation. As a result, significant trends in national
party politics, including the rise of the Greens, and growing support for the Liberal
Party from socially conservative working-class voters – the ‘Howard Battlers’ – were
evident in Tasmanian long before other states.
In Tasmania, the Labor and Liberal two-party system13 generally prevailed
at the state level between 1949 and 1982, with continuous Labor governments,
occasionally with the support of independents, only disrupted by a one-term
minority Liberal government between 1969 and 1972.
By the early 1980s, a proposal to dam the Franklin River became the focus of
political debate both in Tasmania and nationally, at a time of high unemployment in
the state. The Liberal opposition in Tasmania supported the scheme while the Labor
government was torn between maintaining its commitment to industrialisation and
the demands of an increasingly vocal and influential green movement who were
determined to save the Franklin. Labor Premier Doug Lowe proposed a compromise
of damming an alternative river in the south-west wilderness, which would still
generate more power for industry but save the Franklin River. Lowe’s plan failed; he
lost the party leadership over the issue and moved to the crossbenches as a Labor
independent. The government continued under his successor Harry Holgate, who
called an election six months later. The Liberals, under Robin Gray, subsequently
secured a landslide win in the May 1982 election on the back of unprecedented
working-class support. A sign of things to come, the leader of the ‘Save the Franklin’
campaign, Bob Brown, who later became the leader of the Australian Greens, was
elected to the House of Assembly in 1983. By 1989, Green independents were a
political force in Tasmania, winning five seats in parliament and entering a power
sharing ‘accord’ with the Labor Party, enabling Labor to return to government in
1989.
13 The National Party has never achieved state-level representation in Tasmania.
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The following 30 years have seen both majority Labor and Liberal governments,
with one period of minority Liberal government and a further term of Labor–Green
power sharing between 2010 and 2014. Not only was the Liberal Party’s 1980s
strategy to win working-class votes through a pro-development and jobs platform
later echoed nationally, rivalries between Labor and the Greens for progressive votes
in the inner cities were also first evident in Tasmania in the same decade.
The changing political landscape
While Tasmania has also experienced three minority governments with the Greens
holding a balance of power,14 there has been a long history of independents or
minor parties holding the balance of power.15 A report by an advisory committee
chaired by A.G. Ogilvie noted in 1984 that ‘history has shown independents and
minor parties have a tendency to gain representation in a majority of elections’.16
This is facilitated by the Hare-Clark system, which enables candidates to win seats
with considerably less than 50 per cent of the vote in multi-member electorates.
However, the entry of the Greens to the left of the Labor Party on the back of the
conservation debates changed the complexion of representative politics within the
state. Since the early 1980s, the Greens have won up to five seats in some elections.
Much of their gains were at the expense of the Labor Party, which recorded a record
low vote of 28 per cent and won only seven seats in 2014. In the parliament elected
in 2018, the Liberals have 13 seats, Labor 10 and the Greens two in the House of
Assembly, while the Liberals have two seats and Labor four seats in the Legislative
Council. Nevertheless, a lack of major conservation-related issues17 at the 2018
state election probably resulted in a significant decline in the Greens vote, and they
won only two of the 25 lower house seats available.
The economy
Traditionally, Tasmania’s major industries have been mining, agriculture, fishing
and forestry. During the period of hydro-industrialisation, major metal and forest
product processing plants were also established in the state. Aquaculture has grown
from a relatively small industry in the late 1980s so that Tasmania is now a large
producer of seafood, particularly salmon. However, the narrow industrial base
14 These three hung parliaments with the Greens holding a balance of power were the Field Labor
government of the Labor–Green Accord between 1989 and 1992, the Rundle Liberal minority
government between 1996 and 1998 and the Bartlett–Giddings Labor government, with two
Greens in Cabinet, between 2010 and 2014.
15 Newman 1992, 198–201.
16 Newman 1992, 98.
17 Whitson 2018. Although salmon farming was an issue, its restriction lacked significant support,
and the earlier question of a pulp mill on the river Tamar had been long buried.
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means that average Tasmanian household income is almost 19 per cent below the
national average and, as a consequence, Tasmania is more reliant than other states
on federal Goods and Services Tax and grant revenue for the provision of public
services and infrastructure. A reliance on exports, a small number of relatively large
processing industries, the vagaries of interstate and overseas transport and reliance
on federal transfers have combined to make Tasmania particularly susceptible to
downturns in the Australian and international economies. From the late-1990s,
improvements to sea and air passenger transport sparked a growth in tourism,
which has now become one of the state’s major industries. Education has also
grown in importance, attracting more overseas fee-paying students, albeit from a
relatively low base. One outcome of the decades of debate over forestry, mining and
the environment is that some 42 per cent of Tasmania is protected in the World
Heritage Area, national parks or other reserves. Tasmania’s natural environment
and clean air, and its reputation for excellent food and drink products are key
factors in attracting visitors and students to the state. As of 2018, these factors were
contributing to strong economic growth and, for the first time in over a decade, the
Tasmanian economy was outperforming the economies of the mainland states.
Key issues
The much smaller scale of Tasmania’s political system, compared with the other
Australian states, is significant. Another distinctive feature of the island state is its
relatively dispersed population. There are three distinctive and competitive regions
– Greater Hobart and the south; Launceston and the north-east; and the north-
west and west coasts, including Devonport and Burnie. These regions have different
industrial bases, economies, needs and expectations. Despite the small size of the
state, each region has its own daily newspaper that champions causes for its district.
Overlaying this regional structure are the five House of Assembly electorates
discussed above, each about the same size, in terms of voter numbers, and with
boundaries drawn around communities of interest. The same electorates also give
Tasmania five seats in the House of Representatives – and 12 senators in the
Australian parliament, as negotiated under the federation process, primarily by
Tasmanian Andrew Inglis Clark,18 an admirer of the US constitution.
The state’s smallness creates issues for governing and governance. All political
parties, at times, find it difficult to find capable candidates to fill vacancies. Name
recognition has seen the establishment of political ‘dynasties’, where members get
elected based on their family name. For example, current Liberal Premier Will
Hodgman is the son of former federal and state MP Michael Hodgman, whose
father, William Hodgman, was a former president of the Legislative Council. The
current member for Denison, Scott Bacon, is the son of former Labor Premier
18 The same Clark as in the ‘Hare-Clark’ voting system.
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Jim Bacon. The same issue causes problems in filling positions at all levels of
government, from the judiciary to appointments and promotions in the public
service, to filling board positions on government–business enterprises. Relatively
small networks in business and politics mean it is hard to find people who have no
past affiliations or business associations that can lead to suspicions of cronyism and
nepotism.
More than 95 per cent of Tasmanian businesses are classified as ‘small’.19 By
comparison, some government-owned businesses are big employers and have more
financial resources, which give them a dominant voice in key policy arenas. The
political power of a small number of private-sector business leaders, investors
and large (in Tasmanian terms) employers has also been a cause for concern.
For example, during the 2018 state election, a high profile advertising campaign
funded by gaming industry lobby groups against a Labor and Greens policy to
remove gaming machines from pubs and clubs was both effective and reminiscent
of the forest industry campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. It is arguable that the
government was returned due to that campaign, and thus the Liberals are in debt to
the gambling industry.20
Fault lines and the future
Historically, the underperformance of Tasmania’s economy is a recurring theme
and the subject of numerous inquiries and attempted interventions. The 1997
Nixon report on the Tasmanian economy for the Commonwealth government, for
example, noted that ‘economic activity and jobs growth in Tasmania is the worst of
all the states’.21 As we have noted, the Tasmanian economy is currently experiencing
a period of strong growth in what has been described as a ‘golden age’. In a speech
to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), Premier Will
Hodgman declared Tasmania was ‘now a stronger, prouder, more confident place
and the economy one of the strongest performing in the country’.22
This economic renaissance began in the late 1990s, under Labor Premier Jim
Bacon, with a program he named Tasmania Together – an attempt to unite people
behind a plan to focus on Tasmania’s advantages – its natural attractions, its
reputation for excellent produce, the arts – and to instil a sense of confidence in
the community. Despite falling victim to irreconcilable differences over forestry,
Tasmania Together succeeded in promoting growth in tourism, a turnaround from
a net decline in population to growth from both interstate and overseas migrants,
and recognition of the importance of education and the arts as important sectors of
19 Department of State Growth 2019.
20 See also Knaus and Evershed 2019 on the gambling lobby’s donations to the Liberals ahead of
the 2018 state election, totalling $500,000.
21 Nixon 1997, v.
22 Hodgman 2017.
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economic growth. The establishment of the Museum of Old and New Art, known as
MONA, by professional gambler and eccentric entrepreneur David Walsh in 2011
tapped into an international market of cultural tourism and has fostered innovation
and creativity across the state.
The ongoing struggle between economic development and the environment has
defined Tasmanian politics. Struggles such as the fights to save the wilderness from
hydro development in the 1980s and the forestry conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s
seem to be abating. However, the rapid growth in tourism in recent years has led to
environmental tension around the location and scale of tourism infrastructure, such
as resorts, hotels and a cable car, and encroachment on wilderness areas.
Conclusions
The central challenge facing Tasmania is whether the island state can exploit its
distinctive strengths to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth despite
the challenges of remoteness and scale. In many ways, this is a political challenge
as much as an economic one. Ultimately, Tasmania’s prosperity will depend on two
factors. First, the political challenge involves resolving traditional tensions between
progressive environmentalists and more conservative commercial interests. On this
front, the outlook is more optimistic than it has been for decades, given that
political conflict over forestry has abated significantly in recent years, although
concerns about aquaculture and tourism remain. A second challenge is whether
Tasmanians can have the education and skills to capitalise on the transition from
an industrial to a service and knowledge-based economy. The concern here is that
levels of educational attainment in Tasmania are well below the national average
and that growing numbers of businesses complain about shortages of skilled labour.
Tasmania is Australia’s smallest and poorest state. Its isolation, scale and
economic challenges have contributed to what is, by Australian standards, a unique
political culture. In recent years, Tasmania’s economic performance and outlook
have improved significantly, but it remains to be seen whether the ideological and
parochial divisions that have afflicted its politics in the past will prevent the island
state from realising its full economic and social potential.
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Victoria
Nick Economou
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The state of Victoria can be thought of as Australia’s ‘second’ state not because of
historical chronology (Victoria, previously known as the Port Phillip District, was
an administrative province of NSW until formal separation on 1 June 1851 and
was established after both NSW and Tasmania) but rather because of demographics
and economics. Victoria is the second most populous state after NSW, and the
state’s capital city, Melbourne, is Australia’s second most populous city after Sydney.
Victoria provides the second largest tranche of members to the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the Victorian governor stands second in line to be governor-general
should the incumbent vacate the position.
Victoria is also important to the national economy, although the nature of its
contribution has changed over time. Initially settled (illegally) as an extension of the
Van Diemen’s Land fine wool industry by people such as John Batman and Edward
and Stephen Henty, Victoria received a massive infusion of free settlers with the
official discovery of gold in 1851 – the same year the Port Phillip District was
Economou, Nick (2019). Victoria. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian
Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
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separated from NSW and renamed Victoria.1 By the 1870s, Melbourne emerged as
a major manufacturing centre, and in the 1880s the city experienced a significant
real estate boom that was to end in a spectacular crash in the 1890s.2 At Federation
Victoria was a major producer of grains and wool as well as a manufacturer of
farming implements, and one of Australia’s landmark industrial disputes occurred
at the Sunshine Harvester Works in Melbourne’s western suburbs in 1907 – a
dispute that was resolved by Justice Henry Bournes Higgins outlining the concept
of a ‘minimum wage’ in his Harvester judgement.3
For all this industrial activity, the state’s political history was, until comparatively
recent times, dominated by conservatives and liberals.4 Until the 1980s, Labor gov-
ernments were rare. The state’s politics were invariably a battle between rural con-
servatives and metropolitan liberals with the nascent Labor Party something of an
incidental player (see Table 1).5
This changed in 1982, when Labor was elected to government for the first time
since the 1950s. Since then government has been shared by Labor and the Liberal
and National parties operating in coalition.
History
The colonisation of the Port Phillip District began with sheep farmers from Van
Diemen’s Land such as John Batman and Edward and Stephen Henty making the
trip by sea to ‘squat’ on the western plains of what was then part of NSW. The
entrepreneurial drive behind this initial land grab, to the cost of both Indigenous
people and the authority of the governor of NSW, Richard Bourke, was revisited in
1851 when gold was officially discovered at Warrandyte and a rush of free settlers
from around the world descended upon Melbourne.
Tensions arose between miners and the colony’s governor that culminated in
the rebellion at Eureka, Ballarat, in 1854. As part of their list of demands, the
miners called for full parliamentary reform and adult suffrage. In 1855, the British
parliament approved a new constitution for Victoria that met both demands and
established the basis for the system of democratic parliamentary government that
continues to this day.
The new constitution was promulgated in Victoria in 1856. It provided for a
Legislative Assembly that would be elected by men over the age of 21 regardless of
property ownership. The assumption was that government would be exercised by
1 Legislation from the NSW Legislative Council authorising the separation was passed in 1850
upon passage of the Australian Colonies Self Government Act 1850 (UK) in Britain.
Promulgation of the Act and actual separation occurred on 1 June 1851.
2 Cannon 1995.
3 Rickard 1984.
4 Murray 2007; Rawson 1977.
5 Holmes 1976.
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a ‘prime minister’ and a ministry with the confidence of the majority of the lower
house. The Legislative Council would comprise men of property, elected by men of
property, who could exercise a powerful veto over the lower house. Parliamentary
salaries were not introduced until 1870. Female suffrage was not legislated for
until 1908, and the law that prohibited women from standing for election was not
abolished until 1924. The property qualifications that applied to the Legislative
Council were abolished in 1951.
Political instability was the dominant characteristic of Victorian parliamentary
politics from colonial times until a major split in the Labor Party in 1955, which
set the basis for a period of Liberal Party dominance through to the 1980s.6 Prior
to 1955, leadership challenges, bitter fights between rural conservatives and urban
liberals, and the threat of early elections by a conservative-dominated Legislative
Council were the norm in Victorian politics. Indeed, the Legislative Council
exercised its power to bring down governments on no less than ten occasions.
Modern Victorian politics
The Labor split in 1955 provided the opportunity for Bolte and the Liberal Party
to dominate state politics until the 1980s. It was this period that led to Victoria to
be described as ‘the jewel in the Liberal crown’. Bolte led a socially conservative
government. His retirement marked a shift towards a more progressive approach
as a new generation of urban moderates emerged within the ranks of the Liberal
Party. The most prominent of these was Rupert (‘Dick’) Hamer who, as premier,
led a government that set about undoing a raft of conservative policies put in place
by his predecessor.7 By 1981, however, Hamer had retired amidst a sense that the
Liberal Party had atrophied. In 1982, Labor, under the leadership of John Cain Jr,
was elected to government for the first time since 1952. A new era of Victorian
politics had begun.8
Labor’s success in 1982 showed that the consequences of the 1954–55 split had
finally run their course. This election was to mark a new era in which executive
government would be shared by both Labor and the Liberal–National Coalition.
Labor exercised executive power between 1982 and 1992, between 1999 and 2010,
and from 2014. During these terms in government, five people served as premier
including John Cain (1982 to 1991), Joan Kirner (1991 to 1992, and Victoria’s first
female premier), Steve Bracks (1999 to 2008), John Brumby (2008 to 2010) and
Daniel Andrews (2014 to ). Between 1992 and 1999, and 2010 and 2014, the Liberal
and National party governed in coalition. The Liberal premiers included Jeff Kennett
(1992 to 1999), Ted Baillieu (2010 to 2012) and Denis Napthine (2012 to 2014).
6 Murray 2007.
7 Rodan 2006.
8 Considine and Costar 1992.
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Party Premiers Duration of party government
Liberal (Deakinite) John Murray 8/1/1909 to 9/12/1913
William Watt
Labor George Elmslie 9/12/1913 to 22/12/1913
Liberal (Deakinite) William Watt 22/12/1913 to 21/3/1917
Alexander Peacock
Nationalist John Bowser 21/3/1917 to 18/7/1924
Harry Lawson
Alexander Peacock
Labor George Prendergast 18/7/1924 to 18/11/1924
Country/Nationalist John Allan 18/11/1924 to 20/5/1927
Labor Edmond Hogan 20/5/1927 to 22/11/1928
Nationalist William McPherson 22/11/1928 to 12/12/1928
Labor Edmond Hogan 12/12/1928 to 19/5/1932
United Australia Party Stanley Argyle 19/5/1932 to 2/4/1935
Country Albert Dunstan 2/4/1935 to 14/9/1943
Labor John Cain Sr 14/9/1943 to 18/9/1943
Country Albert Dunstan 18/9/1943 to 2/10/1945
Liberal Ian MacFarlan 2/10/1945 to 21/11/1945
Labor John Cain Sr 21/11/1945 to 20/11/1947
Liberal Thomas Hollway 20/11/1947 to 27/6/1950
Country John McDonald 27/6/1950 to 28/10/1952
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Party Premiers Duration of party government
Electoral Reform Thomas Hollway 28/10/1952 to 31/10/1952
Country John McDonald 31/10/1952 to 17/12/1952
Labor John Cain Sr 17/12/1952 to 7/6/1955
Liberal Henry Bolte 7/6/1955 to 8/4/1982
Rupert Hamer
Lindsay Thompson
Labor John Cain Jr 8/4/1982 to 6/10/1992
Joan Kirner
Liberal and National Jeffrey Kennett 6/10/1992 to 20/10/1999
Labor Steve Bracks 20/10/1999 to 2/12/2010
John Brumby
Liberal and National Edward (Ted) Baillieu 2/12/2010 to 4/12/2014
Denis Napthine
Labor Daniel Andrews 4/12/2014
Table 1 Party governments of Victoria 1909 to 2019. Source: https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/
Results/results-historical-vicpremiers.html
Election Liberal % (seats) Country % (seats) ALP % (seats) Others % (seats)
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
37.9 (9)
40.1(9)
38.5(10)
37.6(10)
43.1(11)
48.3(15)
6.2(4)
8.9(4)
9.5(4)
6.1(4)
6.4(3)
7.9(2)
38.9(4)
35.4(4)
36.9(4)
42.0(4)
40.8(4)
42.6(5)
17.0(0)
15.5(0)
15.1(0)
14.3(0)
9.7(0)
1.2(0)
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Election
year
Liberal %
(seats)
Country/National %
(seats)
ALP %
(seats)
Others %
(seats)
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1992
1996
1999
2002
2006
2010
2014
2018
37.8(34)
37.1(39)
36.4(39)
39.6(38)
37.5(44)
36.7(42)
42.3(46)
46.1(52)
41.4(41)
38.3(24)
41.9(31)
40.5(33)
44.1(52)
43.9(49)
42.2(36)
33.9(17)
34.4(23)
38.0(35)
36.8(30)
30.4(21)
9.5(10)
9.3(9)
7.1(9)
8.7(10)
8.6(12)
6.4(8)
5.9(8)
7.1(7)
5.6(8)
4.9(8)
7.3(10)
7.8(9)
7.8(9)
6.7(9)
4.8(7)
4.3(7)
5.1(9)
6.8(10)
5.5(8)
4.7(6)
32.5 (20)
37.7(18)
38.5(17)
36.2(18)
37.9(16)
41.4(22)
41.6(18)
42.2(21)
45.2(32)
50.1(49)
50.1(47)
46.5(46)
38.4(27)
43.1(29)
45.6(42)
47.9(62)
43.0(55)
36.2(43)
38.1(47)
42.8(55)
19.9(2)
15.6(0)
17.9(1)
15.3(0)
15.9(1)
15.5(1)
10.0(1)
4.5(1)
7.5(0)
6.6(0)
0.8(0)
4.9(0)
9.5(0)
6.3(1)
7.2(3)
13.7(2)
17.3(1)
18.9 (0)
10.1 (3)
21.0(6)
Table 2 General election statewide primary vote Legislative Assembly, Victoria 1955–2018.
Source: http://elections.uwa.edu.au/index.lasso
Election Liberal % (seats) Country % (seats) ALP % (seats) Others % (seats)
1979
1982
1985
1988
43.7(12)
39.2(9)
41.1(8)
43.5(10)
5.8(2)
5.5(2)
6.6(3)
7.5(3)
45.3(8)
49.5(11)
47.3(11)
48.1(9)
4.9(0)
5.6(0)
4.8(0)
0.8(0)
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Election Liberal % (seats) Country % (seats) ALP % (seats) Others % (seats)
1992
1996
1999
2002
2006(a)
2010
2014
2018
43.5(14)
43.8(14)
39.7(11)
34.5(3)
34.5 (15)
43.1(18)(b)
36.1(14)(b)
29.4(11)(b)
8.7(3)
6.6(3)
7.3(3)
4.3(2)
4.4(2)
38.5(5)
40.5(5)
42.2(8)
47.5(17)
41.4(19)
35.3(16)
33.4(14)
39.2(18)
9.9(0)
8.9(0)
10.5(0)
13.4(0)
18.6(4)
21.2(3)
29.3(10)
30.8(11)
Table 3 Legislative Council results 1961–2018. Source: http://elections.uwa.edu.au/
index.lasso.
(a)Proportional representation system commences
(b)Liberal and National joint ticket
Constitutional reform
Armed with the recommendations of a constitutional convention that it had
commissioned as part of its agreement with rural independents who held the
balance of power after the 1999 election,9 the Bracks government introduced the
Constitution (Parliamentary Reform) Bill 2003 (Vic) to the parliament in 2003. The
reformed Victorian Constitution is now the only Australian Constitution to make
explicit reference to the position of premier and to note the subordination of the
governor to the premier unless the premier has lost the confidence of the Legislative
Assembly. The amended Constitution reinforces the idea of the Assembly as the
house of government by providing that Appropriation Bills need only to pass the
lower house to become law, thereby explicitly removing the Legislative Council’s
previous power to block ‘supply’. The Council’s power to amend or reject all other
Bills remains, although the new Constitution provides for a ‘Disputes Resolution’
mechanism where the two houses can’t agree on a Bill. It also allows the premier
to declare a Bill to be ‘Special’ in that its rejection by the upper house could be
the trigger for the premier to be able to advise the governor for the need to call an
early election. In another diminution of the power of the upper house, the amended
Constitution provides for fixed four-year terms for both houses and that elections
for both houses be held simultaneously.10
9 Victoria, Constitution Commission 2002.
10 Taylor 2006.
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Electoral systems and party systems
Victorian electoral laws were amended in 2002. They now require voter equality
across all districts and provide for re-districting to occur after every second
election, thus finally laying to rest that venerable controversy of rural malapp-
ortionment. The Legislative Assembly continues to utilise single-member districts
and the alternative vote (known colloquially as ‘preferential voting’). As the upper
house requirements clearly involve multi-member electorates given the changes
to the Constitution, the single transferrable vote (STV) method of proportional
representation favoured in Australian upper house electoral systems now applies in
Victoria.
This has had consequences for the Victorian party system (see Tables 2 and 3).
Between 1955 and 2006 – the first state election to be held under the auspices of
the new Constitution – Victorian election outcomes in both parliamentary houses
were monopolised by the Labor Party, the Liberal Party and the National (formerly
Country) Party with the occasional independent securing a seat or two in the
lower house.11 The new electoral arrangements for the Legislative Council were
predicated on the understanding that the upper house could only be effective as a
house of review provided it was not dominated by either Labor or the Coalition.
This objective has been achieved; since 2006 neither Labor nor the Coalition have
had an upper house majority, with the balance of power being exercised by an
increasingly diverse number of minor parties.
Of the parties that have held seats in the upper house since 2006, the Australian
Greens have been the most consistent performer. The rise of the Greens has been
another significant development in Victorian politics and has been reflected not
just in the party’s ability to win seats in the upper house but also its success in
winning seats in the Legislative Assembly. In 2010, the Greens won the lower house
seat of Melbourne and since then have secured other inner urban seats. The greatest
challenge from the Greens occurs in what used to be very safe Labor seats, but it
has also been the case that the Greens have won inner urban seats from the Liberal
Party as well.
Significant gentrification of the inner urban suburbs has created the conditions
for a Greens-voting constituency. Beyond the inner city the Greens vote falls away
and the party’s role in these lower house districts is confined to influencing the
outcome between the major parties by way of preference distribution. Notwith-
standing this, the Greens now rank alongside the major parties as participants in
the Legislative Assembly, thus providing grounds for describing Victorian politics
as a four-party system. This also has the potential to make for a very close contest
for the Assembly. In theory, single-member electoral systems should reward the
successful party or parties with a clear lower house majority. Since 1999, however,
Victoria has experienced minority government twice (1999 to 2002 and towards
11 Economou, Costar and Strangio 2003, 162–7.
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the latter stages of the Coalition government between 2010 and 2014) and some
election outcomes have been very close.
The policy debate
Given the significant constitutional and administrative capacity state governments
have to make public policy, the list of potential policy controversies on the state
policy agenda is vast. However, in the case of Victoria, the policy record can be
usefully assessed under two broad headings: the provision of infrastructure (which
is of critical importance to the state’s approach to economic policy), and ‘social
policy’. In both cases, something of a major transition occurred in the Victorian
approach to both economic and social policy during the 1980s and 1990s. In the
case of infrastructure provision, Victoria enthusiastically embraced the neoliberal
argument about the desirability of a reduced role for government, particularly
in relation to the provision of services that could instead be provided by the
private sector. Social policy, meanwhile, underwent no less a significant change, the
consequence of which was to erase the state’s previous reputation for conservatism
and prohibition – an approach to policy that was known to an older generation of
Victorians as ‘wowserism’.12
Infrastructure, economy and the state sector
Historically, the public sector has been a major presence in Victoria’s economy.
Until the 1990s, the Victorian economy comprised the private sector operating with
or through major state corporations providing energy, fresh water, transport, port
facilities and financial services.
Given that the Labor Party had hardly ever been in government between 1856
and 1982, the development of the state’s extensive public infrastructure was not the
legacy of socialist ideology but, rather, liberal and conservative pragmatism.13 Put
simply, Victoria’s political leaders were not averse to the idea of creating a state
corporation to build or run something considered vital to the advancement of the
colony/state.
Reducing the public sector: privatisation
By the 1980s, public and political attitudes towards the public sector began to shift.
Those corporations that had been at the centre of the development of Victoria as
a major manufacturing state were now being critically scrutinised. The fact that
12 Dunstan 1974.
13 Holmes, Halligan and Hay 1986, 26–7.
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they were monopolies did not sit well with emerging economic theory about the
need for competition. Their very bureaucratic method of operation was sometimes
interpreted as being impervious to the needs of customers, and their corporate
approach to planning had the unfortunate political consequence of them being
seen to be beyond political control.14 A new generation of politicians tended to
have a less benign view of these corporations than their predecessors, and, in
this environment, arguments about the need to break up large state corporations
and allow a diversity of private players into the market resonated in the political
debate.15
The election of the Liberal–National coalition government headed by Jeff
Kennett in 1992 marked a period of intense privatisation in which few corporations
were spared, although it was also true that the previous Labor government had been
forced to sell the State Savings Bank and had started the disintegration of the SECV.
The initial purpose of the privatisation was to address the budget deficit.
Receipts from the sale of public corporations went to retiring debt. Privatisation
also sought to reduce the size of the state’s public sector workforce. Commencing
with the SECV and extending to other corporations, the government’s enthusiasm
for this approach extended to other areas of policy including corrective services and
local government. The reform of local government was quite extensive and involved
a suspension of local government elections for a number of years. Other changes
resonated with the small government agenda, and included capping rate rises,
amalgamating councils and requiring councils to contract their service provision
functions out to private providers.16 This reform hit rural councils particularly
hard, and it was noticeable that a collapse in support for both the Liberal and
National parties in regional and rural districts contributed to the unexpected defeat
of the Kennett government in 1999.17
Social policy
The task of undoing the Bolte legacy began under his successor, Dick Hamer.
His government moved to solve the police corruption crisis by decriminalising
abortion. This government also put in place extensive urban and rural conservation
laws. It abolished capital punishment and decriminalised homosexuality. The Cain
Labor government legalised and regulated prostitution and began deregulating
liquor licensing laws in a bid to encourage a cafe approach to wining and dining
that was emerging from Melbourne’s large ethnic communities, thereby setting
Victoria on course to enjoy a tourism boom. The Kennett coalition government
14 Gerritsen 1985; Rosenthal and Russ 1988.
15 Woodward 1999.
16 Kiss 1999.
17 Woodward and Costar 2000.
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issued an apology to the Stolen Generation in 1997. It also deregulated retail
trading hours and radically expanded the gaming industry to include poker
machines, and backed the development of a major casino complex on the southern
bank of the Yarra River, where factories and warehouses once stood. The Bracks
Labor government instituted a Bill of Rights, and the Brumby Labor government
oversaw the decriminalisation of abortion. The Andrews Labor government
committed Victoria to ambitious greenhouse gas emission reductions. In 2017,
it also oversaw the introduction of ‘dying with dignity’ laws, thereby permitting
euthanasia in certain circumstances.
Some of these reforms precipitated bitter political exchanges, as the state’s
conservative forces within the community, politics and some of the churches
maintained their opposition to abortion and euthanasia. Other reforms have been
the subject of ongoing debate about their social consequences. Gaming liberalisation
has been the subject of intense criticism on the grounds that it has caused unacc-
eptable social consequences. Strong concerns have been expressed about the link
between excessive alcohol consumption and violence, as well as its impact on road
safety. It is the prerogative of government to respond to these concerns and form-
ulate policy accordingly, but the significance of the extent to which social policy
has changed since the 1980s cannot be denied. Victoria generally, and Melbourne in
particular, are very different places to what they were at the height of the ‘wowser’
period under the auspices of the Liberal Party conservatives of the Bolte era.
Conclusions
The government and politics of Victoria reflect both stability and significant
change. Stability is to be found in the basic institutions of government where, in the
aftermath of the Eureka rebellion, colonial and British political actors were quick
to institute a Westminster system of parliamentary government that continues to
this day. Modifications to the Constitution occurred periodically, with arguably the
most significant of these being the changes in 2003, although all they really did
was codify the core Westminster conventions that the lower house is the house of
government, the upper house is a house of review, and the governor acts on the
advice of the premier.
The significance of change is to be found in the state’s politics and, through
it, the policy debate. The three-way division of the party system after the First
World War led to political volatility and obsession with electoral laws. Planning
and development of the state was left to the major state corporations that delivered
transport, resources and energy and this was to be a feature of the Victorian state
sector until it was comprehensively dismantled by the Kennett government in the
1990s. In the meantime, the Labor split in the 1950s led to one-party government
in Victoria, as a particularly conservative Liberal Party secured a series of election
victories and found little opposition to its agenda from the Legislative Council.
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Although the decline of the conservative hegemony started with generational
leadership change in the Liberal Party, the key moment was the election of a
Labor government in 1982. This was significant for two reasons: first, this election
marked the end of Liberal dominance of the state’s politics and the beginning
of a new era where government could be led by either Labor or the Liberals
and Nationals working in coalition. Second, the election of Victoria’s main social-
democratic party began the process of converting Victoria from the prohibitionist
conservatism of the Bolte era into a more cosmopolitan and socially progressive
community. The modern Liberal Party has aligned with this, and brought a
commitment to economic liberalisation.
Both Labor and the Coalition have assisted in this transformation of Victoria
into a post-industrial economy with a strong reputation for being socially
progressive and remarkably cohesive for a community with such a diversity of
ethnic and racial backgrounds. As with all policy debates, there have been
disagreements on various aspects, and challenges arise as to how to cope with
the growth of the Melbourne metropolis in particular. Despite the decline of
manufacturing, the state continues to be a major driver of the national economy,
and the policy-making process – based on an elected parliament and an extensive
if transformed public sector – has been at the centre of this. Victoria’s record
is a confirmation of the significance of politics, the making of policy, and the
importance of state governance in Australia’s federal system.
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Western Australia
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This chapter furnishes an overview of the political history of Western Australia
(WA), explores the state’s relationship to the federation and outlines its key consti-
tutional, political and electoral features. It is argued that while WA shares much
in common with its federal counterparts, there are several areas of difference that
continue to shape its relationship to the federation.
European settlement
Indigenous peoples inhabited the territory of what is now WA for many millennia
before the official establishment of the Swan River Colony, in June 1829, by British
legislation introduced the month prior. The British view of this land at that time
has been described as: an area ‘that had been known to the Europeans longer than
any other part of the continent and was the least wanted’.1 British settlement was
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ultimately a pre-emptive response to concerns about French colonial ambitions in
the western half of the continent.
The particular circumstances that led to the colony’s founding by the British
would shape its developmental arc for the first five decades of settlement. The
British showed little appetite to invest in the nascent colony, which hampered
WA’s economic growth for several decades and undermined the business case
for self-government.2 Moreover, well into the first half of the 1880s, there was
little urgency for responsible government among WA’s elites, who feared that mass
enfranchisement would weaken their privileged grip over colonial society.3
When WA did attain self-government, it did so a number of decades behind
the other original colonies. Self-government of the colony became effective from
21 October 1890, with the UK parliament’s enactment of the Western Australian
Constitution Act 1890 (UK) to which was scheduled the Constitution Act 1889 (WA)
(CA).
However, the eventual grant of self-government by the Imperial parliament
was encumbered by several conditions: a nominated upper house, constitutional
protections for native inhabitants of the colony in the form of the now redundant
section 70, and retention of crown lands above the 26-degrees-south line of latitude
in the hands of the British government. While the compromises were reluctantly
agreed to by the colony, the outcome was nevertheless hailed as a triumph of ‘the
cherished birthright of Englishmen’.4
Federation
The elation of achieving self-government was, however, quickly overshadowed by
the inexorable march towards Federation. WA faced the spectre of having to
relinquish its newfound independence before it had a chance to exercise it fully.
Compounding the colony’s apprehension was the fact that almost half of its revenue
was drawn from intercolonial tariffs. The new federal Constitution would make
trade, commerce and intercourse among the states ‘free’, thereby undercutting an
important revenue source for WA.5
WA did eventually vote to enter the federation, with the initiative obtaining
nearly a 70 per cent ‘yes’ vote on 31 July 1900. However, the question was only
presented to the people as a result of intervention by colonial authorities. In order
to counter the recalcitrance exhibited by WA’s political elite, colonial authorities
adopted a carrot and stick approach. The carrot took the form of a deal to address
2 Moon and Sharman 2003, 184.
3 Curthoys and Martens 2013, 130.
4 Martens 2016.
5 Musgrave 2003.
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the colony’s financial anxieties, while the stick was the threat to annexe the colony’s
lucrative goldfields.6
The state’s ambivalence towards the federation has remained a distinctive feature
of its history and its identity. Some regard WA’s tentativeness as pathological, with
one former state government minister arguing that one need only ‘[s]cratch a Wes-
tern Australian and you find a secessionist underneath’.7 At various points in time,
WA’s feelings of grievance have found expression in the call for secession.
The most serious of such efforts occurred in 1933, when WA, reeling from the
Great Depression, voted to secede from the federation. The plebiscite obtained over
50 per cent of the electorate’s support.8 While the government of the time, led by
Premier Collier, dutifully – if reluctantly – petitioned the Imperial parliament for
relief, its refusal to hear the matter led to the supplication being dropped.9 It was the
position of the Imperial parliament that it would be unconstitutional for the state
to secede without federal parliamentary support.10
There have been intermittent calls for WA to consider its future outside of the
federation. While the political class have generally been careful not to utter the
‘s(ecession)’ word, they have come close at times. In 2015, the premier warned that
WA’s ‘future’ might not ‘lay with the rest of Australia in a financial or economic
sense’, with the state facing its ‘Boston tea party moment’.11
WA and the federation today
It is, perhaps, overly simplistic to interpret secession rhetoric as a quirk of WA’s
political culture or a provocation to extract concessions from the Commonwealth.
Such claims are better understood as an ‘expression of the powerlessness felt by the
residents’, who perceive themselves to be on the periphery of political power.12
Several factors conspire to fuel WA’s grievance. The first emerges from fiscal
demands arising from the state’s geography and demography. WA occupies 33
per cent of the continent, covering a total area of 2.5 million square kilometres,
with a population of 2.47 million people. It is the second least densely populated
region in Australia, behind the Northern Territory.13 And while the majority of the
population is urbanised, 23 per cent of its residents are located in regional areas,
in ‘some of the least hospitable places on Earth’.14 This includes estimates of 12,000
people living in 274 remote Indigenous communities.15
6 Musgrave 2003.
7 Quoted in Taylor 2015, 2.
8 Besant 1990.
9 Bolton 1993.
10 Besant 1990.
11 Burrell 2015.
12 Hiller 1987; Sharman 1993.
13 ABS 2016.
14 CEDA 2016, 11.
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WA’s nine regions are vital to the economic health of the state and the
federation.16 In 2017–2018,17 for example, WA accounted for 42 per cent of
Australia’s merchandise exports, the bulk of which was generated from natural
resources and agricultural production derived from its regions.
However, the state’s size, population dispersion and the physical diversity of its
regions generate significant governance demands. In ‘lacking economies of scale’, the
regions present ‘multiple challenges, especially in terms of inadequate infrastructure
provision and service delivery’,18 that are not confronted by WA’s counterparts to
the same extent. The WA government must spend significantly more per capita on
delivering an average level of services to ensure that all Western Australians enjoy a
comparable standard of living to their counterparts across the federation.
The second factor that complicates WA’s relationship to the federation is the
‘tyranny of distance’. WA’s capital is closer to Jakarta than it is to Canberra, and
it does not share a time zone with any of its federal cousins. Easement of the
physical obstacles of distance from the eastern seaboard was slow to occur.19 While
contemporary innovations in communication and transportation have removed the
effects of geographic isolation to a great extent, the perception that remoteness
equates to political invisibility endures.
Pre-Federation WA politicians were aware of the challenges that distance would
present for the state’s visibility in the Commonwealth. Moreover, the usefulness
of the federal parliament for channelling the state’s grievances quickly proved
ineffectual. WA’s representation in the House of Representatives was, as it is today,
diminutive owing to its small population, while the party politicisation of the
Senate quickly extinguished its role as a genuine states’ chamber.
A third factor that challenges harmonious relations with the federation is
economic differences. From its inception, the structure of the WA economy was
distinct from the more populous ‘manufacturing’ eastern states. WA’s economy has
depended heavily on exports, principally agricultural commodities and resources.
This has meant that economic decisions that benefit the eastern economies have not
always aligned with WA interests.
One of the earliest indications of how economic differences could prompt
a misalignment of policy preferences between WA and the federal government
occurred with the introduction of a federal tariff in 1902. While the tariff was a
boon for the eastern states, it represented a grave economic liability for the import-
dependent west.20
The sense of disenfranchisement has been magnified by the belief that the
Commonwealth has exploited the state’s resource-rich economy without fair
15 Regional Services Reform Unit 2016.
16 CEDA 2016, 13.
17 Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation 2019.
18 CEDA 2016, 24.
19 Moon and Sharman 2003, 203–4.
20 Musgrave 2003, 99.
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recompense. The consequences of WA’s booming resource economy have collided
with fiscal equalisation arrangements that are slow to adjust to changes in the
economic fortunes of the states.
WA’s concerns assumed particular urgency when the Commonwealth Grants
Commission (CGC) recommended, in 2015, that WA’s share of Goods and Services
Tax (GST) revenue be reduced from 37 per cent of the per capita average to 30 per
cent. The sense of grievance was intensified when the Commonwealth sought to
exploit the situation to compel WA to implement far reaching reforms in exchange
for financial relief.21
However, the source of much of WA’s disgruntlement can ultimately be traced
to the expansionist tendencies of the Commonwealth. Very quickly, it has been
argued, the federation collapsed into an arrangement that is more ‘centralised than
was ever envisaged or intended, indeed one of the most centralised of all true
federations’.22
Constitutional overview
Prior to 1890, the colony was under British control, with a locally residing governor,
the first being Captain James Stirling. While it had a Legislative Council of 18 men,
of which six were appointed and the remainder elected, its enactments had to be
reserved for Her Majesty’s pleasure, and the extent of executive power forestalled
responsible government in the colony.
The enactment of the CA brought about a fully elected Legislative Assembly
and, initially, an appointed Legislative Council, which also became an elected body
in 1893, prior to the six-year limit allowed for by section 6 of the Act.23
Within a decade, amendments to the franchise and the Council and Assembly
were proposed by the colony’s first premier, Sir John Forrest. While initially taking
the form of amendments to the CA, it was eventually determined that a separate
and distinct constitutional enactment should be introduced. To this day, WA retains
two unconsolidated constitutional enactments: the CA and the Constitution Acts
Amendment Act 1899 (WA).
A little over a century later, the state’s colonial apron strings were loosened
with the passage of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth and UK). These dual enactments
meant that the British parliament no longer had legislative powers over the states,
repugnant legislative restrictions were removed and the avenue of appeal from the
state Supreme Courts to the Privy Council was abolished.
21 Fenna 2015a. In 2018, the Morrison federal government announced a 70 per cent floor in the
GST dollar to begin in 2022–23, increasing to 75 per cent in 2025 (Laschon 2018).
22 Fenna 2015b.
23 Murray and Thomson 2013, 22.
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In 2015, the preamble to the CA was amended to ‘acknowledge the Aboriginal
people as the First People of Western Australia and traditional custodians of the
land’, followed by the statement that the WA parliament ‘seeks to effect a
reconciliation with the Aboriginal people of Western Australia’.
Key government institutions
The Australia Acts 1986, although releasing Imperial legislative control, retained the
role of the monarchy in the state governmental structure. The state governor was
‘Her Majesty’s representative’ (section 7[1]) although slight alterations were made
to the governor’s office and it was set out that advice to the monarch was to be
‘tendered by the Premier’ (section 7[5]).
The governor’s role includes ceremonial, as well as constitutional, functions,
such as assenting to legislation, proroguing parliament, issuing electoral writs,
chairing the Executive Council and making governmental appointments.24 In
almost all instances, the WA governor acts on advice, unless rare circumstances
arise to justify the exercise of the governor’s reserve powers.
The present Assembly contains 59 members with a maximum four-year term,
and the Council has 36 members, drawn from six electorates, with a fixed four-year
term. The premier leads the party with a majority in the Assembly and presides over
ministerial decisions made by the Cabinet. There can be up to 17 state ministerial
positions, and one must be filled by a member of the Council.
The WA parliament has plenary legislative power to make ‘laws for the peace,
order and good government’ of the state,25 including the ability to enact extra-
territorial laws. While there are some express constitutional limits on its power
through the terms of the Commonwealth Constitution, the High Court of Aust-
ralia, since Federation, has also determined that some implied legislative limits
exist. Further, the CA includes restrictive procedures that seek to make it more dif-
ficult for the parliament to enact or amend particular laws by standard legislative
procedures (Bills must be passed by absolute majorities or referendum, or both).
While such provisions will not always be binding on a later parliament and require
a suitably authoritative source to be so, they seek to apply to Bills that, for example,
abolish the Council or Assembly, alter the office of governor or seek to amend the
restrictive procedures themselves.
24 ‘Letters patent’ 1986.
25 CA, section 2(1).
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Electoral law
WA operates under the oldest electoral legislation in Australia, with the current
statute, the Electoral Act 1907 (WA), passed during the reign of Edward VII. While
many of the original provisions of the primary Act remain in force, it has been
significantly updated in response to changing societal and political norms (see
Appendix).
The franchise
The initial entitlement to vote in elections was based on a property franchise for
those electors over 21 years of age, with the result that mostly white males met the
qualification. While the property qualification was extinguished for the Assembly
by 1907, an indirect property privilege prevailed until 1923 in that voters with
property holdings in multiple electorates were entitled to vote in each of those
districts. The property franchise remained for the Council until 1962.26
Women were granted the vote in the Assembly in 1899, making WA second
only to South Australia (SA) to confer women’s suffrage. It was also the first state
to elect a woman to parliament: Edith Cowan in 1921. The extension of suffrage
to Aboriginal people on fully equal terms was not achieved until 1962. Initially,
enrolment and voting were optional for Aboriginal electors, even though voting
was compulsory for non-Indigenous electors from 1936.
Fixed-term elections
Prior to the 2000s, the government had the power to call an election at any time of
their choosing, provided they did not exceed the maximum length of the term of
parliament. However, by 2011 a cross-party consensus that this privilege afforded
the government an unfair electoral advantage had emerged, leading to calls to
introduce fixed-term elections. Since this time, general elections have been held
every four years on the second Saturday in March.
Electoral boundaries and ‘one vote, one value’
The challenge of balancing geography and demography when drawing electoral
boundaries has been particularly contentious in WA, so much so that it was the
last state to remove the zonal system, whereby country electorates averaged half the
number of voters in metropolitan electorates.
The principle of ‘one vote, one value’ was eventually secured by the Gallop
Labor government with the passage of the Constitution and Electoral Amendment
Bill 2005 (WA). However, WA electoral law continues to make allowances for larger
electorates in recognition of the challenges of representing such a broad area. A
26 Phillips 2013, 3–5.
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large district allowance provides for districts larger than 100,000 square kilometres
to have a nominal increase in elector numbers. Furthermore, such electorates are
permitted to be more than 20 per cent lower than the average district allowance,
compared to all other districts, which must be within a 10 per cent tolerance.
Since 2005, the state’s electoral boundaries are determined by the three electoral
distribution commissioners: a current or former Supreme Court judge (chair), the
electoral commissioner and the government statistician.
Electoral systems
As is common to bicameral parliaments, WA’s two chambers are elected under
different electoral systems.
At the inception of responsible government, elections for the Assembly were
conducted under first-past-the-post (plurality) combined with single-member
electoral districts. In 1907, plurality was replaced with optional preferential voting
(OPV). In response to concerns from non-Labor parties about preference losses
in three-way electoral contests, full preferential voting was adopted in 1911. This
system remains in force today.
Elections for the Council occur under proportional representation using the
single transferrable vote (PR-STV), introduced in 1987. The present system super-
seded the 1965 regime, comprised of two-person electorates with staggered six-year
terms, conducted under full preferential voting.27
Campaign finance and public funding
Campaign finance restrictions were initially introduced in WA in 1904, in the form
of election expenditure caps on candidates. But it was not until 1996 that a more
comprehensive scheme was adopted, with requirements for an annual disclosure of
donations and electoral expenditure by parties and associated entities. The current
disclosure threshold for individual donations is $2,500.
Public funding of elections was introduced in 2006. Under the provisions,
candidates can apply to be reimbursed for electoral expenditure they incurred if
they secured more than 4 per cent of first preference votes (at $1.92713 per vote as
at 1 July 2019).
Parties and the party system
The core elements of WA’s modern party system had emerged by 1914. Prior to this
time, elections and parliament were largely the preserve of ‘notables’ who formed
loose groupings in parliament. The formation of the Australian Labor Party (Labor)
27 Phillips 2013.
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in 1902 radically altered this dynamic. Created to represent newly enfranchised
workers and unionists, Labor quickly developed into a disciplined electoral party,
enabling it to dominate the contest for government for much of the period until the
late 1950s.28
Labor’s organisational and political successes triggered the mobilisation of the
Liberal and National (formerly Country) parties. While a group claiming to rep-
resent business interests used the ‘Liberal’ label in 1911, it was not until the
establishment of the federal Liberals in 1944 that the WA Liberals acquired the
organisational discipline to emerge as the major non-Labor rival. For much of the
period from the late 1950s until the 1980s,29 the Liberals dominated government,
although, since this time, they have alternated with Labor in office. In the nine
elections held since 1986, the Liberals have held government on four occasions, and
Labor five times.
While the Liberals were slow to institutionalise, the Nationals had established
robust organisational underpinnings by 1914. The party was able to leverage its
close relationship with rural interests, along with its organisational structures, to
become a competitive conservative party. However, similar to divisions of the
National Party elsewhere, the WA Nationals have been under intense pressure from
demographic changes, structural change to the economy, electoral reforms and
competitive pressures from the Liberals.30 At various times, this has led to internal
fracture and the existence of two separate rural parties in the state.31
Acrimony within the Nationals has also affected the party’s ties with the
Liberals. There have been two key inflection points in the relationship between
the conservative parties, the first of which was between 1978 and 1986, when
the coalition disbanded. The second, and present, opened up in 2006, when the
Nationals abandoned the coalition to pursue a looser post-election ‘partnership’
with the Liberals, in which they sought ministries and funding commitments in
exchange for supporting the Liberals in office. While some scholars have declared
the Nationals’ latest strategy a triumph,32 it is unclear whether this tactic will
ultimately be sufficient to save the party from demographic forces over which it has
no control.
Prior to the 1990s, the Council overwhelming favoured the election of members
from the three major party groupings, and the conservative parties more parti-
cularly. Between 1911 and 1993, election of persons entirely unconnected to one
of the three longstanding party groupings was a novel occurrence. However, in the
seven elections held since 1993, 33 independents and non-major parties have been
elected. PR-STV is credited with facilitating the election of ‘other’ electoral actors to
28 de Garis 1991.
29 Black 1991.
30 Moon and Sharman 2003.
31 Gallop and Layman 1985.
32 Phillimore and Mahon 2015.
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the Council and breaking the almost exclusive monopoly held by the three oldest
parties in the chamber. The WA Greens has been the most successful of the newer
entrants; it elected its first member to the Council in 1993 and has managed to elect
between two and five members of the Council at every election since.
Conclusions
WA’s formative historical experiences, its economy and its geography have made it
a sometimes-disgruntled member of the federation. But WA has more in common,
politically and culturally, with other members of the federation than it does
differences. Its grievances have been fiscal, as against identity-based, with the result
that outpourings of disaffection have ebbed and flowed with prevailing economic
circumstances.33 These grievances aside, WA is an integral constitutive unit of the
federation.
Appendix: timeline of key changes to elections in WA since 1890
1890 Creation of Legislative Assembly (LA) with four-year terms. Members of
Legislative Council (LC) nominated by the governor until 1893. Plural voting
with property qualification.
1893 Voting extended to male British subjects over 21 years of age. Property
qualification continued. Optional enrolment.
1899 Adult suffrage. Women awarded the vote in LA.
1900 Payment of members and triennial terms.
1904 Plural voting abolished.
1907 Current Electoral Act passed. Preferential voting introduced.
1911 Full preferential voting introduced.
1919 Compulsory voting for the Assembly.
1920 Women became eligible to be MLAs.
1921 Edith Cowan elected as first woman in LA.
1922 Independent electoral distribution commissioners to determine electoral
boundaries. Decisions ratified by parliament.
1936 Compulsory voting introduced for LA.
33 Lecours and Béland 2018.
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1939 First parliamentary election with compulsory voting.
1947 New distribution legislation – three commissioners, country ‘vote-weighting’
and no ratification of decisions by parliament.
1954 Ruby Hutchison elected as first woman in LC.
1962 Voluntary enrolment and voting for Indigenous people. LC franchise
extended to include spouses, but property qualification remained. Women
gained the vote in the LC.
1963–64 Adult franchise introduced for the LC with removal of the property
qualification. Voting entitlements for both houses became identical.
Enrolment and voting for the LC made compulsory.
1970 Voting age reduced to 18 years.
1975 Restrictions on clergymen standing for election were abolished.
1978 Reduction in number of members of either house now only by referendum.
1980 First Indigenous MP – Ernie Bridge – elected, later became first Indigenous
minister.
1983 Joint enrolment procedure introduced for Commonwealth/state enrolment.
Enrolment and voting became compulsory for Indigenous people. Australian
citizenship became a requirement to enrol.
1987 Western Australian Electoral Commission established. Four-year term for
MPs. Multi-member regions introduced in LC to replace provinces. LC
voting changed to PR-STV.
2000 Funding and disclosure law introduced. Party registration law introduced.
2005 One vote, one value. Distributions in Electoral Act.
2006 Nomination qualifications – citizenship. Overseas voting expanded.
Authorisation of online advertising.
2009 Itinerant voting introduced.
2011 Fixed election dates.
2016 Federal direct enrolment and update introduced. Internet voting for a limited
cohort of electors. Early voting – removal of reasons.
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Local government
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As a place-based layer of government, local governments around the world are
diverse. They operate within and respond to unique regulatory contexts and circ-
umstances, and mould the socio-economic development of the places they govern.
Within Australia, the legislative foundations of local governments and their charac-
teristics, governance, funding and reform agendas differ across jurisdictions. While
this diversity makes it difficult to develop a shared understanding, a range of
common challenges shape local governance.
This chapter reviews some of the contemporary challenges facing Australian
local governments. It begins with a discussion of the legislative foundations and
selected characteristics of local governments across Australia, their governance and
funding, and recent reform agendas. Next, public service delivery is considered,
and the emergence of place shaping as a concept guiding local governments in
the delivery of public services is examined. The chapter then discusses a range
of challenges for local governments in meeting rising community expectations of
public services and an expanded service-delivery task. Frameworks and methods
for measuring local government service-delivery performance are then presented.
Ryan, Roberta, and Alex Lawrie (2019). Local government. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
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Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion applying the concept of public
value to the evolving service-delivery task of Australian local governments.
Local government and Australia’s system of government
Australia is a federation with three levels of government: Commonwealth (national),
state and territory (regional) and local governments. Australia’s system of local gov-
ernment is mostly established through the separate constitutions of each state and
territory. There are, in effect, seven different systems across the country. Indeed,
local governments are often referred to as ‘creatures of state governments’.1
Unlike other countries, local governments are not recognised in Australia’s
national Constitution. A 1988 referendum to change this was defeated, and
campaigns for another referendum have not been successful.2 However, local
governments are still represented at Australia’s chief intergovernmental forum, the
Council of Australian Governments.3
Their legislative foundations mean local governments occupy a somewhat
tenuous position in the federation. Many of their powers and responsibilities are
subordinate to state and national governments, and there is often significant
overlap between their responsibilities and those of state governments. These
foundations also place a range of constraints on local government service delivery.
For instance, the validity of higher levels of government funding local government
service-delivery activities has been challenged in the High Court.
Number, size and type of local governments
Australia’s earliest local governments were established in Perth in 1838, Adelaide in
1840 and Sydney in 1842. These were incorporated to provide town improvement
services, such as street lighting, for early colonial capitals. Other local governments
started as collectives of ratepayers formed to provide services to their properties.4
Over the next 70 years, the number of local governments grew to over 1,000. Today,
there is just over half that number, although this often changes as local governments
are impacted by ongoing structural reform.5
Like Australia’s states and territories, the 537 local governments across the
country vary substantially in population size, land area and economic dominance.
The largest by population is Brisbane, with over 1.2 million residents, while the
smallest, in rural Western Australia (WA), has just a few thousand residents. The
largest by land area is East Pilbara in WA, which covers 380,000 square-kilometres,
1 Larcombe 1978; Stilwell and Troy 2000.
2 Stilwell and Troy 2000.
3 Phillimore and Fenna 2017.
4 Larcombe 1978.
5 Dollery and Grant 2010.
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while the smallest is Peppermint Grove, which covers just 1.5 square-kilometres at
the centre of Perth.6 Australia’s local governments employ almost 200,000 people;
around 100 of these councils are the largest or second largest employer in their local
area.7
Local governments across Australia are typically referred to as ‘councils’, ‘cities’
or ‘municipalities’ in urban areas, and ‘shires’ or ‘towns’ in rural and remote areas.
‘County councils’ are incorporations of two or more local governments established
to deliver services, such as water, across rural areas.8 The entire Australian land mass
is not covered by local government areas. Some remote ‘unincorporated’ areas are
administered by state and territory governments. The Australian Capital Territory –
the seat of Australia’s national government – does not have a formal system of local
government, and local services are delivered by the territory government.
Most capital city councils have their own legislation that provides expanded
powers for these local governments.9 For example, the City of Brisbane Act 2010
(Qld) allows the lord mayor to prepare a budget for approval by the elected council
and allows councillors to be assigned a portfolio such as transport or community
services. In contrast, in non-capital city councils, the general manager or chief
executive officer prepares the budget for approval by council. The City of Sydney
Act 1988 (NSW) establishes voting rights for central business district businesses,
whereas businesses in non-capital councils do not have voting rights.10
Functions and governance
The functions of Australia’s local governments have expanded in the postwar era to
include a more diverse and complex range of economic, social and environmental
services, such as child care and youth services, libraries and aquatic centres,
economic development, environmental management and community health.11
Local councils are governed by elected councillors, who form the official governing
body, and an operational executive, led by a general manager or CEO, responsible
for day-to-day functions such as corporate governance and finance, community
services, assets and engineering, and planning and environment. Councils have
a high degree of flexibility in the organisational structures they choose to adopt.
Whilst these executive portfolio areas are fairly common, they can differ between
councils.
The responsibilities of councillors and mayors differ across the states and
territories, depending on the legislation establishing the local government system in
each jurisdiction. Generally, councillors act as formal decision makers and approve
6 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
7 Ryan, Lawrie and Hastings 2014.
8 Larcombe 1978.
9 Larcombe 1978; Spearritt 2000.
10 Ng et al. 2017.
11 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
Local government
263
strategic plans, policies and budgets prepared by the executive. They are also
responsible for appointing and overseeing the performance of the general manager/
CEO in accordance with an employment contract.12 The mayor is typically a
ceremonial figure, although there are differences here too. For example, mayors in
Queensland are mostly directly elected and have wide powers to prepare major
policies and budgets. In contrast, many metropolitan mayors in New South Wales
(NSW) are indirectly elected and share responsibility for major policies and budgets
with councillors and general managers.13
Funding
Australia has a high level of vertical fiscal imbalance compared to other countries.14
This means the level of government that collects revenue to fund services is often
not the level responsible for delivering them.15 In Australia, the national
government collects the most revenue from taxation (over 70 per cent) but is
responsible for less than half (about 40 per cent) of all public sector expenditure
on service delivery.16 To remedy this situation, Australia uses a complex system of
intergovernmental transfers to reallocate national revenues to and between state,
territory and local governments.17 A formula of horizontal fiscal equalisation is
then used to ensure that, at least theoretically, all governments have the financial
means to provide similar levels of service to their communities.18
Local government is the most evenly matched level of government in Australia
in terms of the tax revenue it collects and the amount it spends on services.
However, local governments are increasingly handed ‘unfunded mandates’ as
higher levels of government transfer responsibility for service delivery to them
without transferring revenue or providing new revenue powers to fund these
services.19 Nationally, local governments collect about 3 per cent of all tax revenues
and are responsible for about 6 per cent of total public sector expenditure on
service delivery.20 Of the $17 billion in revenue they collect annually, property
rates account for about 40 per cent.21 Australia’s local governments hold around
$400 billion in assets and infrastructure.22 Housing and community amenities
(24 per cent), transport and communication (22.5 per cent) and general public
services (17.2 per cent) are the main expenditure items, although the amount local
12 Office of Local Government n.d.
13 New South Wales Electoral Commission 2019.
14 OECD 2014.
15 Charbit 2006.
16 ABS 2018.
17 Phillimore and Fenna 2017.
18 Stilwell and Troy 2000.
19 Charbit 2006.
20 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
21 ABS 2018.
22 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
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councils spend on each function varies depending on the different responsibilities
of councils in each state and territory.
Because property rates are their main revenue source and state governments
use different methods to calculate the land values on which property rates are
based, local government revenues vary substantially across Australia. For example,
South Australian local governments collect 60 per cent of their revenue from rates,
compared with around 15 per cent for the Northern Territory.23 Other major
revenue sources include fees and charges (such as parking fines and fees for lodging
development applications), rental income from properties and grants from other
levels of government.
Capital city councils that include central business districts also often have
higher land values, which means they collect more from rates than other councils
and can deliver more advanced services.24 For example, Brisbane City Council
operates one of Australia’s largest bus fleets, whereas state governments operate
buses in other jurisdictions.25 While own-source revenue (such as rates) comprises
up to 85 per cent of a local government’s revenue,26 this is less in rural areas where
rateable land values are often lower.
Local governments also receive annual and one-off grants from higher levels
of government. These grants typically make up a larger share of revenue for rural
local governments.27 A range of criteria are used to determine the grant amounts,
and the formula is often the subject of conflict. Annual grants are classed as general
purpose and can be used for whatever activities a council desires, while one-off
grants are typically for specific purposes and can only be spent on activities defined
by national or state and territory governments.
In recent decades, the amount of revenue Australia’s local governments can
raise from property rates has been capped by some state governments. This
increasingly common practice has been a subject of conflict between local and state
governments, and some local governments have been granted special exemptions.28
Reform
Reforms to Australia’s local government systems in recent decades have focused
largely on structural and governance issues, such as altering administrative boun-
daries, amending codes of conduct and land use planning decision making.29 For
example, in the 1990s, the Victorian government dismissed all local governments
in order to redraw boundaries and drastically reduce the number of local councils.
23 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2009.
24 Spearritt 2000.
25 Brisbane City Council 2019.
26 Productivity Commission 2017.
27 Worthington and Dollery 2000.
28 Worthington and Dollery 2000.
29 Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010; Nicholls 2017.
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Voter discontent with the swiftness of these reforms became a major state election
issue, and the government was promptly voted out of office.30 Similarly, in 2008,
the Queensland government halved the number of local governments; several of
the amalgamated councils have since demerged. In 2015, the NSW government
sought to reduce the number of local governments, but the reform process was
incomplete, halted due to voter discontent, a change of state political leadership and
court challenges by local governments facing mergers.
The driving force behind these moves to structural reform has been largely
ideological, the notion being that smaller local governments are inefficient. There
is no Australian evidence to support this claim.31 The most recent reforms in NSW
and the pressure for reform in Tasmania have primarily been driven by the property
sector, which has argued that different planning rules in different local government
areas create additional red tape and inefficiency in the development processes.32
Larger local governments can promote strengthened strategic leadership capacity,33
but this is difficult to measure or realise at times.
With the exception of introducing rate capping in some jurisdictions, state
governments have generally shied away from reforms that deliver a fairer share of
revenue to local governments. A national review of the federation that considered
the distribution of revenue and expenses between levels of government also failed
to include any proposals that would rebalance tax revenues to match the increased
service-delivery responsibilities of local governments.34 The continual focus of state
governments on structural reform while ignoring the financial basis of local
government is a source of ongoing conflict in the Australian federation.35
Service delivery
One of the major advantages of local government is that ‘it allows public services
to be adjusted to suit local needs and preferences’.36 Ideally, local governments are
established so that ratepayers who pay for local services can decide on what services
they receive.
Local government and service delivery
Australia’s local governments have evolved beyond a narrow emphasis on ‘services
to property’ to promote the social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing
30 Burdess and O’Toole 2004.
31 Drew, Kortt and Dollery 2012.
32 Property Council of Australia n.d.
33 Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012.
34 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014.
35 Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010.
36 Watt 2006, 8.
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of the communities they govern. This has been a response to citizens’ rising
expectations of public services and the devolution of service-delivery tasks from
higher levels of government to local governments.37 At the same time, local
government services have become subject to increased regulatory requirements
from other levels of government, particularly in core areas such as asset manage-
ment, land use planning and community planning. The costs of providing and
maintaining services have also increased faster than revenue.
The net effect has been that local governments now provide a wider range
and higher standard of services, such as sporting, cultural and community care
facilities, under increasing regulatory and financial constraints. These issues have
all contributed to the vastly increased complexity of local service delivery.38
Recently, attempts have been made to make sense of this expanded and more
complex service-delivery task for contemporary local governments (see Table 1)
The ability to tailor services to meet local needs is one of the justifications
underpinning Australia’s more decentralised system of local government.39 This
justification references the principle of subsidiarity, which is concerned with
ensuring service delivery is assigned to the lowest level of government capable
of performing the task, unless allocating to a higher level would achieve greater
efficiency and effectiveness.40 Because Australia’s local governments are closest to
their communities, they have unique insight into local needs. They determine
service levels according to these needs as well as state, territory and national
regulatory and funding conditions. Therefore, in one way, local governments act
as subsidiary agents responsible for delivering services for state and territory
governments. Yet, in another way, they are also legal entities with elected political
bodies responsible for their communities. This creates a somewhat conflicted
relationship between local government and citizens: as well as being ‘voters’ and
‘ratepayers’, citizens are also ‘customers’.
The justification for local government has been questioned on the basis that,
in a globalising world, it is not possible to constitute a spatial community. Indeed,
commentators have pointed to vast differences between the colonial life that existed
when local government systems were established, and have argued that ‘advances
in modern communications made community governments based on the village
or suburb an outmoded entity’.41 Further, because many public services are now
delivered and funded directly or indirectly by other tiers of government as well
as private and non-government sectors, local government is often not the only
service-delivery agent in a particular area.
37 O’Connor 2017.
38 See Walker and Gray 2012.
39 Colebatch and Degeling 1986.
40 Follesdal 1998.
41 Chandler 2010, 10.
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Function Services and infrastructure
Economic and community
development
Operation of tourist centres and facilities
Provision of grants to local groups to provide
services
Events and promotions
Sustainable land use Development approvals
Building approval and certification
Management of public land
Protecting the environment Preventing pollution or restoring degraded
environments
Providing environmental programs
Strategic planning
Community services Library services
Community events
Aged care
Early childhood education and care
Public health and safety Waste collection and management
Water and sewerage services
Preparedness and response to natural disasters
Table 1 Typology of expanding local government services. Source: adapted from
Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 6.
Other factors to consider when examining the evolving nature of local
government service delivery include:
• ‘Core’ local government functions: although these differ across jurisdictions,
there is an expectation local governments should provide core services to
a minimum standard before other tasks are considered. Examples of core
services include building approval and certification, waste collection and
management, and cultural and recreation services, such as libraries.
• Services delivered in competition with other providers: for a range of reasons,
local governments choose to deliver services in competition with other
providers. Examples include child care, golf courses, caravan parks and
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commercial car parks. These can also provide new revenue sources or generate
additional revenue.
• ‘Market gap’ services: particularly in rural areas, local governments often face
pressure to provide services that are economically unviable for the private
sector due to small population numbers, and there are no alternative providers.
Examples include medical clinics, aged care services and programs, airports,
saleyards, abattoirs and cemeteries.42
Local government and place shaping
Place shaping is a concept that illustrates the evolving role of local governments in
the context of citizens’ increased expectations of public services and an expanded
service-delivery task. Place shaping helps identify the special characteristics of
local places, such as neighbourhoods, so that action can be taken on economic,
social and environmental fronts to enhance the quality of these places and the life
of their people.43 It involves the creative use of power to promote the wellbeing
of a community, and may include building and shaping local identity, regulating
harmful and disruptive behaviours, and helping to resolve disagreements.44
The introduction of place-based community planning across Australia, such as
the Integrated Planning and Reporting framework in NSW, can be viewed as an
effort to help local governments reconcile competing service-delivery demands.45
Through place-based processes, local governments take a ‘whole of council – whole
of community’ view and perform a stronger role by engaging communities more
deliberatively in decisions about services, models of delivery and the inevitable
trade-offs required between community expectations and regulatory and funding
constraints. These processes not only shape what gets delivered but also educate
communities about the increasingly complex service-delivery task facing local
governments. Place-based processes appear to be changing community perceptions
of local government. For example, respondents to one survey identified place-based
planning for the future as one of the most important functions of local governments
in Australia.46 This represents a clear departure from historical perceptions of local
governments as providers of services to property.
Major challenges
In addition to the problems of a growing service-delivery task and stagnant revenue
bases, major challenges facing contemporary Australian local governments include
42 Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 7.
43 McKinlay et al. 2011, 4; Rablen 2012, 303–5.
44 Lyons 2007, 3.
45 Office of Local Government n.d.
46 Ryan et al. 2015.
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rising maintenance costs for ageing assets; shifting community needs and
expectations about the role of local government in responding to economic, social
and environmental problems; reluctance to change existing service-delivery
models; and increasingly fragmented, multi-sector, multi-level service-delivery
governance frameworks.47
Local government assets
Most local government assets are long lived and not traded in markets. Even though
these assets are crucial to the economic and social vitality and everyday functioning
of communities, there is a ‘massive backlog of new projects and maintenance
and upgrade projects’.48 A 2006 national study estimated the Australia-wide cost
of restoring local government infrastructure was between $12 billion and $15.3
billion.49 Comrie suggests that since asset lifespans are difficult to predict, there
may be ‘some uncertainty as to the reliability of local government expenses’.50
Indeed, there is evidence that the total operating expenses of Australia’s local
governments exceed their revenue and that the sector is in a net negative financial
position.51 This has led to observation by some that local government faces
worsening financial sustainability and the emergence of a massive infrastructure
backlog.52
Other factors that have raised interest in the financial capacity of local
governments to manage assets over recent decades include:
• an increased range of responsibilities and expenditure without growing revenues
as property rates are volatile and fluctuate with land valuations
• additional service needs in urban and coastal areas that are experiencing rapid
population growth, and financial challenges for rural local governments that
are experiencing population and revenue decline
• concern that local government assets are ageing and renewal expenditure is
not occurring at the rate necessary to maintain existing service levels, let alone
meet citizens’ rising expectations.53
Changing expectations: adapting to a changing climate
Addressing the impacts of a changing climate requires action by all three levels of
government as well as partnerships with organisations and institutions outside of
government. In light of the recognised exposure of public assets and the community
47 See Walker and Gray 2012, 5.
48 Campbell 2011, 2.
49 Campbell 2011, 2.
50 Comrie 2013, 9–12.
51 Comrie 2013, 9–12.
52 Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010, 81.
53 Comrie 2013, 8.
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to climate change risk, local governments face a rapidly expanding service-delivery
task, including:
• developing climate adaptation policy and planning for local government areas
and, where possible, for regions
• sustainable design and land use planning, including new standards for
construction and effective regulation
• contributing to the development of more resilient communities that can work
together to reduce their vulnerability to climate change and recover more
quickly from adverse events
• developing new models for water reuse and recycling and municipal solid waste
management
• protecting natural resources and increasing the resilience of local ecosystems
• incorporating public participation at all levels of climate change adaptation.54
However, a key challenge for Australian local governments is that they lack
the legal power and financial resources to fulfil this mandate effectively. With a
strong reliance on rates and user fees and charges, they do not have access to the
new revenue streams needed to carry out many of these tasks.55 Another core local
government service, land use planning, is also affected; it is difficult to predict how
climate change impacts will manifest on a local scale, and there is ‘a lack of scientific
information at a scale relevant to inform local planning’.56 Therefore, effectively
adapting to and mitigating climate change may appear beyond the existing capacities
of local government, particularly in rural and remote Australia.57
However, a number of useful models are emerging to assist local governments
to address service-delivery challenges arising from climate change. Recently,
international networks, such as the C40 and Resilient Cities networks, have formed
to build local capacity and drive action by facilitating knowledge exchange.
Moloney and Fünfgeld also describe the Climate Change Alliances that have
emerged in Victoria as good examples of local governments demonstrating their
capacity to respond to climate change in the absence of clear direction and support
from state and national governments.58 Serrao-Neumann et al. also discuss three
Australian local government-led public participation initiatives and note that it is
important that local governments work to ensure responsibility for climate change
adaptation is shared between the public and private sectors, and communities.59
54 Based on: Preston and Scott 2012; Moloney and Fünfgeld 2015; Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015.
55 Preston and Scott 2012, 14.
56 Baker et al. 2012, 135.
57 Baker et al. 2012, 128.
58 Moloney and Fünfgeld, 2015.
59 Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015.
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Reluctance to change service-delivery models
Local governments design services to meet local needs. However, sometimes there
can be a reluctance to change service-delivery models. The dominance of different
functions performed by local governments across Australia’s states and territories
also influences their capacity to alter service delivery models. For instance, social
services are often amenable to delivery by non-government providers, while major
infrastructure is increasingly provided through public–private partnership (PPP)
models. The way services have been delivered in the past is a strong predictor of
how they will be delivered in the future. There is often considerable reluctance to
change how things are done due to ‘the uncertainty and management structure
costs incurred with a switch of models’.60
Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock suggest that ‘in complex and uncertain situations
organisational inertia and incrementalism may limit local public officials’ ability to
depart radically from past arrangements’.61 This could lead risk-averse managers to
prefer the maintenance of existing service-delivery models over potentially superior,
but uncertain, alternatives.
Other factors that may contribute to resistance to change in service delivery
include:
• concern about the costs associated with change, e.g. the fear that costs of finding
new vendors could outweigh costs involved in managing existing contracts
• governance structures and skills, e.g. the structures and skills needed to manage
in-house service production can be quite different from those needed to
contract outside vendors
• specific jurisdictional characteristics, such as management capacity (e.g. for
evaluation), management structures (especially the relationship between poli-
ticians and administrators) and the competitiveness of the market.62
Therefore, when analysing local government service-delivery models, it is wise to
consider the history of services in a locality and the path dependency of service-
delivery models, alongside the attitudes of public officials.
Fragmented governance: working in partnership
Partnerships between government and the non-government sector are not new;
they stretch back to the local governments of the colonial era.63 However, the
notion of working in partnership has received growing criticism over the last
couple of decades following widespread outsourcing of service delivery to private
and non-government organisations. While persuasive arguments can be identified
60 Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008, 48.
61 Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008.
62 Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008, 28–34.
63 Larcombe 1978.
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both ‘for and against the private provision of public infrastructure in contemporary
local government’,64 concerns have been raised about whether the emphasis on
partnership privileges partners over the wider community.65
Local governments have pursued three common responses to privatisation:
• Hollowing out: declines in revenues and reductions in intergovernmental trans-
fers have forced local governments to ‘hollow out’ their services by reducing
service levels, outsourcing core service obligations through PPPs and increasing
user fees.
• Riding the wave: some local governments use privatisation as a two-edged
sword, harnessing the market towards public ends. As services are contracted
out, local governments create markets for public services by allowing com-
petitive bidding to drive down service costs while maintaining quality for
ratepayers.
• Pushing back: often encouraged by citizen action, some local governments
have pushed back against pressures to cut or privatise services. This has led
to initiatives such as establishing multi-sector coalitions of citizens, non-profit
organisations and government to drive service delivery, particularly in the areas
of housing and economic development.66
Flinders has analysed local government PPPs in the UK, and suggests they
‘raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked’. These
include:
• Balancing efficiency and flexibility: PPP projects adopt a ‘buy now, pay later’
approach, creating issues for the policy flexibility of future local governments,
which are constrained by the need to service payments for contracts entered
into by previous governments.
• Failure to address core risks: PPPs do not solve the problems of capital-intensive
service delivery as they focus more on costs and do little to address underlying
revenue issues. Therefore, the risk of revenues not matching expenses stays with
government.
• Complex, delegated governance: when service delivery is contracted out, it can
confuse the public as to who is responsible. There can also be confusion within
government when authority for decision making and managing expenditure is
devolved to non-elected PPPs.67
64 Cannadi and Dollery 2005, 116.
65 Rees, Mullins and Bovaird 2012.
66 Warner and Clifton 2013, 52–7.
67 Flinders 2005, 224–31.
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Improving outcomes for local communities
A core tenet of place shaping is a strong focus on improving economic, envi-
ronmental and social wellbeing. New ways of managing the performance of local
governments in delivering these outcomes have also been introduced as part of
place-based planning processes.68 The core logic of performance management is
that organisations and managers are given targets derived from objectives, such as
promoting community wellbeing, and ‘instruments of authority or incentive’ are
used to encourage staff to achieve or exceed these targets.69
However, while performance management systems need to connect to penalties
and incentives to ensure targets affect behaviour, they must also be designed in
a way that does not crowd out public interest motivations by promoting ‘gaming
and cheating behaviours’.70 This requires constant care and attention, including
establishing clear links between measures, penalties and incentives as well as regular
adjustments to ensure targets reflect community wellbeing.71
Aligning local government performance and community expectations
Citizen expectations of performance influence their satisfaction with and choice
of services as well as their political voice, including who they will vote for.
Expectations can be defined as ‘judgements of what individuals or groups think
will or should happen under particular circumstances’.72 These include expectations
that decision-making processes will attempt to maximise expected utility, and
citizen views of reasonable or desirable levels of service performance. Community
expectations and judgements of local government service delivery are influenced
by factors such as:
• whether there are other agencies available to provide a service, or whether
council is the only option
• the demographics of the community
• the geography of the area
• the community’s willingness to pay higher rates to get more services from the
local council
• the presence of a strong local business lobby
• proximity to major towns (in the case of smaller settlements) where services
can more easily be accessed.73
68 Office of Local Government n.d.
69 Pollitt 2013, 347.
70 Pollitt 2013, 358.
71 Ryan and Drew 2019.
72 James 2011, 1420–1.
73 Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 6.
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According to James, the provision of performance information by local
governments affects citizen expectations of and satisfaction with local government
performance: ‘Information is valuable because it helps them exercise choice as
users of services through knowledge of what they expect to receive’.74 Community
satisfaction surveys are one way Australian local governments determine citizens’
expectations and assess performance. Typically, these surveys ask ratepayers to
indicate how important each service is to them, their satisfaction with what has
been delivered and what they feel needs improving.75
Community satisfaction surveys have become powerful tools to examine and
communicate citizens’ expectations in terms of service delivery and the community’s
judgement about performance. They help local governments to identify gaps bet-
ween expectations and performance and highlight areas where performance imp-
rovement is needed. Increasingly, the findings of these surveys form the basis of
local government annual reports and are being fed into major whole-of-organisation
service delivery review processes.76
Conclusions: a public value approach to local government
Australia’s local governments are increasingly important to the proper function of
economies, communities and environments across the country. This is is reflected
in the growing diversity of their legal foundations, characteristics, governing
arrangements and funding. While recent reform agendas have focused more on
structural and monetary outcomes, the introduction of community strategic
planning, with place shaping and performance management as guiding principles,
is an exciting development that reflects the evolved role of local governments in
contemporary Australia society.
As local governments assume a greater role in society, beyond services to
property, they must strive to meet rising community expectations in increasingly
constrained and layered service-delivery contexts. This requires new frameworks
to guide their activities. Discussion of ‘public value’ has been widespread in public
policy since Mark Moore developed the conceptual framework for it in 1995.77
There is strong support for public value as a guiding principle for contemporary
local governments because it is seen as enhancing service-delivery outcomes.78 For
instance, Stoker suggests a public value style is well suited to fragmented governance
systems in the sense that ‘it bases its practice in the systems of dialogue and exchange
74 James 2011, 1431.
75 Morton Consulting 2014.
76 Ryan and Hunting 2015.
77 Alford and O’Flynn 2009; Williams and Shearer 2011.
78 See Benington 2009.
Local government
275
that characterize networked governance’.79 The public value framework requires
public sector managers to:
• aim to create something that is substantively valuable – that is, to constitute
public value
• be legitimate and politically sustainable, in the sense that they attract enough
ongoing support and resources from the authorising environment
• be operationally and administratively feasible, drawing on available organis-
ational and external capabilities.80
In contrast to the private sector, which can focus solely on monetary outcomes
and creating value for private shareholders, public value emphasises a much
broader range of activities valued by the public. The concept requires public
managers to search for and identify economic, social and environmental goals
valued by citizens, such as climate change adaptation. This necessitates constant
engagement with communities and stakeholders, as well as greater recognition
of the legitimacy of a wider range of stakeholders in realising these goals. For
instance, procurement processes that adopt a public value orientation require an
open-minded approach to identifying the best supplier for a service, regardless of
whether they are public, private and/or non-government providers. This means
that local governments must remain constantly attuned to public preferences and
integrate these into their service-delivery activities.81
Public value requires commitment to new goals and ways of working that are
more demanding than those that existed when local governments were established
in the colonial era. As the role of Australian local governments has expanded to
include services to people, they have begun moving down the public value pathway,
using place-based planning and working with communities and stakeholders to
identify broader goals and ways of achieving them. However, a more ambitious
reform agenda is required to build the regulatory, financial, human and technical
capabilities that contemporary local governments need to deliver on this comm-
itment. This is the major challenge facing modern Australian local government.
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Political sociology

Gender and sexuality in Australian
politics
Merrindahl Andrew
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private divide, quotas, substantive representation, suffrage
Gender pervades social and political life. It is impossible to function in the world
without using gendered categories and concepts and impossible to avoid gender roles,
whether one ends up conforming to or resisting them – or, as is more likely, doing
a complex mixture of both. Gender is one of the perpetually unresolved matters of
politics; woven into power structures but continually challenged, gender shapes many
of the most fraught and controversial political issues, such as reproductive rights,
welfare, violence and poverty. For feminists and their allies, gender politics offers the
hope of transformation and a centuries-long record of progress towards equality.
Over the last half-century, sexuality and gender diversity have increasingly
become topics of contention, with moves to end discrimination and promote
inclusiveness met by intensifying attempts at conservative repression. Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) people’s rights and women’s
rights are framed as threatening and, at times, as foreign agendas, strengthening
neo-traditional sexual and gender diversity politics within nationalist political
movements.1 In Australia, LGBTIQ+ issues have become more prominent due to
Andrew, Merrindahl (2019). Gender and sexuality in Australian politics. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas
Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and
Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Altman and Symons 2016.
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conflict over marriage equality and contestation about the place of sexual and
gender diversity education in schools.2
This chapter discusses the different ways gender and sexuality are manifested
in Australian politics, and the key concepts mobilised by scholars and advocates
working on issues of gender and sexuality. It begins with the ways feminist and
queer scholars have questioned definitions of ‘the political’ that rely on a gendered
view of the public/private divide. The second part of the chapter focuses on political
participation, outlining social movements that have put issues of gender and
sexuality on the agenda, exploring the attainment of voting rights and considering
gendered patterns of voting. The third part focuses on representation in both
its numerical and substantive forms, outlining the representation of women and
LGBTIQ+ people in Australian parliaments and exploring the role of political
parties and quotas. The final section of the chapter discusses media, backlash and
social change in the area of gender and politics.3
Expanding politics: questioning ‘normal’
Politics has conventionally been viewed as being about government and the public.
But politics can also be defined in terms of power. Applying this broader view
of politics, we can see that the apparently natural division of public and private
subordinates women and children.
In liberal political theory, the division between state and civil society (public
and private) is established through a fraternal social contract that claims to free
individuals from traditional hierarchies.4 As Carole Pateman and other feminist
scholars have shown, however, this social contract is based on a concealed ‘sexual
contract’ in which the individual is implicitly understood as a man who is the
head of his household, with women and children subsumed within the family – the
private sphere, where men can do what they wish.5
The identification of the family with the private sphere has made caring labour
invisible and undermined women’s participation by associating the private with
feminised and stigmatised qualities such as emotion, irrationality and the body.
As politics is typically identified as being related to the state, some things are
seen as being more closely related to politics than others. In particular, bodies,
reproduction, sex and emotion are often seen as existing outside the state and as
2 Williams and Sawer 2018.
3 At places throughout this chapter I use the terms ‘men’ and ‘women’ in a simplistic, binary way. I
acknowledge that this is not an accurate way to encompass differences in gender and that it excludes
people who are gender diverse. My use of these terms in this way reflects the fact that much of the
research I am summarising in the field of politics, as in scholarship generally, employs this model of
gender, and I acknowledge the value of scholarship that tries to move beyond this binary.
4 Pateman 1989, 118–40.
5 Celis et al. 2013, 6; Pateman 1989.
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feminine, compared with institutions and rules, which are considered to be at the
centre of the state and to be masculine.
A major contribution of feminist and queer scholarship has been challenging
these presumptions about what ‘the political’ is, while also exploring the private as a
site for new forms of politics based on care and dialogue.6 However, much political
science scholarship continues to disregard gender and sexuality (as well as race,
class, disability and other factors)7 in a way that perpetuates the centring of white
men’s experiences as ‘normal’ and ‘others’ as aberrant or exotic.8
While gender remains important in political scholarship and practice, there
has been a strong critique of the binary and essentialist way gender terms and
categories are used. Scholars have sought to deconstruct gender, going beyond even
the sex/gender distinction (sex as biological fact, gender as social construction) to
focus on how power relations produce gendered subjects.9 This project, sometimes
called ‘queering’, has challenged not only patriarchal presumptions but also some of
the categories on which feminists have tended to rely, such as women/men.
At the same time, the hegemonic nature of feminism, and what it includes or
excludes, has been criticised. This has involved challenging the concept of ‘women’
as a unified category and recognising that gender is always intertwined with
Aboriginality, race, sexuality, dis/ability, class, cultural background, migration
status and other identity factors.10 Developing this critical view further, a body
of scholarship and activism is now concerned with Indigenous and decolonising
perspectives on feminism, which call on participants to reflect on their own
situatedness within systems of power.11 Indigenous and decolonising perspectives
on feminism engage in bringing to light the violence upon which the liberal social-
sexual contract is based and creating new modes of politics and governance with
care at the centre.
In terms of research practices, the development of feminist research ethics
also requires attention to the social position of the knowledge producer and the
potential for relationships and care between the people involved, and exploring
alternative modes of knowledge beyond the abstract and individualised.12 Feminist
research also includes epistemological shifts towards valuing the knowledge of
racialised women, including art, storytelling, music and dance, approaching this
knowledge through dialogue to create new ways of speaking about and engaging in
the political.
6 Smith and Lee 2015, 55.
7 Kantola and Lombardo 2017, 1–17.
8 Celis et al. 2013, 2.
9 Smith and Lee 2015.
10 Altman and Symons 2016.
11 Moreton-Robinson 2000; Motta and Seppälä 2016.
12 Ackerly and True 2008.
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Political participation
Gender is an issue because feminists and their allies have made it so. The reason
they have done so is that gender inequality and gender norms have enormous
impacts on individuals and communities, including on people’s power and rights,
practical circumstances (employment, income, education), safety and access to
decision making.13 The same is true of sexual and gender diversity. Without lesbian
and gay liberation movements and the expanding mobilisation of LGBTIQ+ people
these issues would not be visible or addressed within politics or political science.
Feminist and LGBTIQ+ movements in Australia have been responsible for
expanding civil and political rights, raising new issues for consideration within
formal politics, achieving reforms and building new organisational forms.
In Australia, the mainstream (white) story of the women’s movement has its
roots in the struggles surrounding the vote, responsibility for children and military
conscription that took place towards the end of the 19th century and in the early
20th century.14 It is important to acknowledge that the movement was created
within a colonial context and carried ideas of progress that were embedded in
colonialism – an intertwined history that is now the subject of interventions from
Indigenous and decolonial feminisms.15
The ‘first wave’ women’s movements were largely white, heterosexual and
middle/upper class, oriented towards experiences of womanhood that excluded
the issues faced by other women.16 As women’s liberation and gay and lesbian
rights movements mobilised on larger scales from the 1960s onwards, the groups
seen as central to the movements continued to be those that were comprised of
white middle/upper class people. However, alongside these movements have been
a range of other mobilisations, including Aboriginal women’s collective efforts for
rights and wellbeing, separate from the feminist movement,17 women’s mobilisation
within trade unions,18 white working-class Marxist-socialist feminist movements,
human rights activism by and for women with disabilities,19 and migrant and
refugee women’s mobilisations and community building.20
While the account given here centres on the gender dimension of the women’s
movement and other movements, this is not to say that gender (or at least gender
as understood by those in the ‘mainstream’ of the women’s movement) is, in reality,
the most salient feature or ‘axis’ of oppression/privilege for the people involved.
13 Australian Human Rights Commission 2018; Celis et al. 2013.
14 Andrew 2008.
15 If this was written by Aboriginal women, the story of women’s politics and feminist movements
would undoubtedly be different.
16 Katzenstein 1990; Staggenborg and Taylor 2005; van Acker 1999, 7.
17 Behrendt 1993.
18 Francis 2014.
19 Henningham 2014, 157–61.
20 Pallotta-Chiarolli 1998.
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Indigenous and decolonising feminisms are among those approaches bringing
other dimensions of oppression and privilege to the fore.
The gay and lesbian rights movement, which evolved into the LGBTIQ+ rights
movement,21 has successfully achieved legal decriminalisation of homosexuality in
all Australian states and territories (from South Australia [SA] in 1975 to Tasmania
in 1997).22 LGBTIQ+ communities have mobilised cultural power through events
such as Mardi Gras and popular culture expressions of sexuality and gender
diversity, many of which are international in nature. As in other countries, lesbian
and gay groups created community responses to HIV/AIDS that challenged the
state’s neglect of lesbian and gay lives.23 Marriage equality (achieved in 2017) has
been the most notable recent campaign in relation to sexual and gender diversity.
Another important focus of contestation has been Safe Schools – a national
program aiming to eliminate homophobic bullying in schools and create safe
schooling environments.
Voting rights
As we have seen above, there are various forms of participation outside of formal
politics that are particularly relevant for people who are marginalised in or
excluded from formal politics. In systems of electoral democracy such as Australia,
however, voting is seen as the foundational form of participation.
The Australasian colonies were among the first jurisdictions worldwide to
introduce universal white male suffrage: the right of all white men aged 21 and over
regardless of class or property to vote.24 Women (and, in some states, Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander men) were excluded regardless of property. Queensland
and Western Australia explicitly denied Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people of all genders the vote.
In 1895, SA introduced voting rights for adult women (including Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander women). The other Australian states and territories
followed, extending voting rights to some women within the next decade and a
half.25
The process of Federation and the formation of the new Constitution of
Australia provided opportunities for white women to press for political rights.26 The
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth) established the rights of white women aged
21 and over to vote and stand for parliament at the national level but explicitly
excluded ‘any aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or the Islands of the Pacific,
except New Zealand’, unless they were already enrolled in a state before 1901.
21 Johnson, Maddison and Partridge 2011.
22 Winsor 2017.
23 Johnson, Maddison and Partridge 2011.
24 Curtin 2014, 312.
25 Curtin 2014, 312.
26 Curtin 2014, 312–3.
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As noted above, Federation did not improve the situation for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people, and patterns of disempowerment continued. From the
1950s, however, the US civil rights movement inspired Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people to intensify their efforts to obtain voting rights, among other rights.
It was not until 1962 that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people gained the
right to vote in federal elections.
Using the vote
Many early women political activists rejected the idea of pursuing political power
through the established parties in favour of articulating a maternal civic philosophy
that held itself above the grubbiness of ordinary politics.27 At the same time, women
political activists vigorously encouraged women voters to assess parties on their
merits (particularly their positions on key issues such as child welfare and women’s
economic independence).
Historically, women as a statistical group28 have voted more conservatively
than men in Australia, supporting the Liberal–National (Coalition) parties more
than men and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) less than men.29 Given that left-
wing parties are more likely to pursue policies supporting women’s economic
equality, it might be expected that they would be the ‘natural home’ of women
voters. However, women’s equality is just one issue considered by voters, and others
may take priority.30 Women may also have been influenced by the ALP’s view of
labour as a right of the male breadwinner and of class solidarity as mateship.31
In recent years, the gender gap in voting behaviour has narrowed.32 At the 2016
federal election, women were more likely than men to vote for Labor (by 7 per cent)
and more likely than men to vote for the Greens (by 4 per cent).33
The voting patterns of LGBTIQ+ people are much less studied. The Australian
Electoral Study, perhaps the key scholarly source of information about voting
behaviour and attitudes in Australia, does not ask about respondents’ sexuality and
only allows respondents to select ‘Male’ or ‘Female’ identification for gender (with
no option for ‘Other’, ‘Trans’ or ‘Non-Binary’).34
27 Curtin 2014, 31–4; Koven and Michel 1993.
28 This non-disaggregated measure obscures voting differences by class, race and other factors.
Many women would have been voting less conservatively than white middle- and upper-class
women and men.
29 Curtin 1997.
30 Curtin 2014.
31 Curtin 2014, 148.
32 Bean and McAllister 2015, 411-4; Curtin 2014, 148; Manning 2013.
33 At the time of writing analysis was not yet available for the 2019 election.
34 McAllister et al. 2017.
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Representation
For scholars of gender and sexuality, representation is not just numerical (or
‘descriptive’) but also substantive.35 This means that there needs to be a distinction
between simply having a woman or LGBTIQ+ person in a position of power
(numerical representation) and that representative addressing issues and adopting
political positions that advance the goals of feminist and LGBTIQ+ activism
(substantive representation). Many women politicians, for example, share socially
conservative positions that are opposed to feminist and LGBTIQ+ activism; yet
their participation as visibly feminine people in politics is still significant in itself.
There is evidence that numerical representation enables substantive
representation, such as the collective action of women in parliament across party
lines on reproductive rights during the deliberations on a drug used for medical
abortions.36 Women and LGBTIQ+ people being present in decision making affects
what issues are prioritised and brings knowledge about marginalised problems
and experiences into decision making. But this does not happen in the absence of
countervailing forces, especially existing norms and male-majority representation,
but also (at times) harassment, political violence and more subtle forms of
marginalisation and exclusion. The diversity of women and LGBTIQ+ people is
also not yet well addressed in scholarship on representation or in advocacy for
greater representation. There is a growing understanding that the category ‘women’
is, in itself, important, but needs to be used in a more disaggregated and nuanced
form also addressing race, class, migration status and disability.
Gender representation often tends to be seen as seeking parity in binary terms,
encompassing the two genders that are taken to compose humanity: male and
female. Manon Tremblay notes, though, that ‘the French concept of parité … is
deeply heterosexist’, and human beings cannot be reduced in this way: ‘Things are
much more complex’.37
Representation in parliaments
Practices of assessing parliamentary gender representation in simple terms are
now well established. In October 2019, 30.46 per cent of Australian House of
Representatives members were women, placing Australia 47th in the world.38
Representation differed between the two houses of parliament, with 50 per cent
women in the Senate.39 While analysis of LGBTIQ+ representation has not yet been
published for the 2019 election, in 2016 LGBTI representation stood at 3 per cent in
House of Representatives and 5 per cent in the Senate (compared, for example, with
35 Celis et al 2013; Sawer 2012.
36 Sawer 2012.
37 Tremblay 2019, 108.
38 Inter-Parliamentary Union 2019.
39 Parliament of Australia 2019.
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the UK, which had 6.9 per cent LGBTI representation in the House of Commons
after the 2017 election).40 Worldwide, in February 2016 the LGBTQ Representation
and Rights Research Initiative identified 180 ‘out’ lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans
(LGBT) parliamentarians in 42 countries.41
Studies of electoral systems across the world have shown that proportional
representation systems (as in the Senate) have a positive effect on the election
of female candidates, compared with majoritarian systems with single-member
electorates (as in the House of Representatives).42
Until recently, research on the gendered impact of electoral systems has ignored
the role of sexuality. Manon Tremblay raises several possible avenues for inquiry,
including the fact that, unlike women, who are distributed fairly evenly across
different geographic areas, LGBTIQ+ people may live in quite dense concentrations.
In this kind of constituency, ‘to be an openly LGBT person can be an asset in the
selection of candidates’.43 The finding that urbanisation had no impact on the 2017
Australian marriage equality vote – contrary to assumptions that rural areas are less
LGBT-supportive than urban areas44 – affirms Tremblay’s point that further research
is required on LGBT-supportive attitudes and parliamentary representation.
Political parties and quotas
Political parties have been both a key barrier to the representation of women
and LGBTIQ+ people and a site in which people have organised for better
representation. While research on the preselection of LGBTIQ+ people is lacking,
scholars have confirmed global trends in which parties tend to place women
candidates lower down party lists, nominate proportionally fewer women for safe
seats and be less likely to preselect women than men as candidates for single-
member electorates.45 These trends are also evident in Australia. Since party
preselection is generally the necessary first step towards election to parliament,
parties have a major role in hindering or facilitating women’s representation.
In response to this, feminists and their allies have pushed for quotas to improve
representation of women in parliament. More recently, quotas for LGBTIQ+ people
have also been proposed. Quotas are rules about the minimum/maximum
proportions of a group who are allowed or required to fill positions – in this case, in
party-endorsed candidacies. Quotas have contributed to the doubling of women’s
representation in parliaments around the world over the last 20 years.46
40 Williams and Sawer 2018, 647. Note: acronyms in this paragraph differ as they have been
transcribed from the source texts.
41 Tremblay 2019, 91.
42 Tremblay 2019, 92.
43 Tremblay 2019, 106.
44 McAllister and Snagovsky 2018, 419.
45 Tremblay 2008.
46 Sawer 2015.
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Different views about quotas reveal different beliefs about who is suitable for
and capable of holding office. Opponents of quotas typically argue for selecting ‘on
merit’.47 Given that current ‘merit-based’ systems have produced such disparities
in representation, this implies that women and other under-represented groups are
inherently less meritorious. Those who support quotas see structural and cultural
barriers as discouraging and excluding people who would be as capable as (perhaps
even more capable than) those who have found it comparatively easy to get their
‘merit’ recognised. In 2016, Vote Compass found that while a majority of Labor
voters were in favour of gender quotas, 60 per cent of Coalition voters were against
them, and men overall were nearly twice as likely as women to oppose quotas.48
The ALP has quotas in place requiring women to be preselected in 45 per
cent of winnable seats by 2022 and 50 per cent by 2025.49 The Liberal Party has a
target to preselect women in 50 per cent of winnable seats by 2025, but calls for
binding quotas have been rejected by party leaders.50 While the Greens do not have
formal quotas, the party has comparatively strong representation of women and
LGBTIQ+ people (leading both the ALP and the Coalition parties in the proportion
of candidates and elected representatives after the election in 2016).
Mechanisms to improve the representation of LGBTIQ+ people are less
developed, but the ALP now has Rainbow Labor, a network operating within the
party that was successful in changing the party’s policy on marriage equality. After
the 2016 federal election, the Queensland State Conference of the ALP adopted the
first LGBTI quota in Australia, requiring at least 5 per cent LGBTI candidates in
winnable Queensland seats for state, federal and local government elections.51
Media, backlash and social change
Scholars including Linda Trimble, Carol Johnson, Julia Baird, Elizabeth van Acker
and Blair Williams have shown how media coverage of women politicians gives
platforms for gendered abuse, focuses on their appearance and trivialises their
substantive contributions.52 Women who perform femininity to an acceptable
standard find that this is taken as delegitimising their value as professional
politicians. Politicians who are mothers face questions about how they will be
able to manage their public role while tending to their children’s needs. On the
other hand, women who do not perform conventional femininity to an acceptable
standard find that this ‘failure’ brings into question their ability to fulfil their
role – for instance, Julia Gillard’s childlessness, which conservative commentators
47 Matthewson 2019.
48 Williams and Sawer 2018.
49 https://www.emilyslist.org.au/
50 Gauja, Buckley and Curtin 2018.
51 Williams and Sawer 2018, 646.
52 Baird 2004; van Acker 1999; Williams 2017.
Gender and sexuality in Australian politics
291
portrayed as making it impossible for her to relate to ‘ordinary women’. Acceptable
and unacceptable performances of femininity (and masculinity) are also assessed
through the lenses of race, sexuality, class and dis/ability.
As Australia’s first woman prime minister, Julia Gillard was subjected to
extreme levels of misogynist abuse, particularly on social media and radio, but also
in ‘real life’. In 2011, the opposition leader stood in front of banners reading ‘Juliar
… Bob Brown’s Bitch’ and ‘Ditch the Witch’ while speaking at a carbon tax rally.
A Liberal–National Party fundraiser menu offered ‘Julia Gillard quail’ with ‘small
breasts, huge thighs and a big red box’.53
Gillard finally (after having avoided referring to her gender throughout her
public life) spoke out against what she saw as the misogyny of then opposition
leader Tony Abbott in a speech to parliament, which was subsequently shared
and viewed on social media over three million times. The opposition and the
mainstream media suggested that she had ‘played the gender card’ as a political
tactic, while women’s news sites and social media sharing indicated a very different
and more supportive response. Trimble and Johnson have noted that the discourse
of the ‘gender card’ and ‘gender war’ were used to try to silence people making an
issue of inequality.54
While Gillard is a prominent example, women, LGBTIQ+ people and people
from other marginalised groups who publicly engage in politics face abuse, hate
speech and at times violence – whether they are involved as candidates or media
commentators or are active on social media or in their communities and
workplaces.55 At the same time, effective communities and networks of
marginalised people are flourishing, giving support and discursive resources to
members engaged in politics.56 Backlash and community-building effects are now
being recognised as key elements of social change.
Conclusions
More than ever, Australian political institutions are grappling with issues of gender
and sexuality. At the same time, communities and movements are demanding
that those with power use it to create a broader understanding of what politics is
and who can be part of it. By integrating an awareness of gender and sexuality
throughout the work of the discipline, political science can contribute to this
process.
53 Jabour 2013.
54 Johnson 2015; Trimble 2016.
55 Shah 2019.
56 Hutchison 2016.
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Government–business relations
Michael de Percy and Heba Batainah
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The importance of the relationship between government and business is best
captured in a rhetorical question: What is more important: strong government,
prosperous business or civil society? The question is rhetorical because there is
no correct answer. Strong government is necessary to provide a system of law
and order; however, without prosperous businesses to pay taxes, it is difficult for
government to collect the funds to perform its role. And civil society is necessary
to hold governments and businesses to account; but if we take a Hobbesian1 view of
human society, civil society cannot exist without strong government undertaking
many essential roles, including political representation, public provision, and
maintaining law and order, defence, public safety, regulation, infrastructure and
trading relations. Of course, in a modern economy, all three institutions are
necessary to ensure a society has an appropriate level of stability, security and living
standards for its members.
Although in times past the study of government–business relations focused
on the nation-state, the phenomenon known as globalisation has had a significant
de Percy, Michael, and Heba Batainah (2019). Government–business relations. In Peter J. Chen,
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta
and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Hobbes 1985 [1651].
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impact on the way governments and businesses interact in the global economy.2
Nevertheless, nation-states remain the legitimate political power within their
jurisdictions, and global businesses operating within these jurisdictions are still
subject to the laws of the host nation-state. In practice, the government–business
relationship is influenced by national institutions and cultures and, in line with
changing societal values and interests, remains necessarily dynamic.3
This chapter discusses the various aspects of government–business relations in
the context of the capitalist economic system. It outlines the sectors of the economy
and discusses the various ways that governments and businesses interact, before
considering industry policy and the regulation of business. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of some of the emerging issues for government–business relations,
including the impact of disruptive technologies.
Sectors of the economy
A central feature of the capitalist economic system is the idea of the market. The
term ‘market’ can mean many different things, such as a physical space where
goods and services are bought and sold (e.g. a shopping mall) or even a virtual
space where the sale and purchase of goods and services is conducted completely
online (e.g. eBay). The market is the incentive mechanism for the production and
distribution of property, goods and services and, through ‘competitive interactions
of businesses and consumers’, for the creation and dispersion of wealth.4 Markets
are often said to be ‘self-regulating’ through the laws of supply and demand, but
they often require government regulation to ensure fair competition, prevent
market abuse and provide a safety net (e.g. for the elderly and people with
disabilities who are not able to participate actively in market relations).
In terms of typologies, markets can be classified into four broad categories:
markets for goods and services, financial markets, markets for the sale and purchase
of land and property, and labour markets, where employers and employees
negotiate salaries and wages for work performed. Capitalist economic systems, and
markets in particular, have an expansionary tendency.5
Economic activity within the capitalist system can be divided into three
interrelated spheres of activity: the ‘for-profit’ private sector, government and the
public sector and the civil society or not-for-profit sector. Although these spheres
intersect in various ways in practice, the division of the sectors can be understood
in terms of the legal standing of entities within each sector and their sources of
revenue. For example, government agencies form part of the public sector and
2 Wanna 2003, 420–1.
3 Parkin and Hardcastle 2010, 352.
4 Ryan, Parker and Brown 2003, 24.
5 Stilwell 2002, 49–50.
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are established by various Acts of parliament; their major source of funding is
tax revenues. Businesses form part of the private sector, are established, under
the relevant laws, through articles of association and the investment of private
funds to conduct commercial activity, and are funded by profits created through
the production and sale of goods and services. The civil society or not-for-profit
sector is funded by donations and gifts, and provides philanthropic, charitable or
welfare services that are not provided by government or business and are designed
to deliver some social benefit to members of the community.
In practice, the division between the three sectors is dynamic. Civil society
organisations, locally, nationally and globally, often seek funding from government
and business and may even enter into partnerships with the other sectors in
performing their role. In Australia, for example, the former Commonwealth Em-
ployment Service, which provided job recruitment and search services for
employers and employees, was replaced by a competitive network of private and
civil society employment-sector providers (initially Job Network, then Job Services
Australia, known as Job Active since 2015). In this case, as in others, the delineation
between the three sectors is far from clear – the sectors tend to overlap in terms
of funding sources and activities. Nevertheless, the underlying purposes of each
sector remain an important conceptual framework for understanding the capitalist
economic system as practised in nation-states. The various relationships between
the sectors differ depending on local values, interests, cultures and circumstances,
despite the homogenising effect often attributed to globalisation.6
Government–business interactions
A number of scholarly disciplines have contributed to our understanding of how
governments and businesses interact. For example, Jacoby7 listed a variety of ways
that government–business interactions occur in practice. Governments may
attempt to stabilise the economic environment for businesses; subsidise some
industries; promote business abroad; finance small and minority firms; purchase
military hardware and other products from businesses; enter into joint or mixed
ventures with businesses; tax businesses and make businesses tax collectors (such
as the current arrangements for the Goods and Services Tax); regulate particular
functions of businesses; engage in joint management of public utilities (such as
ActewAGL); and sell postal services, power, government publications, police and
fire protection, and many other commodities and services. Businesses, on the other
hand, may consult with government informally or individually, or formally and
collectively, through lobby groups such as the Business Council of Australia or
through specialist lobbying firms; support political candidates financially or in
6 Scholte 2008, 1476.
7 Jacoby 1975, 5–6.
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other ways; or publicly criticise governments in an effort to influence the policy
agenda (such as the Minerals Council of Australia’s campaigns against the Rudd
government’s mining super-profits tax and the Gillard government’s carbon pricing
scheme). Businesses may also launch campaigns against government policies
through advertising and other forms of public appeal. Increasingly, businesses
and executives lobby governments and make public appeals on issues that do not
necessarily relate to the financial interests of their industries, such as when Qantas
chief executive Alan Joyce spoke out in support of the ‘yes’ vote in the recent
plebiscite on same-sex marriage in Australia.
There is a ‘rich tradition’ of the study of government–business relations at the
national level in Australia.8 Although state involvement in the market was the
dominant paradigm for much of Australia’s early history, the impact of government
intervention on the economy was not without its critics.9 Coinciding with the rise
of ‘neoliberalism’ and the New Right in the 1980s, Australia adopted an approach
to managing the economy known locally as economic rationalism.10 The traditional
industries were no longer protected by government (the Whitlam government
had started to dismantle protection during the 1970s) and would be exposed to
international competition. Up to this point in time, the nature of the government–
business relationship in Australia was heavily focused on industry assistance, and
competition regulation had only seriously been pursued since the establishment of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
Beginning in 1983, the market liberalisation agenda had gathered pace under
the Hawke Labor government and the economy began to change significantly.
Following on from the introduction of the Prices and Incomes Accords, a series
of agreements between the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council
of Trade Unions, the government facilitated a tripartite, consensus-based power
sharing arrangement between government, business and trade unions. This
tripartite arrangement, facilitated by institutions such as the Economic Planning
Advisory Council, became known as corporatism and attracted much study from
government–business relations scholars.11 A key principle of corporatism was
consensus building between the three parties, with the major groups in the
economy (theoretically) participating in decision making. As trade union
membership represented about half of the workforce at the time, it was generally
representative of the interests of labour.12 With the election of the Howard
Liberal–National (Coalition) government in 1996, however, corporatism was
quickly dismantled,13 and the decline in compulsory union membership saw union
8 Bell and Head 1992; Bell and Wanna 1992; Wanna 2003, 420.
9 Eggleston 1932; Hancock 1930; Kelly 1992; Smith 2006 [1887].
10 Pusey 1991.
11 Bell and Wanna 1992, 4; Wanna 2003, 421.
12 Hall and Soskice 2001, 20.
13 Head 1997.
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membership declining steadily from 1992 from traditional levels of almost 50 per
cent of the workforce, to 14 per cent of the workforce by 2018.14
At the industry level, business scholars such as William Byrt15 developed
approaches to understanding the interaction between business and government
by focusing on various elements of the relationship that affect business, such as
regulation, consumerism, trade unions and public enterprises. There are a number
of different approaches to studying government–business relations, but these
approaches are much more than an analysis of the struggle for dominance between
the two monsters – Leviathan (government) and Behemoth (business) – as the two
tend to merge ‘in complex and specialised arrangements, producing a pattern of
interaction which brings together both government and non-government bodies’.16
One of the major industry-level studies of the ‘protective state’ and its ‘gradual
transformation’ of the manufacturing industry in Australia17 was conducted by
political scientists Capling and Galligan in 1992.18 More recently, scholars
considered government–business relations in light of globalisation and found,
among other things, that local practices of government–business interaction
persist.19 This means that local effects of national culture, law and ideologies and
the ‘appropriate’ role of the government in the economy cannot be overlooked
when considering the government–business relationship.
Yet, as will be seen in the section on emerging issues below, the topic is of
increasing importance. We now turn to the major elements of the
government–business relationship: industry policy and regulation.
Industry policy
The term sector typically refers to the various firms that produce goods or services
of a similar type, such as the mining, agricultural, manufacturing, transport,
tourism and construction sectors. The term industry is usually a subclassification
of a given sector. For example, the transport sector includes taxis, but the taxi
industry is distinct from other transport industries due to its private, point-to-point
transport focus. The taxi industry is also regulated in certain ways by the states and
territories. While these distinctions are important for collecting statistics (and there
are numerous classification standards), for our purposes the term industry will be
used to refer to firms that produce similar products or services and will include the
policy and regulatory institutions of the state that govern a particular industry.
14 Gilfillan and McGann 2018.
15 Byrt 1990.
16 Colebatch, Prasser and Nethercote 1997, xviii.
17 Wanna 2003, 423.
18 Capling and Galligan 1992.
19 McAllister, Davis and Moodie 2004; Parkin and Hardcastle 2010.
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Generally, industries are divided into three types: primary, secondary and
tertiary. Primary industries are focused on the production of raw materials and
typically include mining, agriculture, forestry and fishing. Secondary industries
are those that use raw materials to produce goods, such as the manufacturing,
engineering and construction industries. Tertiary industries are those that produce
services rather than goods, such as wholesalers, retailers and transport. They can
be further classified as quaternary (knowledge, such as education, media and
telecommunications) and quinary (personal services, such as hospitality, health
care and recreation) industries. These types of industries are important, and the
relative industry mix in Australia has changed significantly over time, with the
manufacturing industries declining significantly since protectionism was largely
replaced by competitive markets in the final decades of the 20th century.
Under protectionism, policy instruments were used to restrict the impact of
international competition. For example, secondary industries in Australia, such
as the textile, clothing and footwear and automotive manufacturing industries,
were protected by tariffs (government charges that increase the cost of cheaper,
imported goods) and quotas (government-imposed limits on the number of goods
imported). This approach to protecting domestic industries from international
competition is known as barrier protectionism. Protectionism was a major form of
industry policy in Australia and elsewhere from the end of the Second World War
until recently. However, beginning in the 1970s, and in the 1980s under the Hawke
government, Australia’s economy, following international trends, was increasingly
the subject of trade liberalisation and competition reform.20 This meant that tariffs
and quotas were reduced or removed and domestic industries, particularly the
textile, clothing and footwear and automotive manufacturing industries, faced
increasing international competition. By the second decade of the 21st century,
cheaper labour costs overseas meant that Australian manufacturing declined and
continue to decline as a result of the end of protectionism.21
One consequence of barrier protectionism for government–business relations
was the concentration of lobbying forces from both manufacturing companies and
the related trade unions. As these industries relied on government protection to
prosper, both capital and labour had an interest in the ongoing success of the
sector. The sunk costs of lobbying and compliance, in addition to higher wages
supported by inflated prices, provided little incentive for protected industries to
seek efficiencies. As international trends in trade liberalisation led to numerous
free trade agreements with other nations, other heavily subsidised sectors, such as
agriculture, were also subjected to competition. Debates over the benefits of free
trade versus protection continue as a result of the 2008–10 Global Financial Crisis
and, more recently, in the USA under the Trump administration. Nevertheless, there
is bipartisan agreement that Australia has prospered under trade liberalisation, with
20 Emmery 1999.
21 ABS 2018.
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the Department of Foreign Affairs under a Labor government admitting that market
liberalisation had worked.22
Industry policy remains central to the government–business relationship,
although as Australia continues to enter into free trade agreements under the rules-
based trading regime monitored by the World Trade Organization, the types of
policy instruments adopted have changed. Today, there are two major types of
industry policy that are compatible with the free market: passive and anticipatory
industry policy. Passive industry policy does not mean that government does not
make policy for industries; rather, government focuses on establishing conditions
that support competition within all industries. This may include monetary policy,
establishing trade agreements that are beneficial to businesses, enacting
competition regulation to prevent monopolies and other non-competitive
practices, reducing taxation and compliance costs, or incentivising research and
development. Anticipatory industry policy involves governments making policies
that target particular industries. In anticipatory industry policy, governments
attempt to stimulate or assist certain industries to achieve desired economic
outcomes. This can be politically risky as it requires governments to ‘pick winners’
– in effect, to predict what will happen in the future, and attempt to stimulate and
incentivise firms in a particular industry to change their market behaviours.
For example, during the 2008–10 Global Financial Crisis, the Rudd
government introduced a series of industry policies designed to stimulate the
economy (or ‘fiscal stimuli’). A green car initiative was introduced to subsidise the
automotive manufacturing industry to develop fuel-efficient vehicles, enabling the
industry to compete internationally by using Australia’s highly skilled workforce to
develop sophisticated technologies. In addition, funding was provided to schools
for building halls and fences (to stimulate the construction industry), subsidies
were provided to householders to install roof insulation and individuals receiving
education assistance or family welfare payments were given a one-off cash payment
of approximately $900 to stimulate the retail sector. While not considered
protectionism per se, this level of government intervention in the economy
challenged the orthodoxy of the previous decades’ market reforms.
These types of intervention reflect anticipatory industry policy, where
governments attempt to achieve economic objectives through direct intervention.
Where anticipatory industry policy differs from protectionism, however, is that it
tends to be for a specific purpose and for a short period of time. Protectionism, as
practised in the postwar era, on the other hand, was a long-term, institutionalised
policy designed to reduce the impacts of international competition. The Rudd
government’s policies were designed to stimulate, not protect, the industry.
Industry policy can be further classified into two different types (which may
be either anticipatory or passive). Horizontal industry policies apply to all industries
22 DFAT 2010, 34.
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(noting that definitions in the literature vary considerably). This may include
research and development, the environment, skills education, human capital,
infrastructure investment, innovation stimulus and so on.23 Vertical industry policy
is targeted at particular industries. Policy instruments such as tariffs and quotas are
generally considered protectionist, and therefore inconsistent with modern ideas
concerning global markets. Vertical industry policies, on the other hand, are not
inconsistent with the rules established by the World Trade Organization if the
intervention is focused on a particular outcome in the short term.
It is not unusual for governments to use a combination of horizontal and
vertical measures to bring about structural change in the economy. For example,
tariffs on Australian exports of sugar were not excluded from the Australia–United
States Free Trade Agreement, which meant that the Australian sugar industry
would not be competitive and would require transformation to adjust to the market
conditions. The Howard government introduced the Sugar Industry Reform
Program to help sugar cane farmers and harvester operators cope with the loss of
protection. This program included welfare payments, crisis counselling services,
industry-exit assistance, business planning and diversification assistance, retraining
and other funding to assist those affected by the changes.24
Similarly, the Gillard Labor government introduced a carbon pricing taxation
scheme, which was generally horizontal in that it was intended to affect industries
other than road transport and agriculture, and later become a carbon emissions
trading scheme. However, the Abbott Coalition government replaced the policy
with the Direct Action Plan to fund carbon emissions reduction projects through
an Emissions Reduction Fund, among other ‘green’ projects.
One of the challenges for vertical industry policy is the difficulty in ‘picking
winners’. Some of the outcomes from recent industry policies include:
• The Rudd government’s Green Car Innovation Fund did little to stimulate the
industry, and, once elected, the Abbott government wound up the scheme and
did not support the industry further. In 2017, the last Holden vehicle rolled off
the production line and car manufacturing in Australia ceased.
• The Rudd government’s Home Insulation Program led to the tragic deaths of
four workers, numerous house fires resulting from the use of poor materials,
the demotion of then Environment Minister, Peter Garrett, and subsequently
the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program.
• The Gillard government’s carbon pricing scheme was labelled a ‘carbon tax’,
and a coalition of industry groups, known as the Australian Trade and Industry
Alliance, launched a major campaign against it. The competition regulator, the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, investigated complaints
from consumers about false justifications for price increases, particularly
23 Emmery 1999; Pelkmans 2008.
24 Thompson et al. 2010.
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electricity providers falsely claiming that the carbon pricing scheme was
responsible for price rises. The Abbott government’s Direct Action
Plan consisted of payments to businesses and effectively removed the cost of
carbon emissions from industry and placed the burden on taxpayers.
Government–business relations in the area of industry policy have been far from
ideal over the last decade. Not only have the constant changes in federal governments
(and political leadership) created an uncertain operating environment for businesses,
the lack of stability has also provided little incentive for businesses to invest in long-
term strategy, especially in relation to environmental sustainability. We now turn to
regulation, another important element of government–business relations.
Regulating business
The rationale for regulation in a market economy stems from a number of concerns.
While regulation may appear to interfere with the workings of the ‘invisible hand’
of the market, in the last few decades, most developed economies have been
through phases of deregulation of industries, privatisation of government services
and, more recently, re-regulation to address anti-competitive behaviours, to include
the cost of externalities (such as environmental, social and other related impacts)
not captured in the production process or where the market has failed. Regulation
involves governments making laws to influence the behaviour of firms. This can
include rules to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, to protect consumers from
unfair trading practices, to establish safety and other standards, and to achieve
other social or economic policy goals. Traditionally, governments consult with
industry in establishing a regulatory regime to support certain policy goals. Once
the regulatory model has been established, it is standard protocol for regulators to
enforce the relevant laws, rather than contribute to policy debates, and their major
function is to protect the public interest.
There are two major approaches to regulating businesses: ex-ante (before the
event) and ex-post (after the event) regulation. Ex-ante regulation focuses on the
structure of markets. This may include the number of firms in a given market,
the conditions for entering a market, the degree of product differentiation and
so on. Ex-post regulation is mostly concerned with the behaviour of firms or the
way they conduct business. This may include how a firm relates to its competitors
and customers. These two approaches to regulating businesses may be used in
combination. For example, to enter the telecommunications industry, firms may
need a specific level of capitalisation and may be required to purchase a telecom-
munications carrier licence before operating in the market. Once a firm has met
the requirements to operate in the market, it may then be held accountable for
its behaviour according to the rules that apply within that industry. Various
government and industry agencies may regulate firms concerning different
issues, such as security cameras in taxis or pricing of consumer goods and services.
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Types of regulation may be classified along a spectrum based on the extent
of government intervention in the industry, ranging from government ownership
and command and control to self-regulation and co-regulation, to incentives-based
regulation designed to influence behaviours.25 Command and control regulation
involves the imposition of rules and standards backed up by criminal sanctions.
Some of the advantages of this type of regulation include clear definitions of
unacceptable behaviour, establishing performance standards supported by law and
appearing politically decisive. Some disadvantages are that regulation can be
complex and legalistic, defining acceptable standards can be difficult and the close
relationship between the regulator and businesses can lead to what is known as
regulatory capture. Regulatory capture occurs when the regulator begins to protect
the interests of the industry itself, rather than protecting the public interest. In
practice, the command and control model, at the extreme, involves government
ownership of the entire industry.
In the telecommunications industry, for example, the regulatory framework
uses a variety of different approaches to achieve the desired policy outcomes.
For instance, the Department of Communications and the Arts (a government
department) provides policy advice to the minister for communications for the
telecommunications industry. Through legislation, the parliament establishes
regulations for the telecommunications industry. The Australian Communications
and Media Authority (ACMA) (a statutory authority) enforces the rules for entry
into the telecommunications market and issues the relevant licenses (ex-ante
regulation), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (a
statutory authority) has a role to assess the impact of mergers and acquisitions
(ex-ante) and a particular role for addressing anti-competitive behaviour (ex-post
regulation), while the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) (an
external ombudsman funded by the industry) deals with consumer complaints that
are not resolved by the firm (ex-post regulation). In this case, the ACMA regulates
using a command and control approach, the ACCC uses command and control in
making decisions about its roles, and the industry, through the TIO, self-regulates
(and funds the regulator) and agrees to abide by the decisions of the ombudsman.
Incentives-based regulation might include additional taxes to reduce the
consumption of certain goods, such as those currently applied to tobacco products,
or market-based instruments, such as a carbon emissions trading scheme. In a
typical carbon emissions trading scheme, the government caps the allowable level
of pollution and sells permits to businesses to pollute to that level. Businesses can
then trade these permits with other businesses. In theory, as the price of permits
increases, businesses will innovate to reduce their carbon emissions, thus gaining a
competitive advantage over businesses that still need to pay for the pollution they
generate. Other market-based mechanisms include the auction of radio frequency
25 Hepburn 2006.
Government–business relations
305
spectrum to mobile telephone, radio and television providers, or the provision of
subsidies to encourage particular habits or activities under the Direct Action Plan,
discussed above.26
Self-regulation occurs in many areas of private-sector activity, such as media
and advertising, and many crucial professions, including the law, medicine,
accounting and taxation services. Self-regulation places the onus of maintaining
standards on the industry body, such as Ad Standards and the regulation of
television advertising, and often includes tribunals and complaint mechanisms
where alleged abuses can be aired and investigated. Participants in self-regulated
areas of activity in essence agree to their behaviour and actions being monitored by
their industry peers and to accept any punishment or redress awarded by whatever
tribunal is empowered to consider disputes or complaints.
Each approach to regulation has its merits, and different mixes of approaches
and types are used in different industries.
Emerging issues – disruptive influences
The taxi industry in Australia was one of the last regulated monopolies to be
subjected to market liberalisation and disruptive technologies. As late as 2013,
a report on the Victorian taxi industry made no mention of the emerging ride-
sharing industry led globally by Uber, a multinational corporation. Ride-sharing
businesses are part of the growing sharing economy, where individuals use their
private assets, such as their cars or their houses (with businesses such as Airbnb),
to sell services using proprietary smartphone ‘apps’ that provide the marketing and
billing systems. While the Australian Capital Territory anticipated ride-sharing and
reformed the taxi industry, the states did not. Allegedly, Uber began operating
throughout Australia despite laws prohibiting unregulated businesses from oper-
ating in the point-to-point transport industry. This presented a complex problem
for the state governments. Consumers wanted to use ride-sharing because it was
cheaper and there was a perceived lack of customer service from the existing
regulated taxi operators. Governments were forced to reform the industry, resulting
in protests from taxi operators, many of whom saw the value of their investment
in taxi licences reduced significantly with little time to adjust to the changing
conditions. State governments were forced to compensate taxi licence owners and
to implement packages to ameliorate the effects of industry disruption. Taxi ope-
rators have commenced a class action against Uber seeking further compensation
for lost business.
Unlike the approach adopted with sugar industry, the taxi industry disruption
was almost a complete surprise to regulators and taxi operators alike. This level of
disruption could have been avoided had the reforms been introduced years before,
26 Hepburn 2006, 5.
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but neither government nor the industry was prepared. The most striking part of
the introduction of ride-sharing was not so much the advances in technology, but
the way that the technology has been used globally to disrupt traditional industries.
While other jurisdictions have attempted to ban ride-sharing operators, consumer
demands are forcing governments to enable new services, thus challenging the
command and control approach where it matters most – at the ballot box.
Conclusions
Businesses in Australia are becoming increasingly involved with the public and
civil society sectors in complex ways, and the government–business relationship
is increasing in importance. However, political instability, along with disruptive
technologies, mean the future of this relationship is uncertain. Further, emerging
social and political issues, such as the failure of affirmative action laws to address
gender inequalities in pay and the number of women in leadership positions in
the workplace, indicate that governments cannot solve these problems in isolation.
In the midst of decreasing trust in government in Australia, increased citizen
participation in policy making is seen as one way to improve the legitimacy of
government by bringing businesses and citizens into a system of co-governance.
Yet after a decade of political instability, and recent events suggesting that the
instability will continue, a significant departure from traditional approaches to
government–business relations is politically risky. While the study of government–
business relations may have peaked in the 1990s, it seems time for a revival of this
important field in political studies.
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Indigenous politics
Diana Perche and Jason O’Neil
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treaty/‘Makarrata’ (Yolŋu word)
Indigenous politics is possibly one of the most complex and misunderstood areas
of politics in Australia. Indigenous issues are often presented as particularly
contentious, and the divergence of interests between governments, business, the
community and First Peoples themselves is frequently emphasised. We know that
Indigenous issues do not have much salience in public opinion polls.1 Nevertheless,
political leaders at both state and federal levels have often sought to use Indigenous
issues to score points in public debates, demonstrating their ideological credentials.
Many debates in Indigenous affairs are framed around deep-seated conflicts over
values such as choice, equality, rights, responsibility, diversity, self-determination
and sovereignty.
The major parties have moved away from the bipartisanship that surrounded
the 1967 constitutional referendum and the passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). Instead, over the past three decades, we have
seen divisive and confusing debates around the Mabo case and the recognition of
Perche, Diana, and Jason O’Neil (2019). Indigenous politics. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John
R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 Goot and Rowse 2007.
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native title;2 the creation and abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC); the move towards ‘mainstreaming’ of Indigenous
government services after decades of self-determination; the acknowledgement of
the Stolen Generations culminating in the apology given by Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd in 2008; the Northern Territory Emergency Response (the Intervention),
affecting residents of remote communities, introduced by the federal government
under Liberal–National Coalition (Coalition) Prime Minister John Howard in
2007; and the current debate around constitutional recognition, treaty and a ‘Voice’
to parliament.
It is difficult for a relatively small minority to gain a genuine voice for their issues
in the mainstream media and government. It is also challenging to develop effective
policies without an understanding of First Nations culture and communities. This
chapter breaks down some of these difficulties by:
• exploring the identities of First Peoples and how they understand their place
within Australia
• considering the structural barriers to political participation by First Peoples
• briefly explaining the history of activism by First Peoples since colonisation.
We conclude by reflecting on whether there is one ‘Aboriginal movement’ or many,
and considering the significance of the Uluru statement from the heart and the
return to nation-based identities.
Who are the First Peoples in Australia?
It is useful to clarify the terminology that is used in this chapter. First Peoples in
Australia have been called many things by non-Indigenous people since the 18th
century. Some of these are now recognised as outdated, being based in theories of
racial difference. Even the terms ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘Torres Strait Islander’ describe
legally defined identities that have been imposed. Prior to the arrival of Europeans,
there were no ‘Aboriginal’ people in Australia – there were Dharug, Wiradjuri,
Larrakia, Noongar, Ngarrindjeri and so on, and these identities remain important
today. The authors of this chapter have elected to use the collective terms ‘First
Peoples’ and ‘First Nations’, in recognition of this history and the diversity of
First Peoples. The two terms are used interchangeably, depending on whether the
emphasis is on Indigenous Australians as collective peoples or as collective polities.
Legal definitions of identity are often debated, and sometimes disparaged, and it
is important to understand the ways in which identity can be externally imposed or
denied. In public policy, the ‘Commonwealth definition’ adopted by the government
in the late 1970s remains current for the purposes of determining eligibility for
2 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 (Mabo).
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Indigenous-specific programs and employment in identified positions. It determines
Indigenous status based on three criteria:
• that the person is of Aboriginal (or Torres Strait Islander) descent
• that they identify as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
• that they are accepted as such by the community in which they live.3
These criteria have been difficult for some people to satisfy, particularly mem-
bers of the Stolen Generations who have lost links to their birth families and their
communities. For many First Peoples living in cities or country towns throughout
most of the 20th century, it was preferable to deny Aboriginal heritage or avoid
connecting with other Aboriginal people, out of fear of racism and social exclusion.4
The principle of self-identification is recognised in the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states: ‘Indigenous peoples
have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with
their customs and traditions’.5 The damage done to First Nations through
colonisation, with the associated loss of land, culture, language and connection
to kin, has made this very difficult for many First Peoples, even today. This is
sometimes reflected in present-day conflicts over native title, recognition of
traditional ownership and governance of organisations and communities.
The importance of self-identification is clear when we consider the Common-
wealth’s official statistics on the size of the First Nations population in Australia.
The 2016 Census counted 649,171 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders – 2.8
per cent of Australia’s population.6 While First Peoples make up over 25 per cent
of the population of the Northern Territory (over 58,248), the largest numerical
population lives in the states of New South Wales (216,176) and Queensland
(186,482). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are more likely than non-
Indigenous people to live in remote or very remote parts of Australia; nevertheless,
over one-third of the Indigenous population lives in capital cities.
There are hundreds of different First Nations in Australia, with different cultures,
traditions, lore and languages. First Peoples believe they were born out of ‘Country’.
Country represents a specific area of land and water, but is not reducible to just the
geography of the land and its flora and fauna. Each Nation belongs to and is a part
of Country, which they are responsible for, born from and live with in a mutually
beneficial relationship. All elements of a First People’s Country connected not only
with each other but also with other Peoples’ Country. In English, Country is an
expression of First Peoples’ understanding of the cosmos or ‘philosophy of existence’.7
3 Gardiner-Garden 2003.
4 Read 2016.
5 United Nations 2007, article 33.
6 ABS 2017. Note that the Australian Bureau of Statistics recognises that the Census undercounts
the Indigenous population, and projected estimates released in 2018 indicate that the population
in 2016 was 798,400 or 3.3% of the Australian population. See ABS 2018 for more detail.
7 Weir 2012, 3.
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While their cultures and languages differ widely, all First Peoples have a spirit-
ual connection to Country, to the land of their ancestors and its inhabitants. This
is because First Peoples believe that land, people and the laws that govern them
all were created at the same time by their ancestral creation beings. There is an
inherent understanding that all things are connected: First Peoples are connected to
Country through their ancestors, who were born from Country. These connections
are expressed here by Yolŋu elders:
Bawaka is our homeland, our Country. Country means the land, but it means so
much more too … When ngapaki [non-Indigenous people] come to Bawaka, we
ask Bawaka Country to welcome you. Bawaka is alive, it talks to us and cares for us
… We welcome you so that the land and the sea, the tides, the currents, the plants,
the animals, the winds, the rocks, the songs and the dreams recognise you.
And we are Bawaka Country too, Yolŋu people, our ancestors and our unborn
children, with our Yolŋu languages (dhäruk), our Yolŋu knowledge and our Yolŋu
Law (Rom). People are Country too … Country will welcome you as long as you
respect it, as long as you behave well and care for the land and the nature, care for
each other as family, as kin.
Country is everything in balance, everything connected as kin. Country
nourishes us, and we nourish Country. We can’t be separated from it … We live on
Country, we won’t be treated as if we have no strength, no knowledge, no Law, no
language. Country makes us strong. Country cares, Country nourishes, Country is
who we are. We are Yolŋu.8
This connection, and the wealth of Indigenous knowledges and science that come
with it, have largely been overlooked by governments throughout settler-colonial
history. Since the earliest days of colonisation, land has been seen as a commodity
to be exploited. This is the antithesis of First Peoples’ connection to Country – a
living entity that is to be cared for and cultivated only in accordance with its needs
and limitations.
An important aspect of the relationship between First Peoples and Country is
the cultural protocol of not speaking for someone else’s Country. First Peoples are
quick to reject anyone who purports to speak on their behalf. In its simplest form,
this is a recognition of each People’s custodianship over their own Country. In a
political context, every Nation has its own issues, priorities and internal politics;
local decision making involves a long process of consensus building to ensure that
the right decision is made and that it is done in a culturally appropriate way. At
an individual level, it is important that everybody’s voice is heard. Indigenous
governance is built on consensus-making: sitting down and talking through an issue
until there is a solution that everyone can accept. When this diversity of views is left
unrecognised, it can lead to issues of misrepresentation and inappropriate decision
8 Burarrwanga et al. 2014.
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making. This is often the case when governments fail to tailor their policies to local
needs or when one individual is called on to speak on behalf of all First Peoples.
Political activism and engagement
The arrival of European settlers in Sydney Cove in 1788 was not a peaceful process.
When understood from the standpoint of the clans of the Eora Nation, the first
to encounter the settlers as they established the British penal colony, it was the
beginning of an invasion. Despite being weakened by disease and malnutrition,
as their food sources were destroyed or made inaccessible, the First Peoples were
not passive, and violence spread as the settlers sought to extend their control over
the Country of neighbouring Nations. Violent battles, revenge attacks and reprisals
were common in the early years of the colony, and losses in what we now know as
the ‘Frontier Wars’ were severe.
By the 1830s, colonial governments had begun to move Aboriginal people away
from settlements, onto reserves and missions, under supervision, and eventually
established the regime of ‘protection’, under which Aboriginal people were segre-
gated, prevented from moving freely and subjected to ‘civilising and Christianising’
by missionaries and superintendents. Children with lighter skin or mixed parentage
were removed. First Peoples had their freedom of movement and freedom of
association constrained under the supervision of the Protection Boards. All of these
actions combined are now understood to be acts of genocide, seeking to ‘eliminate
the native’.9 First Peoples continued to resist the power of the settlers through this
period with overt political tactics, such as petitions, rebellions and formal
complaints to authorities about their treatment and conditions, often demanding the
right to own land, and through less visible actions, including maintaining culture
and language in secret.
By the end of the First World War, many reserves were closing in the south,
as land was reallocated to soldier settlement schemes and governments found
the costs of maintaining reserves and providing rations and housing increasingly
prohibitive. Many First Peoples were forced to live on the fringes of urban settle-
ments, relying on precarious low-paid employment. In the north, where frontier
conflicts continued into the 1920s, large reserves were still being used to restrict
the movements of First Peoples, and to suppress culture and language in coercive
and punitive environments, especially in Queensland. The impact of this violence,
racism and exclusion continues to affect many First Peoples today, in the form of
intergenerational trauma.
First Nations political activity was very much constrained by government, but
this does not mean that it was non-existent. On missions and reserves, resistance
took many forms, such as women’s ongoing efforts to preserve culture and kinship
9 Wolfe 2006.
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ties against the wishes of the authorities.10 Early political organisations, such as
the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association, founded by Fred Maynard and
Tom Lacey, and later the Australian Aborigines’ League under the leadership of
William Cooper, Doug Nicholls and Margaret Tucker, called for land and citizenship
rights in the 1920s and 1930s. A significant protest was organised in Sydney on 26
January 1938, known as the ‘Day of Mourning’, disrupting celebrations of the 150th
anniversary of British settlement in Australia and prompting Prime Minister Joseph
Lyons to meet with a delegation of men and women to discuss their concerns. These
organisations received support from non-Indigenous activists, including Christian
groups, trade unionists and members of the Communist Party of Australia.
By the 1960s, activism around Indigenous issues had become much more visible,
and First Nations voices were increasingly being reported by the media. The
government’s policies of segregation and ‘protection’ were abandoned in favour of
‘assimilation’. Governments began to extend essential services and entitlements to
Aboriginal people, including access to education and health care and eligibility for
welfare payments.11 In return, First Peoples were expected to abandon their culture
and ‘learn’ to live their lives as white Australians did. These assimilationist policies
allowed greater freedom of movement and access to education and employment
for First Peoples, but their lack of equal treatment as Australian citizens became
increasingly obvious to the wider public. The Australian government faced inter-
national criticism over the poverty and exclusion of First Peoples.12 Meanwhile, the
civil rights movement – a coalition of activists including feminists, Christians and
trade unionists – focused on the campaign to give Aboriginal people ‘citizenship’ by
amending the Constitution.13 In reality, the 1967 referendum was more limited in its
impact: it removed the provision in the Constitution that excluded Aboriginal people
from being counted in the Census and gave the Commonwealth the power to legislate
on issues affecting Aboriginal people, a measure that activists hoped would override
the obvious neglect of First Peoples’ welfare by state and territory governments.14
The apparent achievement of formal political equality for First Peoples as a
result of the civil rights movement in the 1960s satisfied many white activists, but
it was soon clear that little would change the substantive inequality experienced
by First Peoples, particularly economic inequality and poverty.15 Land rights were
the subject of much of the political activism during this period, both in terms
of the rights of First Nations to make decisions about what happens on their
traditional lands and in terms of the potential for land ownership rights to be the
basis of economic development – a path out of poverty. The spiritual significance
of Country and its importance as the basis of law and social and cultural wellbeing
10 Goodall 1995.
11 Haebich 2008.
12 Clark 2008.
13 Chesterman 2005.
14 Attwood and Markus 2007.
15 Taffe 2005.
Indigenous politics
315
was also emphasised by First Peoples. A number of key flashpoints attracted atten-
tion in metropolitan areas, such as the Yolŋu protests over bauxite mining at
Yirrkala and the Gurindji walk-off at Wave Hill, where aggrieved station hands
demanded the restoration of their land.16
Land rights were also a significant part of the demands made by protesters at
the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, established in January 1972 on the lawns in front
of Parliament House in Canberra. For the Commonwealth, the struggle for land
rights was ultimately an issue that could not be ignored, and the Labor Party,
under the leadership of Gough Whitlam, worked on developing a policy to legislate
for land rights in the Northern Territory. This legislation was ultimately passed
by Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal government in 1976. Many vested interests, such as
mining companies and pastoralists, fiercely opposed the land rights legislation.
They were supported by the Northern Territory government in resisting claims.
First Nations activists were obliged to contest claims and defend hard-won rights
for many years. As Arrente activist and former Director of the Central Land
Council Bruce (‘Tracker’) Tilmouth observed, ‘land rights took a lot of getting, by a
lot of people’.17
First Nations have continued to force issues onto the government’s agenda
through protest, advocacy and sustained campaigns. In many areas, activists have
worked for long periods of time to achieve recognition for significant issues,
struggling to gain acceptance of the problems in the face of government and media
indifference or active resistance from vested interests. For example, Meriam man
Eddie Koiki Mabo and others pursued their claim for recognition of ownership
over land in the Torres Strait in a series of court cases against the Queensland
government, which lasted for over a decade, and eventually resulted in the
significant Mabo case decided by the High Court in 1992 and the subsequent
passing of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) by the Keating Labor government.
In several cases, the Commonwealth government has been obliged to respond
to First Nations advocacy by establishing wide-reaching inquiries. These have
substantially changed the debate around Indigenous affairs over time. Notable
inquiries include the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1991)
and the inquiry into the Stolen Generations (1997). Both allowed First Peoples to
be heard and reported. Both challenged accepted narratives of Australia, pointing
to the racism embedded in institutions, policy decisions and society. More recently,
the Royal Commission into the Detention and Protection of Children in the
Northern Territory (2017) has shown that institutionalised racism has not
diminished in many parts of the Australian political system.18
16 Attwood 2003.
17 Tilmouth 1998.
18 Royal Commission into the Detention and Protection of Children in the Northern Territory
2017.
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Indigenous organisations and leadership
The 1960s and 1970s saw First Peoples push for self-determination, in recognition
of their unique status as Indigenous peoples and in pursuit of their own solutions
to disadvantage and dispossession. With cautious support from the Whitlam Labor
government, First Nations people put self-determination into practice by establish-
ing Indigenous organisations such as land councils, community-controlled health
services, charities and social enterprises. First Peoples needed legal entities to hold
the title for land rights and to negotiate with mining interests. Organisations like
the Aboriginal Legal Service and Aboriginal Medical Service were started by First
Peoples to meet their communities’ legal and medical needs. These organisations
seek to maintain independence from the government of the day, but many rely
on government funding to operate. Indigenous organisations are now widespread,
delivering services to local communities, employing substantial numbers of First
Peoples and acting as representative bodies.
Successful Indigenous organisations and businesses have empowered First
Peoples to attain new levels of wealth and success within Australia’s political and
economic system. Individuals who achieve this success are often identified as
Aboriginal or Indigenous ‘leaders’ by governments and the mainstream media.
This can lead to controversy because First Peoples identify very strongly with their
Elders. Elders are the leaders of Indigenous families and communities. People do
not become Elders simply by virtue of age. Although they may garner respect due
to seniority, they will not be recognised by the wider community without a level
of cultural knowledge and leadership.19 It is this cultural knowledge that is the
source of authority within First Nations. Elders are respected as knowledge holders
– the custodians of knowledge passed down to them by their own Elders about the
proper way to do things according to obligations to Country and lore.
Leadership is a contentious issue in Indigenous politics.20 It cannot be assumed
that a democratically elected leader holds legitimate authority in an Indigenous
context. This is one reason why ATSIC was subject to criticism by First Peoples: the
commissioners were elected in a democratic process but were not seen as legitimate
representatives of the regions and peoples they served.21 When governance is
structured to meet the needs of the settler-colonial state, it is easily critiqued as
denying First Nations sovereignty, and the cultural authority held by Elders and
Traditional Owners over their Country. Media and government departments need
to be mindful of singling out Indigenous individuals because of their success or
qualifications within the Australian system, as they may lack cultural authority
within the community. This is important because governments have a reputation
of woefully inadequate consultation with First Nations. Finding the right people
to talk to – those who have the authority and knowledge relevant to the issue –
19 Yunupingu 2016.
20 Maddison 2009.
21 Smith 2001, 168–9.
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can be a difficult task. This is the heart of the problem of treating First Nations as
a broad Aboriginal or Indigenous population, rather than as a diverse collection
of communities with identities independent of each other and of the broader
Australian population.
Case example: Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network and climate justice
The relationship between First Peoples and Country means that environmental
issues are understood as essential to protecting Country, culture and First Nations
livelihoods. Despite this, the voices of First Nations people are often absent in
debates on environmental issues. Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network (Seed)
is an organisation founded in 2014 by First Nations young people that works to
empower First Nations communities and individuals to campaign against fossil
fuel extraction on their Country and for climate justice. Seed is concerned with
climate ‘justice’ because climate change disproportionally affects those who have
contributed the least to carbon emissions, including young First Nations people.22
Seed has been involved in two major campaigns. They have supported First
Nations communities in the Northern Territory to learn about the impacts of
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and to campaign against fracking being allowed
on their Country. Seed has also collaborated with other organisations in the Stop
Adani movement, opposing the Carmichael coal mine being built on Wangan and
Jagalingou Country.
The model of activism used by Seed involves community-based education of
First Nations peoples on the potential impacts of fossil fuels on Country; training
First Nations young people to be grassroots campaigners and elevate the voice of First
Peoples; collaborating with other environmental organisations to raise awareness of
their own campaigns; and aspiring to make climate change an Indigenous issue.
The work of Seed and young First Peoples campaigning for climate justice is
giving a voice to communities that are both the most invested in the wellbeing of
Country and the first to feel the impacts of climate change.
Barriers to engagement and participation
Like other minorities, First Peoples face considerable structural barriers to full
participation in the Australian political system. It is important to recognise that,
in the case of the First Nations, these structures have been firmly entrenched since
the earliest days of European colonisation. Settler law and institutions took no
account of the existence of First Peoples, deliberately ignored their ownership of the
land and denied their sovereignty. In this section, we will briefly consider some of
the factors that continue to prevent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
22 Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network n.d.
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from enjoying political equality. These include obstacles to political representation,
institutional impediments to accountability and the role of the media.
The Australian Constitution explicitly excluded Aboriginal people from the
newly formed political community, and First Peoples were not included in the
constitutional conventions leading to Federation. Aboriginal people were not given
the right to vote in federal elections until 1962; even after that date, voting was
not compulsory for Aboriginal people. The franchise for Aboriginal citizens had
been inconsistently applied and even occasionally withdrawn by state governments
throughout the first half of the 20th century. Under pressure from the Common-
wealth, all state jurisdictions legislated the right to vote and to stand for election for
First Peoples during the 1960s, with Queensland the last to conform in 1965.23 In
some jurisdictions, little effort was made to encourage enrolment until compulsory
voting was finally extended to Indigenous people in 1984.24
Even after gaining the vote, it proved extremely difficult for First Peoples to
gain representation in parliaments. The relatively small First Nations population is
scattered across many electorates. The majoritarian electoral system guarantees that
a substantial number of electorates are ‘safe seats’, where a large majority of voters
favour one or the other major party and minority voices are easily overlooked.
Furthermore, the dominance of the major parties means that candidates most often
rely on party support to get elected, and Indigenous people have, until recently,
only very rarely been preselected by major parties to run for election, especially
for winnable seats. The first Indigenous member of the federal parliament was
Neville Bonner, Liberal senator for Queensland, who served from 1971 to 1983.
Aden Ridgeway was the second, elected in 1998 as senator for New South Wales,
representing the Australian Democrats, and serving one term. The first Indigenous
member of the House of Representatives was not elected until 2010, when Liberal
candidate Ken Wyatt, a Noongar man, became the member for the Western
Australian seat of Hasluck. The number of Indigenous members of parliament at
the state and territory levels remains very small, with the exception of the Northern
Territory.25
The lack of parliamentary representation for First Nations has received critical
attention in recent years, and political parties have much work to do in ensuring
that First Peoples are preselected as candidates. The 2016 federal election was
notable because a record number of 17 Indigenous candidates stood for election
across the nation, of which 11 were preselected by either Labor or the Coalition.26
The 2019 federal election saw 22 First Nations candidates campaigning, though
only eight of these were running for major parties, and few in winnable seats.27
23 AEC 2017; Attwood 2003.
24 Goot 2006.
25 Gobbett 2017.
26 Morgan and Mandybur 2016; Perche 2018.
27 Perche 2019.
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Following the 2016 election, albeit briefly, the number of Indigenous members
of parliament rose to a peak of five, including Ken Wyatt (Liberal, Hasluck) and
Linda Burney (Labor, Barton) in the House of Representatives, and Patrick Dodson
(Labor, WA), Malarndirri McCarthy (Labor, NT) and Jacqui Lambie (Jacqui
Lambie Network, Tasmania) in the Senate.
Once elected, the challenges of working effectively in a white institution can
be enormous. The adversarial debating system, the majoritarian electoral system,
which allows little room for consensus building, and the dominance of the two
major parties, which frames issues as binary decisions, all work against the First
Peoples’ traditional forms of decision making. Maddison observes the ‘represent-
ational dilemmas’ experienced by First Nations members of parliament, as elected
representatives are constrained by party discipline and are not free to speak against
the party line, even on issues that may negatively affect First Peoples.28 Nor can they
easily represent the diverse interests of all First Peoples, including those outside
their own electorates. The need to manage expectations in the electorate is often
challenging.
Despite these constraints, the presence of First Nations members of parliament
is significant. They reflect the presence of First Nations people in the wider com-
munity and give the otherwise white institution greater legitimacy. First Nations
members of parliament take opportunities to present different perspectives in
debates and committee inquiries. This has proven particularly important in the
Senate estimates committee process, where Labor Senators McCarthy and Dodson
have used their practical understanding of the impact of government policy in
remote parts of Australia to interrogate ministers and bureaucrats working in
Indigenous affairs and to hold the government more effectively to account for the
impact of its policies in Indigenous communities. Finally, there is undoubtedly
strength in numbers, and solidarity can stretch across the parliamentary chamber,
as the member for Barton, Linda Burney, noted in 2018:
The wonderful thing is that we [the Labor Party] have a First Nations caucus, and
we have a very good relationship amongst the Indigenous MPs, no matter what
part of Parliament we’re on. We have a good relationship collectively, and we meet
informally. That’s the mechanics, and the framework we’re working in.29
Parliamentary representation is not enough on its own to ensure that govern-
ments are held to account for decisions affecting First Peoples. Indeed, detrimental
policies are frequently made by governments driven by ideological agendas or
bureaucratic misunderstanding of the issues. The Commonwealth government’s
winding back of native title law and the abolition of ATSIC under Prime Minister
John Howard are notable examples, as are the Labor government’s decisions under
28 Maddison 2010.
29 Burney 2018.
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Prime Ministers Julia Gillard and Kevin Rudd to dismantle the successful Com-
munity Development Employment Program and refuse to consider compensation
for members of the Stolen Generations following the apology in 2008. In each
case, government policy reflected dominant settler ideological views about the
inappropriateness of ‘separate’ or ‘different’ treatment of First Peoples compared to
the non-Indigenous population, and dismissed calls for redress or recognition of
the special status of First Nations as sovereign peoples with specific rights. A more
recent example is the Community Development Program introduced by the Abbott
Coalition government, a punitive form of ‘Work for the Dole’ targeting people living
in remote parts of Australia, with poorly designed ‘work-related activities’ alongside
severe penalties for failing to attend the activities five days a week, all year round.
In the most striking example, the Howard government’s decision to impose an
intervention on remote communities in the Northern Territory was rushed through
parliament in 2007, with no opportunity to consider the perspectives of First
Nations and those affected, in a crisis-driven response to the problem of child sexual
abuse in some remote Indigenous communities. The extreme and widely criticised
response included compulsory welfare quarantining, enforced health checks and
school attendance for children, alcohol bans, increased police presence, changes to
housing tenure, abolition of the permit system controlling access to Aboriginal-
owned land and compulsory acquisition of leases over townships on Aboriginal
land. The initial rollout of the Intervention included army and police officers and the
installation of a ‘Government Business Manager’ in each community.
The targeted nature of these measures required the government to suspend the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), underlining the illegitimate nature of the
Intervention. For some observers, the Howard government appeared opportunistic,
using the cover of a ‘crisis’ in remote communities to justify the rapid imple-
mentation of unpopular and far-reaching changes that it had wanted to introduce,
in particular the imposition of township leases and the removal of permits
controlling access to Aboriginal land.30 Others noted the lack of evidence base
for the policy measures31 and the absence of logical connections between the
imposed policies and the problem of child abuse that had been identified in the
original report that triggered the crisis – the Ampe akelyernemane meke mekarle
(‘Little children are sacred’) report.32 The Howard government lost the election
immediately after rolling out the Intervention in the prescribed communities, but
the incoming Rudd government chose to extend it by another five years and expand
its reach to more communities, despite criticism and clear opposition from many of
the First Peoples affected.33
30 Turner and Watson 2007.
31 Behrendt 2007.
32 Anderson and Wild 2007.
33 Altman and Russell 2012.
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Sullivan explains that this lack of accountability is because the intended audience
is not the First Peoples, but rather:
The wishes of white Australia, the context in which those wishes are formed
largely through mass media images and reporting, and the ability of government
to convince white Australia of adequate funding, appropriate programs and
commensurate performance are significantly more influential than the voices of
Aboriginal citizens. One of the greatest inhibitors of Aboriginal development is
that Aboriginal policy is formulated for the non-Aboriginal public.34
Yolŋu Elder and leader Galarrwuy Yunupingu has observed the same phenomenon
over decades of pursuing legislative and policy reform for his people, engaging with
both Labor and Liberal governments. He points to the deeper settler logic that
prevents genuine responses to First Nations demands for change:
All the prime ministers I have known have been friendly to me, but I mark them
all hard. None of them has done what I asked, or delivered what they promised …
For a prime minister is beholden to his party and to the parliament, which in turn
is held by the Australian people. And the Australian people seem to disapprove of
my simple truths, or the idea of proper reconciliation. The Australian people do
not wish to recognise me for who I am – with all that this brings – and it is the
Australian people whom the politicians fear. The Australian people know that their
success is built on the taking of the land, in making the country their own, which
they did at the expense of so many languages and ceremonies and songlines – and
people – now destroyed.35
The challenge of holding governments to account for policies targeting First
Peoples is even more complex given the overlapping responsibilities of the Common-
wealth and state and territory governments and the opaque nature of federal–state
financial arrangements, which see Commonwealth funds disbursed to states and
territories to spend on disadvantaged populations, without any clear lines of account-
ability.36 The perennial issue of overcrowded housing on Aboriginal-owned land in
the Northern Territory is a clear example of the blame-shifting that can occur as
funds are allocated by one level of government and spent by another, with poor
outcomes. Similarly, the Commonwealth’s ‘Closing the Gap’ policy, designed to close
gaps in health, employment, education and other outcomes between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous people, has failed to meet many of the targets originally set in 2008,
but responsibility for the failure is difficult to trace due to the multiple departments
and agencies involved, across two levels of government.
34 Sullivan 2011, 76.
35 Yunupingu 2016, 29.
36 Dillon and Westbury 2007.
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The attention paid by mainstream media to Indigenous affairs is minimal, as
a rule, with occasional bursts of intense, almost voyeuristic scrutiny.37 This is, in
part, because assumptions are made in newsrooms that stories about Indigenous
affairs are not of interest to urban audiences on the east coast.38 Few media outlets
employ journalists who specialise in Indigenous affairs. Furthermore, journalists’
understanding of the lives and circumstances of those living in remote Indigenous
communities is usually extremely limited, given the lack of ongoing contact and
time spent in the communities, along with language and cultural barriers.39 Often
this will mean that the government’s framing of an issue can go unquestioned, and
few Indigenous voices are directly reported.
This distance between mainstream media and First Peoples has consequences
in terms of the wider public’s understanding of the issues. Sensationalist coverage
focusing on dysfunction, alcohol consumption, violence, welfare dependence and
poverty is often dominant and entrenches racist stereotypes without providing an
understanding of the context.40 This creates an environment in which extreme and
paternalist policies can be imposed with little backlash from voters. Researchers
Kerry McCallum and Holly Reid have observed the particular influence of The
Australian newspaper. As one of the few mainstream media outlets choosing to
focus on Indigenous issues, the newspaper uses a ‘campaigning’ approach, framing
stories about Indigenous communities in ways that emphasise individual respon-
sibility, moral failure and crisis, thereby endorsing government action such as
the Intervention. The newspaper also privileges the voices of a small number of
conservative Indigenous leaders.
First Peoples are increasingly using special interest media and social media to
expand the range of voices in public debate. Indigenous newspapers, such as the
National Indigenous Times and the Koori Mail, community radio stations and the
government-funded National Indigenous TV (NITV) are presenting First Nations
perspectives and voices and covering stories not receiving attention elsewhere.
The @IndigenousX rotating Twitter account and blog also makes a significant
contribution to social and political debates, creating awareness of Indigenous
knowledge and perspectives and providing an independent communication
channel for a diverse range of views. First Nations journalists are also increasingly
taking up positions in mainstream newsrooms and studios, articulating viewpoints
that rarely receive public attention.41
37 Langton 2008.
38 Waller 2013.
39 Waller 2013.
40 McCallum and Reid 2012.
41 Moran 2019.
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One movement or many?
Demands from First Peoples for change have taken many different shapes through-
out Australia’s political history. The 1970s saw the birth of a strong pan-Aboriginal
movement,42 inspired by the civil rights and Black Power movements in the USA.
First Peoples collaborated as a nationwide collective to campaign for land rights, self-
determination, treaty and sovereignty. This movement instilled a strong Aboriginal
identity in many First Peoples. Following the Howard government’s dismantling of
ATSIC and rejection of self-determination in favour of ‘practical reconciliation’, there
has been a strong emphasis on engaging with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
individuals through increasingly neoliberal policies. At the same time, in opposition
to the one-size-fits-all approach of government and in a resurgence of First Nations
identities and political culture, the emphasis has shifted from the pan-Aboriginal
movement of the 1970s back to a focus on localised Nation-based identities,
recognising the sovereignty of each Nation over their own Country.
First Nations sovereignty remains the great unanswered question of Australia’s
colonisation.43 First Peoples claim sovereignty as distinct political communities,
while also pursuing their rights as citizens of Australia. This can be a source
of conflict and confusion in Indigenous politics.44 First Nations have continuing
sovereignty over their Country, which exists alongside and arguably in contestation
with the sovereignty of the Crown. The High Court of Australia has refused to
consider First Nations as sovereign;45 to do so would be to challenge the sovereignty
from which the High Court receives its authority.
Sovereignty is often understood in international politics as the power to exercise
supreme and unrivalled authority within a given territory. As Falk and Martin
explain, most First Nations’ demands for recognition of sovereignty do not take
this form. Rather, they rely on a notion of ‘internal sovereignty’, which is shared,
recognised and negotiated within a geographic area.46 This is concerned with
creating the space for First Nations communities to protect their culture, law and
traditions and to exercise autonomy with respect to matters that are important to
them, such as economic development, land resource management, protection of
cultural heritage and education.47 Internal sovereignty does not seek to displace
non-Indigenous people but does demand recognition of the identity and authority
of First Nations to make decisions for their own people. First Nations hold sover-
eignty not as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals, nor as a single
pan-Aboriginal movement, but as hundreds of distinct polities across the continent.
42 Burgmann 2003, 44–84.
43 Reynolds 2006.
44 Maddison 2009, 44–5.
45 Coe v Commonwealth [1979] HCA 68; Coe v Commonwealth (No 2) [1993] HCA 42; Mabo
[1992] HCA 23.
46 Falk and Martin 2007.
47 Behrendt 2003.
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For this sovereignty to be exercised, it needs to be recognised at the local and
regional level, acknowledging the authority of the respective Nations.
The return to Nation-based identities has also seen a reinvigoration of the
treaty movement. Some of Australia’s state governments have recognised this reality
and begun negotiating with First Nations on a government-to-government basis.
While there is a clear need to redefine the relationship between First Nations
and government, the path forward is unclear. There have been calls for self-
determination and treaty for at least 50 years. First Nations and individuals have
their own articulations of what sovereignty looks like, what constitutes real ‘self-
determination’ and the contents and parties to any treaty or treaties.48 The following
case examples examine two prominent models: state-based treaty-making and a
federal constitutionally enshrined ‘Voice’. Both models are valuable examples of
how the settler-colonial state can renegotiate its relationship with First Nations
within the framework of a liberal federalist representative democracy.
Case example: Victorian treaty process
The Victorian Labor government led by Premier Daniel Andrews committed to
treaty negotiations in February 2016 and has engaged in a process of consultations
with First Peoples in Victoria through Self-Determination Forums, Aboriginal
Victoria Forums, a Community Assembly and the establishment of the Victorian
Treaty Advancement Commission. Jill Gallagher AO, a Gunditjmara woman, was
appointed as Treaty Advancement Commissioner. Her work involves advancing
the treaty process and establishing an Aboriginal representative body. In February
2019, the representative body was named the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria.
The role of the assembly is to establish the negotiation framework for treaty,
including ‘what is on and off the negotiating table, and who can negotiate’.49
The First Peoples’ Assembly will be made up of 28 Traditional Owners. Eleven
seats are reserved for the 11 recognised Traditional Owner groups. The other 17
will be democratically elected by all Victorian First Peoples over the age of 16.50
The process is the first of its kind in Australia and has garnered a great deal
of attention inside and outside Victoria. Concerns have been expressed about the
representation of First Nations’ interests in the process, whether treaty negotiations
would survive a change of government and the risk of Commonwealth intervention.
Specifically, the process has been critiqued by First Peoples for not being a nation-
based treaty process, with the suggestion that peak bodies currently recognised by
the government are afforded greater attention than nations themselves. Also, as
the process exists through government policy and legislation alone, it can easily be
48 For an example of an early discussion of First Nations sovereignty and a draft treaty, see Gilbert
1988.
49 Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission 2018a.
50 Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission 2018b.
Indigenous politics
325
altered or abolished by a successive state government or a Commonwealth govern-
ment exercising the races power under the Australian Constitution.51 However,
with the Andrews government securing a second term and the assembly formed in
mid-2019, the Victorian process is gaining momentum.
The Victorian treaty process began at the height of the constitutional recog-
nition movement, which has dominated Indigenous politics at the national level
for a decade. Constitutional recognition has been critiqued as a purely symbolic
reform, palatable to the general population but distracting from the real issues and
concerns of First Peoples.52 The revitalisation of the treaty movement and the Uluru
statement from the heart are both emblematic of the true desires of First Peoples:
recognition of their sovereignty as the First Nations of Australia and substantive law
reform that empowers First Peoples to self-determine their future.
Case example: Constitutional recognition and the Uluru statement from the heart
The Uluru statement from the heart holds a unique position in Indigenous politics.
Its origins are in the constitutional recognition movement. Constitutional recog-
nition of Australia’s First Peoples initially came to mainstream attention in 2007,
when Prime Minister John Howard committed his government to symbolic
recognition. Prime Minister Julia Gillard created an expert panel that conducted
over 250 consultations around the nation and delivered its final report in 2012.53
The movement for constitutional change was pushed by Recognise, a government
and corporate-sponsored campaign run by Reconciliation Australia. The expert
panel was followed by a Referendum Council, which had bipartisan support but
came as a direct response to widespread calls for greater First Peoples involvement
in the process.
The Referendum Council held 12 First Nations consultations during 2016–17,
inspired by the original constitutional conventions of the late 19th century. These
consultations were unique, as they were Indigenous-designed and led. During the
Regional Dialogue process, 1,200 First Nations delegates were consulted, making
it ‘the most proportionately significant consultation process that has ever been
undertaken with First Peoples’.54
Each Regional Dialogue selected representatives to attend the First Nations
National Constitutional Convention at Uluru in May 2017. At the Uluru convention,
representatives rejected outright the idea of symbolic recognition, which was the
major concern of the Recognise campaign. First Peoples instead opted for sub-
stantive reforms to the Australian legal system in the form of a staged process:
51 Section 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution (the races power) was amended following the
1967 referendum to provide the Commonwealth with the ability to create legislation specific to
First Peoples.
52 O’Neil 2014.
53 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians 2012.
54 Referendum Council 2017, 10.
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Figure 1 Denise Bowden, CEO of the Yothu Yindi Foundation, signing the Uluru statement from the
heart. Source: Australian Human Rights Commission 2017.
• A First Nations Voice to parliament, enshrined in the Australian Constitution
• A truth-telling commission, designed around local processes of examining the
untold and suppressed histories of settler–First Nations relations
• A Makarrata Commission, using the Yolŋu word for an agreement between
parties after a struggle.
These claims were outlined in the Uluru statement from the heart, a document add-
ressed to the Australian people. This has been summarised as: voice, treaty, truth.55
The Referendum Council’s final report summarised its findings and supported
the call for a First Nations Voice to parliament.56 Both the Uluru statement from the
heart and the final report received hostile responses from the Coalition government
under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Parliamentarians attempted to
reinvigorate the issue of symbolic recognition in the Australian Constitution,
holding a Senate inquiry into constitutional recognition that reported in 2018.
55 Appleby and Davis 2018.
56 Referendum Council 2017.
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First Nations leaders and activists have been working to gain bipartisan support
for a referendum on a First Nations Voice to parliament, after gaining a commit-
ment from the Labor Party in late 2018. The purpose of the First Nations Voice is
to provide a constitutionally enshrined voice for First Peoples within the Australian
political system, to combat the decades of policy failures and lack of substantive
consultation with First Peoples on Indigenous issues.
Conclusions
This chapter focused on the complex nature of Indigenous politics, and the diversity
of First Nations across the Australian continent. Historically, governments have
failed to take into account the political culture and leadership of First Peoples, pre-
ferring policies that are one-size-fits-all and often based on a poor understanding
of local priorities. This has led to decades of policy failures, allowing for the contin-
uation of socio-economic disadvantage and denying First Nations’ culture, law,
knowledge, experiences and aspirations.
First Peoples have a long history of political activism and resistance, pre-dating
the formal recognition of political equality and the right to vote in the 1960s.
Adapting to changing circumstances and the restrictions imposed by governments,
First Peoples have maintained a number of consistent demands over a long period:
land rights, self-determination, treaty and recognition of First Nations sovereignty
arising from their continuing obligations and connection to Country. The struggle
against institutional racism and social exclusion has also been an enduring theme.
Activism has led to significant achievements in terms of social and political change,
but First Peoples are forced to work within racialised institutional structures.
Indigenous politics has the potential to change for the better and to move
away from the history of failed policy making and denial of First Nations as self-
determining political actors. The Uluru statement from the heart presents an
important opportunity for substantive reform at the national, state and territory
level, and the move towards treaty negotiations in certain jurisdictions shows
another promising path forward. It is clear that First Peoples in Australia are deter-
mined to engage as equals in the political process and work with all Australian
citizens to develop a new, more inclusive political culture, reflecting the contem-
porary realities of First Peoples, settlers and migrants sharing the Australian story.
In the words of the Uluru statement from the heart, all Australians are invited to
‘walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future’. It is now
up to governments to find appropriate ways to respond.
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Multicultural Australia
Juliet Pietsch
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The rise and fall of multiculturalism and public support for multiculturalism in
Australia has historically been influenced by social issues, such as public concerns
about globalisation, national identity, immigration, social cohesion and population
growth. In contrast to other settler countries, multiculturalism was originally devel-
oped to dismantle the White Australia policy and provide the legislative and policy
foundations for supporting migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds
(NESB). In Australia, multiculturalism has focused primarily on the needs of
migrants and their right to express their cultural identities. Attempts to include
Indigenous Australians in multicultural policy have been met with caution due to
the concern of conflating issues regarding Indigenous Australians (especially with
regards to land rights, constitutional recognition and reconciliation) with distinctly
migrant experiences.1
Multiculturalism is underpinned by a vast body of philosophical literature on
modern liberalism and cultural diversity that examines the concept of a ‘politics
Juliet Pietsch (2019). Multicultural Australia. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Parliament of Australia 2011.
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of difference’.2 Kymlicka, for instance, explores the importance of collective rights
to self-determination. These rights can be held by individuals or groups, such as
minority nationals or Indigenous peoples.3 Kymlicka argues that cultural group
rights are needed, on the one hand, to protect a cultural community from forced
segregation and, on the other, to provide enough flexibility to protect other
communities from forced integration (i.e. Indigenous peoples).4
Countries have approached multiculturalism differently due to their unique
historical, legal and cultural circumstances. For instance, in Canada multi-
culturalism was introduced to resolve tensions between French- and English-
speaking Canadians. There was a much stronger emphasis on the institutionalisation
of multiculturalism in Canada than in Australia, which was strengthened in 1982
with the inclusion of protections for Canada’s multicultural heritage in the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. This was followed by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act
1988 which aimed to address the under-representation of minority groups in
parliament. In contrast, Australia has never adopted a legal framework for multi-
culturalism. Instead, it has focused on improving social and economic outcomes
for migrants from NESB. Before the introduction of multiculturalism in Australia,
migrants from NESB struggled with low levels of English literacy and were often
the victims of racism and discrimination due to the enduring impact of the White
Australia policy.
This chapter focuses on the development of multiculturalism in Australia, as
distinct from other countries around the world. The first section of the chapter
traces the development of multicultural Australia in three distinct phases: 1)
integration of non-British postwar European migrants; 2) social justice and
equality; and 3) citizenship and civics. The second section of the chapter examines
public attitudes towards multiculturalism over time, drawing on findings from the
Australian Election Studies, and reflects on the meaning of multicultural Australia
in the 21st century.
The development of multicultural Australia
After the Great Depression and the Second World War, Australia moved towards
an ethnically plural program, concomitant with a significant decline in arrivals
in Australia of migrants with British origins. By the 1940s, it was clear that
immigration from Britain was not going to be sufficient to achieve economic
growth in Australia. Therefore, Australia’s immigration resources were diverted
from Britain to the refugee issues in western and southern Europe. To assist with
2 Faulks 1998; Favell 1998; Isin 2008; Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Levey and
Modood 2009.
3 Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka 1989.
4 Kymlicka 1995.
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overpopulation and fears of political instability in Europe, Australia was persuaded
by the International Refugee Organisation to accept large numbers of people
displaced by the war. After the Second World War, the decision to initiate a
program of mass migration was announced in the Commonwealth parliament by
the first minister for immigration, Arthur Calwell.
Australia introduced the assisted European migration program, which began
in 1947. The Australian government was initially hesitant to admit Greek and
Italian refugees because they were seen as culturally different and politically suspect
due to the influence of communism in their home countries.5 However, due to
the demand for labour, the program eventually accepted 170,000 refugees from
countries including Malta (1948), Italy and the Netherlands (1951), Germany,
Austria and Greece (1952), Spain (1958), Turkey (1967) and former Yugoslavia
(1970).6 European immigration peaked in the 1960s, with a total of 875,000 assisted
passages.7 Overall, the European immigration program helped to increase the size
of the workforce and contributed to postwar economic expansion.8
In this period, the ideology behind the European immigration program was
‘assimilationism’. Non-British migrants were encouraged to naturalise and
assimilate.9 In 1945, Arthur Calwell, the minister for immigration in 1945–49,
proposed that ‘Australian nationality’ be equated with Australian citizenship to
facilitate immigration and deportation, the issue of passports and the
representation of Australians abroad.10
Following the 1947 Commonwealth Conference on Nationality and Citizenship,
the Commonwealth nations agreed on a system of nationality and citizenship. In
1949, Australian citizenship came into being after the enactment of the Nationality
and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth). Citizenship was seen as a crucial component of
nation building.11 However, Australian citizenship was still associated with being a
British subject.
The conception of citizenship based on a sense of national belonging led to
different levels of discrimination against non-British migrants. For example, non-
British subjects could only obtain citizenship after five years, whereas British
subjects only had to wait one year to obtain citizenship.12 In terms of eligibility for
citizenship, there was also discrimination between Asian migrants and European
migrants. For instance, by 1958, Asian migrants were required to live in Australia
for 15 years or more before becoming eligible for naturalisation under the Migration
5 Vasta 2005.
6 Jupp 1992.
7 Jupp 2002, 23.
8 Jakubowicz 1989.
9 Jakubowicz 1989; Jordens 1997.
10 Dutton 1999.
11 Jordens 1995.
12 Zappala and Castles 2000.
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Act 1958 (Cth). By contrast, European migrants only had to wait five years for
naturalisation.13
At the 1952 citizenship convention, the minister for immigration, Harold Holt,
referred to the importance of restrictions in Australia’s immigration policy. He
stated that restrictions were not based on racial superiority, but rather on
differences between cultures that make successful assimilation difficult.14 Although
Holt was mainly referring to migrants from Asian backgrounds, this discrimination
was also directed towards southern European migrants, who were often provided
little or no support for their resettlement. For example, in 1952, the Department of
Immigration’s social workers reported severe distress among non-British migrants,
where shelters for the homeless were unable to cope and thousands were left
sleeping in parks.15
During the late 1960s, many European migrants experienced poor working
conditions and poor health associated with unhealthy working environments and
unemployment.16 James Jupp’s Arrivals and departures (1966) provided significant
insight into anti-assimilationist complaints and migrant welfare problems. Jupp
criticised the lack of government housing, the lack of pensions for elderly migrants,
the high number of migrants in low-skilled employment, the lack of recognition of
overseas qualifications, poor protection of migrant workers by Australian unions
and the lack of English-language courses and available interpreters.17
In 1973, the Labor government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam, promoted a reconceptualisation of Australian national identity in terms
of multiculturalism. The term ‘multiculturalism’ was borrowed from Canada but
applied differently in the Australian context. The Labor minister for immigration,
Al Grassby, identified that nearly a million migrants had not taken up Australian
citizenship because of their experiences of racism and discrimination. Grassby
suggested encouraging the retention of social and cultural differences among non-
British Australians. In response, the Australian Citizenship Bill 1973 (Cth) was
introduced in 1973, reflecting a new national identity that was anti-racist and
challenged assimilationist values.18 The focus of citizenship shifted from culture
and British inheritance to the principle of territoriality – that is, residence on the
territory of the Australian state.19
In 1974, the government also introduced a Bill to combat racial discrimination
and ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, to which Australia had been a signatory since 1966 but had not
ratified. The Bill was passed by both houses of the Commonwealth parliament on
13 Brawley 1995.
14 Jordens 1997, 149.
15 Jordens 1997, 13.
16 Castles et al. 1988.
17 Jupp 1966.
18 Davidson 1997.
19 Zappala and Castles 2000, 40.
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4 June 1975 and became the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The legislation
made it unlawful to discriminate against a person because of their nationality, race,
colour or ethnicity. The passing of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 formally
ended the White Australia policy. However, that policy had such a significant
impact on the public imagination and sense of national community and identity
that its effects lingered for decades afterwards.
With increasing numbers of Asian migrants in the late 1970s, the government
was under international pressure to move ahead of the general population of
Australia in endorsing a new ethnically inclusive national identity. Migrant services
and programs: the report of the review of post-arrival programs and services to
migrants, known as the Galbally report, was introduced in 1978 as a key driver in
formulating government policies affecting migrants. At the heart of the report was
the need to provide encouragement and financial assistance for migrants so that
they could maintain their cultural identity.20 The Galbally report recommended:
• improvements in the Adult Migrant Education Program, which was initiated in
1947 to teach survival English to refugees
• free telephone interpreter services for migrants from NESB and emergency
services
• the establishment of Migrant Resource Centres
• the introduction of a Special Broadcasting Service (SBS).21
The Fraser government strongly supported the recommendations of the report,
initiating expanded migrant settlement services and seeking to promote cultural
pluralism as a source of strength to Australia’s national identity rather than a
threat. The Galbally report suggested shifting migrant services from the general
area of social welfare to ‘ethnic specific’ services.22 Overall, between 1976 and 1983,
the Fraser government reduced spending by shifting funding from government
agencies to voluntary organisations within the community. Therefore, cultural
diversity was encouraged, but only if political and economic structures were left
intact.23
When the Labor government was elected in 1983, it set about reforming some
of the Liberal policies of multiculturalism. The Review of Migrant and Multicultural
Programs and Services (ROMAMPAS) was released in 1986. It proposed a strategy
of providing basic resources and support for cultural expression, stressing the
importance of equality. The report suggested four principles for developing
government policies:
20 Galbally 1978.
21 Jupp 1992.
22 Kalantzis 2000, 104.
23 Jupp 1988, 927.
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1. All members of the Australian community should have an equitable opp-
ortunity to participate in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the
nation.
2. All members of the Australian community should have equitable access to an
equitable share of the resources that governments manage on behalf of the
community.
3. All members of the Australian community should have the opportunity to
participate in and influence the design and operation of government policies,
programs and services.
4. All members of the Australian community should have the right, within the
law, to enjoy their own culture, to practise their own religion and to use their
own language, and should respect the right of others to their own culture,
religion and language.
The focus of the report was ensuring equal opportunity and outcomes for
all Australians. The report also recommended the establishment of an Office of
Multicultural Affairs (OMA), which was set up in 1987 and assumed responsibility
for the Commonwealth Access and Equity Strategy.24
The principles of multiculturalism were broadly accepted by the Hawke and
Keating Labor governments throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.25 However, with
the rise in Asian immigration, there were rumblings that the government was
moving too far ahead of public opinion. For example, Geoffrey Blainey argued that
the immigration policy in the early 1980s was insensitive to the views of the majority
of Australians. In All for Australia, Blainey criticised Australia’s immigration policy
and the slogan ‘Australia is part of Asia’. He argued that Australia was importing
unemployment but not announcing what it was doing.26 Furthermore, he criticised
the nature of multiculturalism as an identity for Australia:
Multiculturalism is an appropriate policy for those residents who hold two sets of
national loyalties and two passports. For the millions of Australians who have one
loyalty this policy is a national insult.27
Blainey’s criticisms were later echoed in the mid-1990s. For example, in 1996,
leader of the One Nation Party (ONP), Pauline Hanson, expressed the following
concerns about Asian immigration and multiculturalism in her maiden speech in
federal parliament:
Immigration and multiculturalism are issues that this government is trying to
address, but for far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate
24 Jupp 1992.
25 Jones 2003, 116.
26 Blainey 1984.
27 Blainey 1988, 22.
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by the major parties. I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically
reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of
being swamped by Asians.28
The recognition of ethnic difference in multiculturalism was interpreted by the
ONP as a form of disrespect to Anglo-Australian identity.29 In fact, it is possible
that ONP populism caused the most damage to multiculturalism.
The rise of transnationalism tends to encourage states to reassert their authority
in shaping national identity and national citizenship.30 The frequency of terrorist
attacks has also led to governments reaffirming national identity and establishing
new citizenship obligations. As a result, Eleonore Kofman argues that more than
ever ‘the state is asserting its role as protector of national identity and social
cohesion’.31
The shift to civic integration was partly due to the pressure to maintain a secure
environment and also to obtain public consent for large-scale influxes of skilled
migrants.32 The Australian government response has been to support high levels
of migration but at the same time demonstrate to the public that they are tightly
monitoring the management of migration and diversity.33
At the turn of the century, with nearly 25 per cent of Australians born outside
the country, with transnational connections, the Coalition government specifically
focused on the notion of citizenship as a basis for a collective national identity. The
government proposed more difficult and protracted citizenship tests. In October
2006, Liberal MP Petro Georgiou criticised the government’s discussion paper
‘Australian citizenship: much more than just a ceremony’ in a speech delivered to
the Murray Hill Society at the University of Adelaide. Georgiou argued that difficult
and protracted citizenship tests were not necessary to promote social cohesion and
integration. In particular, Georgiou criticised the proposed English tests, arguing
that the take-up of citizenship is lowest among English speakers. For example,
migrants from the UK, New Zealand and the USA have traditionally had lower
take-up rates of citizenship than migrants from non-English-speaking countries.
With no real break in terrorist incidents in Western countries, and subsequent
concerns about racial and ethnic tensions, the civic approach to multiculturalism
and social cohesion was largely supported by successive Labor and Liberal
governments in the first two decades of the 21st century. However, terrorist attacks
further damaged government support for multiculturalism. They also harmed
Muslim communities that in most cases had fled from wars, terrorism and religious
28 Hanson 2016.
29 Leach 2000, 45.
30 Holton 1998; Kofman 2005.
31 Kofman 2005, 454–5.
32 Joppke 2004.
33 Ang and Stratton 2001.
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violence in their countries of origin, only to be confronted with the reality of
politically motivated violence once again.
Public support for multiculturalism
So far, this chapter has looked at the development of multicultural Australia from
the perspective of government in response to changing immigration patterns, public
fears about national identity, globalisation and national security. However,
throughout the changes in government policy, the broader Australian public has
maintained consistent views towards multiculturalism. One way to measure public
attitudes towards multiculturalism is to ask people whether they feel equal
opportunities for migrants have gone too far. As can be seen in the previous section,
the original goals of multicultural Australia were to provide equal opportunities
for migrants through a range of programs, such as providing English as a second
language support for migrants from NESB, as well as a range of migrant welfare,
cultural and translation services.
Figure 1 shows the results from the 1990–2016 Australian Election Studies.
The Australian Election Study surveys a representative sample of Australians each
election year, asking questions on a range of social and political issues. The
advantage of the Australian Election Studies is the way in which the surveys track
political attitudes and behaviours over time, asking the same questions in each
election year. The results in Figure 1 reveal that up to 44 per cent of respondents
were not overly supportive of multiculturalism in the early 1990s. Interestingly,
the percentage that were concerned about multiculturalism decreased in the years
leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the follow-up concerns about migration,
particularly arrivals of asylum-seekers with Muslim backgrounds. Asylum-seeker
arrivals became a source of political controversy during the 2001 election
campaign. In 2001, the Howard government, in what became known as the ‘Tampa
Affair’, claimed that asylum seekers had thrown their children overboard to secure
long-term protection in Australia. An Australian Senate Select Committee later
found that the children of asylum seekers were not placed at risk and that the
government had tried to mislead voters.
The percentage of survey participants that were concerned about multi-
culturalism increased throughout the first decade of the 21st century from 27 per
cent in 2004 to 35 per cent in 2016. This may, in part, be related to increasing media
attention on terrorist attacks in other countries. However, the results in Figure 1
also show that attitudes towards levels of migration run parallel to attitudes towards
multiculturalism, with an increasing percentage of Australians concerned about the
number of migrants allowed into Australia. In 2016, more than 40 per cent of the
Australian population felt that the number of migrants allowed into Australia had
gone too far, increasing from a low of 27 per cent in 2004.
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Figure 1 Attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration (%). Source: 1990–2016 Australian
Election Studies, https://australianelectionstudy.org/.
Australian attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration are also
consistently related to several important background factors, such as age, education
and political identification. Table 1 shows that, in more recent election years,
younger Australians were less likely to be concerned about equal opportunities
for migrants, compared to older Australians. For example, in 2016, only 14 per
cent of respondents in the ‘18–24’ age bracket expressed, concern compared with
over 40 per cent of respondents in the ‘35–44’ and ‘55 and over’ age brackets. In
some elections, younger respondents were more likely to express concern about
multiculturalism, compared to older respondents, such as in 1990, 1996, 1998,
2001 and 2010. This shows that younger age groups are not always supportive of
multiculturalism, as is often assumed, with younger age groups considered to be
more progressive than older age groups.
Other, more consistent factors that are related to views on multiculturalism
are education and political identification. Those with a tertiary qualification are
consistently more likely to support multiculturalism, although even among respon-
dents with a university education there has been a steady increase in the number
concerned about multiculturalism, from only 9 per cent of respondents in 1990
to 20 per cent in 2016. Nevertheless, those without a university qualification show
a much higher level of concern about multiculturalism, with more than 45 per
cent of respondents in 2010 and 2013 and 40 per cent in 2016 stating that equal
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1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Age
18–24 34 46 52 35 40 18 19 42 31 14
25–34 28 46 46 34 36 26 24 30 34 30
35–44 21 43 40 33 34 25 28 42 35 40
45–54 15 40 43 36 34 27 32 42 40 33
55–64 15 41 42 29 31 27 28 34 41 40
65+ 18 46 46 31 33 29 27 35 39 41
Education
No qualification 26 49 50 36 42 28 30 41 43 39
Non-tertiary
qualification
19 46 46 37 37 33 34 44 46 46
Tertiary qualification 9 24 28 19 16 15 13 23 21 20
Vote
Liberal 20 47 50 31 37 33 32 45 45 40
Labor 21 41 36 30 32 21 25 31 31 32
National 30 50 59 41 39 31 43 65 47 47
Greens 39 39 17 9 15 25 12 9
Table 1 ‘Equal opportunities for migrants gone too far’, by background (%). The question
was, ‘Do you think the following change that has been happening in Australia over the
years has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right? ‘Equal opportunities for
migrants’. Source: 1990–2016 Australian Election Studies,
https://australianelectionstudy.org/.
opportunities for migrants had gone too far. The most consistent factor that is
related to views about multiculturalism is how respondents vote during the
election. Those who vote for Labor and the Greens at each election have been
consistently more likely to support multiculturalism, compared to those who vote
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for the Coalition. This would be expected because since the 1990s the Labor Party
has more actively promoted multiculturalism. Federal and state Labor electorates
are also more likely to have significant populations of migrants from both low
socio-economic and non-English-speaking backgrounds.
Conclusions
Political leaders, by and large, acknowledge that the old form of nationalism in
Australia, based on common history, language and tradition, has declining
relevance. These leaders have given expression to what a new ‘national community’
should be. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Bob Hawke supported the view of a
‘national community’ in Australia as defined in terms of multiculturalism. This
view was presented in the 1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia.
Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke all attempted to reconcile diversity with a common
British-Australian identity. However, the use of multiculturalism as a symbol of
Australian nationalism began to unravel when subsequent governments began to
feel uneasy with the concept.34 Since the rise of the ONP and conservative politics
in the late 1990s and terrorism in the 21st century, consecutive governments have
refrained from promoting multiculturalism as a unifying symbol of national
identity. Instead, the policy of multiculturalism is considered useful for managing
cultural diversity and social cohesion.
The findings of the Australian Election Studies discussed in this chapter show
that while there are many ebbs and flows in government policies and public debates
on multiculturalism and immigration, there is a fairly consistent level of public
support for multiculturalism, especially among those with a tertiary qualification
and Labor voters. It appears that efforts among government and media elites to
undermine the enduring success of multicultural Australia have had very little
success, revealing the inclusivity and egalitarianism of the Australian population.
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Pressure groups and social
movements
Moira Byrne
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Groups and movements that pressure governments and political parties seeking
government to change policy are vital features of democracy. Without the
combined actions of people participating in groups and social movements, those
who wish to hold office may not be aware of issues affecting constituents or how
changes to policy may affect them.
Knowing about pressure groups and social movements is critical in considering
democracy, government and policy making. This chapter discusses what pressure
groups and social movements are, when they form, who joins them and how
they work. These considerations shine a light on some of the important theories
about group power. The chapter also reflects on whether these groups are good for
democracy and discusses the kinds of pressure groups and social movements in
Australia.
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What are pressure groups and social movements?
Political scientists use a number of terms to describe pressure groups, including
interest groups and lobby groups.1 The term ‘pressure groups’ refers to organisations
that pressure government to change policy, whether for their own interest or in
the interest of others. A pressure group more broadly is defined as an association
that seeks to represent a sector of society and make a direct or indirect claim on
government to influence policy, without wanting to govern.2
Interest groups seek to represent their own interests in government policy
without wanting to govern. Advocacy groups advocate for others. Some pressure
groups are both interest groups and advocacy groups.3 They might represent some
of their own interests, but also the interests of others.
The term ‘social movement’ refers to shared opinions and beliefs in a population
which indicate preferences for changing elements of the social structure or
operation.4 These coalesce into people’s campaigns to change society and culture.
Sociologist Sidney Tarrow observed that major societal changes such as war,
recession, political instability, or large demographic or technological change often
prompt ‘waves of protest’ which give rise to social movements.5 Typically, social
movements centre on a broad issue, so are also known as issue movements.
Contemporary social movements tend to have many of the following
characteristics:
• high levels of participation by individuals who don’t necessarily see themselves
as part of a formal organisation
• self-identification with the cause or issue of concern
• seeing political or ideological opponents as ‘enemies’ to overcome
• links with formal interest groups and ‘social movement organisations’ within
this wider tapestry of informal participation.
Collective action is intrinsic to pressure groups and social movements because they
employ group power to alter public policy.6 Many activities may not be directly
political, but groups and movements spend at least some of their time and resources
trying to influence public policy. This may include indirect methods through net-
working or participating in government consultations, or more direct methods
such as electioneering or strategic professional links to government by being close
to government decision makers, either geographically or politically.7
1 Richardson 1993, 1.
2 Halpin 2012, 179; Matthews 1980, 447; Richardson 1993, 1; Smith 1993, 2.
3 Sawer 2007, 24–5.
4 McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217–8.
5 Tarrow 1994.
6 Cook 2004, 138.
7 Davis et al. 1993, 139; Warhurst 1986, 312.
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When do pressure groups and social movements form?
A number of theories explain formation. While these theories are explained sep-
arately, in practice, many factors affect formation of pressure groups and social
movements.
Disturbance theory
David Truman observed the formation of pressure groups as a response to the
growing complexity of society. Any disturbances arising in the community upset
the balance within society. This in turn prompted pressure groups to form to
oppose these threats to the status quo. Truman also noted that in almost all
organised groups, an ‘active minority’ governed on behalf of the many.8
Population ecology
The theory of organisation population ecology illuminates the challenge to balance
outcomes for all interests. In the 1970s, scholars attempted to understand group
formation in the context of the politics of the day, as well as those who were trying
to promote ideas or change policy.9 Groups form depending on the population
density of other groups at the time of their formation, which ‘both legitimises
and constrains’ group formation.10 A group with the same motivation may arise
because great numbers of people wish to join them in a particular location; another
group with the same motivation may founder because it does not offer a unique
perspective and there are already groups at that place. These groups frequently
compete for the same resources, membership and funding.
Because pressure groups are in competition with each other, the existing
density of groups in the population affects a new group’s prospect of formation.11
Further, low density of groups increases the legitimacy of the organisations that
exist. Yet as more organisations form, competition for resources means some
groups cease to exist.12
Political opportunity
Political opportunity is a third theory advanced to explain group formation, noting
that group formation depends on the political environment. In this framework,
favourable political conditions prompt advocacy groups to form. This can include
changes in government, which provide the impetus for groups to form whose ideas
8 Truman 1951, 139–55.
9 Nownes 2004.
10 Jenkins 2006, 313.
11 Nownes 2004.
12 Jenkins 2006, 313.
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align with those elected. But it can include structural factors, like the openness of
institutions to lobbying, litigation, or other forms of political practice that groups
and movements have expertise in.13
Who joins pressure groups and social movements and why?
A variety of motivations prompt individuals to participate.
Incentives and exchange theory
Clark and Wilson categorised benefits offered to group members:
• Material benefits: offer tangible advantage for the member, such as economic
benefits (publications, or discounts on services and products) or improved
working conditions. This is often associated with Robert Salisbury’s exchange
theory, namely, that organisers offer incentives and benefits to potential
members for joining.14
• Solidarity benefits: are intangible, offering a sense of identity and community
through education, involvement and participation. This also brings a collective
identity, marking one as belonging to a group or standing for a cause. This, in
turn, can bring status, enjoyment and social capital.
• Purposive benefits: relate to the group’s purpose, such as to change a policy,
promote an idea, or pursue a particular action.15 These purposive benefits are
also termed ‘expressive’ benefits, as people join to voice their values and ideals.16
Clark and Wilson argued that one or more of these benefits must be provided to
members to either entice them to join or to remain part of the organisation. A
pressure group’s continued existence depends upon members sharing in the group
benefits, and group organisers extracting advantage from those members.17
This approach also explains paradoxes in group formation: if groups produce public
benefits that all can access, what is the incentive of participation for the individual?
If groups become too large, some may benefit without paying the costs of the group.
This problem of ‘free riding’ can be seen in the way some groups attempt to restrict
the benefits of their collective action to their membership, such as when unions
historically enforced ‘no ticket no start’ requirements that workplaces must employ
union members.
13 Jenkins 2006; Nownes 2004.
14 Salisbury 1969.
15 Clark and Wilson 1961, 134–5.
16 Salisbury 1969, 16.
17 Salisbury 1969.
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Cultural models
New social movement theory maintains that most social movements today are
international and largely concerned about their physical and psychological envir-
onment.18 The internet is an enormous contributor to the global nature of social
movements and dialogue in the public sphere. Social movements can be considered
as sites of shared identity, and can be instrumental in radical identity-forming
processes. Old loyalties are detached from conventional views or the status quo, and
transferred to the new movement, bringing a sense of identity.19
How do pressure groups work?
Political scientists have identified five levels through which pressure groups or
citizens convey their ‘demands’ to government:
1. Concerned individuals acting of their own accord represent interests, or
advocate for others.
2. Spontaneous group activity occurs, that is unplanned and unorganised.
3. Groups of people sharing a common trait or concerns form non-association
pressure groups.20 Examples include particular cultural groups or localised
citizens concerned about a particular development in their town or suburb.
4. Organised groups represent interests in a more sophisticated way through
institutions, such as businesses, educational institutions and non-government
organisations.
5. Associations and specific lobbying organisations representing particular groups
advocate to influence how political, social and economic goods are distributed
in explicit policy changes.21
How the latter advocate depends on the structure of the pressure group.
Strategies used to influence policy makers
Pressure groups demonstrate these roles in the strategies they employ, including:
• Direct and indirect lobbying of politicians, policy advisors and political parties,
and the public. Indirect lobbying aims to change government policy through
lobbying people and bodies which themselves may have influence on
government decision-makers, such as lobbying political parties and the public.
• Agenda-setting through lobbying activities, media work, or direct
communications with the public.
18 Habermas 1995.
19 Melucci 1994.
20 Matthews 1980, 447.
21 Hogan 1996, 158.
Pressure groups and social movements
349
• Electioneering through mobilising support or opposition for candidates or
parties based on their policy positions, or influencing public opinion so that
the wider public is inspired to act.
Yet despite any success, a group’s reliance on electoral tactics over party politics
or bureaucratic involvement is a sign of weakness. This is because it depends on
a concerted campaign rather than integration into the policy system. Similarly,
although protest can be powerful, it is a less assertive form of leverage because it is
often undertaken by groups without ‘insider’ knowledge or contacts, whether from
lack of resources or exclusion from consultation.22
A group or movement’s choice of strategies depends largely on its resources,
but also on the political system and its conventions, and on the goal.23 A lack of
power does not preclude successful lobbying by less-resourced pressure groups,
particularly where a pressure group boasts experience and evidence to persuade
policy makers of an argument. As a result, such pressure groups may become more
formally involved in the policy system.24
Excluding electoral tactics, focusing a lobbying effort on an individual politician
can be effective.25 It prevents some difficulties encountered when lobbying parlia-
mentary groups, where party discipline dominates responses. Although contact with
a member of parliament is usually referred to the relevant minister or at times to
Cabinet, it can also become a ‘fast track’ to raising the issue in a policy area.26 Of
course, lobbying also involves garnering support from others, including the media.27
Participation and involvement within policy-making institutions
Placing an issue on the policy agenda, lobbying and developing policy is a time-
consuming process of ‘continuous contestation’. It often involves participation from
a number of pressure groups to reach policy decisions.28 Negotiation is important
in policy making, as is ongoing interaction within the policy cycle.29 Ideally, the
policy process engages local communities and an array of voluntary groups, but for
decades governments have preferred to deal with one ‘umbrella’ group, rather than
a number of smaller organisations.30
Although some political lobbying is secretive,31 most pressure group attempts
to intervene in the polity are part of broad public consultation on the public
22 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 244–5.
23 Rozell and Wilcox 1999, 2–3.
24 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 236–7.
25 Barnett 2010, 47.
26 Matthews 1980, 467.
27 Barnett 2010, 73.
28 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 322, 344.
29 Colebatch 2002.
30 Giddens 1998, 75–6; Matthews 1980, 458.
31 Warhurst 2007a, 9.
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record. Pressure groups are useful to governments, offering representation, lending
authority, and providing knowledge – often gathered through close involvement
with the subject at hand.32 This can assist policy bureaucrats to gather invaluable
information and arguments about a particular policy before a decision is made, and
is useful for policy specialists providing briefing or advice.33 Governments use this
expertise and the advice of pressure groups in policy development,34 so engagement
yields mutual benefits. It can broaden the government’s support by demonstrating
stakeholder participation. Pressure groups achieve attention and credibility from
the wider community, and leverage to pursue their own policy priorities if the
opportunity arises.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
recommends that a lobbying framework should include strategies to promote a
‘level playing field’. Information should be made readily available, conflicts and
preferential treatment avoided, and policy makers should be accessible to the broad
community and not just a privileged few, so that all voices can be considered.35
Insiders and outsiders
Wyn Grant noted that pressure groups, like many other political entities, are
frequently categorised as political ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ in their access to
government.36 Insiders are very close to government, and numbers of pressure
groups are integrated into government. Others remain excluded, presumably
because they lack the requisite power, contacts or expertise.
Consequently, certain stakeholders are relatively subservient subjects of
‘bureaucratic citizenship’, while other groups enjoy a ‘right’ to consultation and
participation in the policy process. The Australian Council of Social Services
(ACOSS) is one of the few welfare or advocacy groups represented in policy
advisory committees. In many ways it is an insider group, as it retains ongoing
consultative status. Its lobbying role is accepted, but unlike ‘producer’ groups,
ACOSS is not able to use economic sanctions to achieve a policy result.37
Although groups are normally more able to bring about change as insiders,
some pressure groups prefer to be ‘outsiders’. An outsider signals a separation
from government, which affirms a philosophical commitment to an issue and
provides freedom and independence to express views or pursue agendas without
real or perceived censorship. While some other outsiders may respect this position,
outsiders tend to be valued less by politicians – particularly if the strategy could be
perceived as extreme or unlikely to affect electoral results.
32 Warhurst 1986, 311.
33 Barnett 2010, 17; OECD 2008, 8.
34 Warhurst 1986, 313.
35 OECD 2008, 18–20.
36 Grant 1995.
37 Mendes 2006, 4.
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Cultural and communication work
Literature about social movements sheds light on the way that issues are ‘framed’
by organisations to garner support for a social movement or for policy change.
Framing refers to how groups link interpretations of individual interests, values and
beliefs with their activities, goals and ideology. Entman provides a useful definition
of framing and its policy implications:
to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.38
When a particular event is framed as meaningful, individuals can be prompted to
bring others together in collective action. Moreover, the event may serve to guide
social movement organisations or pressure groups.39
Are they ‘good’ for democracy?
Within the framework of political economy and public choice theory, organised
interests can be seen as a risk to good governance. Interest groups operate
ultimately from the same selfish motive: to benefit themselves, even to the exclusion
of others. They behave to maximise their economic, societal and legal or regulatory
conditions as they pursue their objectives in the political sphere. Political and
policy decisions may be attributed to the expedience and motivations of politicians
and political parties, such as electoral advantage, rather than policy best practice.40
Ultimately, while governments determine which interests to indulge, interest
group behaviour cannot be separated ‘from the surrounding institutional and
cultural framework’.41 In other words, governments cannot always be relied upon
to ensure a balance of optimal outcomes for all interests.42 In this critique, interest
groups potentially undermine governance and the economy.
More positively, Beer identified pressure group types which governments can
harness to achieve superior policy outcomes. In this way, pressure groups are func-
tional: they support, rather than destabilise, governance and democracy (although
Beer cautioned that special interests had the potential to ‘impair’ a political system’s
action for the long-term interests of its citizenry).43 Beer’s more optimistic ap-
proach suggests that participation, making a contribution and concern for quality
of life are the values which inspire pressure group formation, rather than the
38 Entman 1993.
39 Snow et al. 1986, 464.
40 Frey 1980, 66; Self 1993, 45.
41 Marsh 1995.
42 DeAngelis and Parkin 1986, 316; Marsh 1995.
43 Beer 1982, 4.
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self-interested interpretation of some rational choice scholars’ view of pressure
groups.44
Beer’s interpretation recognises that pressure groups arise from various
political environments. With this more ‘contextual’ perspective, each pressure
group can be examined and assessed in the context of its own history and situation.
In this view, collectives are motivated by the freedom of members of society to
choose, as part of a democratic and inclusive ‘provider’ society. Interest, or pressure,
groups are organised representations of citizens who facilitate democratic
participation. The motive to form a pressure group is egalitarian rather than selfish,
as groups lobby to address disadvantage.
What kinds of pressure groups and social movements are in Australia?
Within Australia, pressure group participation is much higher than membership of
political parties.45 Pressure groups are often divided into two main camps:
• Sectional organisations represent traditional, recognised interests such as those
of the labour force, business or primary industries.
• Promotional groups advance interests other than these main sectors, such as
women’s interests or environmental issues.46 However, their focus on particular
issues can result in representing narrower interests than those of other political
groups.47
Both prefer different styles of action and different relationships with governments
or political parties.48 Despite some complications, most pressure groups in Australia
could fall easily into these two categories; the categories may also overlap.49
Sectional groups
Sectional interest groups represent significant sections of the community and the
economy, and are usually integrated into party politics and government. Some are
frequently involved in policy development, often as advisors.50 Despite a goal of
representing issues of their sector to influence policy, some sectional groups remain
aligned to particular political parties, even to the disadvantage of their interests.51
44 Beer 1982; Marsh 1995, 57–80.
45 Warhurst 2006, 327.
46 Matthews 1980, 448.
47 Warhurst 1986, 313.
48 Warhurst 2006, 329.
49 Maddox 1996, 411; Warhurst 2006, 330.
50 Warhurst 1986, 313.
51 Davis et al. 1993, 139; Warhurst 1984, 24.
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Sectional interests represent a ‘fixed’ clientele,52 and professional groups tend
to be well-resourced sectional interests. Somewhat lesser resourced are producer
groups who generate goods or services. This includes unions, which represent
labour services. Groups representing the interests of state welfare service clients
are more inclined to represent groups of individuals who are the clientele of the
welfare provider groups. When banded together, conglomerations of interests may
be called ‘collectivist’ pressure groups.53
The major sectional interest organisations operate under established
conventions of participating in the policy-making process. Large sectional organ-
isations such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the National
Farmers’ Federation, and the Australian Council of Trade Unions are involved in
the policy process, and are often represented on government advisory committees.
Sectional groups often employ highly qualified individuals to act for them; busi-
nesses frequently recruit former senior public servants for such roles.54 In fact,
business groups are significant sectional interests representing their views to
government in Australia. The business lobby tends to be privileged because its
resources, significant sectional interests and its production capability afford it
power in a market-based economy, described as structural power.55
Peak bodies
Peak bodies are usually strong sectional pressure groups, with several democratic
functions: involvement in the policy process of those most affected, developing
the capacity of its member organisations to enter into the policy process, but also
representing resource-poor sections of the community. Peak bodies represent, co-
ordinate, inform, research, and develop policy on behalf of member organisations
for their sector. Importantly, peak bodies are not service providers, though there
are a number of ways in which they provide services to their members (e.g. in
co-ordinating submissions, participating in consultation processes, and perhaps
providing information).56
Promotional groups and advocacy groups
Unlike sectional interest groups, promotional pressure groups are more peripheral
to government policy making. For this reason, they may use more electoral
tactics.57 Despite promotional groups appearing to succeed at the ballot box
through either election of candidates, or significant portions of the voting public
52 Beer 1958, 133.
53 Beer 1958, 133–4.
54 Warhurst 1984, 5, 9.
55 Lindblom 1977; Warhurst 2007b, 53.
56 Sawer 2002, 40–1.
57 Matthews 1980, 460.
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supporting candidates, they exert limited policy influence. This is because they are
not integrated into government processes and relationships, and can be divisive
for parties. That said, particular promotional groups obtained greater access to the
bureaucracy during past decades due to some government agencies engaging staff
with links to promotional groups, or with a personal commitment to their cause.58
Promotional groups are often more concerned with advancing a particular
issue or cause. Advocacy groups are a type of promotional group that seek to raise
the status or profile of a section of society seen to be disadvantaged or deprived
– socially, politically or materially. Promotional groups tend to focus on causes to
advance the interests of society as a whole, and speak along policy lines rather than
as a representative.59
On a cautionary note, at times promotional pressure groups may be proxies
for more vested interests of sectional organisations.60 For example, the Alliance
of Australian Retailers was a group ostensibly opposed to the plain packaging of
cigarettes because the policy would damage the business of small retailers. It was
later found to be an ‘astroturf ’ group (i.e. a fake ‘grassroots’ organisation) as it
was funded by tobacco companies Philip Morris, British American Tobacco and
Imperial Tobacco Australia.61
Other types
Single-issue pressure groups focus on raising the profile of a single cause or issue,
perhaps as part of a social movement. Social reform movements seek to change
norms rather than push for radical change, whereas radical movements seek to
change the way society is structured. Groups and movements can be temporary,
whether short-term or semi-permanent, emerging as needed. Fusion refers to when
two or more groups or movements join for a common purpose.62
In the political sphere, the approach of single-issue pressure groups can be
seen as a ‘thin edge of the wedge’, as they concentrate on one particular issue
or one aspect of a more complicated issue, and they may not be integrated into
either the party system or the machinery of government. They do not become
part of government processes or advisory committees. Rather, single-issue lobby
groups focus on raising awareness of their particular issue so it is adopted by more
powerful pressure groups or the community itself.
Multi-issue groups promote several, usually interconnected or themed, issues.
They are generally better resourced and therefore better able to promote their causes
and concerns. At times, the delineation between single- and multi-issue groups is
ambiguous. For example, an environmental group could be dismissed by politicians
58 Warhurst 1984, 20–4.
59 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 239.
60 Matthews 1997, 271; Matthews 1980, 452–3.
61 Davies 2010.
62 Cole and Foster 2001.
Pressure groups and social movements
355
and policy makers as a single-issue group, yet such groups frequently campaign on
related concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions, preservation of wilderness areas,
and recycling. Similarly, the Australian Christian Lobby may engage on a number
of issues including refugees, school curriculum and euthanasia, but is primarily
concerned with ‘Christian principles and ethics [being] accepted and influencing
the way we are governed, do business and relate as a society. We want Australia to
become a more just and compassionate nation.’63
Conclusions
While the political sphere undergoes change from digital disruption and disaffection
with democracy, pressure groups and social movements form an important conduit
to ensure citizens’ voices are heard and reflected in policy. Theories of pressure
group formation can help explain why some groups emerge and last. An individual’s
decision to join a pressure group or social movement can be influenced by a variety
of factors, but collective action is effective in bringing about change. Groups’ roles
of representation, education and scrutiny are used differently by groups who employ
insider and outsider strategies. Whether they are political insiders or outsiders, they
can use either or both kinds of strategies to exercise influence.
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Religious communities and politics
Marion Maddox and Rodney Smith
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Defining religion
Political scientists have not always paid much attention to religion – and, when
they do, they often do so without definition.1 Yet religion is an elusive concept;
many languages have no word that is a ready equivalent of what English speakers
understand as ‘religion’.
As Brent Nongbri pointed out, religion’s intuitive meaning for modern
Westerners is ‘anything that sufficiently resembles modern Protestant Christianity’.2
Traditions that do not fit that pattern tend to be either overlooked or reinterpreted
to squeeze them into a Protestant Christian mould.
To help navigate this problem, Ira Allen and Saul Allen proposed that political
scientists should think of religions as ‘systems of shared activity organized around
Maddox, Marion, and Rodney Smith (2019). Religious communities and politics. In Peter J. Chen,
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta
and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Maddox 2015.
2 Nongbri 2013, 18.
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transcendental signifiers’.3 Focusing on activity systems (which are observable)
avoids favouring faith or belief (which are not only inaccessible to the researcher but
also of greater importance in some traditions than others). Similarly, ‘transcendental
signifiers’ are observable in public discourse, and not limited to such things as deities
(which not all traditions have). The Allens’ definition also helpfully avoids seeing
‘religion’ as static, allowing for the fact that such activity systems change over time,
in interaction with other aspects of society, including the political.
Religion and democratic politics
Religious studies scholar Timothy Fitzgerald argued that the terms ‘religion’ and
‘politics’ acquired their modern meanings through being conceptually separated
from one another in the 17th century. ‘In this new formula’, according to Fitzgerald,
‘religion has nothing in its true nature to do with “power”’ and ‘governance and
the political state’ were redefined as ‘non-religious’. A consequence of the pattern
Fitzgerald identified is that modern Western political thought has theorised that
religion and politics are safest when kept separated. This preference for separation
is often traced to the trauma of the European wars of religion in the 16th and 17th
centuries.4
To Naomi Goldenberg, religions are more helpfully understood as ‘vestigial
states’ – that is, ‘the cultural remnants of former sovereignties that persist within
current states’.5 The main difference lies in the ‘abstractions they cite to justify their
authority’.6 Where fully functioning states ‘might ground themselves on such terms
as freedom, equality, justice, or as the proper homelands of an idealized race or
ethnicity’, the ‘vestigial states called religions often appeal to some form of divinity
(generally male)’.7 Goldenberg’s observations clarify that the kinds of organisations
conventionally called religions, and those conventionally called states, share
concerns with the organisation and distribution of (among other things) material
goods and power (of various kinds). Little wonder separating ‘religion’ from ‘pol-
itics’ proves much harder than it sounds.
In Australia, as elsewhere, religious communities have exhibited varying
political alignments, and the rise of the ‘no religion’ category provokes further
questions. Moreover, the demand to keep religion out of political debate is arguably
anti-democratic, preventing some people (the religiously committed) from drawing
on their deepest convictions in thinking about public concerns. Rejecting the
conventional wisdom that religion renders public life unstable, several scholars
have argued for democracy over secularism.8 Lori Beaman gives the name ‘deep
3 Allen and Allen 2016, 559.
4 Fitzgerald 2015.
5 Goldenberg 2013.
6 Goldenberg 2013.
7 Goldenberg 2013, 40–1.
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equality’ to the forms of ‘agonistic respect’ that facilitate democratic community
across religious differences.9
The Constitution and formal political institutions
Australia’s Constitution and formal political institutions are not completely secular,
nor do they embody religious values, language and symbols to the extent of those
of some other liberal democracies, including the UK.
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) begins with
reference to ‘the people … humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God’, an
expression that the late 19th-century framers of the Constitution thought would
be inclusive enough to avoid offending adherents of most faiths. A century later,
in a much more secularised social context, delegates debating a possible Australian
republic at the 1998 Constitutional Convention were happy to retain a reference to
God in the preamble to the Constitution, seeing it as a reminder of a generic source
of authority over lawmakers or as a reflection of the nation’s best aspirations, or
both.10
The other direct reference to religion in the Constitution occurs in section 116,
which states:
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for the establishing of a religion, or for
imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of religion,
and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
under the Commonwealth.
A casual reading of section 116 might suggest that it erects a strong, American-
style wall separating church and state. In fact, the Constitution’s drafters were
not particularly careful about the wording of section 116, leaving constitutional
protection of religious freedom in Australia relatively weak. While the High Court
has defined ‘religion’ broadly, it has interpreted ‘law for’ in section 116 as
prohibiting the Commonwealth only from making laws specifically intended to
establish a religion, impose observance, or prohibit free exercise. The court has
upheld Commonwealth laws that impinge on the exercise of a religion but are not
designed to do so. In addition, section 116 does not prevent the states or territories
from making laws concerning religion. Attempts in 1944 and 1988 to address these
issues via constitutional amendments both failed.11
8 Bader 2008; Connolly 1999.
9 Beaman 2017.
10 Maddox 2001, 41–90.
11 Beck 2018.
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Indigenous religion
For at least 60,000 years, the territory that is currently Australia was covered by a
dense network of interlocking activity systems for organising power, knowledge, law
and goods. These systems were conceived in terms of humans’ relationships with
one another, with the land and with non-human others, both physical and spiritual.
The languages in which these systems were expressed – more than 250, with some
800 dialectal varieties12 – did not distinguish ‘religion’ from other areas of life, such
as political or economic. In the words of native title scholars Michael Dodson and
Diana McCarthy, ‘The Indigenous process by which historical events become part
of an everlasting and immutable Creation are ritualistic and religious’.13 In addition
to areas that European ways of thinking normally consider ‘religious’, this process
is also the basis of some matters – such as land ownership – that European ways
of thinking consider economic and of others – such as relationships, rights and
responsibilities between groups of people – that European ways of thinking consider
political. As Dodson and McCarthy observe, ‘the fit between traditional knowledge
systems and Australian law is neither close nor comfortable’.14
In the colonial era, missions tried (with a few exceptions) to reshape
Indigenous peoples’ political and economic systems, along with their beliefs, to fit a
European image of a ‘Christian’ way of life.15 Belief had practical consequences; for
example, colonial courts in the 1840s denied the testimony of Indigenous witnesses
because they were ‘ignorant of the existence of a God or a future state’ or even ‘had
no religion at all’.16
Yet, little more than a century later, Indigenous law was considered too religious
for an Australian court to recognise. The 1971 Gove case was the first land claim
to be heard in a federal court. Justice Blackburn found that the Yolŋu claimants’
relationship to their land was ‘religious or spiritual’ and that this precluded the
court from granting their claim.17 In a further twist, anthropologist Nonie Sharp
has shown how the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) finally undid the doctrine of terra
nullius and recognised Indigenous ownership, but at the cost of downplaying the
religious and spiritual aspects of Indigenous land law.18
In 2017, the First Nations Constitutional Convention, meeting at Uluru,
encapsulated the unity of the spiritual, material and political by declaring that
Indigenous sovereignty:
12 Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 2019.
13 Dodson and McCarthy 2006.
14 Dodson and McCarthy 2006.
15 Rowse 2017.
16 Smandych 2006, 107.
17 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141, 167, 270–1
(Gove).
18 Sharp 1996, 149–88.
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is a spiritual notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother nature’, and the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who were born therefrom, remain
attached thereto, and must one day return thither to be united with our ancestors.
This is the basis of our ownership of the soil, or, better, of sovereignty.
The Uluru statement then spells out the consequences of that sovereignty’s fracture,
including catastrophic incarceration rates. It proposes political solutions, including
a Makarrata Commission, and a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution,
enabling ‘this ancient sovereignty’ to ‘shine through as a fuller expression of
Australia’s nationhood’.19
Patterns of religious belonging and commitment
Australia’s contemporary pattern is religious pluralism. According to the 2016
Census, the largest single religious group – 30 per cent of the population – were
those who identified as having no religious commitment (Table 1). Australians
who identified as Christian comprised around half the population (52 per cent).
Catholics were the largest individual Christian group (23 per cent), followed by
Anglicans (13 per cent). The ‘other Christian’ group (16 per cent) is diverse, with
Uniting Church identifiers comprising the largest sub-group at 4 per cent. ‘Other’
religions are also diverse, with Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus the largest non-
Christian religious groups.
It is also clear from Table 1 that Australians’ religious identities are more
diverse now than they were at Federation in 1901, when nearly all of the population
identified as Christian. Those Christians were divided, with the largest two groups
being Church of England (Anglican in contemporary terms) and Catholic. The
‘other Christians’ were overwhelmingly Protestants – Presbyterians, Methodists,
Congregationalists, Baptists and the like. This pattern of an Anglican and other
Protestant majority and a significant Catholic minority reflected the colonising
populations’ overwhelmingly British and Irish origins, which had not altered much
by the Second World War. As other parts of this chapter show, this foundational
period of Christian dominance and subsequent diversity has had important effects
on Australian political institutions, political organisations and public policies.
Greater religious diversity began to develop from the 1970s, driven by two main
processes. The first was the growth of immigration from outside Europe, which has
increased the proportion of Australians from Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh
traditions. At the 2016 Census, 4 per cent of people born in Australia identified
with a religion other than Christianity, compared with 21 per cent of people born
overseas.20
19 First Nations National Constitutional Convention 2017.
20 ABS 2017.
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1901 1947 1971 1996 2016
Catholic 22.7 20.9 26.9 27.0 22.6
Anglican* 39.7 39.0 31.0 22.0 13.3
Other Christian 33.7 28.1 28.3 21.9 16.3
Total Christian 96.1 88.0 86.2 70.9 52.2
Islam ** ** 0.2 1.1 2.6
Buddhism ** ** ** 1.1 2.4
Hinduism ** ** ** 0.4 1.9
Judaism 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Sikhism ** ** ** ** 0.5
Other religions 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.4
Total religions other than Christianity 1.4 0.5 1.5 3.4 8.2
No religion 0.4 0.3 6.7 16.6 30.1
Not stated 2.0 11.1 6.1 9.0 8.5
Table 1 Religious identification in the Census since Federation (selected years). Source:
ABS 2017; ABS 2014.
*Includes Church of England ** Less than 0.1 per cent
The second process has been secularisation. Since the 1970s, fewer and fewer
Australians have declared any religious allegiance. In 2016, 10 per cent of
Australians aged in their 80s and 90s had no religion, compared with 25 per cent of
those in their 50s and over 40 per cent of those in their 20s.21 This secularising trend
is also evident in patterns of religious practice and belief. About half of Australian
adults attended at least one religious service a month in 1950, compared with one-
fifth by the 1990s and one-sixth over the past decade. Practices such as prayer,
as well as belief in God, have also declined. In 2018, 30 per cent of Australians
21 ABS 2017.
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prayed or meditated at least once a week. Twenty-six per cent believed in God, with
another 30 per cent believing in a ‘spirit’ or ‘life force’.22
These patterns of religious pluralism and secularism mean that religion has
very different interactions with Australian politics than it does with politics in the
USA. In America, Christian identification, church attendance, beliefs and devotional
practices are more common and more socially valued than they are in Australia.23
Devout American politicians who invoke Christian language thus share religious
experiences and beliefs with many American voters in a way that devout Australian
politicians do not. This does not mean that religion is unimportant in Australian
politics; however, it means that American patterns of religious influence on politics
cannot be assumed to operate in Australia.
Parties and voters
When the Australian party system solidified in the early 20th century, it did so
primarily along class lines. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) was born out of the
trade union movement, while the forerunners to the current Liberal and National
parties drew heavily on the support of urban and rural businesspeople and
professionals. This class divide had some religious undertones, particularly in the
non-Labor parties, which were dominated by Protestants. Labor attracted
Protestant as well as Catholic activists and leaders. Labor’s first five federal leaders
were Protestants, before the party elected a Catholic leader, James Scullin, in 1928.
Despite the ALP’s diversity, a mythology of Labor Catholicism versus
Liberal–National (Coalition) Protestantism became popular in Australia,
particularly after the First World War conscription debate saw prominent
Protestants, including Prime Minister Billy Hughes, leave Labor to take up leading
roles in the non-Labor parties.24
Labor’s ranks continue to include Catholics and Protestants. By contrast, the
non-Labor parties remained dominated by Protestants until the final decades of
the 20th century, when upward social mobility among Catholics increased their
presence and visibility within the Liberal and National parties. Three of the four
federal Liberal leaders since 2007 have been Catholics. This trend effectively ended
any lingering sectarian traces in the major party contest.25
Political scientists have identified two longstanding relationships between religion
and voting in Australia. The first is that religious identification affects party
support. At the 2016 federal election, for example, 44 per cent of Catholics voted
for Labor or the Greens, compared with 37 per cent of Anglicans and 33 per
22 Pepper and Powell 2018; Smith 2001, 253–4.
23 Putnam and Campbell 2010.
24 Hogan 1987, 178–88
25 Hogan 1987, chapter 10.
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cent of Uniting Church adherents. Voters with no religion were most likely to
support Labor (56 per cent). The second pattern is that more observant members of
religious groups are less likely to support left-of-centre parties. In 2016, 33 per cent
of voters who attend religious services at least once a month voted Labor or Green,
compared with 49 per cent of voters who never attended.26
Religious commitment among political elites
Australia’s federal politicians have at least as high rates religious adherence as the
general population.27 Also, leaders have become more outspoken about their
religion. For example, in the decade to 2019, three prime ministers (Rudd, Abbott
and Morrison) have regularly discussed their Christian faith (respectively, Anglican,
Catholic and Pentecostal), while a fourth (Turnbull) was a less vocal, but consistent,
church attender (Catholic). Only Julia Gillard claimed no religion. The tendency
for Australian politicians to discuss their religion publicly has increased as popular
levels of religious commitment have fallen.28
It is tempting to look for direct correlations between politicians’ religions and
specific policies, but the reality is considerably more complicated. To take a few
examples, the ALP’s longstanding opposition to public funding of Catholic schools
was permanently altered by Gough Whitlam, a self-described agnostic from a
Protestant family. Further education policy changes favouring Christian schools
and introducing religious chaplains in public schools were initiated by John
Howard, who, while in office, described himself as only a sporadic churchgoer.29
Same-sex marriage was eventually legislated under the Catholic (and marriage
equality advocate) Malcolm Turnbull, having been resisted by the atheist Julia
Gillard. Religion is not an independent force in political processes; it interacts with
party pressures, politicians’ career paths, electoral calculations and community
expectations, among other factors.30
Religious communities as political actors
There is no peak religious organisation that speaks in the public arena for all
religious communities, or even for all Christians. Most, but not all, major Christian
denominations are members of the National Council of Churches in Australia
(NCCA), which, among other activities, makes statements on public policy issues
such as economic justice, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights, refugee rights
26 Bean 2018, 240–1.
27 Maddox 2001, 11–19.
28 Crabb 2009.
29 Maddox 2014a, 183; Maddox 2005, 258.
30 Maddox 2014b.
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and welfare, foreign aid, peace and security. Member churches are not, however,
bound by NCCA statements. Muslims Australia (the Australian Federation of
Islamic Councils) and the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) act as
national peak bodies for most significant Islamic and Jewish communities. The
NCCA, Muslims Australia and ECAJ maintain interfaith dialogue and express
similar positions on some policy issues, such as religious tolerance, refugees and
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights; however, united action in other policy
areas has been limited.31
Several developments in the lobbying efforts of Australian religious
communities have been evident in recent decades. The first has been the growth,
since the 1960s, of interest groups and social movements with positions that
directly challenge traditional religious values. Where once the Christian churches
were dominant voices, particularly on ‘moral’ issues such as euthanasia, sexuality
and abortion, now they are just one set of voices competing with a range of other
vocal and well-organised interests.
The sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants (including Anglicans)
that marked the lobbying efforts of Christian churches for much of the 20th century
has largely disappeared, replaced by an increasing tendency to unite against secular
voices in policy debates.32 In recent years, this co-operation has extended to Islamic
and other religious communities. In addition, sections of the churches have sought
a role within social movements alongside secular groups with whom they share
positions, a pattern that developed from the late 1970s in movements for peace,
Aboriginal land rights, refugees and the environment.33
The most recent development has been the increase in professional lobbying by
or on behalf of religious communities. This development has been most obvious in
the Canberra-based Australian Christian Lobby, which has employed staff to lobby
parliamentarians and influence voters since 2001, mostly in support of conservative
policy positions. Its techniques are partly borrowed from similar organisations in
the USA, but it has less influence than its American counterparts.34
Religious communities as service providers
Australia’s shift to neoliberal governance has increasingly built religious
organisations into policy implementation, as providers of services that were
previously supplied predominantly by public agencies. Especially since the
mid-1990s, education, welfare, aged care, health and disability services have been
progressively privatised, with religious organisations as major participants.
31 Executive Council of Australian Jewry 2019; Muslims Australia AFIC 2019; National Council of
Churches in Australia n.d.
32 Hogan 1987.
33 Smith 2014.
34 Maddox 2005; Payne 2019; Smith 2014; Smith 2009.
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Economist Paul Oslington calculated in 2015 that, due to contracting arrangements
with governments, ‘Church-related not-for-profit organizations deliver approx-
imately half of social services in Australia’, and that this proportion would increase
due to the introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme.35
The effects of this shift included hastening the de-unionisation and
deregulation of workforces in social services. The transfer of substantial quantities
of previously government services to religious organisations, which are exempt
from aspects of anti-discrimination law, removed a significant proportion of the
education, health and welfare workforce from the reach of these protections and
raised questions about the use of public money for services that were not provided
on a purely non-discriminatory basis. Religious organisations have historically
been effective critics of government policy; but, from the mid-1990s, the contracts
under which they become agents of government policy often included ‘no-criticism’
clauses, limiting this capacity.36 By giving a publicly funded boost to organisations
with declining memberships, Oslington observed, the contracting system put ‘most
Australians’ contact with Christianity … through education or social services
rather than congregations’.37
One area where the involvement of religious organisations in delivering public
services has been particularly evident is schooling. By 1880, all of the Australian
colonies had abolished public subsidies for religious schools, and from then until
1963, religious schools received no public money. ‘State aid’, as it was called, was
reintroduced incrementally, first by the Coalition government under Robert
Menzies. This was followed by a much larger expansion, in 1973, by the Labor
government led by Gough Whitlam. The original justification was equity, given the
dire state of many Catholic schools that were unable to afford even basic facilities.
The return to ‘state aid’ was part of a larger package of education reform overseen
by the Commonwealth Schools Commission, which was required to observe the
‘primary obligation … to provide and maintain government school systems … of
the highest standard and … open, without fees or religious tests, to all children’.38
Since then, however, the funding mix has consistently favoured private schools
over public schools, as well as shifting from the neediest schools to benefit the
better-resourced schools.39 In 2019, one in three private schools received more
public funding per student than public schools with similar student profiles.40 Since
more than 90 per cent of private schools have some form of Christian affiliation,
this represents a substantial public subsidy to religious organisations.
35 Oslington 2015.
36 Maddox 2005, 228–59.
37 Oslington 2015.
38 Commonwealth Schools Commission Act 1973 (Cth), section 13(4)(a).
39 Maddox 2014a, 83–6.
40 Ting, Liu and Scott 2019.
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Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that, while Australia’s formal political institutions
are broadly secular, Australian politics has been substantially shaped by dominant
Christian traditions, often in surprising ways. Members of non-Christian religions
have taken prominent roles in Australian public life, but their traditions’ impacts on
the public culture have been smaller overall than that of Christianity. Indigenous
ways of knowing, including the spiritual dimensions of sovereignty and land
ownership, remain an aspect of the Australian religious landscape that the non-
Indigenous population is still attempting to comprehend.
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Voter behaviour
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Representation is the basis of modern democratic theory. In most mature electoral
democracies, it is achieved through regular elections, which provide voters with
the opportunity to select representatives whose policy goals align with their own.
This chapter explores how citizens vote and some of the key influences on their
behaviour.
Research into voter behaviour has been greatly influenced by a shift from
normative assumptions about how citizens should behave in democratic society
to studying how they act. This highlights a troubling and persistent problem for
democratic governance: if citizens in representative democracies are largely not
interested in politics and are under informed about basic matters of state, how can
they provide any control over public policy through elections or referendums?
Borrowing from social psychology, political science provides an answer to
this. While most voters are far from perfectly equipped to analyse political issues,
most use limited information to make reasonably sophisticated judgements about
political leaders, candidates, parties and salient matters, particularly those relevant
to their lived experiences. When voters pool their individual opinions at elections,
the resulting collective decision is actually likely to be better than an individual
decision.
Ratcliff, Shaun (2019). Voter behaviour. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
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This chapter will explore the political science research on voter behaviour to
better understand how representative democracy functions.
What is public opinion?
Public opinion is a concept frequently used by political leaders, journalists and
political scientists to describe and understand politics. It can be viewed as the
aggregation of the attitudes and preferences of individuals who comprise the public.
This term – ‘the public’ – is widely used, but in political science it has a particular
meaning. Sociologist Herbert Blumer suggested three criteria. In his framework,
the public consists of a group of people who:
1. face a common issue
2. are divided on how to address it
3. are engaged in discussion or debate about the issue.1
In this view, publics emerge over particular issues, such as immigration or the rate
of taxation. To become a member of a public, an individual must join a discourse
on an issue, thinking and reasoning with others. According to Blumer, if a public is
not critically engaged with an issue, then that public ‘dissolves’, and uncritical and
unengaged public opinion becomes mere ‘public sentiment’.
However, this is not a universally accepted definition. More recently, philosopher
and sociologist Jürgen Habermas argued that public opinion is context dependent,
anchored to the ‘public sphere’ – the political and social domain in which people
operate, which changes over time.2 It comprises public discussions about politics
outside the formal arena of government, such as conversations in a cafe or bar,
talkback radio or what is covered in the editorial pages of a newspaper. Changes in
the public sphere include who is permitted to participate and the issues and positions
that are considered to be socially acceptable. In the past, women, those who didn’t
own property and some ethnic and racial groups were not permitted to engage
in Australian political debate or vote in elections. Because it consisted only of the
opinions of certain groups of men, the public sphere in mid-19th-century Australia,
for instance, did not consider it socially acceptable to discuss issues such as LGBTIQ+
rights.
The history of the public opinion as an idea
The concept of public opinion as a distinct phenomenon was born in the European
Enlightenment of the 18th century. It played an important part in the
1 Blumer 1946.
2 Habermas 1989.
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Enlightenment project to replace absolute monarchies with liberal representative
democracies of various forms.
Most early theorists and philosophers, including Plato and Machiavelli, were
generally dismissive of the political opinions of the common people. They believed
most citizens did not have the capacity for rational political judgement. However,
some were more positive. Aristotle advocated an early version of the wisdom of the
crowd. The modern, mostly more positive, attitude towards public opinion can be
traced to the Enlightenment, which saw a growth in literacy, the development of early
newspapers and the distribution of political pamphlets. Enlightenment thinkers,
including John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued for the existence of
normative, inalienable rights for individuals, protected by the state, and for greater
citizen participation in government.
Lockean political theory was a significant inspiration for the design of the
political system and culture of the USA and other modern representative demo-
cracies. Locke argued that humanity was subject to three laws: divine, civil and
opinion (or reputation). He regarded the latter as arguably the most important.
Poor public opinion could force people to conform to social norms. Despite this, he
generally did not consider public opinion to be a suitable influence for governments.
Other Enlightenment thinkers had a more positive view. David Hume argued that
public support provided government with legitimacy – and was the only thing that
could do so. This view is closest to modern normative beliefs about the functioning
of democracy.
Modern views of voter behaviour
Despite the early origins of the concept, the study of voter behaviour and public
opinion emerged as modern fields of research later, in the 1930s. Key debates
included how voters learn, why they believe certain things and prefer particular
policy options, how their attitudes match with their behaviours and their influence
on government policy decisions.
Much of our understanding of human behaviour comes from the field of social
psychology, where studies of public opinion typically employ one or more of four
basic concepts: beliefs, values, attitudes and opinions.
1. Belief systems tend to be thematically and psychologically consistent. They are
the assumptions by which we live our lives, comprising our understanding of
the world, our attitudes and our opinions.
2. Values are ideals. They are our understanding of the way things should be.
Many researchers distinguish between ‘terminal’ and ‘instrumental’ values.
Terminal values are ultimate social and individual goals, like prosperity and
freedom. Instrumental values are the constraints on the means used to pursue
our goals, such as honesty and loyalty.
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3. Attitudes are the relatively stable and consistent views we hold about people
and objects. These are often defined as evaluations combining emotions, beliefs,
knowledge and thoughts about something.
4. Opinions are the expressions of attitudes, sometimes seen as narrower, more
specific and more consciously held (as opposed to unconscious attitudes we
may have formed without deliberation) than attitudes. The idea that opinions
are separate from attitudes is not universal, though.
Do voters hold meaningful political opinions?
Political science research was deeply influenced by the behavioural revolution that
occurred during the mid-20th century. Changes in approaches to investigation
permitted researchers to measure citizens’ preferences and behaviours, raising
questions about the capacity of citizens and challenging some of the normative
assumptions of representative democracy.
Besides social psychology, theories of voter behaviour and public opinion have
been heavily influenced by the discipline of economics. Rational choice theory
has been one of the most consequential of these, operating on the assumption
that aggregate social behaviour is the result of independent decisions made by
individual rational actors who take available information, probabilities of events
and potential costs and benefits into account when determining preferences, and
act consistently in selecting the alternatives that maximise their interests.
Anthony Downs’ An economic theory of democracy is one of the most influential
political science works published after the Second World War.3 In a Downsian view
of electoral democracy, voters are rational utility maximisers. They support the
party with policies closest to their own preferences (which are generally expected
to benefit their self-interest). Parties and candidates are also utility maximisers,
seeking the private benefits of public office and, therefore, electorally motivated
and willing to adjust their policy offerings to match the preferences of the median
voter. In doing this, parties provide voters with the greatest utility for their vote and
increase their chances of electoral success.
Much of the research from social psychology supports this cynicism about
citizen competence. Psychological and experimental research has repeatedly demo-
nstrated the irrationality of individuals4 and the influence of context on preferences
and decision making.5 Citizens’ policy positions are often unstable and inconsistent.6
Behaviour is frequently influenced by emotion7 and framing.8 Voters use evidence
3 Downs 1957.
4 Redlawsk and Lau 2013.
5 Rabin 1998.
6 Converse 1964.
7 Brader 2012.
8 Kahneman 2003; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991.
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incorrectly or prejudicially and are often overly confident about their conclusions,9
and their acceptance of new evidence is clouded by motivated reasoning.10
Reconciling these findings with democratic theory
Concerns about the capacity of citizens to meaningfully participate in electoral
democracy are inconsistent with the general assumptions of classical democratic
theory, which requires citizens to be informed and attentive for democracy to
properly function. These concerns are typically reconciled with the normative
ideals of democratic theory through the wisdom of the crowd argument. Aggregate
opinion can be much more stable and apparently ‘rational’ than individual opinion,
so long as error in individual opinions is assumed to be random.11 Even large
proportions of random error ‘cancel out’ when aggregated, resulting in reasonably
efficient and stable collective choices.
In defence of voters
Voters certainly face limitations, but how far do these extend? Voting is cognitively
demanding. Most political issues are complex, abstract and remote from citizens’
lives, and voters lack the time and resources to properly make informed policy
distinctions between parties. Rather, individuals are often forced to trade off effort
and optimisation.
Although citizens may not be familiar with policy details, they usually exhibit
behaviour that is logical, responding to circumstances with ‘bounded rationality’
to obtain some utility from their vote. ‘Bounded rationality’ makes different
assumptions than economic theories of rationality.12 Rather than being intimately
familiar with policy themselves, citizens learn from their own lived experience and
take cues from parties, elites and opinion leaders, who actively promote specific
policies to voters, providing cues to their supporters about political matters and the
importance of particular issues.13
9 Gilovitch 1991.
10 Bartels 2002.
11 Page and Shapiro 1992.
12 Kahneman 2003.
13 Gilens and Murakawa 2002; Levendusky 2010; Lupia 2016; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin
1991.
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How citizens learn
Political and social psychology provide substantial critiques on citizens’ capacities
to perform their democratic duties, helping us reconcile voters’ limitations with the
idea that democracies work reasonably well.
Voters do not necessarily need detailed knowledge about politics and policy
to fulfil their democratic duty. They can be thought of as ‘cognitive misers’, who
minimise the effort involved in making potentially complex or difficult decisions
using shortcuts, learning only as much as they need to and receiving and
interpreting signals from elected officials, opinion leaders and other sources.
One way voters make political choices (such as choosing who to vote for)
without a substantial investment in information gathering is through the use of
heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts.14 These are also used when making non-political
decisions.
The types of heuristics used by voters include:
• Anchoring: when they fix their beliefs more heavily on the first piece of
information offered (the ‘anchor’) when making decisions.
• The representativeness heuristic: involves comparing a problem or decision to
the most representative mental prototype.
• Stereotyping: making a judgement based on limited information – usually surface
characteristics, such as groups the subject belongs to, or observed actions – and
not on any detailed knowledge of the subject.
• The availability heuristic: involves assessing the probability of an event based
upon how easy it is to recall similar cases.
Agenda setting, elite cues and framing
The reason voters use heuristics or other shortcuts – as Lippmann15 and Zaller16
identified – is that in large and complex societies they generally have no other choice.
Their time and attention is finite, and political and policy issues are complicated.
One of the major sources relied upon by voters for political information is the
media. By choosing to report certain stories, they control the flow of information
to the public, which may impact perceptions about the importance of issues.17 This
process is called agenda setting .
Cues can also be taken from parties, elites and opinion leaders, including
policy experts and religious leaders, union officials and business executives,
environmental campaigners and other interest groups, who actively promote
14 Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982.
15 Lippmann 1922, 59.
16 Zaller 1992, 6.
17 Cohen 2001.
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specific policies to voters. Individuals use these signals to save time and effort on
matters about which they are not well informed.
Beyond agenda setting and cues, the media and elites – including political
campaigns run by parties and candidates – may also use framing to influence
voters.18 This occurs when an issue is portrayed a particular way to guide its
interpretation. Individuals will react to a choice differently, depending on how it is
presented.
Most political issues are heavily framed to persuade voters. In Australia, the
decision to call people arriving by boat to seek asylum ‘refugees’, ‘boat people’ or
‘illegals’ is the result of framing. The choice of words and imagery is often deliberate
– designed to evoke a particular reaction from the audience. Political actors try and
place their cause and message in a positive frame or their opponent’s in a negative
frame.
Aggregating individual preferences: studying voter behaviour
We can study voter behaviour a number of ways: through electoral results (aggregate
studies) and using public opinion surveys (individual-level studies). Both have stre-
ngths and weaknesses.
Measuring aggregate voter behaviour
The ultimate expression of public opinion is the votes cast by citizens at elections,
referendums and plebiscites, which we can examine to understand what voters
think about particular issues and how they behaved in different parts of the
country.
However, there are risks associated with exclusively relying on these aggregate
election results to study voter behaviour. We cannot be certain that lower income
voters are more likely to vote for the Coalition than those with middle incomes, or
are less likely to support same-sex marriage, for example. This risks committing an
ecological fallacy, a type of error where inferences are made about individuals based
on aggregate group-level data. Assuming that results for high-income divisions
translate to high income individuals would be such a fallacy. We cannot be sure
whether this is the case without individual-level data, including the kind of
information collected through public opinion surveys.
Using surveys to understand voter behaviour
As students and scholars of public opinion, we want to examine the attitudes and
behaviours of voters more frequently than every three (or more) years, when
18 Tversky and Kahneman 1981.
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elections are held, and to make inferences about the behaviour of individual citizens,
not just aggregate-level election results. Generally, electoral returns are not disa-
ggregated by demographics, socio-economic status, issue preferences or other attri-
butes of citizens. We also want to understand attitudes towards issues that elections
are not necessarily held on. Quantitative data from random, representative samples
of the electorate – public opinion surveys – can provide a snapshot.
Much of our exposure to public opinion surveys (commonly called ‘polls’) is
through the ‘horse race’ coverage of politics – who is winning, who is unpopular
and how much has changed in recent weeks or months. Survey research can be
much more extensive than this and can be used to understand what shapes public
opinion (Is it the media, politicians’ messages or culture?). Surveys are useful for
understanding citizens’ attitudes towards policies, events and political leaders, and
how they might vote at elections and respond to future political decisions. Surveys
can also be used to examine the influence of public opinion on political and policy
decisions made by leaders.
The history of public opinion surveys
Prior to the development of survey research, sociologists and political scientists
generally studied behaviour and opinions by interviewing people in small groups.
Although providing detailed information, this often resulted in samples that were
too small and too concentrated in limited geographical areas (such as particular
neighbourhoods or workplaces), making it impossible to make generalisations
about the broader public. Journalists and magazines often conducted informal
straw polls and interviews on the street, but these were more for entertainment than
serious research.
Most of the tools on which modern sampling is built have their origins in the
1940s and 1950s. In the USA, Australia and most other representative democracies,
populations became more urban (and therefore concentrated), household
telephones became more common, mailing lists became more accurate and people
became generally easier to reach.
A significant incentive for the development of better public opinion measures
was the burgeoning US radio industry in the 1920s and 1930s. Broadcasts were
primarily funded by advertisers, who wanted to know the size of audiences when
agreeing to pay for air time. Statistical sampling provided this, with random
samples of hundreds or thousands of people offering relatively accurate estimates
of the general population.
Political surveys followed, providing a way to regularly measure citizens’
privately held opinions. This was done by the news media, obtaining measurements
of shifting opinion that they could report. Political parties, candidates and leaders
also undertook surveys and used the data obtained to guide political decisions.
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Early survey research relied on in-person interviews. Home telephones were
not yet ubiquitous and were mostly owned by the wealthy. Mail surveys were
difficult, as there was often an absence of complete and reliable lists of valid postal
addresses. However, face-to-face surveys have many of the same drawbacks as int-
erviews. Regardless, these early efforts at sampling sometimes provided useful data
and established the foundations for later efforts.
There are several types of surveys, and methodological decisions can influence
the utility of different survey types for different purposes. First, researchers need to
decide how they are going to select their sample. The most common method is opt-
out, or random, sampling, which sits at the heart of modern survey research. It is
built around the idea that every individual in the population of interest (e.g. citizens
likely to vote in an election) has a known probability of being sampled. Random
sampling helps us to secure a representative sample by providing the means to
obtain what is intended to be an unbiased selection of the larger population.
From address-based, in-home interview sampling in the 1930s to surveys by mail,
random digit dialing after the growth of landlines and mobile phones, and online
surveys, researchers have placed significant efforts into obtaining representative
samples.
Each type of survey allows us to reach different parts of the population in
important ways. In-person surveys are best at obtaining a response, but can be
expensive and have significant problems with social desirability bias – the tendency
of respondents to answer questions in a way they believe will be viewed favorably
by others, under-reporting potentially undesirable behaviour (e.g. eating junk food,
smoking) and over-reporting what might be construed as good behavior (e.g.
exercising daily, eating well, working hard). Other methods are cheaper and tend to
have low social desirability bias, but generally have lower response rates.
Conclusions
Learning about voter behaviour is the first step to understanding if and how
democracy works. For students of electoral democracy, this is important as
representation sits at the heart of democratic theory. Research shows that citizens’
aggregate preferences influence policy outcomes to varying degrees.19
While there are questions about the ability of voters to function as competent
political actors, some of the early critiques were found to have been overly
pessimistic. It is arguable that many studies set unrealistic expectations of the
average voter. Rather, public opinion and the involvement of voters are necessary
safeguards of democracy.
19 Gilens 2012.
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Young people and politics
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‘[W]e do not support our schools being turned into parliaments’
‘What we want is more learning in schools and less activism in schools’
Prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison1
Young people’s relationship to democracy is a dynamic one. Over time, how youth,
participation and citizenship are defined has changed, reflecting the persistent and
changing norms and conventions of Australian society and politics. As suggested
by Scott Morrison’s response to the student-led ‘School Strike 4 Climate’, there
are both firm and contested ideas about who young citizens are and their role in
Australian democracy. These reflect how ‘youth’, as a life stage, is conceptualised,
how citizenship is defined, how people develop and express political views and
behaviours and create, share and consume political media, what constitutes
Collin, Philippa, and Jane McCormack (2019). Young people and politics. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas
Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and
Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Australian Associated Press 2018.
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participation and how people exercise their rights and responsibilities in Australian
democracy and shape its ongoing evolution.
This chapter looks at how young people’s relationships to politics have changed
and diversified over time. It first considers how young people’s citizenship and
their role in democracy can be conceptualised. The second section looks at young
people’s status in Australian politics – in formal processes, policy and advocacy.
The final section discusses how young people’s political interests and participation
in democracy are evolving in relation to the constraints and opportunities of
Australian democracy.
Conceptualising young citizens
Like most concepts in social science, ‘citizenship’ and ‘youth’ are not ‘natural’ –
actually, they are highly contested! Not only has their meaning changed over time,
there are also lively and continuing debates about how we should think about these
terms – and therefore who can participate in democracy and how.
Citizenship
Citizenship is a key term in theories of democracy because it defines who belongs to
a particular community – or to a state such as Australia. In this regard, citizenship
refers to a legal and administrative status – specifically membership of a political
community. Citizens have rights – for example, to vote and to help decide how
their community or country is governed. Liberal theories of democracy present
the exercise of rights as the most important form of political participation; citizens
need knowledge and experience to understand and use their rights well. Citizens
also have democratic duties and responsibilities. For example, communitarian
theories argue that citizenship is fostered through a sense of belonging, which
requires that people join communities and associations to learn about and
contribute to democracy in ways that benefit the broader group – or ‘common
good’. This way of thinking about citizenship connects to the idea of ‘active
citizenship’, which is often evoked in youth policy,2 and suggests that to qualify as
citizens young people must demonstrate that they contribute to civic associations.
Throughout history, many people have pointed out that these rights, and
opportunities to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship, are not experienced
equally by all. For instance, until the 20th century in most democracies, women were
citizens but lacked some political and civil rights, such as the right to vote or to own
property. So radical theories of democracy – such as feminism – argue that citizenship
is necessarily exclusionary, producing ‘second- or third-class citizens’ because some
members of political communities are less valued and more marginalised and dis-
2 Harris 2012.
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advantaged than others. They point out that citizenship is enacted when people and
groups challenge who ‘counts’ as a citizen by undertaking ‘acts’ such as speaking,
marching or posting content online to express opinions or to protest an event or issue
– thus constituting themselves as members of a public. These different theories of
citizenship all affect how young people are perceived in Australian politics.3
Youth
While ‘youth’ can refer to a stage of life somewhere between ‘childhood’ and
‘adulthood’, the term is ambiguous because it is hard to determine when childhood
stops or adulthood starts. Historically, psychology and developmental sociology
have viewed ‘youth’ as a universal, biological stage through which young people
should pass on normal pathways to (full) ‘adult’ citizenship.
However, there is no distinct age at which young people become ‘adult’ or ‘full
citizens’ in Australia. Young people can leave formal education at 15 (depending on
the jurisdiction) but are not paid ‘adult’ wages until they are 21; they can be held
criminally responsible for their acts from the age of 10 and be jailed in adult prisons
from 17, and yet, for the purposes of youth support payments, they are generally
not considered ‘independent’ until they are 22.4 While (in certain industries) there
is no minimum age at which a young person can gain employment and pay income
tax, they are not allowed to vote until they are 18.
Broadly speaking, youth policy defines ‘young people’ as aged 12–25 years, but
the ambiguity reflects the fact that the experience of youth is not ‘fixed’ – it is shaped
by context, policy and lived experience and in relationship to social institutions, like
the family and education and justice systems. Sociologists White and Wyn describe
youth as a ‘relational term’ – meaning it is mostly defined in relation to what it is not.5
Just as young people are ‘not yet adult’, they are largely constructed in mainstream
political discourse as not yet (full) citizens. This contributes to the idea that young
people are only fully of value ‘in the future’ – and that they need to be monitored
and managed towards ‘good citizenship’ in the interests of protecting society’s future.6
Over time, concerns about whether or not young people will develop into ‘norm-
atively good’ citizens have manifested differently in scholarship and policy but have
frequently been anchored to the question of how people acquire political knowledge
and behaviours – or political socialisation.
In the 1950s, scholars of political socialisation were particularly concerned with
how children and young people develop political orientations and the way families,
schools and existing community and government structures help young people
to learn and ‘practise’ civic skills.7 In the 1960s and 1970s, as young people were
3 See Collin 2015, Furlong 2012, and Marsh, O’Toole and Jones 2007 for further reading.
4 See Department of Human Services 2019.
5 Wyn and White 1997.
6 See White, Wyn and Robards 2017, chapter 11.
7 See Edwards 2012 for a good summary and discussion.
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increasingly questioning traditional values, creating new cultures and leading or
participating in social movements, researchers and policy makers asked questions
about the participatory rights of children and young people. This is exemplified in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990). The convention has a specific
article that lays out children and young people’s ‘right to participation and to be
heard in decisions that affect them’ (article 12). Since the 1990s, significant interest
in how to realise young people’s right to participate in community and government
decision making has arisen. Sometimes this is termed ‘youth development’ –
helping young people to grow into good adult citizens. Governments and non-
government organisations have also introduced programs and strategies to enable
youth participation as ‘active citizens’ – where young people participate in approved
ways in adult-managed processes.8
Rather than linear progress in the understanding and recognition of young
people as political actors, these phases are better thought of in terms of emerging,
contrasting and sometimes overlapping concerns, approaches and debates about the
nature of youth citizenship and participation.
The status of young people in Australian democracy
Young people’s status in Australian democracy is ambiguous. As described above,
a range of laws and different age thresholds govern young people – although only
those young people aged 18 and over are ascribed full political rights and can
vote and run for office. A number of Australia’s political parties have federal and
state ‘youth wings’ that are open to members of various ages. For example, the
Young Liberals’ federal branch is currently open to those between 16 and 31,9 while
Australian Young Labor is currently open to those between 14 and 26.10 Statistics
regarding young people’s membership or involvement in party activities are seldom
published, however, making accurate assessment of how many young Australians
are actively involved in political parties difficult.
What young people can – or should – do has been increasingly ‘governed’
(regulated by policies and laws) since the middle of the 19th century, when
parliaments in Western countries started to legislate in areas such as education
(compulsory schooling), justice (laws and institutions for ‘juveniles’) and work
(minimum working age).
Rather than being enabled, some researchers argue that young people have been
monitored and ‘interventions’ applied to direct their learning and behaviours.11 This
is another way in which young people are constructed as ‘trainee citizens’, as is
8 Bell, Vromen and Collin 2008.
9 Young Liberals 2019.
10 Australian Young Labor n.d.
11 White, Wyn and Robards 2017, 266–8.
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exemplified by ongoing debates about the age at which people should be allowed to
vote.
Case study: lowering the voting age – the debate
The debate about the minimum voting age is almost as old as the franchise itself.
From the 1960s onwards, most established democracies lowered the voting age from
21 to 18, including Australia in 1973. Since then, debate has turned to extending the
franchise to those aged 16 and over. Indeed, the voting age has been lowered to 16
(in a variety of circumstances) in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Brazil, Norway, the
Philippines, Scotland, Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua.12 Currently, young
Australians can enrol to vote at 16 and vote when they turn 18. In 2018, Senator
Jordan Steele-John (Australian Greens) introduced a Bill proposing to lower the
minimum (non-compulsory) voting age to 16.13
The arguments for and against lowering the voting age are wide-ranging and
have evolved over the past five decades. Rights-based arguments include: that young
people should be allowed opportunities to vote for the governments and members
of parliament that make decisions on policy that affects them, and that reducing
the franchise to 16 would bring it into line with other legal and administrative
thresholds that permit young people to, for example, enlist in the defence forces (at
age 16.5), consent to sexual interactions (at 16) and get a driver’s licence (16 in most
states).14 Advocates also argue that lowering the voting age could positively address
the marginalisation from mainstream politics that many young people experience15
by signalling that their views and participation are valued at an institutional level.
Opponents maintain that young people are not mature, knowledgeable or
responsible enough. Recently, some have used neuroscience to argue that adolescent
brains cannot manage the rational and logical processes required for voting. Some
suggest that young people’s views are already adequately represented in the political
system and that there is little evidence to indicate that lowering the voting age will
increase participation.16
Another feature of young people’s relationship to democracy in Australia is
that youth interests are inconsistently represented at different levels of government.
Treatment of these interests has historically depended on the political priorities of
the parties in government. Various attempts to engage with young people in policy
processes at a federal level have been developed at different times since the 1980s.
12 Bessant et al. 2018.
13 Commonwealth of Australia 2018.
14 See Bessant et al. 2018; Collin 2018.
15 Collin 2015; Harris 2012.
16 McAllister 2014; Young Liberals 2018.
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For example, in 2007, the newly elected Labor government appointed a minister for
youth and re-funded the national youth peak body (the Australian Youth Affairs
Coalition). The government invested in national research and consultations to
create a National Youth Strategy (2010).17 It also created ‘experimental’ mechanisms
for engaging with young people in agenda setting and policy making, such as the
Australian Youth Forum – an online platform to promote discussion by and with
young people on policy issues. A federal Office for Youth Affairs has also existed at
various times. Its purpose has largely been to research government action on youth
issues and to support the planning and co-ordination of policies and services that
affect young Australians.18
Since 2013, Australian federal governments have supported a National
Children’s Commissioner, who advocates for the rights and interests of children,
and reviews and reports on legislation, policy and practice that affects them. After
its election in 2013, the Liberal–National (Coalition) government defunded most
federal-level youth policy initiatives, abolished parliamentary representation and
closed the Office for Youth.
In response to the challenges of representation, an active ‘youth sector’ has
emerged in Australia, made up of a range of ‘interest groups’ – organisations seeking
to represent and advocate for the interests of young people and to influence public
policy. These include community and non-government organisations of varying
sizes, such as large charities, service providers, social movement organisations and
associations. There is also a network of national, state and territory peak bodies for
youth affairs. Young people are extensively involved in or lead many of them. An
important contribution the youth sector has made to youth politics is in the area of
participation, by advocating for young people’s right to be heard, particularly when it
comes to issues and policies that affect them. These organisations consult with young
people about relevant issues and advocate for young people’s participation in policy
and decision making; many provide training and resources to assist communities,
organisations and government bodies to better engage young people in their agenda-
setting processes and other activities. Popular engagement mechanisms include
youth advisory committees, youth executives, in-person and online consultations and
forums, and the co-design of relevant initiatives.
Engaged and active citizens?
Much research on youth political participation has focused on levels of political
knowledge or ‘civic literacy’, electoral participation and membership of traditional
civil society organisations (such as churches and charities). These are ‘institutional’
measures of participation. Studies using these measures identify increasingly low
17 Australian Government 2010.
18 Ewen 1995, 30.
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levels of knowledge, trust, membership and support for traditional political actors
(e.g. politicians), institutions (e.g. parties) and ‘repertoires’ of participation (e.g.
voting or joining a political party or union) among young people.19 For example,
2004 research by the Youth Electoral Study showed that only 50 per cent of
surveyed Australian high school students would enrol to vote if it was not
compulsory. Some scholars and commentators interpret this as indicating greater
apathy and/or poor civics knowledge among young people.
However, other researchers argue that these studies’ definitions of ‘politics’ and
‘participation’ (e.g. as elections and voting) do not reflect the broader ways young
people think about or practise politics. They show that young people engage in
a wide range of non-electoral, ‘cause-oriented’ participatory practices, including
signing petitions, buying a particular brand or product because of a political belief,
taking part in demonstrations and joining online or local issues-based groups.20
Rather than participating in politics mainly due to a sense of obligation to particular
forms of democracy and democratic institutions (e.g. political parties or govern-
ment), the theory is that young people participate because of causes or issues, such
as violence, climate change or corruption.21
Case study: youth activism and networked participation
Many young Australians actively participate in social movements, activist
organisations and other initiatives in which they learn about and campaign on issues
that concern them. In recent decades youth-led issues-based movements have
blossomed, using the internet and social media to connect with and mobilise their
young members and grow national and global networks for action. For example, the
Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC) emerged in the early to mid-2000s as a
youth-led organisation founded and governed by young people and based on strong
coalitions with other organisations and movements. In contrast with older styles
of civic organising, the more than 150,000 AYCC ‘members’ can choose their level
of involvement – and self-organise. For example, the AYCC encourages ‘members’
to organise their own actions – online and offline – and runs different campaigns
and activities from which members can ‘pick and choose’. They are also unique for
running workshops and training aimed at school-age students, as well as networking
and building coalitions with aligned causes and communities.
Another youth-led issue-based movement emerged in 2018, when school
students from Castlemaine, Victoria, organised with peers to demand that
parliamentarians take urgent action on climate change. Inspired by 15-year-old
Swedish school student Greta Thunberg, who had regularly gone on strike from
19 Collin 2015, 8–9.
20 Harris and Wyn 2009; Martin 2012; Norris 2003; Vromen 2003.
21 Norris 2003.
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school to bring attention to the climate crisis, they coordinated with a group of
classmates to go on strike and journey every week to the offices of different members
of parliament in their region to stage a similar event. Organised by word of mouth,
eight initial school strikes in the Castlemaine region attracted between 20 and 50
students to each event. Following the success of the initial strikes, the AYCC helped
the Castlemaine students create a webpage for their movement and develop a
campaign strategy, trained them in organising events and, importantly, helped them
generate a social media presence to allow a decentralised model that would support
students anywhere in Australia to organise and co-ordinate their own school strikes
for climate action. An online community grew, and students across Australia began to
co-ordinate and organise in their own regions.22 On 30 November 2018, an estimated
15,000 students temporarily left school to attend rallies in 30 locations around
Australia to demand that politicians take immediate action on climate change. This
(school) student movement has spawned similar groups and developed informal
links to other groups and campaigns, such as #FridaysForFuture. On 15 March 2019,
150,000 students in 56 locations around Australia were some of an estimated 2.29
million strikers across 2,699 sites in 135 countries participating in a School Strike for
Climate.23
Lance Bennett uses ‘dutiful’ and ‘self-actualising’ to describe two ways of
thinking about contemporary citizenship.24 Dutiful citizens are guided by ideo-
logies, mass movements and traditional loyalties to particular parties and the values,
processes and institutions that constitute representative government. In contrast,
self-actualising citizens respond to personal political concerns and connect
informally to issues through family and friendship groups, lifestyle and identity.
They value participatory forms of governance where different members of society
inform and influence government decision making. Thinking about dutiful and self-
actualising citizens helps to move away from debates about whether young people
are ‘more’ or ‘less’ politically active now than they have been in the past. While
young Australians are less involved in traditional organisations, such as churches,
charities and political parties,25 they do participate in online and local activities run
by community groups, organisations and networks and create their own campaigns
and actions. A 2018 Mission Australia survey of 28,286 15- to 19-year-olds found
that 36.8 per cent participated in volunteer work, 36.4 per cent in arts/cultural/music
activities, 27.4 per cent in student leadership, 22.6 per cent in youth groups and 18.8
per cent in religious groups.26
22 Susie Burke, emails, 20 and 26 March 2019.
23 #FridaysforFuture 2019.
24 Bennett 2007.
25 Martin 2012; Vromen 2003.
26 Carlisle et al. 2018, 30.
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The internet is key to changes in how people participate.27 The extent to which
the internet mobilises new political actors or improves engagement is widely
debated. It is generally accepted that social life is increasingly mediated by digital
technologies and networks. The internet plays an important role in youth political
practice as a means for: seeking news, information and opinions on social and
political issues; communication and cultural expression; and joining and/or
participating in online organisations and interest groups.28
Conclusions
Youth is not a fixed or natural category but one that is fluid and changing –
produced by the way young people are constructed in policy, social structures and
different contexts. As such, young people occupy an ambiguous place in Australian
democracy. Young people in Australia enrol to vote and participate in elections
in high numbers. However, they are more likely to value and engage in non-
electoral and non-institutional forms of political participation – especially local,
individualised collective action (such as signing a petition or joining a march) and
loose, cause-oriented networks that campaign on particular issues. In this regard,
the views and behaviours of young people reflect generational shifts in the values
and norms underpinning contemporary democracy – signalling exciting new ways
forward.
References
Australian Associated Press (2018). Scott Morrison tells students striking over climate change to be
‘less activist’. The Guardian, 26 November. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/
nov/26/scott-morrison-tells-students-striking-over-climate-change-to-be-less-activist
Australian Government (2010). National strategy for young Australians. Canberra: Australian
Government. https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2010/04/apo-
nid30323-1210776.pdf
Australian Young Labor (n.d.). Australian Young Labor is the largest political youth movement in
Australia. http://www.australianyounglabor.org/
Bell, Johanna, Ariadne Vromen and Phillipa Collin (2008). Rewriting the rules for youth participation
– inclusion and diversity in government and community decision making. Canberra: National
Youth Affairs Research Scheme.
Bennett, W. Lance (2007). Civic learning in changing democracies: challenges for citizenship and
civic education. In Peter Dahlgren, ed. Young citizens and new media: learning for democratic
participation, 59–77. New York: Routledge.
Bessant, Judith, Kerry Carrington, Mark Chou, Brendan Churchill, Anna Copeland and Anita Harris
(2018). Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters on the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Lowering Voting Age and Increasing Voter Participation)
27 Collin 2015; Vromen 2011.
28 Loader, Vromen and Xenos 2014; Stanyer 2005; Vromen 2007.
Young people and politics
391
Bill 2018. http://www.aph.gov.au/
DocumentStore.ashx?id=0835a792-e578-47d8-95f8-bd7c6a5391a0&subId=659182
boyd, danah (2014). It’s complicated: the social lives of networked teens. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Carlisle, Erin, Joann Fildes, Sabine Hall, Valancy Hicking, Brianna Perrens and Jacquelin Plummer
(2018). Youth survey report 2018. Sydney: Mission Australia.
https://www.missionaustralia.com.au/what-we-do/research-impact-policy-advocacy/youth-
survey
Collin, Philippa (2018). Submission to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters inquiry into
the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Lowering Voting Age and Increasing Voter
Participation) Bill 2018. http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=fb462bba-
b936-4ed0-b87a-fe480ab57230&subId=658988
—— (2015). Young citizens and political participation in a digital society: addressing the democratic
disconnect. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Commonwealth of Australia (2018). Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Lowering Voting Age and
Increasing Voter Participation) Bill 2018. https://parlwork.aph.gov.au/bills/s1130
Department of Human Services (2019). Dependent or independent for Youth Allowance.
https://www.humanservices.gov.au/individuals/enablers/dependent-or-independent-youth-
allowance/29921
Edwards, Kathy (2012). Political socialisation. In Rodney Smith, Ariadne Vromen and Ian Cook, eds.
Contemporary politics in Australia: theories, practices and issues, 83–93. Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press.
Ewen, John (1995). Co-ordination in youth affairs: why it has failed to work and how we could do
better. Youth Studies Australia 14(3): 28–37.
#FridaysforFuture (2019). Strike list. https://fridaysforfuture.org/statistics/list-countries
Furlong, Andy (2012). Youth studies: an introduction. New York: Routledge.
Harris, Anita (2012). Citizenship stories. In Nancy Lesko and Susan Talburt, eds. Keywords in youth
studies: tracing affects, movements, knowledges, 143–53. New York: Routledge.
Harris, Anita, and Johanna Wyn (2009). Young people’s politics and the micro-territories of the local.
Australian Journal of Political Science 44(2): 327–44. DOI: 10.1080/10361140902865308
Loader, Brian D., Ariadne Vromen and Michael Xenos (2014). The networked young citizen: social
media, political participation and civic engagement. Information, Communication and Society
17(2): 143–50. DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2013.871571
Marsh, David, Therese O’Toole and Su Jones (2007). Young people and politics in the UK: apathy or
alienation? Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Martin, Aaron (2012). Young people and politics: political engagement in the Anglo-American
democracies. London; New York: Routledge.
McAllister, Ian (2014). The politics of lowering the voting age in Australia: evaluating the evidence.
Australian Journal of Political Science 49(1): 68–83. DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2013.868402
Mossberger, Karen, Caroline J. Tolbert and Ramona S. McNeal (2008). Digital citizenship: the
internet, society and participation. Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press.
Norris, Pippa (2003). Young people and political activism: from the politics of loyalties to the politics
of choice? Report for the Council of Europe Symposium on Young People and Democratic
Institutions: From Disillusionment to Participation, Strasbourg, 27–28 November.
Stanyer, James (2005). The British public and political attitude expression: the emergence of a self-
expressive political culture? Contemporary Politics 11(1): 19–32. DOI: 10.1080/
13569770500098623
Vromen, Ariadne (2011). Constructing Australian youth online: empowered but dutiful citizens?
Information, Communication and Society 14(7): 959–80. DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2010.549236
—— (2007). Australian young people’s participatory practices and internet use. Information,
Communication and Society 10(1): 48–68. DOI: 10.1080/13691180701193044
Australian Politics and Policy
392
—— (2003). ‘People try to put us down …’: participatory citizenship of ‘Generation X’. Australian
Journal of Political Science 38(1): 79–99. DOI: 10.1080/1036114032000056260
White, Rob, Johanna Wyn and Brady Robards (2017). Youth and society, 4th edn. Melbourne: Oxford
University Press.
Wyn, Johanna, and Rob White (1997). Rethinking youth. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
Young Liberals (2019). Young Liberals. https://www.youngliberal.org.au/
—— (2018). Submission to Senator Linda Reynolds CSC, Chair, Joint Standing Committee on
Electoral Matters. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/
Electoral_Matters/VotingAge/Submissions
About the authors
Dr Philippa Collin is principle research fellow at the Institute for Culture and
Society at Western Sydney University. She researches the politics of youth and the
role of digital media for participation, citizenship, health and wellbeing. Philippa is
the author of Young citizens and political participation in a digital society: addressing
the democratic disconnect (2015) and co-author of Young people in digital society:
control shift (2019). She is co-director of the Intergener8 Living Lab and is a stream
leader in the Wellbeing, Health and Youth Centre of Research Excellence in
Adolescent Health.
Jane McCormack has conducted research in academic, advisory, commercial and
non-government organisation contexts across a range of topics, including social
media and the wellbeing of children and young people, and young people’s partici-
pation in democracy.
Young people and politics
393

Policy making

Making public policy
John R. Butcher and Trish Mercer
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policy process
It is commonly believed that Australians are uninterested in politics. Whatever the
truth of this proposition, voters are generally interested in government policies that
they believe will affect them, although the manner in which policy is made remains
opaque for many.
We argue that public indifference to how policy is made is problematic. Policy
making affects the life of every person residing in Australia; it shapes the social,
economic and physical environments in which we act out our lives. The policy
process itself can also have repercussions for society and communities, particularly
when community opinion about policy options is divided. An example is the emo-
tionally charged public debate leading to the passage of legislation allowing for
marriage equality in Australia.1
Policy making is, in part, an exercise in rational problem solving. It is also an
intensely political process and requires the judicious consideration and balancing of
complex issues, including public opinion, competing interests, social relations and
Butcher, John R., and Trish Mercer (2019). Making public policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry,
John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija
Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI:
10.30722/sup.9781743326701
1 Neilsen 2012.
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the distribution of power within a society. A recent example is the South Australian
Murray–Darling Basin Royal Commission, which found that policy governing the
management of water resources was largely driven by political considerations, ‘not
science’.2
For the most part, policies begin as statements of values and intent. Policies
often have an ideological foundation, and are frequently portrayed as occupying
part of a spectrum ranging from left to right. For example, governments or parties
of the right or centre-right might be characterised as favouring market forces over
government intervention, individual rights over collective rights and unilateralism
over multilateralism. Governments of the left are typically portrayed as favouring
government intervention in social and economic affairs, emphasising collective
rights and preferring multilateral approaches to problem solving.
Such characterisations are, of course, simplistic. Governments of the right some-
times resort to intrusive uses of state power despite the value placed on individual
sovereignty, and governments of the left sometimes resort to market mechanisms to
address distributional inefficiencies.
This chapter aims to help students to understand:
• what policy is
• how policy happens
• the contestable nature of public policy
• the importance of evidence-based policy
• the craft of policy making
• the importance of policy analysis and policy instruments
• the task of policy implementation
• the implications of policy failure.
What is ‘policy’?
This chapter is primarily concerned with formal expressions of government – or
public – policy:
• as a set of values and convictions
• as operational rules designed to comply with legal requirements
• as embodied in law in the form of primary legislation or regulation.
In each case, the formal expression of policy gives form and consequence to policy
intent.
Almost every aspect of our lives is affected by policy; policy affects our birth,
the manner in which we are raised and educated, our access to health care, the
quality of our physical environment, how we conduct ourselves, whom we might
2 Murray–Darling Basin Royal Commission 2019, 63.
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marry, our access to employment, our rights at work, our access to housing, how we
raise our children and even the quality of our deaths and what we are able to pass
on to the generations succeeding us.
In broad terms, policy can be said to represent preferred responses to problems.
For any given problem there might be a number of available responses. For
example, the statement ‘anyone who attempts to travel illegally by boat to Australia
will be turned back to their country of departure’ is a declaration of policy. It sets
out a preferred response under defined circumstances. To the extent that such a
statement sets out a preferred response, it also precludes other potential responses.
Policy provides a framework for what can and ought to occur in prescribed
situations. However, policy is also malleable and is subject to interpretation and
adjustment as circumstances change. Changing expectations, attitudes, beliefs, values
and behaviours often lead, eventually, to changes in government policy. Laws allow-
ing same-sex marriage, assisted dying or the recreational use of cannabis represent
policy responses to cultural changes. Similarly, technological change and envi-
ronmental changes – think of digital technology, automation or climate change –
have fuelled a demand for adaptive policy responses (as well as entrenching resistance
to change in some sections of the polity). Likewise, changes in the economy and in
our systems for production have driven adaptive changes in policies pertaining to
industry, consumer law, employment, education and finance (among others).
How does policy happen?
Public policy can be a messy business. The 19th-century American poet, John
Godfrey Saxe, is reported to have written ‘Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire
respect in proportion as we know how they are made’.3
Public policy is an expression of political intent and a framework for action.
Political parties or groupings, in and out of government, will have a set of policies
– a policy platform – covering a broad and diverse range of matters. Ideally, policy
platforms are internally consistent and represent a coherent narrative for govern-
ance. This is not always the case, and the highly contested nature of public policy
sometimes means that governing parties bring contradictory positions to the
business of government.
For a problem to be considered deserving of a policy response – having what
the influential political scientist John Kingdon4 refers to as ‘policy salience’ – there
first needs to be:
• broad agreement that a problem exists
• a broadly shared understanding about the nature of the problem
3 Citing famous quotes can be messy too; a similar remark is frequently misattributed to the
19th-century German statesman, Otto von Bismarck.
4 Kingdon 1995.
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• a broad acceptance of available solutions.
Moreover, propositions about the existence and nature of problems, not to mention
the nature of possible solutions, need to be tested in a variety of forums: for
example, within the broader community and the electorate; within communities of
interest, including geographical regions, industry sectors and civil society; within
professional ‘epistemic’ communities of subject area specialists; and within political
parties themselves.
The existence and importance of ‘problems’ is often highly contested, both in the
community at large and within political parties. Even where there is broad agree-
ment about problems, ‘solutions’ are often controversial. There are many reasons
why it is difficult to reach a majority view about the nature of policy problems
and preferred solutions. Different actors and stakeholders bring different things to
the table and their perspectives are shaped by their lived experience, education,
qualifications, attachment to particular interests, attachment to community, ideol-
ogy, religious beliefs and personal convictions.
Policy makers also need to be attuned to perceptions of ‘winners and losers’.
In other words, who benefits from the policy and who perceives themselves to be
adversely affected by the policy? They also need to be aware of the potential for
‘interests’ (e.g. civil society organisations, industry groupings, communities) to
mobilise for or against policy proposals. Taking all of these factors into account, it is
easy to see why it can be so difficult to reach agreement about problems and solutions.
A marketplace of ideas
Public policy might best be described as a marketplace of ideas and prescriptions
for the broad and diverse array of matters that need to be actively governed in order
for human society to function. It involves making difficult choices and negotiating
multiple trade-offs between competing options. Moreover, this is a highly contest-
able marketplace, especially in liberal democratic societies like Australia’s.
Policy practitioners need to be mindful of the ideological leanings and philo-
sophical underpinnings of governing parties. It is also important for them to
understand the policy leanings of non-governing opposition and minor parties in
order to anticipate possible resistance to policy proposals and advise government
about policy compromises that might be broadly acceptable to legislatures.
Although Australia’s polity is often portrayed as a ‘two-party system’, our
parliaments are generally made up of representatives from multiple parties as well
as independents who have no formal party affiliation. And although electoral
contests in all Australian jurisdictions usually involve competition between two
major parties – in most cases, the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal Party of
Australia (an exception being Queensland, where the Liberal and National parties
merged in 2008) – Australian parliaments are usually dominated by three, and
sometimes four, established political parties.
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Even non-governing parties and members of parliament – including minor
parties, ‘micro parties’ and independents – can exert influence on policy, especially
when governments do not enjoy a numerical majority in both the upper and lower
parliamentary chambers (the exceptions being Queensland, the Australian Capital
Territory and the Northern Territory, which are ‘unicameral’, meaning they have
only one legislative chamber).
It must be admitted that when in power governments do not always adhere faith-
fully to the ideological positions they espoused when in opposition. Governments are
usually obliged to take a pragmatic view and work within constraints imposed by the
political, social and economic environment in which they are situated.
A contest of interests
Public policy is also the concern of particular interests in society, and it can be said
that some policy settings can become captive to particular interests.
Policy is often vigorously contested within political parties, a prime example
being the internal debate within the federal Liberal Party around the question of
climate change and strategies to reduce carbon emissions; within the federal Labor
Party one finds sometimes rancorous debate about the treatment of asylum seekers.
Policy proposals from government might also be challenged by a variety of
interests, including industry sectors (e.g. the Minerals Council of Australia), pro-
fessional groupings (e.g. the Australian Medical Association), trade unions (e.g. the
Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union or CFMEU), civil
society organisations (e.g. the Australian Council of Social Service) or consumer
lobbies (e.g. CHOICE). These interests represent stakeholders that stand to be
affected in some way by government policy. In general, policy makers seek to consult
with affected interest groups (usually through their representative organisations)
in the formulation and implementation of policy. Politically powerful interests can
wield significant – and sometimes disproportionate – influence. Australian examples
include the first Rudd Labor government’s attempt to introduce a Minerals Resource
Rent Tax and the Gillard Labor government’s national gambling reforms – these
measures were staunchly resisted by industry interests and subsequently wound back.
An evidentiary basis?
In an ideal world, policy responses would have some kind of evidential basis. This
might mean a combination of empirical research, statistical analysis, comparative
policy studies, public consultation, evaluation studies or other forms of evidence
that can be made available for independent scrutiny.5 However, ours is not an ideal
5 Davies and Nutley 2000; Pawson 2006.
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world, and the evidence base for many public policy choices is often selective,
sometimes even to the point where decision makers find themselves accused of
‘policy-based evidence making’ – a pejorative converse of the term evidence-based
policy making.
‘Policy-based evidence making’ means working backwards from a predefined
policy position with the aim of finding evidence that supports decisions that have
already been made.6 It is possible that the growing trend of governments engaging
private consultancy firms to produce commissioned research as an input into policy
development has contributed to the perception that evidence is often crafted to fit
policy preferences.7 It is also not unknown for special interests or lobby groups to
produce commissioned research (of varying quality) in support of their advocacy
for policy change.
Policy making is subject to bounded rationality – meaning that the decisions of
policy makers are constrained by a variety of factors, such as the tractability of the
problem at hand, the availability of information and the time frame within which
decisions must be made. There will be times when the ‘evidence’ either fails to
support, or directly contradicts, the preferred policy positions of governments, and
it is not unknown for contradictory evidence to be suppressed in order to ‘protect’
policy settings that are based more in ideology or moral conviction than in any
objective appraisal of the circumstances.
Finally, if evidence is to have an impact on policy governance and management,
systems that are capable of incorporating new information into decision making are
required. This is a perennial problem for public sector organisations, which often
fail to use evaluative data generated in the course of delivering public policy to
make adjustments to policy settings and/or to the service delivery architecture.8
Practical policy formulation
It is government’s role to set policy objectives, and it is the duty of the public
service to advise government about the technical, political and economic feasibility
of those policy objectives, including any risks that might arise in their imple-
mentation. Having ‘advised’ government, the public service is obliged to give effect
to government policy by developing an implementation strategy (in consultation
with the government), including formulating a budget, identifying relevant internal
and external capability and undertaking appropriate consultations with affected
stakeholders.
It is also the responsibility of the public service to manage any risks arising in
the implementation and operational phases. Policy implementation can be subject
6 Marmot 2004; Sanderson 2002.
7 Howlett and Migone 2013.
8 Banks 2018; Stewart and Jarvie 2015.
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to a wide variety of constraints, such as short time frames, availability of resources,
technical practicability, a lack of appropriate legal authority (an example being the
Gillard government’s ‘Malaysia solution’, which aimed to develop a regional strategy
to redirect boat arrivals in Australia), inability to pass enabling legislation in
parliaments (an example is the Turnbull Liberal–National Coalition government’s
withdrawal of proposed corporate tax cuts legislation in 2018) and community/
stakeholder resistance. The public service often bears the brunt of any fallout
associated with ineffectual or misguided policy formulations (such as the Rudd
government’s GROCERYchoice and FuelWatch initiatives).
In Australia, public servants typically acquire their policy skills ‘on the job’ in
the form of ‘craft knowledge’.9 Indeed, it is unusual for Australian public servants –
unlike their North American counterparts – to enter the public service with formal
training in public administration, public policy or political science. Although
increasing numbers of public servants now undertake postgraduate qualifications
in disciplines related to public policy, there remains a degree of scepticism among
public servants about the relevance of academic learning to the ‘craft’ of public
policy making.10
Until the late 1950s, policy making was predominantly portrayed as a process of
rational analysis culminating in a value-maximising decision. However, American
political scientist Charles Lindblom (1917–2018) regarded the rational policy
process as an unattainable ideal and proposed an alternative model, incrementalism,
which focused less on abstract policy ideals and placed greater emphasis on solving
concrete problems.11 Often described as ‘muddling through’, incrementalism
describes an iterative process of building on past policies and reaching broadly
agreed positions among diverse stakeholders.12 Incrementalism offers a plausible
account of the policy-making process. In particular, Lindblom’s emphasis on ‘trial
and error’ would resonate with many contemporary public servants.13
The ‘Australian policy cycle’
Originally developed 20 years ago specifically for an Australian practitioner
audience, the ‘Australian policy cycle’ is an enduring – if somewhat idealistic –
model of the policy development process. The model is a signature feature of The
Australian policy handbook, first published in 1998. Published in its 6th edition in
2018 and billed as a ‘practical guide to the policy making process’, the handbook has
been described as a ‘popular “go to” policy survival manual for public servants’.14
9 Adams, Colebatch and Walker 2015, 104; Rhodes 2016, 638.
10 See Katsonis 2019.
11 Lindblom 2018.
12 Cairney 2015, 17.
13 Cairney 2015, 31.
14 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018.
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Whereas theoretical models of the policy process seek explanations through
investigations of institutional, political, organisational and cultural factors that
shape the policy environment, the ‘Australian policy cycle’ is more of a ‘how to’
guide and presents policy making as a sequence of practical actions. It is intended
as ‘a pragmatic guide for the bewildered’; the handbook’s authors assert that ‘good
policy should include the basic elements of the cycle’.15 The strength of the model
is its practical approach, which captures the entirety of policy development and
implementation, although it does not supply causal explanations of policy.
A policy cycle approach can help public servants develop a policy and guide
it through the institutions of government. The policy cycle starts with a problem,
seeks evidence, tests proposals and puts recommendations before Cabinet. Its
outcomes are subject to evaluation and the cycle begins again. The policy cycle
offers a modest and flexible framework for policy makers.16
The policy cycle model has been criticised for suggesting a far more linear and
logical progression of activities than would ever be observed in practice.17 Critics
also point out that the model does not accurately capture the lived experience of
policy professionals.18 The Australian policy handbook’s authors, Althaus, Bridgman
and Davis, have engaged openly with such critics and have responded to their
criticisms in the following terms: ‘The policy cycle does not assert that policy
making is rational, occurs outside politics, or proceeds as a logical sequence rather
than as a contest of ideas and interests’.19
In simple terms, the policy cycle entails eight logically sequenced steps:
1. identify issues
2. analyse policy options
3. select policy instruments
4. consult affected parties
5. co-ordinate with stakeholders
6. decide preferred strategy
7. implement policy
8. evaluate success/failure.
Notably, the policy cycle offers little guidance to the aspiring policy practitioner
about the technical feasibility and integrity of the policy development and imple-
mentation phases.
15 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018, 45.
16 Bridgman and Davis 2003, 102.
17 Howlett, McConnell and Perl 2017; Maddison and Denniss 2013, 87–89; Scott and Baehler
2010, 29.
18 Adams, Colebatch and Walker 2015, 108; Colebatch 2006, 26; Gill and Colebatch 2006, 261–2;
Head and Crowley 2015, 4.
19 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2015, 112.
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Cross-portfolio policy co-ordination
Policy generated in one ministry or portfolio can have impacts on policy in other
ministries, portfolios and agencies. Similarly, policies originating in one jurisdiction
can have consequential implications for intergovernmental relations, including
between national (federal) and subnational (state, territory and local) governments
(one example being the impact of changes in revenue or spending decisions by
the Commonwealth government upon state/territory governments) and between
nations in respect of multilateral or bilateral agreements (examples being trade
agreements or United Nations conventions).
In Australia, central agencies of government – Departments of Prime Minister
and Cabinet or Premier and Cabinet/Chief Minister – perform an essential policy
co-ordination role. It falls to these agencies to review policy and budget proposals
emanating from ministers and their departments and to seek comment from other
ministries and agencies in order to identify any unintended consequences that might
arise. Once comments have been compiled from affected agencies – including other
central agencies, such as Departments of Treasury and Finance as well as agencies
responsible for government revenue – a briefing, together with recommendations,
will be prepared for the consideration of Cabinet. Vetting of this nature often
requires specialist knowledge of particular policy domains and of the statutory basis
for government programs and services. It also depends less on political theory and
more on an appreciation of the practical and pragmatic dimensions of public policy.
Policy analysis
The aphorism ‘the best is the enemy of the good’, commonly attributed to the
French Enlightenment writer and philosopher Voltaire (1694–1778), neatly encap-
sulates a key challenge of public policy. At some level, all policy decisions represent
compromises between different interests and involve considerations about political
acceptability as well as economic and technical feasibility. To quote the 19th-
century German statesman Otto von Bismarck, ‘politics is the art of the possible’ –
likewise, policy is the art of the achievable.
Policy analysis is an important part of the ‘craft’ of policy making. The task of
the analyst is to understand the implications of policy decisions in terms of their
impact on the policy problems being addressed; any unintended consequences for
government or the community; and their legal, economic and technical soundness.
Policy analysis is essential for the provision of policy assurance and enables the
analyst to provide answers to the following key questions:
• Is the policy well targeted?
• Is the policy delivery architecture well designed?
• How will performance be measured?
• How will we know if the policy is working?
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• If the policy is not working, what corrective action is available?
In order to make reliable pragmatic judgements about such matters, it is import-
ant for the analyst to give close consideration to a wide range of factors. The kinds of
questions the astute policy analyst might ask include:
• Is the policy framed within a particular political or philosophical perspective,
and is it consistent with the values and policy platform of the governing party
or parties?
• Is the policy genuinely directed towards solving a problem in public policy, or
does it primarily seek to solve a ‘political’ problem by creating the impression
of action while having little tangible effect?
• Have similar policies been pursued in other jurisdictions and to what effect?
How might past experience inform policy implementation?
• What are the competing options to achieve the policy aims, and how do they
compare? Does the policy require enabling legislation? What policy instru-
ments or tools are available to give effect to the policy? What are the expected/
hoped for impacts of the policy, and how might these be reliably measured and
reported?
• Which groups or communities of interest – including classes of workers, trade
unions, professional associations, advocacy organisations, industry groupings,
communities and/or geographical regions and expected beneficiaries – stand to
be affected by the policy and in what manner,?
• Does the infrastructure exist to give effect to the policy? Is there a functioning
market framework within which the policy might be delivered? What skills
base is necessary to deliver the policy? Is an appropriately skilled workforce
available? What capacity exists within the public and non-state sectors to give
effect to the policy?
• What will policy implementation cost? Is it affordable? Will delivery be
selectively targeted, means-tested or otherwise ‘rationed’? Is it possible to offset
expenditure through some form of cost recovery, such as user fees? What are
the principal cost drivers in the policy space?
• How will the policy be delivered and governed? What systems or frameworks
need to be established to provide assurance to government that policy
implementation and delivery will occur within prescribed timeframes and
budgets? What systems or frameworks are available to ensure that the policy is
performing in the expected manner?
• Has provision been made for periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of the
policy and/or the operational arrangements established to give effect to the
policy, and is there a capacity to make necessary adjustments to the policy and/
or management structures should evaluation findings so indicate?
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Policy instruments
Policy instruments enable the application of policy decisions in practice and can be
grouped into the following major categories:
1. money (spending and taxing powers)
2. law (including regulation)
3. government action (e.g. delivering services)
4. advocacy (e.g. educating, persuading)
5. networking (e.g. cultivating and using relationships to influence behaviour)
6. narratives (e.g. using storytelling and communication – including public
advertising)
7. behavioural economics (e.g. using economic incentives to induce behaviour
change, or ‘nudging’ as it has come to be known).20
It should be noted that in the real world these categories often overlap and a mix
of instruments is generally required. For instance, governments might elect to use
a form of direct service delivery (government action) to achieve policy aims; the
delivery of services requires statutory authority (law), is funded by government
appropriations (money) and employs ‘nudge’ strategies (behavioural economics),
advertising (narratives) and public education (advocacy) to achieve the govern-
ment’s policy aims.
Government policies aimed at reducing the harms from the use of tobacco
products provide a good example; they employ all of the instruments named above:
1. Money: the collection of excise tax on cigarette sales to provide a source of
funds for medical research and for non-government organisations involved in
anti-smoking programs.
2. Legislation/regulation: setting age restrictions on the purchase of tobacco prod-
ucts, banning smoking in public places and restricting the sale, advertising,
distribution and packaging of tobacco products.
3. Government action: funding the delivery of preventative health services aimed
at assisting smokers to quit.
4. Advocacy: there have been multiple education campaigns on the health risks
associated with tobacco and how to quit.
5. Networking: successive governments have entered into partnerships with
representative bodies, such as the Australian Medical Association, and non-
government organisations advocating smoking reduction.
6. Narratives: anti-smoking campaigns utilising various media and featuring
testimonials by former smokers and/or portraying the health and other impacts
of smoking on real people.
20 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018.
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7. Behavioural economics: levying excise taxes to increase the purchase price of
tobacco products and/or offering financial incentives to quit smoking.
It is worth noting that the choice of policy instrument is all too often a function
of familiarity, as opposed to optimal fitness for purpose (in other words, policy
makers stick to what they know). Other factors influencing the choice of instru-
ments include:
• the characteristics of the policy area in question (e.g. some policy areas might
have a long history of recourse to particular models of implementation, and
this predisposes policy actors in those areas to prefer those models)
• available resources (e.g. some policy instruments might entail significantly
higher establishment and running costs than others, or they might require
skills or technologies that are in short supply, leading to the selection of less
optimal but more feasible options)
• ease of administration and/or administrative traditions (e.g. some policy
instruments might be inherently easier to administer, while others entail greater
complexity and risk; in some policy domains particular traditions – say, central-
ised, hierarchical management frameworks, as opposed to decentralised, dis-
tributed frameworks – might predominate, predisposing practitioners towards
the selection of instruments that ‘fit’ with the existing administrative culture)
• the political dimension (e.g. recourse to particular policy instruments might be
precluded because they are not considered to be acceptable to the community
and/or they might be unacceptable to governments on ideological grounds).21
Policy implementation
The true test of any policy lies in its implementation. The Australian Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet sets out a structured approach to thinking about
how a policy or program will be delivered, framed around seven principles drawn
from lessons learnt by frontline staff involved in implementation and delivery:
1. planning
2. governance
3. engaging stakeholders
4. risks
5. monitoring, review and evaluation
6. resource management
7. management strategy.
Implementation gives practical effect to policy. It is a complex process requiring
application of a range of technical and management skills. Many seemingly ‘good’
21 Peters 2005.
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policies fail in their implementation, resulting in a failure to achieve expected
outcomes or in unintended ‘perverse’ outcomes.
Implementation failure
Implementation failure can occur at any stage of the policy process and can be
caused by any combination of:
• inadequate research, design and planning
• poor co-ordination and inadequate consultation with stakeholders
• insufficient resourcing and capacity constraints
• legislative and regulatory gaps
• proceeding too quickly and/or failure to ‘pilot’
• failure to anticipate and/or effectively manage risks
• ineffective governance and/or administrative architecture
• multiple and/or incompatible policy goals.
Implementation failure entails significant costs in terms of finite resources (such
as money, labour and time), reputation and trust. These include a failure to realise
intended policy aims; loss of public confidence; costs of restoration, rectification
or redress; costs arising from bringing failed programs to a premature end; lost
opportunities (opportunity costs); and, for governments, loss of political capital
(with potential electoral consequences). It is important to recall that policy making
is, and remains, inherently ‘political’ and that ‘policy success’ will always be a
contested assessment. Indeed, it might be said that ‘failure’ has been ‘weaponised’
in Australia’s contemporary political culture.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted to introduce readers to a spectrum of ideas about
the nature, formulation and ‘craft’ of policy making. In so doing, we have tried to:
• equip readers to more effectively understand past and present policy debates
• enable readers to interrogate the processes of policy development, implement-
ation and evaluation.
Policy design and implementation is a complex and imperfect process that is
often seen as more of a ‘craft’ than a formal discipline. Policy professionals tend to
‘learn on the job’, and even those who have formal qualifications in public policy
or exposure to the academic study of policy often find that the pragmatic reality of
policy making aligns poorly with policy theory.
In contemporary policy spaces, effective policy craft increasingly comes down to
working effectively within networks inside and outside government. Today’s policy
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professional needs to be acutely aware that governments have many sources of policy
advice and that many of these sources have vested interests in particular outcomes.
Above all, a capacity for critical reflection and an ability to anticipate the risks and
consequences of policy choices provide the foundation of sound policy practice.
It is our hope that the concepts canvassed in this chapter will assist readers to
make sense of scholarly and media accounts of policy histories and policy making
in different domains and of the changing role, form and modus operandi of the
public sector.
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Communication policy
Jock Given
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Communication matters to people and organisations and Australian governments
do a lot to enable and manage it. Through much of the 20th century, they controlled
state-owned enterprises and statutory agencies that provided all the postal and
domestic telecommunications services. Government-funded broadcasters also
provided some radio and TV services under Australia’s ‘dual system’ of public
and private enterprises. Commercial operators dominated other media sectors –
movies screened in cinemas, and printed newspapers, magazines and books –
although governments were active there too, supporting public libraries to provide
equitable access to printed media and eventually supporting Australians to create
texts and audiovisual works. The private sector also played a big role in pioneering
international telecommunications services, until these were nationalised after the
Second World War, and in manufacturing equipment for networks and telephone,
radio and television receivers for consumers. Parliaments passed a growing body
of laws to regulate the activities of all these public and private communications
enterprises.
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Late in the 20th century and early in the 21st, three major changes occurred.
The telecommunications market was liberalised, privatised then partly re-
nationalised. New entrants were allowed to offer services and build their own
infrastructure and the government’s shareholding in the incumbent Telstra was sold
in three tranches from 1997 to 2006. From 2009, the National Broadband Network
(NBN) returned the federal government to a large, direct role in the local telecom-
munications market. Second, foreign ownership restrictions were progressively
removed, and particular transactions accommodated, in ways that permitted a
higher level of overseas participation in media sectors that had been largely
controlled by Australians. Third, from the mid-1990s, the internet transformed
the social and economic processes of communication. This eventually affected all
people and enterprises. For Australian policy makers, one of the most important
features of the new digital economy and society was that largely new commercial
organisations came to dominate it – Facebook, Apple, Alphabet/Google, Amazon,
Netflix and Microsoft. They became the world’s biggest corporations, measured by
market capitalisation, and they were based outside Australia. This changed some of
the targets and instruments of Australian communications policy, though many of
its broad themes have endured.
What’s at stake?
Communication raises at least four issues for politics and public policy. Citizens,
consumers, enterprises, defence forces, elected representatives and others require
information that is carried over communications networks. Those networks also
convey ideas, images, sounds and stories that shape culture and identity.
Communications industries contribute directly to employment and economic
activity and provide vital inputs to other industries.
One of the first things the Australian parliament did after Federation in 1901
was create an information powerhouse by merging the six state post, telegraph and
telephone administrations into a single enterprise run by a federal department.
More than half the total sum appropriated under the first Consolidated Revenue
Act, No. 3 1901 (Cth) was allocated to it. When television was introduced in
1956, expectations about its cultural impact quickly prompted demands for policy
measures to ensure this new medium did more for Australian culture than the
tiny local film industry at the time. The scale and value of equipment purchased
for telecommunications networks encouraged governments to support local
manufacturing, initially by tariff protection and later by requiring carriers to have
industry development plans. Since then industry policy in the sector has continued
but it has been redirected towards creative, service industries rather than
equipment manufacturing.
Digital networks have accentuated the role of communications as an input to
other industries. Recent analysis of investment in Australia from the mid-1960s to
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2011 found a higher rate of return for information and communications technology
(ICT) than non-ICT capital investment, and that the impact of ICT investment
was more profound over the longer term.1 ICTs have come to be seen as ‘general
purpose technologies’. These are ‘characterised by the potential for pervasive use
in a wide range of sectors and by their technological dynamism’. According to
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, ‘As a [general purpose technology] evolves and
advances it spreads throughout the economy, bringing about and fostering
generalized productivity gains’. Earlier examples include the steam engine, the
factory system, electricity, and semiconductors.2 The perceived breadth, depth and
scale of the impact of networked digital technologies have attracted the attention of
politicians and policy actors well beyond the domain of ‘communications’, in areas
like agriculture and water resources, autonomous vehicles, ‘smart cities’, innovation
and science, as well as communications and arts.
Australian consumers have been spending more on communications in recent
years. Even though the cost per gigabyte of data fell between 2014 and 2018, the
share of household income devoted to internet services grew because more time
is being spent online and much more data is being downloaded.3 For industry,
communications plays a central role in future transformations encompassed by
terms like the ‘Industrial Internet’, the ‘Connected Enterprise’ and the ‘Internet
of Everything’. This is what consulting firm Deloitte and others call a ‘Fourth
Industrial Revolution’, to follow the revolution in power generation in the late 18th
century, industrialisation in the early 20th century, and electronic automation from
the 1970s to the 2000s. This next phase, according to Deloitte, will be about ‘smart
automation’, where machines no longer simply create products, but ‘product[s]
communicate with the machinery to tell it exactly what to do’.4
Characteristics of the policy space: what do we know
Because communication is so central to all aspects of social and economic life,
it is not easy to fix boundaries around the policy space it occupies. The rhetoric
of rapid, revolutionary change that so often accompanies discussion and debate is
not always matched by the prosperity of the largest Australian enterprises or the
industry as a whole. Networked digital services create rich sources of data about
consumer behaviour but increasingly sophisticated and personalised patterns of
use complicate the task of making sense of it. New policy issues arise but old themes
endure.
1 Shahiduzzaman and Khorshed 2014.
2 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, 84.
3 Thomas et al. 2018, 12.
4 Sniderman, Mahto and Cotteleer 2016, 2–5.
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In recent years, expenditure on communications devices and services has
grown steadily and data downloaded over fixed and mobile networks has soared.
Australia’s communications industry, however, has not been buoyant. According
to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘gross fixed capital formation’ by Australia’s
‘information media and telecommunication’ enterprises doubled from 2007/08 to
2016/17, driven by public investment in the NBN and private investment especially
in mobile networks, cloud storage facilities and backhaul networks. Yet total
employment in 2016/17, at 171,000 people, was unchanged from 10 years earlier,
and profits were just 5 per cent higher. Across the whole economy over the same
period, employment grew by 15 per cent and profits by 54 per cent. That means
the proportion of the workforce employed in ‘information media and
telecommunication’ fell from 1.8 per cent to 1.6 per cent, and the sector’s share of
profits declined from 6.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent, while its share of investment grew
from 5.4 per cent to 8.5 per cent.5
The composition of the industry has also changed. Traditional
telecommunications, broadcasting and publishing have grown slowly or declined;
internet or cloud-based services including streaming video-on-demand have
grown sharply. Landline telephony has fallen steadily while fixed and mobile
broadband has grown.6 The challenge of profiting from the apparent boom in
communications is reflected in the share price of Australia’s largest telco, Telstra:
down from over $4 in November 2008 to less than $3 a decade later, after rising
above $6 in early 2015.7 The 2018 takeover of Fairfax Media by Nine Entertainment
Corporation was justified as a merger of old newspaper and TV assets to create
a media company for the future, but it was also an opportunistic acquisition of
the currently faster-growing Domain (real estate advertising) and Stan (video
streaming) businesses at a moment of ‘elevated valuation’ of Nine’s stock.8
The tech giants that have risen to such prominence in the communications
and media landscape – Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google/Alphabet,
the so-called FAANGs, as well as the durable Microsoft – are based overseas,
unlike so many of the telecommunications, television and newspaper companies
that dominated in Australia in the second half of the 20th century. Traditional
measures of the scale of foreign involvement in domestic markets, like ‘foreign
direct investment’ and numbers of local employees, are not good proxies for the
level of influence achieved by US-based platforms. A large part of their power arises
from the data they are able to collect and analyse about their users. This data has
itself become an economic resource, ‘the oil of the digital era’. Some argue it has
5 Author analysis of data in ABS 2018. This publication provides annual estimates of the
performance of Australian industries by combining data from the ABS’s annual Economic
Activity Survey (EAS) and Business Activity Statement (BAS) data provided to the Australian
Taxation Office.
6 ACMA 2017.
7 Australian Stock Exchange 2018.
8 Hewett 2018.
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changed the nature of competition so fundamentally that it necessitates a ‘radical
rethink’ of competition policy.9 At the same time, the corporate behemoths of the
formal ‘data economy’ borrow from and interact with an informal economy of user-
generated content, open source software, crowd-funded projects, unremunerated
labour and organisational cross-subsidies.10 The scale and sophistication of the
data and analytical tools promise new levels of knowledge for policy makers, while
the complexity of online and offline behaviour reinforces the fundamental
unknowability of social practices.
Actors and politics of the domain
The Australian Policy Handbook’s summary of the institutions of Australian public
policy lists various elements of government (the executive, the Cabinet, public
servants, ministerial advisers) and opposition, the ‘third sector’, the ‘fourth estate’,
social movements, lobbyists and stakeholders.11 In communications, several
specific institutions deserve particular attention. Publicly funded regulators (the
Australian Communications and Media Authority, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission) and industry-funded complaints-handling organisations
(the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, the Australian Press Council)
play significant roles. The prevalence of state-funded organisations, discussed in
the next section, means governments still play a major role in providing
communications services as well as regulating service providers. The fourth estate,
the media, is part of the field itself, not just the conduit for disseminating
information about it. Citizens who are the ultimate focus of all policy need to
be conceptualised also as consumers, users and audiences for communications
services.
An important addition to the list of public policy institutions in
communications are international organisations like the Universal Postal Union,
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WIPO) – all of which are United Nations agencies – and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN). Domestic policy has to be co-ordinated with these
organisations. For example, local laws have to be amended to translate
commitments made in international agreements; auDA manages the .au domain
space allocated through ICANN, the non-profit corporation, incorporated in
California that, among other things, manages the internet’s global domain name
system. These institutions reflect the longstanding international dimensions of
communications policy. From the earliest days of postal and telegraph services,
9 ‘The world’s most valuable resource’ 2017.
10 Lobato and Thomas 2015.
11 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018, 18–31.
Communication policy
417
protocols were needed to manage and share the costs and revenues of delivering
physical articles across national borders and interconnecting electronic networks.
The ITU now also co-ordinates the international management of radiofrequency
spectrum and satellite orbits as well as standardisation of technologies for things
like internet access, transport protocols, home networking and video compression.
WIPO and the WTO oversee the global agreements put in place over many decades
to manage intellectual property and trade. They also handle disputes that arise
under them.
These global arrangements are complex and overlapping: there are many
regional (like the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) and bilateral (like the
Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement) trade agreements
as well as the WTO’s multilateral ones, and trade agreements now often include
detailed provisions about intellectual property that are not necessarily consistent
with WIPO agreements. Alongside these longstanding international dimensions,
networked digital technologies have accentuated the global nature of many other
policy issues. Global communication is not new – Australians have always read
books, listened to music and watched movies from elsewhere and sent messages
over networks owned and controlled by overseas-based organisations – but the
current phase has rendered nationally based policy measures less effective in areas
like taxation of multinational corporate activity, competition, consumer protection
and policing child pornography.
High-level public policy goals for communications in Australia are expressed
in the objects of legislation and government funding programs and the charters of
public institutions. Statutory objects emphasise several broad areas: first, equitable
access to reliable basic services and innovation in the development of new services;
second, content that reflects Australian identity, character and cultural diversity,
covers issues of local significance, treats matters of public interest fairly and
accurately, and respects community standards; and an industry that is efficient,
competitive and responsive to Australian needs. These are enduring themes,
articulated in distinctive policy responses in different eras. So regular mail
deliveries and public payphones have been overtaken by fast fixed broadband and
wide mobile coverage as the most important basic services. Broadcast radio and
television are now less important to emerging generations than to older media
users. The High Court’s 1992 Mabo decision12 rewrote the political and cultural
framework within which ‘Australian content’ needs to be imagined. Existing
mechanisms for dealing with fairness and accuracy in news and current affairs have
been overwhelmed in the digital era: policy responses to ‘fake news’ are a work-
in-progress.13 Communications networks have always been instruments of defence,
national security and law enforcement but the rules and tools of surveillance have
changed constantly: foreign shareholding in Telstra is still capped at 35 per cent
12 Mabo and others v Queensland (No. 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo).
13 Nelson and Taneja 2018; Viner 2016.
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and in 2012 and 2018 the federal government banned Chinese telecoms equipment
makers Huawei and ZTE from supplying equipment for the NBN and 5G
networks.14
There is a strong element of bipartisanship in these broadly expressed goals but
communications is often a heavily contested, highly political field. The broadening
and deepening of the social and economic role of networked digital technologies
has changed the politics of communications in at least two ways. First, the political
power of particular media forms, especially commercial TV, newspapers and
talkback radio, has diminished, along with the unrivalled influence of their owners.
Former editor-in-chief of the Herald and Weekly Times, Les Carlyon, described
Australia’s media policy in the 1980s and 1990s as ‘founded on notions of mates
[especially Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch] and enemies [especially the old
owners of the Fairfax and Herald and Weekly Times newspapers], just like the third
world’.15 The decline in the power of old media’s owners was especially apparent
through the long process of switching broadcast television to digital transmission
from 2001–13, which freed a large amount of radiofrequency spectrum for mobile
broadband. The technological migration enabled both an economic and a political
transition.
Second, the libertarianism of the early internet has moderated. In 1996,
Electronic Frontiers Foundation co-founder John Perry Barlow asked the
‘Governments of the Industrial World’ to leave cyberspace alone: ‘You are not
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.’16 Since then, as
the internet has been integrated into almost every aspect of life, communication
and commerce, governments have moved to treat online and offline activities more
consistently, even in areas like taxation and content regulation which were once
argued to be firmly off-limits.
How policy is made for communications
Communications policy uses three main tools: law, money and ownership. It is
made by governments and parliaments that make and amend laws; regularly decide
to allocate money through annual budget processes; and occasionally decide to
create, redesign, privatise or otherwise disband the activities of public institutions.
Laws can directly prohibit or require certain behaviour, or permit it subject to
conditions. They can also create markets for commodities like radiofre-
quency spectrum and intellectual property, and rules to be observed by anyone
trading them. Money can be allocated to individuals or organisations as grants,
investments, loans, minimum guarantees or tax concessions to meet the cost of
14 Slezak and Bogle 2018.
15 Cited in Barr 2000, 1.
16 Barlow 1996.
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doing particular things: making a movie, erecting a mobile phone tower,
conducting research about consumer needs or advocacy on behalf of specific types
of consumers. Institutions can be created to carry out public missions with varying
degrees of independence from the governments that establish, fund and oversee
them: public broadcasters, a national library, a national broadband network.
Laws
Parliaments pass laws to prohibit or require conduct by individuals or
organisations. General prohibitions about communications are set out in the
Commonwealth Criminal Code. It outlaws many kinds of interference with
‘national infrastructure’, including tampering with or stealing mail, intercepting
electronic communications and accessing data on a computer without
authorisation.17 In recent years, federal and state laws have been introduced to deal
with various forms of cyberbullying and online abuse, including ‘revenge porn’.
Legislation passed in 2015 established a complaints mechanism and an eSafety
Commissioner to administer it, under which individuals, websites and social media
services can be asked or required to remove cyberbulling material targeted at an
Australian child. Amendments in 2018 established civil penalties and criminal
offences for sharing intimate images without consent. Perpetrators can be
imprisoned for up to seven years and substantial monetary penalties can be
imposed on individuals and corporations that do not remove offending content
when directed by the eSafety Commissioner.18
Some forms of interference with communications that would otherwise be
prohibited are allowed for law enforcement purposes, subject to safeguards.
Communications service providers are now required to keep records to assist
enforcement agencies. The government argues these ‘data retention’ rules are
necessary to support serious criminal and national investigations: data gathered
can be used to identify suspects and networks, rule out innocents, and support
applications for warrants needed for more intrusive forms of investigation.
The main bodies of law about telecommunications, radiocommunications and
broadcasting services in Australia pursue policy goals through licensing schemes.
These work by prohibiting certain conduct without a licence, and then imposing
conditions on different licence types. For example, a ‘class licence’ authorises the
use of mobile and cellular telephone handsets. Each device does not need its own
licence: instead, manufacturers have to ensure their handsets comply with the
conditions of the single, standing licence for that class.
17 Chapter 10, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
18 Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015 (Cth); Enhancing Online Safety (Non-consensual Sharing of
Intimate Images) Act 2018 (Cth).
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Some laws are designed to influence behaviour indirectly by creating markets
or rules that participants must observe. In communications, two crucial examples
are the markets for radiofrequency spectrum and intellectual property.
Money
Money can be spent or collected to encourage or discourage behaviour. Hundreds
of millions of dollars have been spent since the late 1960s supporting Australians
to make and distribute films, TV programs and other forms of audiovisual content
that governments thought would not be produced otherwise. Concerned about the
decline of mainstream news media, the federal government established a Regional
and Small Publishers Innovation Fund in 2018 to assist ‘innovative and
transformative’ public interest journalism projects ‘with an Australian perspective’.
Government money can also be provided by offering concessions on taxes that
would otherwise be due. Most of the assistance to the film and TV industry is
now provided this way, as tax ‘offsets’ or rebates encouraging production (‘Producer
Offset’), large budget film and TV projects shot in Australia (‘Location Offset’) and
post-production, digital and visual effects production in Australia (‘PDV Offset’).19
Institutions
Australian governments have created many organisations to undertake
communications activities. Their forms differ widely. Australia Post and National
Broadband Network Co are government-business enterprises whose shares are
wholly owned by the Commonwealth. One is old, the country’s oldest continually
operating organisation; the other is young, created only in 2009. The national
broadcasters (the ABC and SBS, into which the National Indigenous TV service
was merged in 2012), the National Library and the Australian Film, Television and
Radio School do not have shares, but are corporate Commonwealth entities set up
under their own legislation. Their boards are appointed by the responsible ministers
and funding is provided mainly from the federal budget. Another, different kind of
organisation is the National Relay Service, a non-government organisation that has
a contract with the federal government to run a call centre enabling people with
hearing disabilities to make telephone calls.
Making policy
The ‘Australian policy cycle’ described in The Australian Policy Handbook20 is a
useful way of conceptualising the way issues are identified and responses
developed, implemented and evaluated, but it is rare for communications policy
to proceed in so orderly a manner. The field is rife with large, detailed reports
19 Screen Australia n.d.
20 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018, 43–53.
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from government agencies and parliamentary committees that had little immediate
impact, and relatively brief ministerial media releases that announced fundamental
changes. The big changes to spectrum management implemented in the
Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) were a rare example of a neat ‘policy cycle’:
a report from the federal government’s Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics, then a public parliamentary inquiry, then draft legislation attracting
bipartisan support.21
The NBN was a response by a new Labor government frustrated about the state
of play in fixed line broadband. All three of the main tools of communications
policy were deployed. The legislative changes that opened up the local
telecommunications market to new players in the 1990s had not generated rapid
take-up of high-speed broadband. Successive governments offered to provide
money by way of co-investment with Telstra to build a ‘next generation network’
but had been unable to agree terms. Better broadband was an important element
of Labor’s pitch in the ‘Kevin07’ election campaign which emphasised ‘the future’
to contrast Rudd and his agenda with ageing incumbent John Howard. Even more
frustrated with the state of Australian broadband after two years in office, Rudd
announced the NBN, a wholly new, state-owned institution that would build the
mainly fibre network itself, as well as new constraints on the infrastructure others
could build. This was a striking return to the days of infrastructure monopoly
that had ended with such policy fanfare just over a decade earlier, effectively a
renationalisation of the last mile of the fixed line network connecting exchanges
to customers.22 At the 2010 federal election, the expensive commitment to an
all-fibre network reaching more than 90 per cent of Australian households and
business premises was a decisive policy for independent members of parliament
representing traditionally conservative-held country seats. It persuaded them to
support Labor ahead of the Coalition, enabling Prime Minister Julia Gillard to form
a minority government.
A further example of a complex communications policy demonstrating the
challenges of long-term planning and implementation in a fast-changing and
politically charged field was the migration of TV broadcasting from analogue to
digital transmission. Formal policy reports were produced in the 1990s by the
broadcasting regulator; major packages of legislation were passed in 1998 and 2000;
the policy was reviewed by the Productivity Commission as part of a wholesale
reconsideration of broadcasting law;23 large amounts of money were spent on
new equipment for the ABC, SBS and country commercial stations, and to track
the take-up of digital receivers and assist low-income consumers; and legislative
changes were made to remove some of the original constraints and impositions
on broadcasters and others. Analogue TV transmissions were eventually switched
21 Productivity Commission 2002, 41.
22 Given 2010.
23 Productivity Commission 2000.
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off progressively from 2010 to 2013 and vacated spectrum was reallocated. Total
revenue from the sale of that ‘digital dividend’ spectrum was $3.7 billion in 2018/19
dollars, $1.3 billion more than the total government expenditure outlaid to make
the whole project happen. The experience showed that a long-term government
policy project could be undertaken, and achieve its major objectives, despite
considerable disagreement over the detail. It also showed how much past policy
decisions shape future possibilities.24
These two examples demonstrate both the possibilities and the limits to radical
policy action. Established institutions, infrastructure and people exert profound
influence over policy decisions, especially through often long-running processes of
transition from the old to the new.
Federal, state, local and international interactions
Communications is generally seen as a federal government responsibility in
Australia. Using its constitutional power to make laws about ‘postal, telegraphic,
telephonic, and other like services’,25 the body of law that began in 1901 with
post, telegraphs and telephones soon expanded to cover wireless telegraphy. Radio
broadcasting was initially regulated as a form of wireless in the 1920s and 1930s
before specific legislation was passed, first to create the Australian Broadcasting
Commission in 1932 and then to regulate radio and later television broadcasting as
a whole. High Court cases confirmed that the constitutional power encompassed
these novel forms of communication, while leaving some doubt about pre-existing
forms, especially printed media.26
Three principal statutes now cover telecommunications, radiocomm-
unications (including the allocation of spectrum for mobile telephony and
broadband) and broadcasting services. The power has also been used to make other
federal laws; for example, prohibiting tobacco advertising from the 1970s, and to
restrict interactive gambling from the early 2000s. The Constitution also empowers
the Commonwealth to make laws about intellectual property, which it began to
do in 1905 when the first copyright legislation was passed.27 By ‘covering the field’
in these areas, the exercise of Commonwealth power has effectively excluded the
states from policy measures that might, for example, have given the institutions of
broadcasting a more regional flavour, as occurred in Germany.
Beyond these areas, the Constitution leaves considerable room for the states
to make laws about other matters relevant to communications. In areas such as
classification of content, defamation and advertising, separate state laws were
24 Given 2018.
25 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth), section 51(v).
26 See La Nauze 1968.
27 Section 51(xviii) of the Constitution covers ‘copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and
trade marks’.
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eventually integrated into more-or-less uniform national schemes. In areas like
racial, religious and other forms of discrimination and vilification, the reporting
of court proceedings, whistleblower protections, and freedom of information (or
‘right to information’), significant differences in state and territory laws remain.
Federal, state and local laws interact in regulating the construction and
maintenance of networks by telecommunications companies, especially mobile
towers and overhead cables. The aim here is to strike a balance between the
communications policy goal of reliable, affordable services and the desire of
landowners, local communities and councils to shape the sometimes intrusive
infrastructure of their own spaces.
State governments have also chosen to spend money to pursue comm-
unications policy goals where federal government policy is regarded as falling
short, or where co-investment can deliver better outcomes. For example, the
Victorian government has invested in free public wi-fi in large regional centres. It
has also funded mobile base stations in areas with poor or no mobile coverage and
to improve coverage along busy regional rail lines. Aiming to support community
activities, to assist public safety particularly during emergencies, and to boost
economic activity and employment including through the ‘visitor economy’, state
and territory governments have often co-invested in such programs with telecoms
carriers, local councils and the federal government. Around 35 local councils in
NSW hold equal shares in Southern Phone, a provider of commercial fixed and
mobile phone and internet services designed to bring competition, and hence
improved services and lower prices, to regional areas. It was set up in 2002 with
federal funding from the Telstra sale proceeds. Councils have also used their
planning and licensing powers in creative ways to support cultural activities and
infrastructure, such as the Special Entertainment Precinct in Brisbane’s Fortitude
Valley.
Debates and non-agenda issues
New forms of media and communication have often had dramatic impacts on
existing practices and institutions. The rise of social media platforms is particularly
significant for politics and policy in Australia for at least three reasons. First,
these platforms have undermined the business models for news organisations,
broadcasters and telcos that have been such important vehicles for achieving public
policy goals. The seriousness of the challenges was demonstrated by the decision
to have the ACCC conduct a Digital Platforms Inquiry in 2018, with a final report
published in 2019. Second, social media have changed the ways issues make it onto
and off policy agendas and how people and politicians respond. Mainstream media
remain important but they are less dominant conduits for communication between
electors and their representatives. Third, social media platforms have themselves
become important policy-making institutions. Facebook and Google and their
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wholly owned subsidiaries Instagram and YouTube, for example, are now among
society’s most powerful information and cultural intermediaries. The terms and
conditions of service they specify and the decisions they take in response to
complaints now comprise jurisdictions with at least as much influence as law, the
courts and formal systems of industry co- and self-regulation.
An example of this agenda-setting and policy-making role is the decision by
the rental accommodation app Airbnb to remove listings in Israeli settlements in
the occupied West Bank ‘that are at the core of the dispute between Israelis and
Palestinians’. Acknowledging Airbnb itself was ‘certainly not the experts when it
comes to the historical disputes in this region’ and that the listings were not illegal
under US law, Airbnb nonetheless developed a five-point framework to guide
decisions about listings in occupied territories generally and decided, in this case,
to remove the 200 listings on its site.28
Much of the revolution in digital communications has not been controllable
by the telecommunications and broadcasting institutions that managed so much
technological change in Australia in the 20th century. New services like online
and mobile search, streaming audio and video, social media and smartphone apps
arrived without the government policy inquiries, public funding or legislative
change that accompanied direct-dial telephones, AM and FM radio, television, the
domestic satellite and digital TV. Yet old debates about the role of government – to
intervene in markets or let them take their course – are never far from the surface.
Conclusions
Networked digital communications and the liberalisation, privatisation and partial
renationalisation of Australia’s communications markets and institutions have
changed some of the targets and instruments of Australian communications policy
while preserving many of its broad themes. In a sector typified by rapid change
in technologies and social and economic practices, policy makers, politicians and
the Australian people need to be aware of the possibilities of both radical
transformation and incremental adaptation along familiar lines. Old orthodoxies
can provide irrelevant templates as well as durable wisdom.
The dramatic rise of networked digital media platforms has undermined
business models for communications incumbents, fundamentally altered the
processes of political communication, and created new corporate behemoths that
are now potent policy actors in their own right. Predicting the political impacts
of these changes is highly uncertain. Arguing for Indigenous recognition to be at
the heart of any Australian republic, Megan Davis notes that no referendum has
been held in the era of social media. ‘It can happen quickly with campaigns’, she
says. ‘The old adage that, by and large, Australians trust and defer to politicians’
28 Airbnb 2018; Kershner 2018.
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judgement on referendum questions may not hold up to scrutiny … Being afraid of
the constitutional amendment process in section 128 is to be scared of the demos.’29
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It is ‘the economy’ that provides the goods and services we consume. It is also
the economy that provides the jobs and business opportunities that enable us
to purchase those goods and services. And it is the economy that provides the
tax revenue to fund the activities of government. It is easy to see, then, why
managing the economy is one of the most important tasks of government. At
the macroeconomic level, the task is to keep economic growth up and unemploy-
ment and inflation down. At the microeconomic level, the task is to optimise the
structure of the economy for longer-term performance, ensuring that it remains
internationally competitive.
In a ‘market’, ‘free enterprise’ or ‘capitalist’ system, dominated by private
ownership and free exchange such as Australia's, the government can only influence
how well the economy functions. Moreover, a small national economy such as
Australia’s is often at the mercy of events in the world economy. The main tools
government has at its disposal to influence the economy are:
• fiscal policy: the way it taxes and spends
• monetary policy: setting official interest rates
• financial regulation: the rules governing banking and investments
Fenna, Alan (2019). Economic policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune,
Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
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• trade policy: regulation of the flow of goods, services and capital in and out of
Australia
• industry policy: support and promotion of particular economic sectors or
activities.
In Australia’s federal system, most of these functions – particularly the main
fiscal ones – are the responsibility of the Commonwealth government. The Com-
monwealth Treasury is the lead agency, and treasurers are the central figures.1
Monetary policy is decided by a separate Commonwealth agency, the Reserve Bank
(RBA). In some important microeconomic areas, the states retain a significant role,
with each state promoting its own economic development as best it can.
While there is little opportunity to explore the broader context of economic
policy here, it must be remembered that other policy areas, such as social policy and
labour market policy, have direct implications for the economy and, reciprocally,
social policy has a strong economic rationale.2 Among other things, ‘human capital’,
or the quality of the workforce and business people, is an increasingly important
factor in economic performance.3 Likewise, the tax and expenditure systems that
are key instruments of economic policy have direct implications for the distribution
of economic wellbeing or levels of economic inequality in society.4
The market economy
The challenges of economic policy are defined by the nature of the economy itself –
a system of production and exchange that has, to a large extent, its own dynamics.5
In tandem with the development of industrial capitalism has been the development
of economics as a theory of how markets function.
The invisible hand
An economy such as Australia’s is based on the free exchange of goods and services
between businesses and individuals. This exchange is driven by the profit motive.
What is produced and what price can be charged are not dictated by government
(as they were under the communist system that once prevailed across a good part
of the world but that has now retreated to Cuba and North Korea). Rather, they
are determined by what demand exists or can be generated by the creation of new
products or by advertising.
The problem of balancing supply and demand is solved by the price
mechanism: when demand exceeds supply, prices rise, prompting more production
1 Bowen 2015.
2 Barr 2012.
3 Becker 1994; Edwards 2016.
4 Fenna and Tapper 2015; Fenna and Tapper 2012; Tapper, Fenna and Phillimore 2015.
5 Lindblom 2001.
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and reduced consumption, and when suppliers have too much stock, they can
reduce the price until the surplus is cleared. Millions of economic activities are thus
co-ordinated in the most efficient way possible by what the founder of modern
economics, Adam Smith, called the ‘invisible hand’.6
Trade
The market economy places a premium on exchange or trade, the logical extent
of which is global free trade and integrated global economy. Recognition of the
value of international trade was integral to the postwar international order, as
leading Western countries signed up to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) – now the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and set about progressively
dismantling barriers to trade in the 1950s and 1960s. Tariffs had been implicated in
the economic difficulties of the prewar period.7
International trade has, however, been a contentious issue since long before
Adam Smith, with governments often under pressure to protect the local economy
against ‘unfair’ competition or international divisions of labour that leave them
producing less valuable goods or lead to the painful demise of existing industries.
Sometimes government action takes the form of outright ‘protectionism’, through
such measures as import tariffs, as US President Donald Trump has recently been
implementing in the world’s leading economy. Other times it takes the form of
subsidies for local industry and other assistance measures.
Role of government in a market economy
Few people have any illusions that the market economy works perfectly, and
economists have long recognised the tendency towards various forms of ‘market
failure’.8 One form of failure is the inability of the market to supply those goods for
which it is difficult to charge – what Adam Smith referred to as ‘public works’ and
‘public institutions’ – such as roads or schools.9 Another is insufficient competition
in some industries. And a third is the problem of ‘externalities’: the tendency for
the costs or benefits of an economic activity to spill over onto third parties or be
left for future generations to deal with.10 Since the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century, the most significant negative externality has always been the pollution that
an individual firm may inflict on the environment and society.
The consequence of such market failures, as Adam Smith originally suggested,
is the need for some government intervention. Sometimes that means government
stepping in to provide essential infrastructure. Other times it might involve pro-
6 Smith 1776.
7 Irwin 2012
8 Pigou 1932; Quiggin 2019.
9 Smith 1776, book V, chapter 1.
10 Coyle 2011.
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tective or prudential regulation, such as environmental protection laws or financial
systems regulation. How active a role government should play is, however, unav-
oidably an ideological question of individual values and preferences, ranging from
those on the left supporting intervention to those on the right opposing it.11
Macroeconomic policy
Government’s most prominent concern today is with macroeconomic policy –
or the short- to medium-term performance of the economy as a whole. Macro-
economic policy has three aims. First and foremost, ideally, everyone who wants
or needs a job should have one – full employment. Second, prices should be stable
over time – low inflation. Third, the value of what the economy produces must
increase by at least a few per cent each year – economic growth.
Economic growth
Economic growth is an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) – a flawed but
essential measure of economic activity.12 A rapidly developing economy, such as
China’s, might grow at 6 to 9 per cent per year, while a typical developed economy,
such as Australia’s, can be expected to grow at a much more modest 2 to 3 per cent
per year. Even that can exaggerate the degree of ‘real’ growth, since it may simply
represent population growth. When there is per capita increase in GDP, we can
say that the ‘standard of living’ is going up. Over the longer term, growth and the
resulting increase in the standard of living is driven by the economy’s increased
productivity – more is being produced for the same amount of effort or input. If
productivity is increasing, there is room for workers to receive increases in their
real wages.
Growth and the business cycle
Growth rates vary from year to year, often building to a high point and then stalling,
in a pattern referred to as the ‘business cycle’. When growth slows, unemployment
rises; if growth ceases altogether and the economy shrinks, the result is an
economic recession, or, if it persists, an economic depression. The most recent
recession globally was the ‘great recession’ in the USA and other advanced countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that
was set off by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008.13 The great recession
11 On ideologies, see Fenna 2013a.
12 Coyle 2014; Stiglitz, Fitoussi and Durand 2018.
13 Garnaut and Smith 2009; Lybeck 2011. The OECD is a club of 36 mainly developed economies
including Australia that undertakes shared research to enhance economic performance and
social welfare.
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resulted in burdensome government debt loads in a number of OECD countries;
those, in turn, led to politically, and perhaps economically, painful spending cuts
referred to as ‘austerity’ policy.14 Australia narrowly escaped that recession; its last
serious downturn was in 1990–91 and its last depression was in the 1930s.15
Growth and inflation
If the economy grows too quickly, demand for certain goods and services starts to
exceed supply, forcing prices to rise in a process known as inflation. A low and stable
rate of inflation, where prices increase by a few percentage points a year, is fine –
indeed, quite healthy. If inflation starts to spiral upwards, however, difficulties quickly
emerge. Along with a number of other OECD countries, Australia had difficulty
containing inflation through the 1970s and 1980s. Economic policy making is heavily
constrained under such circumstances, since, rather than stimulating the economy,
further spending simply stokes inflation. Ideally, an economy stays in the sweet spot,
where everything is in balance – but we don’t live in an ideal world.
Keynesianism and the economic cycle
Until the Great Depression of the 1930s, it was an article of faith that, if left to their
own devices, markets would function to keep unemployment and prices stable. The
economy should naturally move towards ‘equilibrium’ through the action of the
price mechanism. That did not seem to happen in the Great Depression, and since
the revolution in economic thinking sparked by English economist John Maynard
Keynes,16 it has generally been accepted that governments have an essential role to
play in smoothing the economic cycle.17 They must counteract tendencies towards
either unemployment or inflation by adjusting levels of effective demand. When
economic activity slows and unemployment rises, demand needs to be stimulated
by putting more money into people’s hands. Conversely, when the economy is
in danger of overheating and causing inflation, demand needs to be reduced by
tightening the supply of money.
Counter-cyclical demand management is known as ‘Keynesianism’ and is
implemented through some combination of monetary and fiscal policy. Reducing
interest rates, reducing taxes and increasing government spending are the three
mechanisms for stimulating the economy by increasing demand. In Australia, as in
many other Western countries, responsibility for monetary policy has been assigned
to the Reserve Bank – the banker to the banks. Under legislation, the RBA is tasked
with keeping inflation within a 2 to 3 per cent band, raising interest rates when
14 Atkinson 2014; Blyth 2013; Clark 2015; Quiggin 2018; Tooze 2018; Wanna, Lindquist and de
Vries 2015.
15 Macfarlane 2006; Keating 2015.
16 Keynes 1936.
17 Backhouse and Bateman 2011.
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the inflation rate threatens to rise above that and lowering them when inflation
threatens to fall below. Fiscal policy, meanwhile, is up to the government of the day,
which may decide to increase or decrease spending or taxation at any point.
Monetary policy has three great advantages: raising or lowering the official
interest rates (the 'bank rate') costs nothing, takes immediate effect and can be
reversed or fine-tuned at any time. However, it may not always be effective and is
constrained by the ‘zero-bound’ limit – interest rates can only be lowered so far.
In the past few years, official interest rates have been close to or at zero in several
countries. Once rates are that low, central banks can only stimulate the economy by
printing money – ‘quantitative easing’, as it is somewhat euphemistically known.
Keynesianism in practice
In many cases, what sounds good in theory may be rather more difficult in practice.
In the Keynesian view, there are times when risk of an economic downturn is so
great that governments should not hesitate to run deficits and accumulate debt to
stimulate the economy. This is particularly the case when, as happened in some
countries during the GFC of 2008–09, interest rates have been lowered as far as
they can go. When times are good, governments need to be running equivalent
surpluses to stop the economy from overheating and to pay down that debt.
To some extent this happens automatically. In today’s world, with substantial
levels of taxation and an extensive ‘welfare state’, government spending goes up and
tax revenue goes down when the economy declines, and the reverse occurs when
the economy improves. However, these ‘automatic stabilisers’ may not be sufficient
on their own, and economic fluctuations still may require ‘discretionary’ policy
decisions to increase or cut spending or taxes.
When Australia faced what looked like an economic abyss with the GFC in
2008, the circumstances were highly favourable for a Keynesian response, and the
newly elected Labor government, led by Kevin Rudd, launched a series of spending
initiatives to boost demand.18 That vigorous response seemed to be vindicated when
Australia emerged as one of the very few OECD countries to avoid recession. To
what extent the policy initiatives themselves can be credited with that success, and to
what extent they were well calibrated and designed is, however, difficult to judge.19
Economists debate how effective or realistic Keynesian notions of ‘demand
management’ are, and some also point out that how well the economy performs may
be influenced as much by supply-side factors as by demand-side ones. If taxes are
too high or hiring and firing regulations too strict, for instance, businesses will be
less likely to respond to increased demand by hiring more workers. Keynesianism
has experienced its own ups and downs, depending on how well it seemed to be
working. It was broadly accepted in the postwar boom conditions of the 1950s and
18 Fenna 2010.
19 Fenna and ’t Hart 2019.
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1960s; but it fell out of favour when Western economies experienced simultaneous
slowing growth, rising unemployment and high inflation – ‘stagflation’ – in the
1970s. It then enjoyed a great revival with the onset of the GFC and ensuing
recession in 2008.20
Ideology again
While the discussion so far could give the impression that managing the economy
is a technical question of pulling the right levers to get the optimal outcome,
the reality is far more complex and contested. Macroeconomic policy is a deeply
political issue, where perspectives and priorities are unavoidably shaped by
interest, ideologies and values. As with interventionism generally, the Keynesian
demand-side approach has always been favoured by the left, while supply-side
considerations have typically been prioritised by the right.
It is not surprising, then, that the Rudd Labor government enthusiastically
embraced a Keynesian solution in 2008–09. Likewise, it is unsurprising that the
Liberal–National (Coalition) parties warned that the result would be wasteful
spending and a large increase in government debt, which represented an ongoing
constraint for future governments. The Coalition parties tend to favour supply-
side measures, such as tax reductions, particularly for business enterprises, on the
basis that this will create greater incentives for investment, innovation and job
creation.
Microeconomic policy
In addition to the challenges of managing the economy over the cycle, there are
the questions of how the economy is structured, how competitive local industries
are internationally and how well the economy can be expected to perform over
the medium to long term. These microeconomic issues have been a major focus of
policy in Australia throughout the country’s history. They are important because
our standard of living – how wealthy we are as a country – depends on our ability
to sell into export markets and attract investment capital in a way that finances the
goods we import. Some of those imports are for Australian businesses to use for
their own production, such as machinery for factories or mines. Many imports,
though, are consumption goods bought by individuals.
The resource economy dilemma
Since European settlement, Australia has developed via the export of primary
products. In other words, Australia exploited its resource and agricultural wealth
20 Clarke 2009; Fenna 2010; Macfarlane 2006; Skidelsky 2009.
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– most famously in the form of gold and wool. Those exports financed the import
of investment capital and of the wide range of manufactured goods integral to
an advanced economy and society. Consistent with the teachings of classical
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo,21 Australia thrived by
exploiting its comparative advantage – focusing on what it could produce most
profitably and importing the rest. A country is seen as having a comparative
advantage in primary products if it is abundant in resources, or a comparative
advantage in manufactured goods if it is abundant in capital and labour. Australia’s
situation remains similar today. ‘After more than 150 years of sustained high
incomes, the comparative advantage of this economy still lies in its resources’.22
Eight of Australia’s top 10 exports today are primary products: iron ore, coal,
natural gas, gold, aluminium ores, beef, wheat and petroleum. The two exceptions
are services: tourism and education.
Although ‘Australia prospered’ from its primary products, as McLean puts it,23
a major theme of Australia’s economic policy has been the concern that resource
exports provide an unreliable basis for long-term wealth and that the country should
diversify to establish a more ‘normal’ export profile for an advanced economy. That,
however, requires the development of a manufacturing sector that is capable of
competing, first, in the domestic market against imports, and second, in overseas
markets. The limitations of resource dependence first became apparent when the
colonial gold rush ended in 1860. In response, Australia turned to a policy of tariff
protectionism, beginning in the colony of Victoria and subsequently implemented
on a national scale immediately after Federation This was intended to shelter the
country’s ‘infant’ manufacturing industries and thereby diversify the economy.
Tariff protectionism complemented a heavy reliance on government for the
provision of key infrastructure, which was inevitable in a developing country
such as Australia.24 It was reinforced by the introduction of provisions such as
centralised wage fixing and the principle of the ‘living wage’ through the
arbitration system and of the White Australia policy protecting Australian workers
from an influx of low-wage Asian labour. It was ‘a strategy of domestic defence’25
that has also been called ‘the Australian Settlement’.26 Diversification was also
encouraged by the two world wars, which reduced access to imported
manufactured goods and increased the demand for military materiel.
21 Ricardo 1817; Smith 1776.
22 McLean 2013, 5.
23 McLean 2013.
24 Butlin, Barnard and Pincus 1982; White 1992.
25 Castles 1988, 93.
26 Kelly 1992. See also Fenna 2012.
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The end of the protectionist road
While the ‘fortress Australia’ model was highly successful for several decades, it
became anachronistic by the 1960s and untenable by the 1980s.27 Other advanced
countries were signing up to the GATT and reducing tariffs on manufactured goods.
Then, from the 1970s, the value of Australia’s primary product exports relative to
the country’s manufactured imports started to languish. The result was rising current
account deficits, showing that Australia was failing to earn enough to cover its import
costs. At one point, the Labor government’s treasurer, Paul Keating, declared that
Australia was at risk of becoming a ‘banana republic’ if the slide was not averted.28
Government control of the Australian dollar’s exchange rate with overseas currencies
had only recently been removed, and market sentiment was decreasing the dollar's
value by the minute in response to Australia’s poor trade performance.
Almost all elements of the fortress Australia model have been dismantled,
with much of the reform being introduced under the Hawke–Keating Labor
governments that held office from 1983 to 1996. Extensive privatisations of major
government-owned businesses, the progressive removal of protective tariffs,
liberalisation of the wage bargaining system, introduction of National
Competition Policy and a variety of other reforms shifted the balance much more
towards an open market economy.29 This was controversial at times and a focus
of ideological debate.30 However, it has been credited with underpinning the
extraordinarily strong performance of the Australian economy in the last quarter
of a century – ‘the longest unbroken period of economic expansion of any
developed country ever’.31
The end of protectionism exposed Australia’s extensive manufacturing sector
just as globalisation was increasing the quality, quantity and competitiveness of
overseas manufacturers. A range of industrial policy initiatives sought at first to
assist with the necessary restructuring, but in the end many firms, and indeed
entire industries, shut down. This was particularly the case in the labour-intensive
textile, clothing and footwear sectors, where advanced countries struggled to
compete against Asian manufacturing at the best of times, and in the ‘metal
bashing’ industries such as whitegoods and motor vehicles. In 2017, Australia’s
last car manufacturer closed its doors, and an industry that had begun with
great fanfare in 1949 came to an end. Australia still manufactures sophisticated
industrial goods as well as some traditional core industrial goods, such as steel.
However, manufacturing now contributes only a small part of Australia’s overall
GDP, and even then, what is officially counted as ‘manufacturing’ is often merely
the processing of primary materials.
27 Fenna 2013b.
28 Kelly 1992, 196–7.
29 Borland 2015; Fenna 2019.
30 Fenna 2013b.
31 Garnaut 2013, 5. For a contrary view, see Cahill and Toner 2018.
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Back to the future
The difficulties of a declining manufacturing sector prompted questions about why
governments were not pursuing more imaginative and ambitious industry policy.32
However, the need for active intervention to promote manufacturing was swept
aside by the extraordinary recovery in Australia’s traditional area of comparative
advantage that occurred from 2004. After a long period of stagnation or decline
in the ‘terms of trade’ (the value of one’s exports versus the cost of one’s imports),
Australia’s mineral wealth suddenly became the road to riches again with the
mining boom. Other than requirements for local construction of major new
defence acquisitions, such as submarines and destroyers, there remains little by way
of national industrial policy in Australia. That is likely to remain the case for as long
as Australia continues to prosper from its agricultural and natural resource wealth.
Conclusions
Economic policy lies at the heart of what government does, and no government
can survive for long if the economy is not performing. Through a combination
of demand- and supply-side measures, governments engage in macroeconomic
management to maintain rates of growth that will keep unemployment to a
minimum. At the same time, they also have to be wary about the danger of
inflation. Ideally, a combination of low interest rates and increased spending and/or
decreased taxation would increase effective demand and thus stimulate economic
growth when the economy was slowing. And ideally a combination of rising
interest rates and decreased spending and/or increased taxation would ‘cool’ the
economy when it was in danger of ‘overheating’. Ideally, too, any debt accumulated
as a result of deficits incurred when trying to stimulate the economy would be paid
down by equivalent surpluses achieved during the good times. At the same time,
it must be remembered that this is a gross simplification of a very complex reality,
where countless other factors intrude, including debates in economic theory, the
overlap between economics and ideology, the intersection between economic
policy and other policy areas, and the interaction between the domestic and the
international economies.
And that’s just macroeconomic policy. As discussed on at the end of this
chapter, governments also have economic responsibilities of a more structural
nature, concerning the operation of specific markets, the path of economic
development and the industrial focus and international competitiveness of the
economy. These microeconomic issues confront policy makers with a fundamental
question of whether market forces should generally dominate or whether
government should seek to play a strategic role. The latter requires considerable
32 Bentley and West 2016; Fenna 2016a; Fenna 2016b; Phillimore and Leong 2017; Stewart 2016.
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political will and entails a number of difficult questions about what tools and
approaches work best to foster innovation, retain and promote investment and
achieve export success.
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Environmental policy is a highly contested, critically important, and intellectually
interesting area of politics and policy. Environmental policy not only concerns the
relations between people and the forms of social co-ordination that they create
(i.e. the relations between states, markets and civil society) but also concerns the
fundamental relations between humans and other species (what is our place in
the web of life). Environmental policy re-energises the age-old question of ‘How
should we live?’ by reframing it as ‘How should we live on this planet, in ways
that sustain it, others, and ourselves?’ Put another way, environmental policy is
important because everything that we do as humans (as individuals, as employees
of companies, as consumers of goods and services, as members of a community, as
citizens of a country, and as inhabitants of planet earth) directly or indirectly has
environmental implications – we are part of nature and rely on it to survive.
A good example of the connection between how we live and the environment
can be seen at a very simple level. At a local level, have you ever considered the
environmental implications of something as simple as washing your face? First,
where does the water come from, how is it treated, and what is involved in getting
it to your tap? Second, how often do you wash your face and what with (what
Coffey, Brian (2019). Environmental policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326701
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packaging does it come in, and how is it disposed of), what ingredients are in the
cleanser, where was it manufactured, where did you buy it, and how did you get it
home? Third, how is the ‘waste’ water disposed of, where does it go, and with what
effects? (e.g. microplastics in cleaners may end up in the stomachs of fish and other
marine life.) By contrast, the issue of coal mines raises more obvious questions
regarding our relationship with the environment. The proposal by the company
Adani to develop a coal mine in central Queensland has attracted considerable
opposition in terms of both the local (possible impacts on water systems and
some native species such as the black-throated finch) and global (greenhouse gas
emissions associated with the burning of the coal extracted) consequences of the
mine.
Origins of the policy domain
While our relationship with the environment and how human behaviours impact
the environment may seem more commonplace in contemporary society,
environmental policy is a relatively new phenomenon. What we now know of as
‘environmental policy’ only emerged as a significant, and distinct, field of public
policy interest since the late 1960s.1 Influential books such as Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring2 contributed to raising public awareness about the environmental
consequences of human activities, and the emergence of the environmental
movement provided a political constituency around which concern about
environmental issues was mobilised.3 Many of the major environmental non-
government organisations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have
their origins in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Further, it is important to realise
that environmental thought contains threads from many different intellectual
traditions,4 and that major political ideologies, such as liberalism, conservatism,
Marxism and anarchism, have developed their particular perspectives on the
politics of the environment.5 A distinctly ‘green’ political ideology – ecocentrism
(aka ecologism) – has also emerged in recent decades.6
Significant shifts in environmental policy debate and practice have occurred
during a period of major technological, social, political and economic change.
The widespread influence of neoliberalism and the development of information
and biological technologies go hand in hand with increasing knowledge of human
impact on the environment. Scientific knowledge now provides abundant evidence
about the impacts of human activities as demonstrated by issues such as
1 Dryzek 2012.
2 Carson 1962.
3 Doyle, McEachern and MacGregor 2016.
4 Hay 2002.
5 Hay 1988.
6 Dobson 1992; Eckersley 1992.
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biodiversity decline, climate change and the pervasive spread of plastics in the
environment.7 Alongside these concerns is the necessity of better meeting the
development needs of the marginalised and disadvantaged people living in Africa,
South America and Asia, as well as in Western societies.
Within this broad context, environmental policy debate revolves around widely
divergent views about how serious environmental issues are, why they are
important, what has caused them, and what may need to be done to address them.
What is at stake are competing conceptualisations of the ‘proper’ relationships
between humans and the non-human world and between humans and other
humans, which have profoundly important implications for how the environment
is governed.
This chapter explores these issues and draws on Australian examples. The
chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a brief overview of what is at
stake in environmental policy debate; Section 2 considers some of the major actors
involved in Australian environmental policy; Section 3 explains the place of the
environment in Australia’s federal system of government; and Section 4 highlights
some areas of ongoing debate/non-debate.
Understanding what is at stake in environmental policy debate
Environmental policy is challenging! According to leading international policy
scholar B. Guy Peters, environmental policy is characterised as politically and
technically complex.8 Reflecting this, Stephen Dovers proposed that environmental
issues have attributes which make them particularly challenging for policy makers,
namely: temporal scale (issues emerge over time and responses may take time to
work); spatial scale (what happens in one place can affect somewhere else); limits
(irreversibility – extinction is forever); urgency (timely responses can be critical);
connectivity and complexity (ecological and biophysical systems are complex and
connected – e.g. water cycles); uncertainty (there will never be complete certainty);
cumulation (some issues are like ‘the straw that breaks the camel’s back’ or ‘death
by a thousand cuts’, where a large number of small actions can have large cons-
equences); moral and ethical dimensions (they involve important philosophical
questions about who or what is worthy of consideration); and novelty (humanity
hasn’t faced the kinds of questions that we now face – e.g. major climate change).
For Dovers, these attributes matter because:
Existing processes, which have evolved around problems that do not as com-
monly display these attributes, can be suspected to have limited ability in coping
7 Crowley and Walker 2012.
8 Peters 2015, 24.
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with problems that do [such that] the shortcomings of current responses to
sustainability have a structural basis, being the products of unsuitable processes.9
Dovers suggests that such responses result in policy being ‘ad hoc’ and exhibiting
‘policy amnesia’, which means that policy making is not systematic and policy
learning does not occur.
According to Carter, environmental issues have seven core characteristics that
distinguish them as policy problems, as summarised in Table 1. In broad terms,
these views are informed by the understanding that humans are dependent upon
nature for their survival and that ecological systems and processes do not conform
with human boundaries.10
To provide insight into how these complexities play out in environmental
policy debate, this section sketches some of the types of responses that can be made
to simple questions (which feature – implicitly or explicitly – in all environmental
debate) such as:
• What is the nature of ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’?
• Why should we be concerned about the environment?
• What is the cause of environmental problems (and who is responsible)?
• What should be done about them?
Considering these questions, and their associated responses, helps to identify
the ways in which different ideas about the environment and environmental
policy are made tangible in political debate. Importantly the different responses
are associated with different interests, and so are inherently political, and have
implications for the types of responses put into place.
Perspectives on ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’
Appreciating the different ways in which ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ can be repre-
sented is critical for understanding environmental policy. For some people, the
environment is simply ‘our surroundings’, which means that our cities, suburbs and
homes are part of ‘the environment’. Similarly, nature is often considered to be
anything that is non-human, but, as we are mammals, we are also part of nature.
In other words, it can be difficult to conclusively separate us from nature. A good
example is that our survival requires the presence of beneficial stomach bacteria
which call our bodies home. For the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to
simply illustrate some of the many ways in which ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’
can be understood, and to highlight that these are often deeply ingrained, and so
frequently taken for granted.
9 Dovers 1996, 313.
10 Carter 2018.
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Characteristic Description
Public goods Many environmental resources can be described as public goods,
whereby one person’s consumption of the good does not impact upon
another person’s (e.g. clean air).
Transboundary
problems
Environmental systems and environmental problems cross
administrative boundaries (e.g. migratory species, water catchments,
climate change, marine pollution).
Complexity
and
uncertainty
Ecological and biophysical systems are complex, as captured in the
phrase ‘the web of life’. In nature everything is connected, but this
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly how it works or
what might happen.
Irreversibility Species extinction is forever, and non-renewable resources can be
exhausted.
Temporal and
spatial
variability
Impacts may not be experienced immediately, or in the place where
they are caused (e.g. the hole in the ozone layer and the effects of acid
rain are spatially and temporally displaced, which means the people
who cause the problem may not be the ones who suffer from it).
Administrative
fragmentation
Different departments have different responsibilities, which means
that the activities of some departments can impact negatively (or in
some cases positively) on the portfolio responsibilities of others.
Regulatory
intervention
Addressing environmental issues can impose costs on those causing
the problem.
Table 1 Core characteristics of environmental problems. Source: compiled from Carter
2018.
In terms of ‘nature’, environmental historian William Cronon considers that
‘the natural world is far more dynamic, far more changeable, and far more tangled
with human history than popular beliefs about the “balance of nature” have
typically acknowledged’ and that ‘nature is not nearly so natural as it seems’.11
For example, viewing nature as ‘Edenic’ portrays it as something that is pure
and perfect. Clearly, such a view would be unlikely to be held by people who
experience natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and droughts.
11 Cronon 1996, 24–5.
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In relation to the ‘environment’, Barry identifies four ‘environments’: wild-
erness, countryside/garden, urban environment, and global environment.12 These
suggest that the environment can be partitioned in different ways for different
purposes. These kinds of themes are evident in a study by Coffey, whose
investigation of national park policy and management in Victoria, Australia,
revealed nature variously thought of as: something to be managed; something to be
improved upon; a frontier or source of adventure; Eden; and a source of balance,
calmness and harmony. For Coffey, these representations, which were associated
with neoliberal-inspired reforms to national park management, were evidence of a
commodification of nature, whereby ‘nature was portrayed in ways which targeted
consumers for whom a visit to national parks had become synonymous with a
recuperative respite from urban life’.13
This raises the question about where the environment begins and ends: for
example, are suburban backyards or nature strips part of the environment? Further,
the environment is often considered simply as a ‘resource’ which is there solely
for the benefit of humans. It is very commonplace to hear waterways, forest
ecosystems, landscapes and minerals considered simply as natural resources, which
brackets and therefore minimises consideration of important ecological (e.g. rare
and endangered species) and cultural (e.g. Indigenous cultural heritage) factors. In
effect, positioning the environment as a resource privileges economic value over the
intrinsic ‘value’ of the environment. In other words, it assumes the only thing that
matters is whether or not someone can make money out of them. Such viewpoints
are often a feature of debates about mining in Australia, where proponents may
emphasise the revenue to be gained from selling gold, coal, bauxite, iron ore, or
some other mineral, while overlooking the other ‘values’ associated with the site.
More conceptually, there is interest in ‘social-nature’, which can be understood
as a perspective that seeks to break down the barriers between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’,
and which instead focuses attention on the various ways in which humans influence
how we might conceptualise nature and how nature might influence humans.14
Relatedly, given the longstanding relationship between Indigenous Australians and
the environment,15 it is critically important that their knowledge and deep cultural
connection to country is given due consideration in environmental debate.
Clearly, there are many ways of understanding and categorising the world
in which we live, and our place in it, each with strengths and weaknesses. Pol-
itically, views about nature and the environment are enlisted in particular ways
to either promote or marginalise environmental concerns. Some of these diverse
understandings and perspectives are clearly summarised in the work of Dryzek,
12 Barry 1999.
13 Coffey 2001, 75.
14 Lockie 2004.
15 Gammage 2012; Pascoe 2014.
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Limits to growth and their denial
Looming tragedy: Survivalism (limits to growth)
Growth forever: The Promethean response
(infinite growth)
Problem solving approaches
Administrative rationalism: Leave it to
the experts (technocratic)
Democratic pragmatism: Leave it to the
people (mainstream democracy)
Economic rationalism: Leave it to the
market (neoliberalism)
The quest for sustainability
Sustainable development: Environmentally
benign growth (having our cake and eating it)
Ecological modernisation: Industrial society and
beyond (pollution prevention pays)
Green radicalism
Changing people: Green consciousness
(deep ecology)
Changing society: Green politics (social
ecology)
Table 2 Major environmental discourses. Source: compiled from Dryzek 2012.
who identifies and discusses nine different overarching approaches to environmen-
tal issues, as summarised in Table 2.16
Why care about it?
Peoples’ concern for the environment may be informed by diverse motivations,
which reflect different philosophical foundations.17 For this discussion it is
sufficient to highlight five broad sources of environmental concern discussed by
Eckersley and summarised in Table 3. Debates around whether or not native
animals (e.g. kangaroos) should be used for human consumption illustrate why it
is important to be aware of the diverse philosophical motivations underpinning
the different arguments being made. For example, resource conservationists may
support human consumption of kangaroo meat (it would be wasteful not to eat
them), animal liberationists may oppose culling (on the basis of animal rights),
while some ecologists may not oppose human consumption of kangaroo meat
because kangaroo farming may be less ecologically damaging than grazing sheep.
In recent years there has been growing use of the concept of ecosystem
services (which encompasses the resource conservation, preservation, and human
welfare ecological positions). This is illustrated in the United Nations (UN)
sanctioned Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, where ecosystems services are
considered as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, with these benefits
16 Dryzek 2012.
17 Fox 1990.
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Approach Major characteristics
Resource
conservation
Resources should be used efficiently because it is wrong to be wasteful.
Preservationism Parts of the environment are unique, inspire awe, or are highly aesthetic
and should be protected from development.
Human welfare
ecology
The environment provides us with goods and services and therefore it
is in our own long-term self-interest to look after it (enlightened self-
interest).
Animal
liberation
If animals can feel pain or suffer, then we have no moral right to cause
them harm.
Ecocentrism The various multi-layered parts of the biotic community are valuable
for their own sake.
Table 3 Sources of environmental concern. Source: compiled from Eckersley 1992.
encompassing provisioning services (food and fibre); regulating services (floods,
drought); supporting services (soil formation and nutrient cycling); and cultural
services (recreational, spiritual, religious and other non-material benefits).18
However, a number of authors critique the use of ‘ecosystems services’ and
associated economic terminology because these terms frame nature narrowly and
serve to commoditise the way in which we understand and govern the world in
which we live and share with other species.19
Clearly, having an appreciation of different sources of environmental concern
provides insight into the motivations informing different perspectives in
environmental debate. This is important because environmental conflict frequently
involves debates about competing philosophical positions, and the desirability of
different responses. For example, approaches to biodiversity management will vary
depending upon whether decision making is informed by a ‘hands off ’ (resource
preservationist) approach or a ‘wise use’ (resource conservationist) approach.
Further, debates about the live export of sheep and cattle or the culling of native
animals are more concerned with issues of animal rights than they are with
ecocentrism.
18 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005.
19 Coffey 2016; Sullivan 2016; Turnhout et al. 2013.
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What causes environmental problems?
Another important element of environmental policy debate concerns the
‘identification’ of the cause, or causes, of environmental problems. For Stone, such
debates involve competing ‘causal stories’ which means that part of what is at stake
in political debate about environmental issues is what is considered to be the cause
of the problem: identification of the cause of the environmental issues is as much
political as it is technical.20
At a systemic level, environmental degradation has been attributed to factors
such as overpopulation, technology, production and consumption, Western science
and patriarchy, and the Judeo–Christian tradition. Paterson’s analysis of interna-
tional relations literature discusses some of the different ‘causes’ of global
environmental issues identified and the implications of these different framings
for the types of solutions advocated. For example: liberal institutionalists see global
environmental issues as being caused by an inter-state ‘tragedy of the commons’21
with no systematic pattern of winners and losers, with these issues able to be
addressed through the building of international institutions. Realists see discrete
trends such as population growth or technology as the cause, with these amenable
to solution through a focus on security. Eco-socialists see capital accumulation as
the cause of global environmental issues, with the solution being the overthrow of
capitalism. Deep ecologists have philosophical outlooks which see the domination of
nature as being the cause, with their response being grassroots resistance to create
decentralised, egalitarian, self-reliant communities.22
Further, Caldwell identified three different ways in which environmental
problems can be interpreted as a political issue. First, environmental disruptions
can be seen as accidents or miscalculations and thus amenable to admonition,
education, indoctrination and a few legal sanctions such as anti-litter laws (which
may be amenable to incremental responses). Second, environmental problems can
be seen as largely inadvertent but caused by inadequate or inappropriate
organisation and management of economic and public affairs (which can be
amenable to operational responses). Third, environmental issues can be seen as a
direct consequence of the socio-economic systems currently in operation (which
require systemic responses).23
Responsibility for environmental problems can also be assigned to individuals,
groups and organisations, such as past and present governments, the failings of
bureaucracy, or the operations of particular businesses or industry sectors. For
example, Coffey and Marston explored how the causes of environmental issues
20 Stone 1989.
21 Hardin 1968. The notion of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ was popularised in an article by
Garrett Hardin. In broad terms, it suggests that the pursuit of rational self-interest may produce
collectively irrational outcomes. For example, overfishing of global fish stocks.
22 Paterson 2001, 4.
23 Caldwell 1993.
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were represented in a sustainability framework developed by the Victorian
government in 2005. Their analysis showed that the Victorian government placed
the primary responsibility for Victoria’s environmental challenges on the everyday
choices made by Victorians, rather than the policy settings established by
governments or the activities of industry and business.24
Clearly, how the causes of environmental problems are interpreted influences
how environmental problems are understood. Analyses of environmental policy
therefore need to be alert to the implications of different causal stories, because of
the way in which they focus attention and enable and constrain the possibilities
for taking action. For example, economic interests will seek to have environmental
issues defined in ways that avoid them being blamed, whereas environmental
interests will seek to define issues in ways that emphasise the need for greater
priority to be given to environmental objectives.
What should be done, and by whom?
Environmental issues also involve debate around what should be done and by
whom. At its simplest, such debates centre on what type of policy instrument, or
instruments, should be used to address an issue. Policy instruments are ways in
which governments take action and may involve:
• Advocacy: advocating for something or providing information and advice to
inform and educate people
• Networks: bringing people together to develop collective responses
• Money: spending and taxing
• Government action: direct provision of services and infrastructure by
government
• Law: regulation.25
For example, reducing water consumption in cities during times of drought may be
achieved by: encouraging people to take shorter showers and turn off dripping taps
(advocacy); charging people according to how much water they use or providing
subsidies for the installation of water tanks and other water-saving devices
(money); introducing water restrictions so that people are no longer allowed to
water their lawns using sprinklers or wash their cars using a hose (regulation); or
constructing a water desalination plant to produce fresh water (direct provision).
There is also considerable debate about the merits or otherwise of regulation,
subsidies, carbon taxes and emissions trading as preferred mechanisms to manage
greenhouse gas emissions. In such debates, economists are likely to advocate for
market-oriented approaches and ‘user pays’, while welfare advocates may advocate
for subsidies, regulation and information-oriented approaches. Importantly,
24 Coffey and Marston 2013.
25 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018.
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ideological underpinnings inform policy actors’ views about the merits or
otherwise of different policy tools, even if they deny this is the case.
Environmental policy debate is also concerned with how much change is
required, as is illustrated in the three types of responses – incremental, operational
and systemic – identified by Caldwell.26 An analysis of policy change in the UK
under the Thatcher government by Peter Hall provides a similarly useful
framework. It focuses on three distinct kinds of policy change:
• First order change: policy instrument settings are changed in light of experience
and new knowledge, while overall policy goals and instruments of policy
remain the same
• Second order change: the instruments of policy as well as their settings are
altered in responses to experience although the overall goals of policy remain
the same
• Third order change: a simultaneous change in all three components of policy:
the instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals
behind policy.27
Drawing on this typology, Carter suggests that ‘although incremental changes in
environmental policy are possible within the traditional paradigm [i.e. incremental
approaches to policy] an accumulation of first and second order changes will not
automatically lead to third order change, because genuinely radical change requires
the replacement of the traditional policy paradigm with an alternative’.28 Debates
about what should be done also inevitably involve debates about who should be
doing it. In broad terms, in recent decades the relative roles and responsibilities of
government (the institutions of the state), the private sector (private companies and
industry sectors) and the community (the general public or members of particular
groups or communities) have attracted considerable attention.29
In relation to government and the broad apparatus of the state, central
questions relate to the role and capacity of government (and the state) in dealing
with environmental issues. Views about the role and capacity of the state are
contested.30 There are questions about the disposition of governments to intervene
in policy matters, as highlighted by debates between Keynesian and neo-classical
economic perspectives on the role of government.31 However, there are limitations
in using these terms in discussing the role of government in environmental policy
issues, as they both remain wedded to promoting economic growth, and only differ
in terms of the role of government. By contrast, some environmentally oriented
26 Caldwell 1993.
27 Hall 1993, 278–9.
28 Carter 2018, 196.
29 Rhodes 1997.
30 Marsh, Smith and Hothi 2006.
31 Fenna 2004.
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economists highlight the need for government to encourage a shift beyond the
paradigm of economic growth.32
The ‘public’ may also occupy various roles in relation to environmental matters
and can be viewed as either consumers (where their only form of agency is through
spending decisions), or citizens (where people have important rights and
responsibilities within democracy).33 Finally, the role of the private sector in
environmental matters is also subject to considerable debate, with a central issue
being whether business is ‘part of the problem’ or ‘part of the solution’. Business is
often viewed as central to economic growth, and hence the cause, or at least part of
the cause, of environmental problems, although some people consider the potential
role of business positively (e.g. free market environmentalists).
Actors and politics of the domain
Given the diversity of environmental issues (e.g. biodiversity decline, climate
change, water pollution, water quantity, air quality, soil erosion, invasive species,
toxic waste, microplastics, etc.) and the range of levels at which environmental
policy debate occurs (e.g. local, regional, state, national, international and global)
it should come as no surprise that environmental issues involve a diverse and
dynamic range of ‘policy actors’, where policy actors are understood as ‘any
individual or group able to take action on a public problem or issue’.34 Effectively
every person, individually or as part of a group, has the potential to inform
environmental policy debate. Within the context of Australian environmental
policy, Table 4 illustrates some of the actors involved.
This diverse range of policy actors, particularly non-government organisations
(NGOs) and think tanks, not only occupy different niches within the
environmental policy ecosystem, they also draw on diverse resources (e.g.
economic power, information and expertise, capacity to mobilise people or attract
attention) and deploy, either willingly or by necessity, particular strategies35 in their
efforts to shape environmental policy. For example, NGOs may seek to influence
policy using direct and indirect strategies. Contacting a relevant minister or public
servant, making a submission to an inquiry, or responding to a call for comment are
direct forms of influence, while contacting reporters, writing letters to the editor,
arranging strikes or marches, or holding public meetings and so forth are indirect
ways to influence policy actors.
One thing to note is that environmental policy debate is not the sole preserve
of ‘environmentalists’. Many policy actors with sectional/sectoral interests are also
32 Jackson 2009.
33 Dobson 2003; Latta 2007.
34 Considine 1994, 6.
35 Binderkrantz 2005.
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actively involved, and arguably in many instances are substantively more influential
in shaping environmental policy. This would seem to be the case with respect to
Australia’s policy position on climate change. High-profile contributions from Clive
Hamilton36 and Guy Pearse37 identify various actors that they see as having played
a noteworthy role in shaping climate-change debate and policy in Australia.
How is environmental policy made in Australia?
Australia’s Constitution provides the formal institutional context within which
environmental policy is made. The first thing to appreciate about this is that there
is no explicit head of power in our Constitution, which formally articulates the
role of the federal government in environmental matters. This is because state
governments existed before Australia (as a nation) existed and negotiations to
establish the Commonwealth resulted in the federal level of government only being
granted specific powers (these powers are specified in section 51 of the Australian
Constitution).
By contrast, state governments create the basic legislative settings relating to
development, such as land tenure, planning schemes, primary industries, public
utilities and the environment; for example, national parks legislation. Hence, many
environmental policy decisions are made at the state level within decision-making
processes established by the state government.
Nonetheless, the federal government has come to have considerable influence
on environmental matters, should it choose to exert itself, by virtue of its dominant
financial position (termed the vertical fiscal imbalance), and decisions by the High
Court. In effect, a range of strategies have increased the reach of the federal
government on environmental matters, through levers such as the powers over
external affairs, foreign investment, and corporations. In this context, Buhrs and
Christoff argue that:
Over the past three decades the Commonwealth government has gained greater
formal control over environmental protection and resource development through
the Constitution’s powers relating to external affairs. These enable national laws
enacting treaties including international environmental agreements to ‘override’
the States. But, the States retain the capacity for policy implementation, and
therefore real influence in these matters largely remains with them.38
However, the federal government’s willingness to exert influence has waxed and
waned since the 1980s when there was considerable conflict between the federal
36 Hamilton 2007.
37 Pearse 2007.
38 Buhrs and Christoff 2006, 235.
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Type of actor Examples
Elected officials Members of parliament in federal, state, and territory parliaments, who
may occupy roles in government (prime minister, minister,
backbencher) or opposition (e.g. shadow minister, etc.). At June 2019
the federal minister for the environment was the Hon. Susan Ley MP.
Members of parliament may be elected to either the lower or upper
house in their jurisdiction (Queensland only has a lower house).
Local government councillors.
Appointed
officials
Ministerial advisers and electorate officers are appointed to support
members of parliament.
Public servants undertake policy, planning, management and service
delivery roles in public organisations including federal, state and local
government departments (e.g. environment departments) and
statutory bodies (e.g. environment protection agencies).
Judges (although formally their role is to adjudicate on legal matters
rather than make law) appointed to various courts are sometimes
called upon to adjudicate on environmental matters brought before
their courts. For example, in 1983 the High Court considered the
constitutional validity of federal laws introduced to protect the world
heritage values of the Franklin River.
Political parties Political parties generally exist to get candidates elected.
Established political parties include the Liberal Party, Labor Party,
National Party, and the Greens.
Other ‘minor’ parties include Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, the
Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party, and the Sustainable Australia Party.
Non-
government
organisations
(including
interest groups,
industry
associations,
and trade
unions)
Non-government organisations represent the interests of their
members, and seek to influence policy rather than be elected to
parliament.
Prominent environmental interest groups include the Australian
Conservation Foundation, Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth,
and World Wildlife Fund. Such groups are often viewed as promotional
as they tend to promote some general agenda.
Prominent national industry associations include the Business Council
of Australia, Minerals Council of Australia, National Farmers’
Federation, National Association of Forest Industries, Australian
Beverages Council, and Australian Food and Grocery Council. Such
groups are often viewed as sectional as they tend to promote their
sectional interests.
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Type of actor Examples
Prominent national trade unions include the Australian Council of
Trade Unions (which is the peak body for the union movement), and
the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union, and
the Electrical Trades Union.
Think tanks and
research
organisations
Think tanks are understood as independent organisations (i.e. non-
government) who seek to influence policy through the provision of
ideas, information and research, although specific think tanks are often
aligned with a particular perspective on policy matters.
Think tanks include the Institute of Public Affairs, Grattan Institute,
Australia Institute, and Centre for Independent Studies.
Some think tanks are also established as research centres at
universities.
Media The role of the media is generally understood as a mechanism for
informing debate and holding policy makers to account, and so has an
important role in environmental policy debate.
The actual contribution of the media in environmental policy debate is
contested, as evident from debates about the influence of the Murdoch-
owned media on climate change debate.
There is also considerable debate about the contribution of new forms
of media to environmental policy.
Grassroots
groups
People get involved in environmental policy debate as individuals and
as part of small informal grassroot campaigns, such as campaigns for
the protection or enhancement of locally significant sites.
Table 4 Overview of policy actors involved in Australian environmental policy debate.
government and subnational governments over issues such as the proposed
damming of the Franklin River and protection of wet tropical rainforests in Far
North Queensland. An Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment was
negotiated in the early 1990s as a way to improve intergovernmental consideration
of environmental issues (including through Ministerial Council processes). In
addition, a significant attempt was made to establish a national strategy for
ecologically sustainable development (NSESD) in the early 1990s, although it is
clear that much more could have been achieved.39
39 Curran 2015; Hollander 2015; Macintosh 2015.
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Importantly, Australia’s federal system of government may not be the sole, or
even primary, cause of Australia’s inability to make effective national environmental
policy. While challenges such as those associated with the Murray Darling Basin
Plan, the lack of a coherent national waste strategy and the absence of a nationally
coherent policy on energy (and climate change) point to the role of government
and politics, further factors must also be considered. For example, the scarcity of
effective environmental policy may be due as much to the influence of economic
interests such as policy actors advocating for the interests of industries as it is to the
features of Australia’s federal system of government.
Another feature of environmental policy making in Australia is that each state
has a relatively unique approach to local government, and there is no recognition
of local government in the Constitution. This shapes the ways that council-level
environmental issues play out, with the major tensions being between state and
local governments.40 Put simply, local governments are the creature of state
government, and so state governments determine what roles and responsibilities
are granted to local government: for example, in Queensland the Brisbane City
Council has a role in water management, whereas in Melbourne it is primarily
managed by Melbourne Water and various government-owned water retailers.
Environmental policy in Australia is also influenced by the ways in which
the federal government participates in international negotiations and processes,
such as those dealing with climate change (the UN Framework Convention of
Climate Change) and biodiversity (the Convention on Biological Diversity, and
other treaties dealing with migratory species, wetlands of international importance,
and ozone depleting substances). Australia’s contribution to such processes varies
considerably depending upon the orientation of the government in office at the
time. This variation in commitment to being a ‘good global citizen’ is clearly
captured in both the title of an article by Christoff, ‘From Global Citizen to
Renegade State: Australia at Kyoto’, and the vignette used to begin the article:
In 1992, Australia was one of the most progressive advocates of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), so much so that at the Earth Summit
in Rio de Janeiro Ros Kelly, then Labor Minister for Environment, almost signed
in place of Afghanistan in her enthusiasm to see Australia become the first of
some 160 signatories to the multilateral Convention. Yet merely five years later, by
the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) held in Kyoto from 1–11 December
1997, Australia distinguished itself by refusing to accept binding greenhouse gas
emissions reduction targets and by pushing for a mandate to increase its emissions
by up to 18 per cent.41
40 Thomas 2010.
41 Christoff 1998, 113.
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More recently, Australia’s inability to submit its national progress report on
biodiversity to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity by the required due date
provides a further example of Australia’s retreat from being a good global citizen.42
Environmental policy making in Australia involves diverse issues and actors
and plays out in multiple settings with inconsistent results. Given this, it is not
possible to provide any simple explanation of how environmental policy is made
in Australia, beyond stating that it is political and involves particular actors
advocating particular ideas, through particular processes, in particular
circumstances: the devil really is in the detail, and this is why detailed analyses of
different issues is so useful.
Debates and non-agenda issues
Environmental policy debate in Australia is almost invariably couched in terms of
development versus the environment, which serves to frame environmental debate
in a very narrow and conflictual way – you are either ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ development,
there are no shades of grey. Useful insights into how these terms of debate play
out in particular cases are well canvassed in a variety of edited collections.43 Read
together these collections provide excellent introductions to the major lines of
debate and non-debate that animate the politics of the environment in Australia,
with useful coverage of issues such as climate change, the Murray Darling Basin,
natural resource management, forest conflict, and coastal management, to name but
a few.
Two clear themes from this literature are particularly worth noting because they
highlight recurring issues. First is Walker’s notion of ‘statist developmentalism’44
which he considers is both a ‘state of mind’ and a ‘development strategy’ in that:
It embodies the assumptions that ‘development’ is (1) imperative, (2) popular,
and (3) has self-evident advantages [which] ignores evidence that development
damages ecologies and diminishes amenity for the population at large [and
instead] assumes that ecologically rational policies will be costly and will eliminate
jobs.45
Walker’s accounts explore the dominance of ‘statist developmentalism’ in Australia
from the First Fleet through to the recent times. Statist developmentalism is still
alive and well, if recent debates about the Adani mine and other mines in the
Galilee Basin are any indication.
42 Haslam 2019.
43 Such as Crowley and Walker 2012, Dovers and Wild River 2003, Walker and Crowley 1999 and
Walker 1992.
44 Walker 2012; Walker 1999.
45 Walker 1999, 40.
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Second is Dovers’ view that Australian environmental policy suffers from
policy ‘ad hockery’ and amnesia, the idea that ‘what we do at a given time often
appears uninformed by previous experiences, and often, previous policy and
management attempts are not even recognised’.46 This highlights that it is not
possible to consider environmental policy making in Australia as proactive or
systematic in any way. Even worse is the sense that this ‘forgetfulness’ may not be
accidental but may instead be part and parcel of statist developmentalism. Such
an interpretation is supported by the fact that many of Australia’s environmental
achievements (e.g. halting sandmining and logging on Fraser Island, preventing
the damming of the Franklin River, establishing the Wet Tropics World Heritage
Area, and not proceeding with gold mining at Coronation Hill) were only achieved
through extensive public campaigns by the environmental movement.
Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the politics and policy of the environment,
highlighting that environmental issues are not only incredibly interesting, but are
also fundamentally important: our survival as a species depends upon how well
we learn to live on this planet with other people and species. In broad terms
this chapter has introduced some of the major questions that are debated in
environmental policy, outlined some of the key types of policy actors and the
institutional context they operate within (i.e. Australia’s federal system of
government), and discussed some of the themes that seem to be a recurring feature
of environmental policy debate. While this may make for bleak reading, it should
not be imagined that it has always been this way, or that such a situation is set in
stone.
Progressive environmental politics and policy making can, has, and hopefully
will occur, with glimmers of hope evident in both successful grassroots campaigns
and some government supported actions. For example, there are clearly
considerable numbers of Australians with an interest in, and concern for, making
Australia more sustainable if the following initiatives are any indication: the
widespread adoption of solar panels (because of, or despite, government policy
settings and associated programs); the ‘Lock the Gate’ campaign to oppose
widespread fracking; the Victorian government’s renewed efforts on climate
change; local councils declaring climate emergencies; the activist energy behind
campaigns such as ‘Extinction Rebellion’; and the mass mobilisation of young
people as part of the ‘School Strike for Climate’ movement.
46 Dovers 2003, 3.
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Foreign and defence policy
Thomas S. Wilkins and Nicholas Bromfield
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regionalism
This chapter takes a thematic approach to looking at Australian foreign and defence
policy encapsulated in four sections. The first, looks at the historical background,
Labor versus Liberal party policy traditions and liberal internationalism, all of
which set the stage for Australian policy engagement. The second investigates three
core “platforms” of foreign policy engagement: economic policy, defence strategy
and non-traditional security. The following section concentrates on Australia’s
‘regionalist’ policies through Asian engagement and foreign aid. The final section
considers Australia’s relations with the two ‘superpowers’ in the Indo Pacific: China
and the United States.
Section 1: contexts
Historical background
During the Cold War, Australian foreign and defence policy focused on the putative
communist threat emanating from Soviet and Chinese expansion. Canberra acceded
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to the ANZUS alliance at the same time as the Second World War San Francisco
Peace Treaties in 1951. This was tied to the ongoing process of decolonisation as
European powers sought to preserve their influence in South-East Asia against
nationalist, and often Marxist, independence movements and conflicts. Canberra
provided diplomatic and military support for the UN-led coalition in the Korean
War (1950–53), the British in Malaya against ‘communist terrorists’ (1948–60) and
against the Indonesian ‘confrontation’ policy in Borneo (1963–66), and deployed
substantial military force to support the USA in Vietnam into the 1970s (including
through membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation Pact). At this time
Australia also withdrew from its own colony in Papua New Guinea (1975) and
sought to manage relations with the diverse array of newly independent countries in
the South Pacific making up the British Commonwealth.
Serious challenges arose around this time. President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine
(1969) signalled that America’s allies would henceforth have to provide more
resources for their own defence, prompting a more self-reliant defence policy in
the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s postwar economic recovery had also encouraged
increasing Australian economic engagement with Asia. But continuing Australian
economic prosperity was undermined by protectionist policies, the economic
rupture with the UK when the latter joined the European Economic Community in
1973, and a series of Middle Eastern ‘oil shocks’. At this time, Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam also ended the isolation of communist China by his visits to Beijing,
which ultimately ended in the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China in 1973,
and the removal of the Australian Embassy from Taipei in the Republic of China.
The 1970s therefore saw a ‘torrent of change in Australian foreign policy’.1
Against this backdrop, the Department of Foreign Affairs was established in
1971 (replaced with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1987). These
economic problems also led to a reappraisal of trade and financial policy and the
embrace of a ‘neoliberal’ economic agenda in the 1980s: a progressive elimination
of tariffs, privatisation, and opening of markets under the Hawke and Keating
governments (see Section 4). These moves re-established Australian economic
competitiveness and encouraged closer engagement with the Asian region,
avoiding the possibility – in Keating’s words – that Australia might become a
‘banana republic’.2 Australia also drove the building of regional multilateral
institutions such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and was at the
forefront of peace-keeping operations in Cambodia (1992–93) and East Timor
(1999).
The long-running Howard Coalition government (1996–2007) continued these
regionalist and globalist policies, while simultaneously taking a ‘hard-headed’
approach to the national interest despite its nostalgia for the UK–USA ‘Anglos-
phere’. By the 21st century, Australia’s firm attachment to the American alliance and
1 Gyngell 2017, 102.
2 Kelly 1992.
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active participation in the Asia-Pacific region was firmly established and deepened.
But the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods unleashed a range of new and
unfamiliar policy challenges such as the rise of China, international terrorism,
migration, and climate change. While Australia benefitted from the rise of Asian
power and prosperity, the longstanding certainties upon which its foreign policy
settings had been predicated have been called into question.
Foreign policy traditions
The Coalition’s and Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) foreign and defence policy
traditions are frequently thought to conform with the international relations
paradigms of realism and liberalism respectively.3 The Coalition is commonly
associated with international relations realism, which assumes that the competitive
interaction of states, acting in their self-interest in an anarchic international system,
results in ‘a politics of power and security’.4 Both scholars and Liberal Party
members alike tend to agree that the Liberals reflect elements that can be
characterised as ‘realist’: a strong preference for alliances to ensure security, a
scepticism towards the utility of multilateral forums and agreements, and a
tendency towards pragmatism, rather than idealism in decision making.5 Prime
Minister Howard’s government epitomised such an approach to foreign and
defence policy. His government’s 1997 Foreign Policy White Paper, entitled In the
National Interest, made the argument that the Coalition’s approach was ‘the hard-
headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy’.6
More recent foreign and defence policy decisions from Prime Ministers Abbott,
Turnbull and Morrison have continued to reflect the realist mindset with the
continuing centrality of ANZUS to defence strategy, the ongoing proliferation of
bilateral defence co-operation and free trade agreements (FTAs) since the Coalition
returned to power in 2013, and the ‘pragmatism’ of the Liberal Party approach
evident in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.7
In contrast, the ALP is often linked with international relations liberalism,
which assumes democracy, free trade, and multilateral institutions and norms are
viewed as the most conducive means of achieving co-operation between states
and international peace.8 The ALP has thus placed faith in international law, the
UN, and global/regional organisations as a means for pursuing Australia’s national
interests and values. ALP Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam, with his
rapprochement with China, and Paul Keating, with his drive for Asian engagement,
set the precedents for such approaches. The Rudd–Gillard governments continued
3 Frydenberg, Parke and Langmore 2014.
4 Wohlforth 2008.
5 McCraw 2008.
6 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1997, iii.
7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017, 11.
8 Jahn 2013.
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to evince these tendencies – the championing of multilateral forums like the G20,
the bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and norm
entrepreneurship and activism at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen. This approach has often been referred to, especially in Labor rhetoric,
as ‘middle power diplomacy’ – and scholars have adopted the ‘middle power’
framework to characterise and understand such behaviour.9 The ‘middle power’
concept emphasises a combination of sufficient power resources (normally
measured as the countries ranked globally from about 6th to 30th in terms of
GDP), with an inclination towards foreign policy activism on key global or niche
issues, such as climate change or disarmament. Middle powers have traditionally
viewed themselves as good international citizens, supporting international laws
and norms through multilateralism, rather than as self-interested mercantilist or
military powers. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s initiative on creating an Asia
Pacific community (APC), a new multilateral pan-regional grouping to improve
stability and security among the region, was exemplary of such self-styled creative
middle power diplomacy. It has become firmly established in the lexicon of
Australian foreign policy, despite the Liberal’s distaste for the middle-power
descriptor itself.
This fact, and further similarities between the parties, reflect the structural
constraints that guide the decision making of middle powers like Australia in the
international system. A core of bipartisanship regarding Australian defence policy
can be identified ‘including a focus on defending the Australian continent, an
alliance with the United States, and the capability to contribute to regional and
global coalition efforts’.10 Similar levels of bipartisanship exist regarding issues of
foreign policy – trade policy is broadly neoliberal in orientation and supports the
principles of free trade and marketisation (not to be confused with international
relations liberalism or the Liberal Party). As such, the differences between the
Labor and Liberal foreign and defence policy traditions may be better characterised
as different means to similar middle-power ends.
Liberal internationalism
There is considerable bipartisanship between Australia’s major parties regarding
how to engage with the international system. This may be captured by the principle
of ‘liberal internationalism’.11 Yet, liberal internationalism stands more broadly
for the extroverted role of Australia in engaging with international institutions,
participating in free trade and upholding a ‘rules-based international order’
(anchored in US global primacy). This has its basis in the identification of Australia
as a liberal democratic country with associated interests and values that should be
9 Wilkins 2014.
10 Carr 2017, 256.
11 Jahn 2013.
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pursued and defended. This liberal internationalism – defined as an ‘activist foreign
policy that promotes liberal principles abroad, especially through multilateral co-
operation and international institutions’12 – reflects Australia’s self-perception as a
‘good international citizen’.
Australia has been active in foreign policy spheres aligned with its national
interests and has pursued its values and support for an international rules-based
order in areas like trade and finance, global governance, human rights and justice,
the environment and aid. For example, the Rudd government played an
entrepreneurial role in encouraging the elevation of the G20 to a leader’s summit
in the context of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Such multilateral forums have
reflected the consensus that Australia’s economic needs are best served by free trade
and open markets,13 but also that better global governance can be achieved through
such forums, too. Australia has been similarly active pursuing international action
on environmental issues that affect Australia, including the Montreal Protocol
of 1987 that addressed the role chlorofluorocarbons played in ozone depletion
and anti-whaling action against Japan in the International Court of Justice in
2010 (though Australia has had a more mixed record regarding climate change
negotiations). These actions demonstrate the liberal internationalist belief in
institutions to provide opportunities for dialogue, mediate disputes and promote
good global governance.
Similarly, Australia identifies the liberal world order established by Pax
Americana (the relative international peace ensured by US hegemony) as a key
security interest, with the 2016 Defence White Paper arguing: ‘The growing
prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and the rules-based global order on which Australia
relies for open access to our trading partners are based on the maintenance of peace
and stability.’14 Australia has been active in multilateral agreements that uphold this
‘rules-based order’, such as pursuing service as a non-permanent member of the
UN Security Council, sanctioning illiberal states like North Korea or Syria, and
advocacy for the Responsibility to Protect, a principle that seeks to prevent mass
atrocity war crimes.
Australia has also defended such principles, including participation in opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Syria against global jihadism; humanitarian intervention
in Timor Leste in 1999 and again in 2006; a long history of peace-keeping efforts;
and attempts to hold Russia accountable for the downing of the airliner MH17 in
2014 while on the UN Security Council. Australia has also trod a ‘middle path’
on nuclear weapons – advocating for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and the
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, supporting international efforts to control
horizontal proliferation by actors like North Korea and Iran, but not supporting
recent multilateral pushes to eliminate nuclear weapons, as seen through the
12 Paris 1997, 59.
13 Fenna 2016, 263.
14 Department of Defence 2016, 15.
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International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. Aus-
tralia’s actions demonstrate the liberal intolerance of non-democratic countries and
their attendant challenge to the liberal order.15
Section 2: core policy platforms
Economic diplomacy
Responding to economic crises of the 1970s, the Hawke/Keating governments
liberalised the Australian economy and opened it to international market forces.
These policy shifts also advocated multilateral agreements to lower tariffs for
Australian resources and agricultural goods – an area where Australia retained
a comparative advantage. The record here was mixed – the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1994
did contain successes for Australia, but the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which set
the framework for the EU single market, the creation of the North America Free
Trade Agreement (now USMCA), and moves by ASEAN (Association of South-
East Asian Nations) to negotiate a free trade agreement that excluded Australia,
concerned Australian policy makers.16 Reducing trade protection barriers further
was of particular concern given the increasing importance of Japan, China and
South-East Asian countries as growing economies and important markets for
Australian exports. APEC was therefore a forum that Labor has embraced to
promote liberalisation in the region, but a pan-regional APEC free trade agreement
remains elusive.
The Howard government faced many of the same challenges as Labor and,
acting upon a preference for neoliberal principles, took the view that bilateral
trade negotiations could supplement multilateral efforts. This was informed by
the difficulties of the Doha Round of the GATT and was especially a concern
about trade access in East Asia, where Australia was making little headway with
ASEAN+317 and signs were developing of regional and bilateral trade agendas that
excluded Australian participation. The Howard government negotiated bilateral
FTAs with Thailand, Singapore, and more controversially the USA (AUSFTA),
where political imperatives to solidify the Australian–USA relationship seemed
to be as paramount as economic considerations.18 Multilaterally, the Howard
government was instrumental in the negotiation of the ASEAN–Australia–New
15 Doyle 1986.
16 Meredith and Dyster 1999, 290.
17 ASEAN+3 is a forum for cooperation between ASEAN members and the East Asian
nation-states Japan, China and South Korea.
18 Capling 2008, 36–7.
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Zealand free trade agreement19 and provided funds to the International Monetary
Fund as part of the bailout package during the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98).
Since then, further bilateral FTAs have been negotiated with Chile, Malaysia,
South Korea, Japan and China and multilaterally with the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) after the withdrawal
of the USA from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations in 2016. This
reflects the continuing significance of the neoliberal consensus in trade policy that
has remained even after the shocks of the GFC. Australia particularly championed
the CPTPP, pushing hard to revive negotiations after the US withdrawal from the
TPP.
This story of Australia’s international economic engagement reflects its position
as a middle power. Canberra has attempted to ensure the comparative advantage
of its resources, services and agricultural goods in the international marketplace,
but has also reflected its geographic position by negotiating key bilateral and
multilateral agreements centred in the Asia-Pacific rim. This has been especially
important as the resources boom is a story closely intertwined with China’s rise. In
the context of growing regional rivalries and US rejection of the free trade agenda
under President Trump, strategic security begins to come to the fore just as much
as economic security. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the abandonment of the
TPP by the USA will continue to concern Australian policy makers worried about
challenges to the orthodoxy of the international rules-based order.
Defence strategy
Australia’s defence strategy has undergone several iterations since Federation, but
its strategic interests have remained largely in the Indo-Pacific arc as, historically,
threats to the Australian continent have emerged from South-East Asia.20 While the
area of interest has remained consistent across time, the nature of the threat, the
balance of power among great nations, and Australia’s own capability to respond
have not remained the same, leading to different strategies being adopted since the
Second World War: the expeditionary school of ‘forward defence’ until 1972; and
the ‘continental defence’ of Australia school until 9/11.
The Second World War demonstrated that the British were no longer the pre-
eminent power in Asia. But the war also crushed Japan and saw China consumed by
civil war. This left Australia in the peculiar situation of continuing its alliances with
powerful allies, but also capable of projecting power with these allies into South-
East Asia to resist communism.21 This ‘forward defence’ policy led to Australian
military commitments to Korea and Vietnam with the US, and to Malaya and
Borneo with the British. Australia was able to defend the continent far from its
19 Firth 2011, 251.
20 Evans 2005, 23.
21 Lockyer 2017, 161
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northern approaches due to the relative weakness of the states in South-East Asia
and the relative strength and commitment of Australia’s allies in the region.
The forward defence era ended when the fear of the spread of communism in
the region reduced, the relative power of South-East Asian nation-states increased,
and Australia’s allies reduced their commitment to the region in the 1960s.22
Australian policy makers worked through the implications in the 1976 Defence
White Paper, the 1986 ‘Dibb Report’ and the 1987 Defence White Paper.23 Dibb
argued for the self-reliant defence of the Australian continent in two ways: treating
geography as an independent variable with an enduring effect on Australia’s
strategic interests; and that Australia should maintain a regional technological
edge.24 These ideas were meant to discipline defence planners: Australia could
contribute to overseas deployments with allies, but had to prioritise a military
geared towards the air and sea defence of Australia’s northern approaches and
relative de-emphasis upon the traditional prioritisation of the army.
Critics argue that there is a disjuncture between continental defence and what
the ADF actually does.25 The liberal internationalist nature of Australia’s strategic
culture has been reflected in its deployments and security priorities against global
jihadism, humanitarian intervention, and providing backing to failing states in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor Leste or the Solomon Islands. Such issues permeated
the 2003 Defence Update.26 More recent white papers have been criticised for
planning a force structure that is too thin to credibly deter a rising China from
operating in areas of strategic interest to Australia’s north, even with new capability
upgrades like the F35 joint strike fighter and the planned doubling of submarine
capabilities.27 How to deal with these problems has yet to be fully resolved. The
2016 Defence White Paper’s prioritisation of a ‘stable Indo-Pacific region and a
rules-based global order’28 demonstrates how far removed current Australian
strategic thinking is from actual continental defence. Such debates reflect the
changing regional balance of power.
Non-traditional security challenges
In the post-Cold War era ‘security’ has been conceptualised beyond the traditional
narrow military-strategic focus. This reflects the securitisation of a new range of
problems such as terrorism and migration, in addition to traditional concerns
about the regional strategic environment. Cyber security has also been an area
of increasing concern, with attacks launched by both state and non-state actors
22 Fruhling 2009, 44.
23 Dibb 2007.
24 Dibb 2006.
25 Evans 2005, 105.
26 Dupont 2003.
27 Babbage 2008.
28 Department of Defence 2016, 33.
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upon Australia’s political, economic and defence sectors.29 Added to this are less
obviously defence-related threats such as climate change and other environmental
disasters, financial risks, pandemics and societal/political instability, typically
described as ‘non-traditional security challenges’.30 As such, challenges such as
terrorism and irregular migration are increasingly considered as national security
threats, sometimes demanding a militarised response.
In the wake of the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks upon the USA (which for the first
time activated ANZUS), Australians were subjected to attacks in Bali (2002 and
2005) and Jakarta (2003 and 2004), followed by other incidents and foiled plots
in Australia. Canberra responded by deploying military force alongside the USA
in the Middle East. Canberra also ramped up its security apparatus domestically
and regionally and initiated major counterterrorism co-operation with regional
partners like Indonesia. Australia has thus provided training, equipment, and direct
military and police support overseas, and is engaged in surveillance and de-
radicalisation programs among domestic would-be Jihadists.
Irregular population movements have also assumed an outsized presence in
Australian security policy, often involving asylum seekers. While Australia has
accepted refugees from Vietnam or China in the past, such ‘illegal arrivals’ have
since been criminalised and military assets are now used to apprehend them in
tandem with Indonesia (Operation Sovereign Borders), and arrivals detained in
offshore processing centres (earlier known as the ‘Pacific Solution’). Such policies
violate Australia’s obligations under various human rights treaties and international
law and damage its reputation as a ‘good international citizen’, but the Australian
public sees asylum arrivals as a security threat31 and such policies now receive
bipartisan support.
Section 3: regionalism
‘Asian engagement’
Australian recognition of its geographic place at the southern tip of South-East
Asia occurred glacially, as it clung to its European roots. The gradual replacement
of fading British power with the greater strength of a fellow Anglo-Saxon
American ally allowed Australia to continue its limited embrace of its Asian
neighbours (with exceptions, such as the 1950 Colombo Plan). Australia found
itself engaged in wars of decolonisation at the behest of the UK and USA in
the postwar era, and Australian contact with Asia remained confined mainly
29 Hanson et al. 2017.
30 Baldino et al. 2011.
31 Lowy Poll 2018 – 77 per cent agreed that large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming
into Australia was a ‘critical threat’ or an ‘important, but not critical threat’ (Lowy Institute and
Oliver 2018, 8).
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to strategic issues, even as trade with a revitalised Japan started to become
increasingly important from the 1960s. One major impediment to Australia’s
acceptance in the Asian region was the ‘White Australia’ policy, which was
officially ended by Gough Whitlam in 1973.
It was not until the Labor prime ministership of Paul Keating that Canberra
truly faced the reality that its natural home was as part of Asia, and not simply as an
isolated ‘cultural outpost’ of an Anglo-Saxon protector.32 Keating, with the support
of his foreign minister, Gareth Evans, carved a path – sometimes controversial –
of ‘Asian engagement’, and the country has assumed a strong role not only in the
economy of the Asian region, but also in its institutional arrangements. Indeed,
Keating and Evans were instrumental in the creation of pan-regional organisations
such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ‘region’ in which Australia
resides is referred to variously as ‘Asia’, the ‘Asia-Pacific’ and more recently the
‘Indo-Pacific’. While Labor governments have typically been more proactive on
this, and though Liberal Prime Minsters such as John Howard and Tony Abbott
have sought to place a stronger accent on ‘Anglosphere’ partners, they have not
interrupted the process (a dynamic identified as the ‘Howard paradox’).33 Even
Liberal Prime Minister Tony Abbott talked about ‘more Jakarta, less Geneva’ as the
guiding principle for foreign policy.34
Canberra’s regional efforts have naturally focused upon the major powers
in Asia, with which Australia has successively built deep trading, and in some
cases, security ties. Successive government white papers have identified Japan,
India, South Korea, India, as well as China, as the main foci of engagement. First
came Japan from the 1960s onwards, as Australian natural resources played a
major role in that country’s economic boom and rise to regional pre-eminence
into the 1980s–90s. From a long-term foundation of economic and cultural ties,
more recently the relationship has taken on a strategic aspect with the ground-
breaking Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, which has since
been reinforced and is now described as a ‘Special Strategic Partnership’.35 Second,
India’s economic liberalisation in the 1990s paved the way for its greater presence
in Asian affairs and indicated the importance of strengthening long-neglected
bilateral ties. With the reframing of Australian strategic policy under the mantra
of ‘Indo-Pacific’, and its accompanying ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy, the
possibilities of enhancing bilateral co-ordination with New Delhi, especially in the
maritime sphere, have gained increased attention.36 The ‘Quad’ dialogue between
Canberra, Tokyo, India and the USA, also reinforces Australian engagement with
these two leading Asian powers. Third, South Korea is a significant Australian
32 Keating 2000.
33 Wesley 2007.
34 O’Neil 2018.
35 Wilkins 2018.
36 Brewster 2016.
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trading partner and Canberra remains deeply engaged with the question of North
Korean nuclear proliferation. Fourth, managing relations with Indonesia has
presented a major challenge in Australian foreign policy, particularly as this
emerging power acts as a fulcrum of both ASEAN and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept,
and ties with Jakarta have been subject to a series of highs and lows related to
human rights concerns, terrorism, irregular migration, and pronounced cultural
differences.
Foreign aid
Aid is an extension of Australia’s national interest, with a regionally directed
focus. Prime Minister Howard once reflected upon the regional basis to this
notion: ‘Australia’s most immediate interests and responsibilities will always be
in our region’37 – the South Pacific (Pacific Island countries) and South-East
Asia. This area is sometimes described as an ‘arc of instability’,38 a term that
conveys the connection between aid, security and the national interest. Aid was
not always conceived of in this securitised fashion. Aid thinking prior to the
mid-2000s was primarily development centred, with an emphasis upon economic
growth and market-based solutions.39 But global jihadism and the danger of failing
states in the region shifted Australia’s approach to aid to one that sought to
manage ‘the spill-over to Australia of transnational risks, potentially festering
within the borders of “ineffective” states’.40 The primary means to influence the
region has largely been through foreign aid or overseas development assistance,
through forums like the Pacific Island Forum, and, in extreme situations, military
intervention.
The securitisation of the region, coinciding with the increasing revenues
garnered from the mining boom, ushered in a ‘golden consensus’ of bipartisan
support for an 80 per cent increase in aid from 2003/04 to 2012/13,41 aiming
to minimise risk and improve governance and state capability. Howard began
the budget increases and Rudd continued, aligning aid spending with the UN
Millennium Development Goals in the process, a framework that committed states
to reducing extreme global disadvantage and poverty.
The GFC of 2008 broke this consensus. The Gillard government cut aid in the
pursuit of budget repair and the incoming Abbott government cut even deeper,
merging the stand-alone statutory body AusAID into DFAT in 2014 and cutting aid
spending dramatically – $7.6 billion over forward estimates and an additional $1
billion in the following financial year.42 The government was able to do this as aid
37 Howard 2005 (emphasis added).
38 Ayson 2007.
39 Corbett and Dinnen 2016, 89–91.
40 Hameiri 2008, 357.
41 Day 2016, 641–2.
42 Day 2016, 643–4.
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was only shallowly embedded in political discourses and institutions, and the cuts
failed to attract public opprobrium.43 The Coalition has subsequently argued that
aid ‘both supports the strong and direct national interest we have in stability and
prosperity in our region and reflects our values as a nation’.44 The securitisation of
aid, its regional focus, and recent budgetary cuts, demonstrate that the aid program
is strongly geared towards the national interest as much as it is towards Australia’s
liberal internationalist values.
Section 4: the superpowers
Rise of China
Australia has been a major beneficiary of Chinese economic development as it has
provided raw materials, and increasingly services, to China. Bilateral trade with
China now amounts to $164 billion, representing 27 per cent of total Australian
trade in 2017.45 This has boosted the economy immeasurably, even more so than
Japanese trade did during its 1960s–1980s boom period. Australia has engaged
Beijing diplomatically (through the Australia–China annual Foreign and Strategic
Dialogue) and joined regional initiatives spearheaded by China such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership. The important tertiary education sector in Australia has also seen an
influx of mainland Chinese students, and the establishment of Confucius Institutes,
exposing the nation to contact with all things Chinese as never before.
But Australian policy makers have been somewhat uncomfortable with China’s
meteoric rise to power,46 and Australian economic dependency upon China is a
double-edged sword as Beijing’s national interests and values are, in many ways,
inimical to those held by Australia. In the past, Australia enjoyed the happy
concurrence of its trade and security centred upon the USA and its allies (especially
Japan), but efforts to ‘compartmentalise’ trade and security initiated under Howard
have now run their course.47 In contrast to Australia’s liberal democratic capitalist
democracy, China is a (nominally) communist authoritarian government which
holds different views on domestic practice and regional affairs. For example,
Australia is mindful of Chinese ‘core interests’ and refrains from aggravating
Beijing over the status of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet (e.g. receiving the Dalai
Lama), subdues its criticism of human rights, and weighs the support it gives to
Washington and Tokyo when this conflicts with Beijing’s views.
43 Day 2016. Also, a 2015 Lowy Institute poll found majority public support for 2015–16 aid budget
cuts (Lowy Institute and Oliver 2015, 4).
44 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018a, 1.
45 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018b.
46 Gill and Jakobson 2017.
47 White 2013.
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Of particular note is Australia’s opposition to Chinese assertiveness in the
South China Sea, where Beijing has territorial disputes with neighbouring countr-
ies and is engaged in a process of militarising artificial land features, against the
strong protests of the USA and others. Australia risks both diplomatic chastisement
and economic retaliation (‘punishment’) for diplomatic missteps in Beijing’s eyes –
such as decrying China as a ‘threat’ (as in the 2009 Defence White Paper). Moreover,
Chinese influence on Australia’s domestic politics has not always been benign. The
revelation of expansive industrial and defence espionage activities and attempts
to shape political dynamics within the country (known as ‘influence operations’)
have revealed the stark divergences in political and cultural mores among the
two.48 Australia has since sought to increase its resilience to such efforts and has
passed legislation to scrutinise Chinese investment due to linkages with state-
owned enterprises. Thus, Beeson and Hameiri conclude that ‘for better or worse,
however, attempting to manage relations with China is going to be the litmus test
of policy efficacy for any Australian government for the foreseeable future’.49
US alliance
The US alliance has remained a central pillar of Australian foreign and defence
policy planning since its codification in the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, which served to
shield the country from the communist threat of the USSR and China. The ANZUS
Treaty created a trilateral Australia–USA–New Zealand arrangement, but is now
effectively bilateral since Wellington was excluded by the USA in 1986 over its non-
nuclear policy.50 The alliance retains strong elite and public support in Australia
and the country remains ‘dependent’ upon Washington for its ultimate national
defence, including the important function of the US nuclear capability to deter
armed attack upon its territory (‘extended deterrence’).51 Indeed, without American
military support Australia would need to raise its defence budget significantly, and
perhaps even contemplate developing an independent nuclear deterrent to secure
its national defence.52
Sustained Australian commitment and ‘loyalty’ to the alliance has been
demonstrated through its unfailing military contribution to coalitions led by the
USA in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the broader ‘War on Terror’ against
al-Qaeda/ISIS. The capabilities of the ADF are closely interoperable with those
of their American counterparts and utilise much of the same US technology.53
Australia also hosts a range of ‘joint facilities’ such as the Pine Gap intelligence
facility and ‘rotational’ deployment of the US Marine Air–Ground Task Force near
48 Hamilton 2018.
49 Beeson and Hameiri 2017, 9.
50 Hensley 2013.
51 Bell 1988.
52 Frühling 2018.
53 Dean, Frühling and Taylor 2016.
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Darwin. Finally, recent white papers have indicated that Canberra is committed to
deepening its alliance interdependence through increased military integration.54 As
such, Canberra has been a resolute diplomatic supporter of US foreign and strategic
policy in a bid to ensure its own national security through the maintenance of
US primacy in Asia (e.g. through the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy). This
is enshrined in Australian defence thinking as necessary ‘payment of an alliance
premium’ to assuage ‘fear of abandonment’, thus theoretically ensuring that the
USA reciprocates should Australia find itself under attack in some future
unspecified contingency.55
However, the management of the bilateral alliance has increasingly come under
duress, not only as a result of the erratic Trump presidency, but due to the rising
power and influence of Beijing upon the Indo Pacific region, particularly its
increasing strategic weight and the deep economic dependence of Australia on
China for its continued prosperity.
Conclusions
This chapter highlighted a range of key themes central to the thinking and practice
of Australian foreign and defence policy. Many of the long-term issues are familiar
– how to balance the US alliance with good international citizenship and Asian
engagement – but these issues may develop in new ways into the future, and new
pressing issues may emerge that create serious challenges to existing foreign policy
settings. The stresses between these central factors are increasing as US power
and purpose in the Indo-Pacific is undermined both by American policies and
structural decline (the end of ‘unipolarity’), but also by the rise of China and
other Asian powers, which will substantially reshape the regional environment that
Australia inhabits.
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Health policy
Ian McAuley
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determinants of health
A fundamental concern of governments is the health of their citizens, and all
governments have policies directed to, or having an effect on, people’s health. Most
policy concern is with health care – that is, the provision of services, ranging from
general practitioner (GP) consultations through to high-intensity care for those
suffering severe accidents or life-threatening diseases such as cancer.
But in terms of health outcomes – the capacity of people to enjoy many years of
healthy life – provision of health care is only one factor. Governments have programs
promoting healthy lifestyles to reduce the need for health care, and almost all govern-
ment policies contribute to or detract from people’s health directly or indirectly.
Health care, however, tends to dominate policy considerations. For reasons to
do with social equity and failures of market mechanisms to deliver health care,
governments of all persuasions, ‘left’ or ‘right’, are heavily involved in health care,
which commands a large and growing proportion of government budgets. In
Australia one-fifth of government outlays are for health care.
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Governments and the health of nations
Public health
Many government interventions that contribute to (or detract from) people’s health
take place in areas other than the health portfolio. Regulations such as those
applying to firearms, food safety, air quality and use of seat belts all have an effect on
health. So too do provision of infrastructure such as clean water and sewerage, and
town planning (do our cities encourage walking, are there enough playing fields?).
Policies to do with slowing the rate of climate change or mitigating its effects may
seem to be distant from health policy, but climate change can have profound effects
on the incidence of heat stress, food supply, the spread of diseases, air quality,
natural disasters and dislocation of entire populations.1
Then there are specific measures that are generally described as ‘public health’.
These include vaccinations, and campaigns on safe sex, discouragement of smoking
and on responsible use of alcohol. The reach of a government’s ‘health’ portfolio
varies between states or other divisions within nations: governments may, for
example, include sport in the health portfolio.
Social determinants of health – unsung but effective policies
Sound health and socio-economic conditions are strongly correlated. Those who
enjoy connections to the community, well-paid and meaningful work, social
support and control over their lives enjoy better health than those who don’t.
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) points out that ‘people in
lower socio-economic groups are at greater risk of poor health, have higher rates
of illness, disability and death, and live shorter lives than those in higher socio-
economic groups’.2
Correlation does not prove causation: those who suffer poor health cannot
easily find well-paid employment, for example. But there is strong evidence that
there is also causation in the other direction: people’s health over their lifetimes
is influenced by their socio-economic conditions. Among what are known as the
‘social determinants of health’ are early childhood development, education
attainment, people’s occupation (those with more control over their work enjoy
better health), job and financial security, and people’s degree of social integration.3
There is also evidence that those who live in societies with more economic
inequality, regardless of their individual income or wealth, have poorer health
than those in more equal societies.4 Therefore policies relating to early childhood
1 McMichael 2017.
2 AIHW 2018a, 256.
3 Wilkinson and Marmot 2003.
4 Wilkinson and Pickett 2009.
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education, employment, and income distribution, which may be distant from the
health portfolio, can have a profound effect on people’s physical and mental health.
There is also evidence that once countries reach a high level of prosperity, and
have been able to afford significant spending on health care, additional spending
has diminishing returns. Figure 1, derived from Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) data for 43 middle- and high-income
countries, shows the relation between health spending per capita (predominantly
health care) and life expectancy, with certain countries, including Australia,
marked. Apart from the USA, all countries in the right-hand two-thirds of that
graph have much the same life expectancy, even though spending varies by a factor
of about two to one. The USA, it can be seen, does not appear to have achieved good
value-for-money spent on health care – an ongoing issue with dysfunctions in its
private health insurance model.
This is not to underplay the importance of devoting resources – government
or private – to health care, but it is a reminder that while policies to do with
health care command attention in the political arena, in high-income countries like
Australia people’s health is influenced by many policies other than those within the
health portfolio.
Australia’s health
By world standards Australians enjoy good health, but so do those who live in
other high-income ‘developed’ countries . Australians’ life expectancy at birth, a key
indicator of a nation’s health, is close to the highest in the world.5
An important factor contributing to Australia’s good health is its young
population. Most high-income countries have an aged population, but in Australia’s
case a sustained high rate of immigration has kept our population comparatively
young. In 2018 the median age of Australians was 39; by contrast the median
age of Italians, Japanese and Germans was above 45.6 Our comparatively young
population has kept demand for expenditure on health care under control. Also,
because immigration policies are selective, immigrants tend to be healthier than the
Australian-born population.
Nationwide indicators such as life expectancy can mask significant variations
within population groups, however. Indicators of ‘disease burden’ show that people
living in non-metropolitan regions have significantly poorer health and die younger
than those in cities. Indigenous Australians have around 10 years lower life
expectancy than other Australians (although the gap is closing) and they experience
high rates of child mortality (twice the national average).
5 OECD 2017.
6 World Population Review 2018.
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Figure 1 Life expectancy at birth and health spending per capita, 43 countries. Source: data from
OECD 2017, data as for chart 3.3, page 49, excluding South Africa.
In terms of health risk factors Australia scores well on smoking but poorly on
obesity (28 per cent of Australians aged 15 and over are obese), and our alcohol
consumption is high by international standards.7
Mental health has become an area of increasing policy concern in recent years.
According to the AIHW almost half of Australians between the ages of 16 and
85 ‘will experience a mental disorder such as depression, anxiety or substance use
disorder at some stage in their life’.8
Mental health disorders tend to peak in late teenage years, but for almost all
other conditions the prevalence of poor health is strongly correlated with age.
Readers of this textbook are probably among those least likely to have more than
occasional first-hand experience with health care services. Figure 2 shows the
incidence of Medicare services (consultations with GPs and specialists, operations,
and certain services provided by other health professionals) by age.
Government involvement in health care
Within health portfolios governments’ main concerns are generally about the
funding of health care – either through public budgets (such as Australia’s Medic-
are) or through private insurance, which is generally subject to regulation, tax
concessions or direct subsidies. Also in some cases, most notably state government-
owned public hospitals, governments are involved in delivering health care. It is
7 AIHW 2018a.
8 AIHW 2018a, 83.
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Figure 2 Medicare services per capita by age group, 2011–12. Source: data from Department of
Health 2019, Medicare statistics 2011–12.
notable that what passes for public debate on health care often confuses gov-
ernments’ roles in funding and providing health care.
There are two broad principles driving government involvement. First, people
seek some mechanism to share their outlays for health care through insurance,
public or private. And second, there are reasons why there would be socially and
economically unacceptable outcomes if health care were left to private markets.
Community-rated health insurance
In times long past, those who could not afford health care went without, or
depended on the meagre offerings of charities. Colonial governments financed
services to provide care ‘for the hospital care or indigent class of the community’,
but such services provided in public hospitals were basic.9 Also medical
practitioners would see it as a noblesse oblige (the paternalistic idea that those with
means had an unwritten obligation to help the less fortunate) to provide care for
the poor.
There has been a slow transition in health care from a ‘charity’ model, whereby
the poor or those with high needs had to rely on religious or similar charitable
institutions, to one of community sharing, whereby through contributions to
insurance-type arrangements, or through taxes, communities share all or part of
their health care expenses. The first mutual benefit societies developed in New
South Wales in the 1830s, but they covered only a minority of the population. It
wasn’t until the period after 1945 that mechanisms for widespread sharing of health
care costs were developed with increasing levels of government involvement.
9 Sax 1984, 25.
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Worldwide the development was along two paths. One path, in Britain and
the Nordic countries, was for governments to take the prime role in funding, and
in some cases providing, tax-financed health care for all. Many other European
countries relied more on mutual benefit societies, which slowly extended their
reach to become not-for-profit health insurers. The USA, by contrast, relied on
insurance provided by for-profit companies. Some countries’ policies were guided
by the principle that whatever one’s means, health care would be accessible to
everyone on the same terms (‘universalism’) while others directed health care
funding more at the poor or indigent, using means tests.
Much is written on the difference between these funding systems. There are,
indeed, important differences: in particular America’s reliance on for-profit
insurance has resulted in that country having high-cost health care and in many
people being uncovered. (As a proportion of GDP, America’s total health care
costs, private and government, are the highest of all OECD countries, and almost
double the OECD average.10) But there are also important similarities in different
countries’ policies, the strongest being people’s choice, generally backed through
political processes, to share health care costs with one another, through some form
of insurance, private or public.
At first sight there seems to be a simple way to fill this need: if people seek
to share their health care costs with one another, then they should be free to do
so through private insurance or through mutual societies. But such laissez faire
arrangements fail to meet community needs.
In the comparatively unregulated markets of general insurance, where we
insure our houses and cars, markets can work reasonably well. Insurance firms,
using indicators of risk, charge according to those indicators. Someone with a safe
driving record pays a lower premium than someone with a string of accidents and
offences. This practice is known as ‘risk rating’.
But risk rating for health insurance would be extremely difficult because for
many high-cost contingencies there are no clear risk indicators: debilitating con-
ditions such as cancer can occur without any prior indicators.
The other main problem with risk-rated health insurance is political
unacceptability. Private insurers would set prohibitively high premiums for older
people, and could refuse to cover people who have pre-existing chronic conditions,
who work in hazardous occupations or who have known risk factors. This would be
unacceptable by most people’s norms of social justice, remembering that the poor
are often those with highest health care needs.
Therefore, through political processes that override market mechanisms,
governments generally intervene to achieve what is known as ‘community rating’
for health insurance. That is a system where there is partial or complete equalisation
10 OECD 2017.
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of insurance premiums across the community, or even forms of subsidies from
those with low needs to those with high needs.
Government-financed ‘single-payer’ systems, such as those in the Nordic
countries, the UK and Canada, achieve community rating through their taxation
systems. In terms of administrative costs these are by far the most efficient systems,
because they tap into the scale economies and powers of compulsion of the taxation
system, and to the extent that their taxation systems are progressive they achieve an
equitable distribution of health care financing.
Achieving community rating through private insurance is more difficult.
Private insurers incur high administrative costs, including the costs of competing
for customers, and the regulations that are designed to achieve community rating
are complex, often leading to perverse incentives.
Public or private insurance
It may seem odd that many governments should choose to use private insurance
to do what the tax and public expenditure system, with all its controls and
accountability, can do more efficiently and equitably. When private health
insurance is compulsory (as in Japan and the Netherlands), or highly subsidised
and incentivised (as in Australia), it can be considered as a ‘privatised tax’.
The explanation lies partially in the politics of public accounting. Governments
are often driven by a simplistic agenda of keeping taxes (official taxes as revea-
led in public budgets) low, and politically it is easier to blame private insurers for
high and rising premiums than to take responsibility for increasing taxes to pay for
health care.
But even in countries ideologically committed to private mechanisms, gov-
ernments still become involved in at least partially funding health care. Table 1
shows how health care is funded in high-income ‘developed’ countries.
Whatever form insurance takes, those seeking health care usually have to
make some out-of-pocket outlays. Such payments may be in the form of a fixed
partial contribution (as with pharmaceuticals in Australia) or in the form of
payments that accumulate before the insurer, usually a government insurer, covers
all or a large part of further expenses. In high-income ‘developed’ countries,
including Australia, out-of-pocket expenses are generally around one-fifth of total
health care expenditure, although they can vary tremendously between different
services.
An enduring debate among health economists has been about the
appropriateness of what is known as ‘fee-for-service’ health care. Fee-for-service
care is a familiar and established system of payment, particularly for outpatient
services. In Australia Medicare pays medical practitioners fixed fees for defined
items of service. A common such service is ‘Item 23’ on the Medicare benefits
schedule – a GP consultation of less than 20 minutes.
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Government
schemes
Compulsory
health
insurance
Voluntary
health
insurance
Out-of-
pocket
Other Total
1 Denmark 84 0 2 14 0 100
2 Sweden 84 0 1 15 1 100
3 UK 80 0 3 15 2 100
4 Norway 74 11 0 14 0 100
5 New
Zealand
71 9 5 13 3 100
6 Ireland 70 0 12 15 3 100
7 Canada 69 1 13 15 2 100
8 Australia 67 0 10 20 4 100
9 Finland 61 13 3 20 3 100
10 Iceland 52 29 0 17 2 100
11 Austria 31 45 5 18 2 100
12 USA 27 23 35 11 4 100
13 Switzerland 22 42 7 28 1 100
14 Belgium 18 59 5 18 0 100
15 Netherlands 9 71 6 12 1 100
16 Luxembourg 9 73 6 11 1 100
17 Japan 9 75 2 13 1 100
18 Germany 7 78 1 13 2 100
19 France 4 75 14 7 1 100
Table 1 Health care funding by source of funds (%), 2015. Source: OECD Health Statistics
(http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm), data for high income OECD
countries (GDP per capita > $US $40 000 in 2017 at PPP).
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Some argue that fee-for-service encourages overservicing by practitioners and
overdependence on health care by patients, suggesting in their place that other
forms of payment should be used, such as what is known as ‘capitation’, where a
medical practitioner or health clinic is paid according to the number of people
in their catchment area (adjusted for age and known risk factors). Unsurprisingly
critics of capitation argue that it can provide incentives for under-servicing.
Drivers of health care expenditure
Whichever measure is used – real expenditure per capita or expenditure as a
proportion of GDP – health care expenditure is rising in almost all countries.
During 2003 to 2016 real per-capita health care expenditure growth in OECD
countries averaged 2.4 per cent a year, a rate that would see a doubling every 30
years.11 Australia’s growth in health care expenditure has been only a little lower.12
Because governments directly fund a large proportion of health care, and try to
control the prices charged by regulated insurers and by those with market power,
rising health care expenditure is a significant political concern.
The main driver of expenditure growth is usage, rather than the cost per
service. So long as services are free or heavily subsidised at the point of delivery,
there will be some pressure for overuse.
Unless there is an increase in the supply of resources dedicated to providing
health care, the result of unmet demand will be ‘queuing’. People will find they
cannot make an immediate GP appointment and people with non-urgent needs
will be put on to hospital waiting lists while more important cases are attended
to. Although waiting times command media attention and political criticism (the
media often confuse queue lengths with waiting times), a health care system in
which everyone could be attended to immediately is neither practical nor
affordable. A waiting list allows scarce and expensive resources (medical specialists,
nurses, diagnostic equipment) to be allocated to those who benefit the most. If
there were so much spare capacity and those resources were underutilised for want
of demand, that would be wasteful.
As we age we use more health care, and Australia’s population, although young
by world standards, is ageing. Over the long term Australians are having fewer
babies, immigration as a proportion of the population is falling, and we are living
longer. It should be noted, however, that older Australians now are much healthier
than they were a generation or two ago. Some health care costs, such as those
associated with treatment of cancer, tend to be concentrated in the last few years of
life, and if we live longer those costs are deferred.
Another driver of health care costs, often mentioned, is new technology. In
most industries new technologies result in unit cost reduction, and it is certainly
11 OECD 2017.
12 AIHW 2018b.
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the case in health care, as in other industries, that information and communication
technologies have helped reduce administrative costs. But there is also a flow of
expensive technologies that offer new opportunities to diagnose or cure diseases
or to ameliorate their effect, particularly pharmaceuticals. Technologies based on
genetic manipulation and bespoke treatment for individuals are just emerging.
Some technologies that have developed and been refined in recent years, such
as magnetic resource imaging (MRI), allow for earlier detection of conditions
than would have been possible in times past. Early detection of conditions can
save lives, allowing for timely and low-cost interventions (such as the removal of
small cancerous growths) or can promote changes in lifestyle. But such diagnostic
improvements can also lead to excess treatment of conditions that pose little threat
in themselves, such as slow-growing tumours that would be overtaken by other
causes of death.
Achieving value-for-money in health care
Both in their own role in funding health care, and in their broader role in helping
people make well-informed decisions with their individual resources (a consumer
protection function), governments are concerned with achieving value-for-money
in health care.
A prime concern is to ensure that health care interventions – pharmaceuticals,
operations – are effective. Do they achieve what they are intended to achieve?
Clinical trials of pharmaceuticals are about establishing a new drug’s effectiveness,
including detection of unexpected or undesirable side-effects. Similarly, there can
be evaluations of operations to find which surgical procedures are most effective or
whether pharmaceutical treatments can substitute for surgery, for example.
As a general rule, governments seek evidence on the effectiveness of health
care interventions. The gold standard, as in other areas of public administration, is
‘evidence-based policy’. But it is a tough standard in health care. Research is difficult
and expensive, in part because there are not standard conditions and there are not
standard procedures. And there are ethical considerations in experiments involving
people: is it ethical to conduct control experiments in which some patients are given
one form of operation while others are given another form?
Even when the effectiveness of a form of treatment is established, the question
of value-for-money arises. A new pharmaceutical may be very effective in
prolonging the life of cancer sufferers, but if the drug is very expensive, and if the
prolongation of life is only short, could scarce public money be better directed to
where more health benefits could be enjoyed?
The changing nature of health care – from acute conditions to chronic conditions
Partly as a result of changed lifestyles, and partly as a result of new therapies, the
nature of health care has been changing over the long term.
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Over most of the 20th century health care was mainly about curing what
are known as ‘acute’ conditions, such as infections and injuries. As new
pharmaceuticals became available, and as regimes of treatment improved,
conditions which were once fatal became curable, or at least manageable. For
example, in the 50 years to 2017, the cardiovascular disease death rate in Australia
has fallen by 82 per cent.13 Some of this improvement is because of lifestyle
improvement, some is because of early detection, and some is because of clinical
management of people with heart disease or risk factors.
This means that many more people, particularly as they age, are living with
conditions that in earlier periods would not have been survivable. Much of the
task of health care has been a shift from curing acute conditions to management of
‘chronic’ conditions such as diabetes, hypertension and dementia.
As people live longer with manageable chronic conditions, the boundary
between health care and care of the aged becomes less clear. This blurring of
boundaries is described by a former head of the Health Department as a ‘major
shift in demand underway because of Australia’s ageing population, with chronic
illness and the frail aged now dominating the burden of disease’.14 In high-income
countries, while heart disease and stroke remain the leading eventual causes of
death, the incidence of death from Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease and
other dementia has trebled over 20 years.15
The political economy of health care
Australia’s set of health care arrangements is complex – so complex that it would
be inaccurate to call it a ‘system’. The term ‘system’ implies a degree of deliberate
design to ensure that all the parts come together and that they operate according to
the same principles. But Australia’s health care arrangements are fragmented, each
of the main parts having its own provenance.
These arrangements have been shaped by competing ideologies, competing
interest groups, the inertia of established practices, historical division of
Commonwealth–state responsibilities, and constraints imposed by interpretations
of the Australian Constitution.
Civil conscription and the British Medical Association
Although the Commonwealth had been involved in public health and in health
care for soldiers and veterans, it was in the postwar years that it was to become
strongly involved in health care. Well before the Pacific War ended, the federal
government had been planning a comprehensive national welfare scheme that was
13 AIHW 2017a.
14 Podger 2018, 197.
15 WHO 2018.
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to include health services, a basic feature of which was provision for a salaried
(rather than fee-for-service) medical service, similar in ways to Britain’s National
Health Service.
Such an extension of Commonwealth powers met with fierce opposition from
the British Medical Association (BMA), the organisation representing Australia’s
medical practitioners. Calling on the emotionally charged conflicts about military
conscription in the 1914–18 war, the BMA presented the idea of a UK-style single-
payer national scheme as a form of ‘civil conscription’.
Partly to buy peace from the BMA, and partly to consolidate its authority,
following a High Court disallowance of the Commonwealth’s authority to make
laws on certain social services, the Chifley Labor government put forward a
constitutional amendment to give the Commonwealth powers to make laws for
‘the provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child endowment,
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental
services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription), benefits to
students and family allowances’. The amendment, with its ‘no conscription’ carve-
out, was easily passed.
At the same time the Menzies Liberal opposition was strongly opposed to any
tax-funded scheme, preferring a contributory scheme for health insurance.
Hence were established the ideological and interest-group divisions which
frame health policy to the present.
The other constraint on coherent policy has been division of Com-
monwealth–state responsibilities, because long before the Commonwealth even
existed the states were involved in funding and providing public hospitals.
So rather than a coherent, integrated health system, with all components
working together under the same design principles, Australia has a set of
arrangements, some private sector, some government, some Commonwealth, some
state, some free at the point of delivery, some with out-of-pocket expenses, some
universal, some means-tested. They come together in a process that health
economist Sidney Sax called ‘a strife of interests’.16
Seventy years of muddling through
Charles Lindblom coined the term ‘muddling through’ to describe a policy
development process whereby policy makers build on what has gone before, even
if the resulting policy does not align with what they have designed from a blank
slate.17 It’s analogous to the way a series of additions may be made to an old house,
in preference to pulling it down and starting from scratch.
While the Chifley government was thwarted in its attempts to develop a
universal tax-funded health system, in 1948 it managed to introduce the
16 Sax 1984.
17 Lindblom 1959.
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Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), initially providing a limited number of
free life-saving and disease-preventing drugs, using the purchasing power of
government to secure reasonable prices. The Menzies (Liberal–Country Party
Coalition) government, elected in 1949, pragmatically retained and extended the
PBS, and, apart from the introduction of a co-payment in 1959, the essential
architecture of the PBS remains largely unchanged.
This is the only case of the Commonwealth using its purchasing power to set
prices and to regulate what will and will not be paid for or subsidised. Politically
it’s easier to take on the largely foreign pharmaceutical firms rather than the local
medical lobby.
The next major initiative was by the Whitlam (Labor) government, in office
from 1972 to 1975. It introduced a universal tax-funded scheme known as
‘Medibank’ (not to be confused with the private insurance firm of the same name).
Its main elements were free access to public hospitals and a range of other services,
most notably free or heavily subsidised access to medical services. Medical
practitioners would be paid on a fee-for-service basis, and would remain in private
practice, thus avoiding the ‘no conscription’ constraint. Hospitals and their funding
remained under state control, with funding negotiated in a series of agreements
between the Commonwealth and the states.
When it was introduced to parliament Medibank met with furious opposition,
from the medical lobbies, the private health insurers and the Coalition opposition
who effectively controlled the numbers in the Senate. Medibank became law only
in 1974 following a double dissolution election and a joint sitting of parliament.
The Fraser (Coalition) government, in office from 1975 to 1983, demolished
Medibank in a series of small steps, and by 1979 health funding had essentially
reverted to the pre-1974 model, relying on private insurance. Publicly funded
medical benefits were reduced, free access to public hospitals was restricted to those
meeting means tests, and an income tax rebate of 32 per cent was introduced for
people with private health insurance.
The Hawke–Keating (Labor) government, elected in 1983, reintroduced
Medibank under the name ‘Medicare’, and eliminated subsidies for private health
insurance. Private health insurance had achieved 68 per cent coverage under the
previous government’s incentives. By the time the Hawke–Keating government lost
office in 1996, coverage had fallen to 33 per cent.
The Howard (Coalition) government set about restoring a raft of incentives to
support private health insurance, many of which were designed to entice younger
people to take insurance to subsidise older members. Almost straight away
coverage rose to 45 per cent of the population and it peaked at 47 per cent in 2015
before starting to fall back. The Howard government’s reversal of Labor’s policy
was less severe than the reversal that had occurred under the Fraser government:
notably it did not apply a means test to access public hospitals, which remained
free, but there was a subtle expectation, encouraged by taxation incentives, that
the better-off would use private insurance to buy private care in private hospitals.
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Ideologically it was a partial shift from health care as a universal service, to a service
for the needy, sometimes referred to as a ‘two-tier’ system.
The Rudd–Gillard (Labor) government, in office from 2007 to 2013,
maintained support for private insurance and the Abbott–Turnbull–Morrison
(Coalition) government essentially maintained the status quo. The election of 2016
had seen the retention of Medicare as a major issue.
The muddle
While in most high-income ‘developed’ countries there is a degree of stability in
health care financing, that is not the case in Australia. A series of policy reversals,
modifying but not redesigning existing policies, has left Australia with a patchwork
and complex set of arrangements.
Figure 3 shows one face of this complexity – the ways different health care
programs are funded. In aggregate terms Australians draw on governments, mainly
the Commonwealth, for about 70 per cent of their health care costs, private insurers
for another 10 per cent, and their own pockets for the remaining 20 per cent. But this
varies tremendously between programs. Public hospitals are essentially free, funded
through joint Commonwealth–state agreements. For pharmaceuticals, patients must
make a capped co-payment, with the co-payments varying according to patients’
means. For dental services, most of the payment is from patients’ own funds, with
some through subsidised private insurance and programs for targeted groups. Private
hospitals are funded mainly through private insurance, the Commonwealth
contribution a set of subsidies which make up about a third of the net cost.
Such complexity inevitably leads to duplicated bureaucracies and high
transaction costs. It leads to gaming and perverse incentives when different
government agencies (sometimes in different tiers of government) try to meet their
own financial targets by shifting costs to different programs. For example, payments
for pharmaceuticals come out of state budgets for patients in state hospitals, but
out of the Commonwealth-funded PBS for others. And it probably leads to people
seeking some care from services that are free or low-cost at the point of delivery
(either through Medicare or private insurance), when other services with higher
out-of-pocket costs would be more efficient in terms of overall costs and benefits.
Further, a lack of system integration means that people do not receive the
timely attention. The Productivity Commission reported in 2015 an opportunity to
get far more out of our health system through better use of measures that come
into play before people become involved in expensive hospitalisation.18 Effective
promotion of healthy lifestyles can reduce the overall demands on health care.
Similarly, well-designed primary care – particularly care by GPs – can avoid some
hospitalisations.19
18 Productivity Commission 2015.
19 Starfield 2005.
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Figure 3 Health expenditure by source of funds, 2016–17. Source: data from AIHW 2018b, table A3.
Recurrent expenditure only, not including research, administration, public health and funding from
other sources comprising 3% of expenditure.
Then there are problems in defining ‘health care’ and therefore what procedures
are to be eligible for public subsidy. Should dietary supplements be included?
Gyms? Acupuncture? Should some presently subsidised procedures be excluded?
The boundary enclosing ‘health care’ can never be well defined, because it is
determined not only by cost–benefit considerations, but also by community values.
Each part of our health care arrangements may be working well, but the
concern of the Productivity Commission and of many health economists is whether
these arrangements are coming together in the best way.
Conclusions
Despite inconsistencies, boundary problems and messy funding, Australians
achieve good health outcomes. In an evaluation of the health care arrangements in
11 high-income countries, the Commonwealth Fund gave Australia fourth place –
behind the UK, Switzerland and Sweden. Australia scores well on quality of care,
but comparatively poorly on access. The access problems in Australia relate mainly
to costs and difficulties paying medical bills, particularly relating to co-payments in
private insurance.20
Many decades of incrementalism have delivered Australia a set of arrangements
which work, but which, by most measures, could work better if the parts could
be brought together as an integrated system, particularly in terms of
20 Davis et al. 2014.
Health policy
493
Commonwealth–state divisions and in developing more coherent and equitable
funding arrangements.
The adjustment of our arrangements from a focus on acute care to one based
on chronic care is ongoing. Also there is still a slow transition from what once was
a labour-intensive set of individual professional practices to a more technology-
intensive service industry model, which will still have to meet community
expectations of high-quality individual care and compassion. Some emerging
technologies, based on genetic manipulation, could have profound effects on our
health care arrangements, as well as opening up new ethical questions.
There may be scope for those with means to contribute more from their own
pockets to their own health care. This is a normative question, which needs to be
put to the community. Australians may opt for more sharing, or they may opt to
pay more from their own pockets.
Whatever the outcome of such deliberations, there will almost certainly be
a need to provide more collective funding for those with high needs or limited
means. If governments are determined to pursue a ‘small government’ policy, they
will probably try to achieve this collective funding through private health
insurance, in spite of its costs and difficulties in achieving community rating, cost
control and administrative efficiency. Otherwise the most equitable and efficient
means of funding growing health care expenditure is through higher taxes.
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Immigration and multicultural policy
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Australia has been shaped by immigration. Nearly half of today’s Australian
population consists of immigrants born elsewhere or their first-generation
descendants. As a consequence of its pattern of immigration, Australia is also
a multicultural country. This chapter examines the policy evolution that has
produced this situation. It also examines the distinctive political dynamics of the
policy-making process pertaining to immigration and multiculturalism.
What’s at stake?
Immigration and multicultural policies directly shape Australia’s social
composition and the social relations between and within its constituent
communities. At the national level, the immigration policy settings mould the
evolution of Australia’s overall ethnic character, an impact which can stir deep
emotions. Over time, immigration numbers and the resultant multicultural
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transformation of the electorate have affected the nature of Australian political
processes.
At the community level, immigration and multicultural policies shape and
structure a potentially awkward social and political balance. On the one hand,
there is a need to respect the multiple ethnic, cultural and religious identities
with which Australians collectively now identify. On the other hand, harmonious
and productive intercultural relations among Australians depend on some
transcendence of these particularistic identities.
While it is shaping Australian society at its broadest levels, the implementation
of immigration policy is also deeply personal for those affected. People’s life
trajectories are potentially transformed by the decisions emerging from the
administrative process established by the policy parameters.
Characteristics of this policy domain
Probably more than in most policy domains, an appreciation of the historical
evolution of immigration policy is needed for a full understanding of the challenges
and dilemmas characterising today’s policy debates.
Historical context
For more than 150 years, from Australia’s initial colonisation in 1788 until the
late 1940s, periods of substantial net immigration were episodic and intermittent.
These immigrants came almost entirely from the British Isles, including Ireland,
and can be described in ethnic terms as Anglo-Celtic. They and their descendants
overwhelmed the Indigenous population and established the basic political
institutions and processes which Australia still features.
There were some exceptions to the Anglo-Celtic predominance (such as
German and Italian immigrants) but the most notable perceived challenge was the
arrival of a significant number of Chinese during the gold rushes of the 1850s.
It was this challenge which led the Australian colonies, and from 1901 the new
Australian government, to formalise the so-called White Australia policy. The
policy precluded immigrants from Asia and later proscribed the continued use
of indentured Pacific Islander labour. Various motivations explain why the White
Australia policy was adopted; these include the protection of wages and working
conditions from the potential impact of low-wage competition as well as a racist or
ethnocentric distaste for population diversity.1
Significant change began in the late 1940s. The Chifley Labor government,
followed by supportive Coalition governments thereafter, embarked on a mass
immigration program that transformed Australia. Britain was no longer the
1 Hardcastle 2010, chapter 5.
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exclusive source; the new immigrants also came from a wide range of European
countries, beginning with postwar refugees from eastern Europe, followed by
substantial numbers from northern and later southern Europe (most notably, Italy
and Greece). From the mid-1960s, the admission of small numbers from Asia
signalled a quiet abandonment of the White Australia policy.2
In 1973, the Whitlam Labor government formally discontinued the White
Australia policy.3 It also instituted a new domestic policy of multiculturalism which,
overturning a rhetoric of assimilation which had accompanied the post-1940s eth-
nic diversification, celebrated Australia’s growing cultural diversity.
Immigration numbers surged again under the Fraser Coalition government
from 1976. It was the Fraser government that elaborated the aspirational notion of
multiculturalism into a range of policies supporting ethnic communities.
This period also saw the formalisation of the immigration policy regime which,
in essence, still prevails today. It involves selection criteria which do not formally
discriminate on the basis of race or national origin. It also involves three principal
selection categories permitting immigrant admission on the basis of occupational
skills (measured by a ‘points test’ scoring such factors as qualifications, English-
language proficiency and age), family connections (mainly admitting the spouses,
fiancées and dependent children of Australian residents) and humanitarian
considerations (including refugees as narrowly defined under international
conventions and others deemed in humanitarian need). This formally non-
discriminatory and category-focused immigration system has now been in place in
Australia for more than 40 years.
The social impact of Australia’s immigration experience over the past 70 years
has been transformative. The 2016 Census revealed that 26 per cent of Australians
had been born elsewhere; 40 per cent of these immigrants had a national origin
somewhere in Asia with 10 per cent originating in the Middle East or Africa.4
Australia’s cultural transformation has been particularly dramatic in the major
metropolitan areas, especially Sydney and Melbourne.
An immigration-driven transformation is also revealed in Australia’s religious
profile. Whereas in the late 1940s nearly all Australians professed affiliation with
some version of Christianity, the proportion identifying as Christians in the 2016
Census had fallen to just over half. While 30 per cent of Australians now profess
no religious affiliation (another radical change from the late 1940s), around 8 per
cent (and nearly a third of immigrants arriving over the past ten years) identify with
non-Christian traditions.5
2 Betts 1999.
3 Tavan 2004.
4 ABS 2017a.
5 ABS 2017b.
Australian Politics and Policy
498
The immigration regime
Admission on the basis of a family connection predominated during Labor’s
lengthy period in office under the prime ministerships of Hawke (March 1983 to
December 1991) and Keating (from then until March 1996). The Howard Coalition
government, in office from March 1996, at first lifted the proportion admitted on
the basis of occupational skills to about equal prominence as those with family
connections. Then a decisive relative shift took place, preferencing applicants in the
occupational-skills category. That decisive relative shift, consistent with a neoliberal
policy emphasis on promoting economic growth and investment, has been
maintained ever since. It survived the replacement of the Howard Coalition
government by the Rudd–Gillard–Rudd Labor governments (December 2007 to
September 2013) and has been maintained since then by the Abbott–Tur-
nbull–Morrison Coalition governments.
Since the mid-1980s, Australia has maintained a ‘humanitarian’ intake in the
range of 11,000 to 20,000 per annum. The humanitarian program has two main
components: an offshore component under which resettlement in Australia is
offered to refugees and others with a humanitarian case located outside Australia,
and an onshore component providing for claimants assessed to be refugees after
arriving in Australia on a valid visa.
The humanitarian program looks relatively small in comparison to the family
and occupational-skills categories, and over time represents a diminishing
proportion of the total immigration intake. In comparison to other countries’
involvement in international efforts to resettle those stranded in refugee camps
around the world, the Australian humanitarian program is one of the more
generous.6 However, this sound record contrasts markedly with the harsh regime
applying to asylum seekers seeking to enter Australia and claim refugee status
outside the parameters of the humanitarian program. This is despite the number of
such claimants reaching Australia being relatively low compared with the numbers
seeking to enter other target countries, for instance in Europe
In the late 1970s, Australia’s acceptance of Indo-Chinese ‘boat people’ had
signalled a decisive end to the old White Australia policy.7 Over time, however,
political tolerance for the management of undocumented asylum seekers arriving
by sea waned, especially as it began to be associated with organised ‘people
smuggling’ networks.
The Keating Labor government in 1992 initiated the mandatory detention of
asylum seekers after facing a resumption of maritime arrivals largely driven by
events in Cambodia. A new flow of arrivals (sourced mainly from Afghanistan, Iran
and Iraq) began in the 1999–2000 period under the Howard Coalition government.
Campaigning for re-election in 2001, Prime Minister Howard capitalised on his
6 ABC 2018.
7 Higgins 2017.
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government’s refusal to accept a vessel, the Tampa, which had been diverted to
Australia by asylum seekers. These asylum seekers were sent into detention, notably
in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, instituting an offshore processing regime which
has continued thereafter. The draconian approach did produce a virtual cessation
of the maritime asylum-seeker arrivals.
After returning to government in December 2007, Labor under Prime Minister
Rudd suspended the mandatory detention of maritime asylum seekers. Maritime
arrivals (mainly Afghan, Iranian and Sri Lankan asylum seekers) later surged to
unprecedented levels, including an extraordinary tally exceeding 25,000 arrivals
in 2012–13. Many others tragically drowned at sea.8 The Rudd and Gillard
governments grappled with the cruel conundrum around what Prime Minister
Rudd described as ‘our responsibility as a government … to ensure that we have a
robust system of border security and orderly migration on the one hand as well as
fulfilling our legal and compassionate obligations … on the other’.9
Eventually, Labor reintroduced mandatory offshore detention10 but this did not
stave off defeat in the September 2013 election to Coalition parties whose ‘stop
the boats’ and ‘border protection’ rhetoric dominated the campaign. The incoming
Abbott Coalition government matched that rhetoric with further policy action.
It launched Operation Sovereign Borders11 under which unauthorised boats were
intercepted at sea and not permitted to enter Australian waters. Asylum-seeker
maritime arrivals again virtually ceased under this regime which has continued
through the succeeding Coalition governments headed by Turnbull (September
2015 to August 2018) and then Scott Morrison (from August 2018).
In early 2019, political attention turned to the management of the asylum
seekers, numbering more than a thousand, who had been sent to the offshore
locations of Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island. An agreement with the
USA allowed hundreds of these asylum seekers to be voluntarily transferred to the
USA.12 The Morrison government was forced, by a parliamentary majority in both
houses comprising the Labor opposition, independent and minor-party MPs, to
allow detainees certified as needing medical treatment to be treated in Australia.
Temporary immigration
There are three principal categories of temporary immigrants, each of them
carrying eligibility (under variable rules) to work in Australia:
1. International students have become a prominent feature of the Australian ed-
ucation systems, most notably in the tertiary education sector. Some
8 Refugee Council of Australia 2018a.
9 Rudd 2013.
10 DIBP 2013.
11 Australian Border Force 2014.
12 Lewis 2019.
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international students have post-study entitlements to remain temporarily in
Australia for further work experience.
2. Temporary skilled immigrants are admitted to work in what are supposed to
be specific occupations or positions where employers find it difficult to recruit
locals.
3. Working holidaymakers are typically young adults permitted to undertake
short-term paid work (such as seasonal work in regional horticulture).
Since the late 1990s, temporary immigrant numbers have more than tripled. There
is a connection between the temporary and permanent intakes, with a recent
analysis finding that ‘about half of the permanent visas grants are to people who are
already in Australia as temporary immigrants’.13
Temporary immigration has attracted some political controversy. Some critics
are concerned about its claimed impact on the integrity of, and job competition
within, the Australian labour market; they might be assured by a Productivity
Commission finding that ‘recent immigration has had a negligible effect on the
labour market outcomes of the local labour force’.14 Many international students
have evidently been exploited through underpayment of wage entitlements and
poor working conditions.15 An inquiry put in place by the Australian government
has endorsed a finding that ‘as many as 50 per cent of temporary migrant workers
may be being underpaid in their employment’.16 Some critics are uncomfortable
with temporary immigrants being treated in effect as ‘not quite Australian’.17
There have been claims that the temporary skilled program too readily
overlooks the availability of qualified local recruits and/or permits an undesirable
under-investment in the education and training that would support an upskilled
local workforce.18 Responding in part to such misgivings, the rules governing the
temporary skilled program were significantly revised in April 2017, with the aim
of ensuring, according to Prime Minister Turnbull, that ‘temporary migration visas
are not a passport for foreigners to take up jobs that could and should be filled by
Australians’.19
Multiculturalism
The Fraser Coalition government (December 1975–May 1983) set in place much of
the national administrative and institutional infrastructure for multicultural policies.
Under the Hawke Labor government in 1989, a National Agenda for a Multicultural
Australia proposed three justifications for multiculturalism: its respect for cultural
13 Productivity Commission 2016, 30.
14 Productivity Commission 2016, 191.
15 Howe, Stewart and Owens 2018.
16 Migrant Workers’ Taskforce 2019, 5.
17 Mares 2016.
18 Kell 2014.
19 Turnbull 2017.
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identity, its alignment with social justice and its utilitarian virtues in facilitating
economic efficiency. Importantly, the document also specified ‘limits’ which, in effect,
asserted the necessity for a set of common values within ‘an overriding and unifying
commitment to Australia’.20 This kind of careful specification of both the claimed
virtues and necessary limits of Australian multiculturalism has enabled the concept
to adapt and survive ever since.
Perhaps the most serious challenge took place during the period of the Howard
Coalition government (1996–2007). The Howard government seemed to downplay
the terminology of multiculturalism and emphasised instead terms like ‘social
cohesion’ and ‘citizenship’.21 It introduced a ‘citizenship test’ under which
immigrants seeking Australian citizenship would need to demonstrate a ‘working
knowledge of the English language’ and ‘an understanding of basic aspects of
Australian society, our culture, and our values and certainly some understanding
of our history’.22 Yet the Howard government’s policy documents also mirrored
the Hawke Labor government’s in balancing the celebration of diversity with the
affirmation of common values.23
The Rudd and Gillard Labor governments (2007–2013) reintroduced a com-
mitment to multiculturalist terminology while also maintaining the now-familiar
balancing of ‘shared rights and responsibilities’.24 Continuity along these lines
essentially continued under the Abbott–Turnbull–Morrison Coalition gov-
ernments from 2013.25
Policy actors
Policy development and political debates around immigration and multicultural-
ism are shaped by a range of policy actors.
Political parties
Policy convergence and bipartisanship, rather than partisan conflict, has mostly
characterised the role of the major political parties within this policy domain.
However, bipartisan consensus is tested from time to time. Within the Coalition
parties, there can be some sentiment which is sceptical of multiculturalism and
instead favours the maintenance of common values. Within the broader
membership of the Labor Party, reservations about the ethics of draconian ‘border
20 OMA 1989, vii.
21 Moran 2017, chapter 4.
22 Howard 2006.
23 Moran 2017, 109.
24 Australian Government 2011, 7.
25 Australian Government 2017.
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protection’ policies and empathy for the plight of affected asylum seekers are not
infrequently expressed.26
Minor parties and independents represented in the federal parliament offer
a broader spectrum of perspectives: the Australian Greens have adopted a stance
consistently favourable to higher immigration levels and sympathetic to asylum
seekers while Pauline Hanson’s One Nation has consistently supported a lower
intake and is unwelcoming to asylum seekers.
Public opinion
The range of views among Australian voters is somewhat more polarised. There is
some dispute about whether survey data over time show majority support for or
against current levels of immigration, with the answer probably dependent on the
wording of the questions put to survey respondents.
A Scanlon Foundation study through Monash University noted that, during
2018, ‘a number of polls … reported majority negative sentiment, in the range of
54–72 per cent, favouring a cut in immigration’. The Scanlon Foundation’s own
2018 survey confirmed ‘an increase in the proportion concerned at the level of
immigration’ but also indicated that ‘support for a reduction remains a minority
viewpoint’ at 45 per cent of respondents.27
The same Scanlon Foundation 2018 survey found generally strong support for
the proposition that ‘multiculturalism has been good for Australia’. The Scanlon
Foundation study also noted ‘the level of negative sentiment towards those of the
Muslim faith, and by extension to immigrants from Muslim countries’ as ‘a factor
of significance in contemporary Australian society’.28
Business
Business interests have generally supported relatively high levels of immigration. It
creates a larger supply of potential workers, reduces upward pressure on wages and
creates a larger consumer demand for business products.
Business organisations also tend to favour a relatively large occupational-skill-
based intake in comparison with the family-based intake, because this can ad-
vantage them in the recruitment of staff. For particular corporations and business
ventures, negotiating favourable arrangements to enable them to access temporary
immigrants is also a priority.
26 Bramston 2018.
27 Markus 2018, 2.
28 Markus 2018, 3.
Immigration and multicultural policy
503
Trade unions
The business sector’s favourable stance towards high levels of immigration might
be expected to be counterbalanced by scepticism from a trade union movement
presumably focused on job protection for the current workforce. Australian trade
unions have indeed been vocal critics of high levels of temporary immigration for
its association with ‘exploitation and denying job opportunities to local workers’.29
However, the trade union movement has generally been supportive of Aus-
tralia’s permanent immigration program. This was historically important in relation
to Australia’s radical shift to mass immigration from the late 1940s.30 More recently,
the ACTU and the union United Voice have joined the Australian Industry Group
business lobby in a statement declaring that ‘Australia’s permanent migration
program is essential to Australian society and economy’ and that ‘we … do not
support any reduction to the scheme’.31
Ethnic communities
Australia’s immigration program has fostered the creation of ethnic-minority
communities of first-generation members and descendants. These communities
naturally have an interest in immigration policy, especially as it applies to rights of
admission for other family members, and a particular stake in multicultural policy.
They do not necessarily harbour a different range of views on other immigration-
related issues; for example, according to Jupp and Pietsch, ‘[s]ome polling suggests
that many “ethnic” Australians were just as unsympathetic as the “Anglo” majority
to asylum seekers who were perceived to be jumping the gun, especially when that
affected family reunion for their own group’.32
Seventy years of large-scale immigration have not changed the basic structure
of the Australian political system, particularly its domination by the two major
party blocs (the Liberal–National Coalition and Labor). However, the political
process, and especially the parties, have adjusted to the changed nature of the
electorate. Parties now actively court ethnic-minority communities.
Sometimes the policy preferences arising from ethnic-minority communities
are articulated through ethnic community organisations, co-ordinated nationally
through the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia (FECCA).
FECCA and its allies were claimed to have had a significant influence over the
Hawke Labor government in securing a high proportion of immigration places
for family-connection applicants.33 If that outcome is a test of the influence of the
‘ethnic lobby’, then its influence seems to have since waned.
29 McManus 2018.
30 Warhurst 1993.
31 Migration Council of Australia 2018.
32 Jupp and Pietsch 2018, 665.
33 Birrell and Betts 1988.
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There is evidence that the same waning impact also applies to patterns of
‘ethnic voting’. The Labor Party had been quite successful during the 1980s and
1990s in disproportionately attracting voting support among members of the Ita-
lian Australian, Greek Australian and Maltese Australian communities. Labor’s
relative advantage within those communities, however, seems to have declined
since then. Australia’s diverse Asia-origin communities likewise seem to have been
disproportionately attracted to Labor in the 1990s but again that partisan distinc-
tion seems to have since declined.34
Nonetheless, an association between ethnic minorities and support for Labor
remains visible on the electoral map. An analysis of the 2016 election identifies
a raft of electorates in ‘central and eastern Sydney … and in northern, western
and south eastern Melbourne … [as] the true Labor heartland and the core of
multicultural Australia’.35
Advocacy and support groups
The issues around humanitarian immigration, and particularly asylum seekers,
have mobilised an articulate, informed and often passionate network of advocacy
groups pursuing what they regard as more humane policies. The scale of this sector,
ranging from faith-based organisations36 to social-movement activists,37 can be
gauged from the 200 organisations affiliated with the umbrella Refugee Council of
Australia.38
Making immigration and multicultural policy
Each year, Cabinet determines an immigration intake target for the coming 12
months and the actual intake normally comes out reasonably close to the
announced target. In recent years, there has been a formal opportunity for
stakeholder input into the setting of targets.39 However, the encapsulation of the
target/ceiling within the annual budget process, and its implementation thereafter
through administrative channels, gives it some insulation from the scrutiny that
accompanies processes requiring more specific parliamentary approval. Policy
making about Australia’s response to asylum seekers, both potential arrivals and
those later held in detention, is somewhat more open in terms of public debate, but
is constrained in practice by the general bipartisanship characterising the policy
response.
34 McAllister 2011, 134–6.
35 Jupp and Pietsch 2018, 671.
36 Wilson 2011.
37 Tazreiter 2010.
38 Refugee Council of Australia 2018b.
39 DHA 2019; DHA 2017.
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International and intergovernmental interactions
Constitutionally, the arena of Australian immigration policy making is focused
at the national level. Section 51(xxvii) of the Australian Constitution gives the
Australian national government clear and unambiguous authority over
immigration policy. International law provides unambiguous recognition of
national sovereignty in relation to the rights of countries to determine their own
policies. Nonetheless, in practice, the Australian government needs to take into
account both external/international and internal/domestic nuances.
National sovereignty is potentially subject to international influence if a
country chooses to enter into international treaties. For example, Australia has long
been a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Australia is also a signatory to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which governs interactions
in international waters beyond the jurisdiction of Australia’s own maritime
boundaries.40 There have been persistent claims that some of Australia’s policies
and practices in relation to the interdiction of asylum-seeker boats and the
indefinite offshore detention of asylum seekers violate some of its international
obligations under such treaties.41 The only recourse, even when the complainant is
the United Nations,42 is essentially via public condemnation and political protest.
Foreign policy and trade considerations provide another international con-
straint. For example, Australia’s policies and practices on maritime asylum seekers
can be a particularly sensitive issue affecting its important relationship with Indo-
nesia, from where most of the boats depart. Australia’s immigration-driven cultural
diversification can assist international trade by opening up, through detailed local
knowledge and personal contacts, new export markets. International trade
agreements to which Australia is a party may in turn carry obligations to grant tem-
porary entry and employment rights to the citizens of trading partners.43
An important international detail about Australia’s immigration policy is that
there is no restriction on the entry of New Zealand citizens. They are not
considered as part of the immigration program if they decide to settle permanently
in Australia.
Turning to intra-national considerations, there are considerable consequences
for Australia’s state governments which are largely responsible for the provision
of infrastructure and services to an expanding population. The strong tendency
for immigrants to gravitate to Australia’s metropolitan centres, and especially Syd-
ney and Melbourne, has been an important factor behind recent arguments for the
intake to be reduced. Attracting or directing immigrants to regions or states within
which population growth would be more welcome would help to remedy this
40 Klein 2014.
41 AHRC 2017.
42 United Nations 2017.
43 Sherrell 2017.
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situation. There is a well-established ‘regional’ subcategory within the occupational-
skills immigration intake which favours applicants willing to reside in specified
regions or states. In late 2018, Prime Minister Scott Morrison proposed inserting a
formal role for state governments into the setting of immigration targets based on
the willingness of each state to accept additional residents.44
Debates and issues
This chapter has already canvassed a number of policy debates around immigration
and multiculturalism. Here two other controversies are discussed: the security and
environmental sustainability implications of immigration policy settings.
Defence and security
National security had been a foremost consideration as a justification for the policy
shift in 1945 towards large-scale immigration. Australia’s relatively low population
and empty spaces were regarded as liabilities for national defence: ‘populate or
perish’ was adopted as something of a national slogan.45
As the decades passed, Australia’s defence thinking, its relationship with Asian
neighbours and the role of military technology had evolved to the point that the
1940s invocation of a direct link between immigration and questions of national
security no longer seemed persuasive. By the late 1980s, there had developed
‘something of a consensus, articulated in several reviews of Australian defence
policy … that the size of the Australian population has little military relevance’.46
Security considerations have re-emerged forcefully as part of recent debates
about maritime asylum seekers. A new lexicon of security-laden terminology
(border protection, border security, Operation Sovereign Borders) has
characterised political discourse in recent years. To some observers, this has been
an overreaction to the actual level of security threat posed by asylum-seeker
vessels.47
Environmental sustainability
In October 2009, Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd effusively declared his support
for ‘a big Australia’ arising from the ‘good news that our population is growing’.48
Less than a year later, his successor as Labor prime minister, Julia Gillard, point-
edly abandoned the ‘big Australia’ aspiration, instead declaring support for ‘a
44 Elton-Pym 2018.
45 For the seminal speech by the then minister for immigration, see Calwell 1945.
46 Parkin and Hardcastle 1990, 332.
47 Refugee Council of Australia 2014.
48 Rudd 2009.
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sustainable Australia’.49 This short-cycle policy oscillation illustrates an unresolved
policy debate about whether considerations of sustainability, environmental and
otherwise, ought to impose a constraint on the scale of immigration.
An increasing population, and/or a rapid rate of population increase, have
been argued by some to endanger the natural environment, to impact on resource
depletion and energy consumption, and produce increased congestion in the urban
environment. This perspective is backed by organisations such as Sustainable
Population Australia and by individuals like the entrepreneurial philanthropist
Dick Smith.50
Nonetheless, the population restraint perspective has secured less traction
among mainstream environmental lobby groups. Some years ago, the Australian
Conservation Foundation (ACF) endured some internal turmoil over taking a
position on the scale of immigration.51 The ACF’s National Agenda 2018 makes no
mention of immigration or population matters.52
It has been the claimed impact on the urban rather than the natural
environment, in the context of the historically high levels of immigration, which
has led in recent years to a stronger voice advocating a reduction in the
immigration intake. The Morrison government responded in 2019 by lowering the
immigration target.53
Until 2019, Australia had not developed, at least not since the ‘populate or
perish’ era of the late 1940s, a formal long-term ‘population policy’ addressing the
scale, pace and impact of population growth. A number of inquiries and reports
had canvassed the issue.54 In March 2019, the Morrison government moved
towards a more formal population policy, with a notable emphasis on infrastructure
provision, by releasing a report entitled Planning for Australia’s Future Population.55
Conclusions
A startling contrast is evident in how Australia’s immigration and multicultural
policies have recently evolved. On the one hand, a generally expansive and
cosmopolitan orientation predominates in the immigration and humanitarian
programs and in domestic multicultural policies. On the other hand, a tough-
minded approach prevails in relation to asylum seekers arriving by sea. The
contrasts and possible contradictions embedded within Australia’s immig-
49 Gordon 2010.
50 Smith 2011.
51 Warhurst 1993, 199–202.
52 ACF 2018.
53 Morrison Government 2019.
54 DSEWPC 2011; Treasury 2015.
55 Australian Government 2019.
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ration and multicultural policies, evolving over time and shaping the country in
fundamental ways, add to the fascination and intrigue of this crucial policy domain.
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‘Law and order’ policy
Garner Clancey and Brenda Lin (with Brendan Delahunty)
Key terms/names
criminal justice system, fear of crime, hyper-criminalisation, law and order policy,
policy transfer, ‘punitive turn’, ‘tough on crime’
‘Law and order’ policy refers to the decisions and actions of governments relating
to issues of crime and justice. Policy in this area has traditionally been referred to
as criminal justice policy but is more commonly being referred to as ‘law and order’
policy – reflecting the increasing punitive nature of debates, laws and policies in the
criminal justice domain. In the interests of simplicity, reference will be made to law
and order policy throughout this chapter.
In Australia, states and territories are responsible for law and order policy.
Consequently, the laws and procedures used in each state and territory to define
criminal conduct and determine how crimes are investigated, arrests made,
evidence gathered, charges brought, defences raised, trials conducted, sentences
rendered and punishment carried out will be slightly or significantly different. Laws
determining what types of conduct should be the subject of the criminal justice
system are shaped by the social, political and moral concerns of the day.
The criminal justice system is (mainly) composed of three key government
institutions: the police, courts and prisons.
• Police: the primary role of police is to enforce the criminal law, maintain public
order and ensure community safety by investigating criminal activity and
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Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C.
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apprehending suspected offenders. Policing agencies are made up of numerous
branches and sections, often with particular cultures, ways of operating and
priorities. For example, most state policing agencies will have (among many
others) separate investigation, traffic, water, air, counterterrorism, intelligence,
education, community engagement, policy and management units.
• Courts: the court or judicial process is concerned with determining whether an
individual is guilty or not guilty of the offence(s) they have been charged with.
If there is a finding of guilt, the magistrate or judge decides on a sentence to
impose upon the offender that adequately reflects the seriousness of the crime
committed and the circumstances surrounding the offence. Criminal courts
operate at different levels, with higher courts presiding over trials for more
serious crimes that attract more severe penalties. Courts manage significant
numbers of cases annually and are the gatekeepers that decide who is sentenced
to prison.
• Prisons: imprisonment is a form of punishment that is reserved for those who
have (generally) engaged in very serious offending and when no other form
of punishment is appropriate. Prisons are places of confinement, where the
offender is deprived of their freedom and autonomy. Prison services have to
manage the prisoners and alleged offenders (in the case of remand) sent to
them by police and the courts. Prisons operate according to security levels, with
more serious or protected inmates being housed in more secure facilities.
This brief overview of the criminal justice system highlights the role of key (but
not all) institutions and points to the different functions of each institution. It also
shows that different parts of the criminal justice system can be heavily impacted by
other agencies. For example, if police assume a pro-arrest policy, which brings more
alleged offenders into the system, it is likely that the courts and prisons will need to
deal with a greater number of cases and entries into custody.
Law and order policy has become increasingly punitive over time. This has
been referred to as ‘hyper-criminalisation’1 and has provided greater opportunities
for police to interact with and sanction people, a greater likelihood that someone
entering the criminal justice system will receive harsher penalties and a greater
likelihood that people will remain in or return to the criminal justice system.
Political cycles and news media play critical roles in law and order policy
making. Political parties often seek to appear ‘tough on crime’ through various
announcements, most frequently prior to an election. Promising more police, and
the introduction of sophisticated technologies to detect and help arrest offenders
and of tougher criminal sanctions are often the stock-in-trade of major political
parties at election times.
News media facilitates the communication and reinforcement of political law
and order messages, while also exacerbating public fear by disseminating endless
1 McNamara and Quilter 2016.
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stories featuring horrific and extraordinary incidences of crime. Crime stories are
designed to capture the public’s interest and intensify public discussion on the issue
in question, often by eliciting feelings of fear and insecurity or creating moral panic
within society.2
Hogg and Brown3 thematically summarised the ‘common sense’ assumptions
about crime that underpin the beliefs held by a significant proportion of the
Australian population. These ‘common sense’ assumptions still ring true in modern
society. Their essence is epitomised by the following commonly held views:
• crime rates are at an all-time high – we currently live in a society characterised
by unprecedented levels of crime
• more police officers with more police powers and tougher penalties on
offenders are needed to combat the crime problem.
Popular misconceptions of the current ‘crime epidemic’ and need for harsh crime
control and punishment have been largely disseminated in the public domain by
news media, politicians and other influential figures.4 A fearful public demands or
requires governments to take law and order policy seriously – or so we are told.
What’s at stake?
There is a lot at stake in the context of law and order policy making. Those who
come into contact with the criminal justice system can lose their liberty (through
imprisonment), their ability to move freely (through place restrictions and
conditions attached to various sanctions) and their ability to work in particular
industries (e.g. an individual may not be allowed to work for a fire service if they
have been convicted of arson), not to mention the impact on victims of crime. Some
of the additional human and financial costs are considered here.
Human costs
Law and order policy has significant ramifications for those entangled in the
criminal justice system. Below are some examples of the ways in which law and
order policy can impact lives:
• expanded police powers and ‘zero tolerance policing’ result in greater numbers
of people being searched, fined and charged, often for minor offences
• the use of electronic monitoring and urinalysis in the supervision of com-
munity-based offenders means that people are being tracked and surveilled in
increasingly intense ways
2 Lee 2007.
3 Hogg and Brown 1998.
4 Hogg and Brown 1998.
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• the rise of ‘supermax’ prisons means that some prisoners are being confined for
long periods with little or no contact with other prisoners or the outside world
• sex offender registers mean that those convicted of particular sex offences will
have their movements monitored for lengthy periods following their release
from prison.
Taken together, the rise and intensification of these practices means that more
people are entering the criminal justice system, staying in it for longer and
returning more frequently, instigating a vicious cycle of offending.
Financial costs
The criminal justice system operates at great economic expense. The Australian
Productivity Commission5 calculated expenditure on the criminal justice system in
2016–17 as follows:
• $10.9 billion on policing (not including federal police)
• $1.4 billion on courts
• $4.1 billion on corrective services (prisons and community corrections)
• $769.5 million on youth justice services (detention-based supervision,
community-based supervision, group conferencing).
Given these significant costs, it is important that law and order policy uses public
funds in the most efficient and effective manner. Every dollar spent on inefficient
law and order policy represents one less dollar spent on education, public
infrastructure, welfare and so on.
The context and characteristics of ‘law and order’ policy
There are a number of characteristics of law and order policy that require attention.
First, it is important to reflect on some recent significant trends in crime. The first
is (generally) falling crime rates. The second, perhaps counterintuitively, is the rise
in criminalisation and punishment, especially through imprisonment.
Crime trends
It is important to give some consideration to crime trends. It might be expected that
crime trends drive law and order policy making, but, as will be shown, this is not
necessarily the case.
Many major crime categories in Australia, as in many other Western societies,
have been experiencing consistent declines since the turn of the 21st century.
Incidents of some crime types in some Australian jurisdictions are at historic lows,
5 Productivity Commission 2018.
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Incidents in 2000 Incidents in 2017 % change
Homicide and related offences 989 414 ↓ 58%
Sexual assault 15,630 24,957 ↑ 60%
Kidnapping and abduction 688 482 ↓ 30%
Robbery 23,314 9,599 ↓ 59%
Unlawful entry with intent 436,865 176,153 ↓ 60%
Motor vehicle theft 139,094 51,869 ↓ 63%
Other theft 674,813 510,083 ↓ 24%
Table 1 Incidents of crime in Australia in 2000 and 2017. Source: ABS 2018a; ABS 2001.
meaning that there has never been a safer period of time to reside in these parts of
Australia. Table 1 compares the number of reported incidents of particular crimes
(by category) that occurred in Australia in 2000 and 2017.
Every major category of crime included in Table 1, except sexual assault,
has shown a substantial decline between 2000 and 2017. Given the significant
population growth in Australia during this period, these declines are even greater
when considered as rates. These trends are generally not well known and are often
lost in heated debates about the incessant need for more law and order policy.
The increase in reported incidents of sexual assault does not necessarily signify
a proportionate increase in the prevalence of sexual assault or a greater likelihood
of becoming a victim of such crimes. The reporting rate of sexual assault has
historically been extremely low. Greater awareness and education surrounding
sexual assault among the general public in recent years raises the probability that its
statistical increases may (at least partially) be attributed to an increased willingness
to report incidents and better police recording practices.6
Furthermore, official crime statistics do not represent an objective truth; one
must be mindful of taking them as an accurate reflection of reality. Numerous
factors will affect crime statistics, including the quality of data collated, counting
rules, police practices both in reporting and in the activities they target, and
whether the statistics are intended to be used to frame political or other agendas.
6 Weatherburn 2004.
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An increasingly punitive society
Despite the significant declines in many crime types, there has been rapid growth
in criminalisation and punishment. This has been referred to as the ‘punitive turn’.7
It has occurred through the proliferation of new laws, which has been described as
‘hyper-criminalisation’, and the increasing use of punishment.
Throughout the last decade, a significant number of hastily crafted laws have
passed through various state and territory parliaments, resulting in the expansion
of law enforcement powers, the creation of new offences, the amendment of the
rules of criminal procedure and increased maximum penalties for offences.8 These
laws are often responses to the ‘problem of the day’ and are designed to alleviate
public concern, rather than resolve the underlying causes of crime.
Below are some examples of punitive law and order policies that have been
introduced in recent years:
• revival and expansion of consorting offences9 in New South Wales (NSW)
• creation of ‘one-punch’ homicide in NSW, Queensland and Victoria
• creation of an organising an ‘out-of-control’ party offence in Western Australia
and Queensland.
It has been argued that the effect of these (and other) laws and powers is to
further criminalise marginalised groups in society, such as the poor and ethnic
minorities.10 Furthermore, there has been increasing co-ordination of criminal
laws between jurisdictions – one announces a new policy to get tough on crime,
and others will follow or attempt to introduce policies that are even tougher on
crime. This is a form of ‘policy transfer’, which will be discussed later.
In concert with the growth in these and other criminal laws and sanctions has
been the growing use of punishment, especially imprisonment. The daily average
imprisonment rate in Australia in 2018 was 222 prisoners per 100,000 population.11
In 1976, before law and order policy began to take hold in Australia, there were
just 77.8 prisoners per 100,000 population.12 On average, there were 42,878 people
in prisons in Australia during the April–June quarter of 2018 – up from 30,835 in
2013 and 26,640 in 2008.13
This growth has been driven, at least in part, by the rising remand population
(i.e. those held in custody while awaiting resolution of their court matters) and the
imposition of longer prison sentences by courts. To provide some context, in the June
7 Garland 2001.
8 Loughnan 2009.
9 Consorting laws prohibit the act of habitual association with convicted offenders. NSW
consorting laws have been in operation since 2012; they were introduced in response to outlaw
motorcycle clubs and other organised criminal networks.
10 McNamara and Quilter 2016.
11 ABS 2018b.
12 Mukherjee 1981, 98.
13 ABS 2018b.
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2018 quarter, 13,182 people were held in prison awaiting finalisation of their matters
in court. This is more than double the 6,482 prisoners on remand a decade earlier.14
Of particular concern, around half of all people on remand are released without
having to serve further time in prison because they are either found not guilty, given
a community order or deemed to have served their time while on remand.15
The law and order rhetoric advocated by politicians has been one of the key factors
that have led to longer prison sentences, whereby legislative amendments to certain
offences have limited the discretion of magistrates and judges in determining an
appropriate sentence for the offender. Longer prison sentences have the effect of
increasing the number of people held in custody at any one point in time, and
therefore places further stress on prison capacity.
It is also important to note that the imprisonment rate for the Indigenous
population is 15 times higher than for the non-Indigenous population. In the
June 2018 quarter, 28 per cent or 11,963 of Australia’s inmates were Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people.16 By comparison, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people constitute just 3.3 per cent of Australia’s overall population.17 This
has been further exacerbated by many of the previously mentioned crime trends,
and it continues to be a stain on Australian criminal justice systems and policies.
Unsurprisingly, the combination of all the above conditions has led to
significant prison overcrowding; in 2016–17, on average, secure prisons in Australia
held 21 per cent more prisoners than their maximum design capacity.18 Prison
overcrowding compromises inmates’ ability to access adequate programs, services
and facilities as well as their right to privacy – all of which may impede their
rehabilitation progress and increase their risk of reoffending. Furthermore,
overcrowding increases the likelihood that disagreements will escalate into violent
situations, presenting a danger for both staff and inmates.
Actors and politics of ‘law and order’ policy
Law and order policy making is a complex process that operates in a highly
politicised public arena and involves a multitude of interrelated actors – each with
differing degrees of interest, power and influence over the policy-making process
and its ultimate outcomes. An overview of the key actors in the law and order policy
domain is provided in Table 2. Key actors include: political actors, news media,
professionals who work in the criminal justice space, penal reform groups, victim
interest groups, criminal justice experts and the general public.
14 ABS 2018b.
15 New South Wales Law Reform Commission 2012.
16 ABS 2018b.
17 ABS 2018c.
18 Productivity Commission 2018.
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Actors Interests and objectives
Politicians and
government
Eliciting popular support to gain or retain government office. The
public’s misconception and fear of crime has enabled politicians to
utilise law and order policy to win popular support. Such policies
are more focused on allaying public anxiety about crime than
addressing its underlying causes.
News media Television and print media are important sources of crime
information for more than 80% of Australians.19 Crime reporting
remains a staple of many media and news outlets. However, in an
era of diminishing investigative journalists and the growth of
centralised police media units, pre-packaged crime stories are
often transmitted with limited nuance or critical analysis.
There are multiple examples where the media has abused official
crime statistics or misrepresented and exaggerated the extent of
crime. For example, a newspaper article, ‘Kid Crime Rampage’, led
readers to believe that young people are engaging in vast amounts
of illegal activity. However, crime statistics reveal that the number
of young people coming to the attention of police has been
declining over time and only represents less than 1% of all young
people in the jurisdiction.20
Penal reform groups Advocating for offender rights, including the humane treatment of
prisoners, better prison conditions and welfare support services
for offenders both during imprisonment and after imprisonment,
lies at the heart of activities of penal reform groups.
Victim interest
groups
Victim interest groups advocate for victim interests and victim
rights. They will often lobby the government to enact law reform
to correct a perceived injustice – it may be in the form of harsher
sentencing laws, the criminalisation of a new range of behaviours
and having a greater voice in bail or parole decisions.
General public The general public seeks to ensure that they and their loved ones
are safe from the threat of crime. Public anxiety is often driven by
media coverage and political agendas, resulting in the false belief
that their communities are no longer safe. This belief then creates
political support for punitive policies.
The general public can impact law and order policy through:
• voting preferences at state and territory election
• participating in opinion polls
• signing petitions
• publishing comments on social media platforms
‘Law and order’ policy
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Actors Interests and objectives
• providing feedback or comments on talkback radio
• participating in focus groups
• contacting their local member of parliament.
Criminal justice
professionals (e.g.
judges, police,
lawyers, prison staff,
social workers)
Criminal justice personnel implement and enforce law and order
policy by carrying out their day to day responsibilities. Often their
work involves discretionary decision making. In addition to the
law, discretionary decisions can be influenced by formal
organisational policies, informal norms and personal values.
Criminal justice professionals determine how justice is
implemented and its impacts on others. They can further influence
policy by advocating for particular approaches to relevant
ministers during parliamentary inquiries and through their
production of research.
Criminal justice
experts
Criminal justice experts are often involved in some capacity in the
policymaking process. They may include academics, commercial
research companies and think tanks. Criminal justice experts will
often advocate for policy changes in response to the system
deficiencies that have come to their attention as a result of their
research and professional work. Experts may be consulted in the
process of drafting policy documents or be asked to advise
ministers on particular issues within their field of expertise. They
may also make submissions to parliamentary inquiries. At times,
governments will utilise expert opinion to legitimise their policy
decisions.
Table 2 Overview of key actors in law and order policymaking.
How ‘law and order’ policy is made
Various approaches, theories and models have been developed to explain and
analyse the law and order policy-making process. The different actors and the
extent of their respective contributions and influence on law and order policy are
contingent on the policy-making model adopted. A small number of models, and
‘policy transfer’ in law and order, will be considered here.
19 Roberts and Indermaur 2009.
20 Weatherburn 2011.
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Models of law and order policy making
Table 3 provides an overview of the core models of law and order policy making,
drawn from Hobbs and Hamerton.21 The law and order policy-making process
does not strictly follow any of these models; rather, it combines different elements
from each model. For less contentious law and order issues, policy makers generally
employ more elements of the rational decision model, which focuses on evidence-
based policy making. Issues that elicit greater political contestation or are hasty
responses to extraordinary criminal incidents tend to result in the adoption of the
elite model of policy making.
Policy transfer
The formulation of purely original and innovative public policy rarely occurs in the
criminal justice space; rather, policy makers often draw inspiration from policies in
other jurisdictions, both within and outside their country.22 This practice is known
as policy transfer. Policy transfer occurs in multiple forms. Policies from another
jurisdiction may be:
• directly copied and transferred to the target jurisdiction
• emulated by copying some elements and adapting them to suit local conditions
• used to inspire the final policy outcome
• combined to achieve the policy outcome.
Below are some examples of Australian law and order policies that have been
imported and adopted from other jurisdictions:
• Prison privatisation: traditionally, all Australian prisons were operated by state
and territory governments. But over time the private sector has been given
responsibility for operating prisons. The privatisation of criminal justice
services first originated from neoliberal ideals in the USA. The growing
acceptance of neoliberal ideas saw a remarkable shift in the way the population
thought about state ownership and control, suggesting that the operation of
state institutions should be subject to market forces of competition and
efficiency. Thus the concept of private prisons was born, resulting in the
commodification of punishment.
• Risk instruments: a range of risk assessment tools that first emerged in the USA
are used in the Australian justice system. These tools assess the level of risk a
person poses to society. This then largely informs the way in which they are
dealt with in the justice system – for example, whether bail or parole is granted.
• Mandatory sentencing: the introduction of mandatory sentencing style policies
in Australia have also originated from comparable models that were first
21 Hobbs and Hamerton 2014.
22 Ogg 2015.
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Model Example
Elite model (policy as elite preference): this
model suggests that policy making is a role
reserved predominantly for political elites
(e.g. ministers and their advisers). This
small group of elite individuals have the
power and ability to create, implement and
enforce public policy that regulates the
behaviour of the rest of society.
A minister observes graffiti on the journey
to parliament and decides that measures
must be taken to get tough on such
offences. Relevant department agency staff
are summoned and told to develop
measures to tackle the scourge of graffiti. A
graffiti hotline to encourage reporting and
tougher penalties are swiftly introduced
and implemented.
Pluralist model (policy as diverse
perspectives): this process is based upon
the idea that society is comprised of a
diverse range of actors and stakeholders, all
of whom have an interest in contributing to
and influencing the public policy-making
process and its ultimate outcomes.
Numerous reviews, inquiries and research
reports highlight the importance of tackling
alcohol and other drug use to prevent
offending. A working party is established
with representatives from key criminal
justice agencies and victim and penal
reform groups to develop policy responses.
A specialist drug court is proposed as one
possible solution, which the government
backs through the provision of funding for
a trial.
Incrementalism model (policy as variations
of the past): many aspects of criminal
justice policy making reflect the traditions
and histories of the system, with minor
reforms being introduced over time. Policy
making in this context is a process whereby
existing policies are incrementally modified
and revised. Policies are continually
improved upon in response to the problems
that have arisen from their implementation.
The juvenile justice system has largely
operated the same way for many years –
children appearing in closed children’s
courts are sentenced to serve time in
juvenile justice detention facilities and are
then released into the community with case
management support. A new approach to
assessing and addressing risk factors for
offending is introduced into the system to
augment existing practices.
Institutional model (policy as institutional
output): this model emphasises the
organisational norms, culture, structures
and procedures (both formal and informal)
that develop within institutions and the
ways in which they impact public policy.
Corruption within the police force has
prompted a widespread review. In
developing a blueprint for a new approach
to policing, careful consideration is given to
existing institutional cultures and how
reform of the organisation will be achieved
in this context.
Rational decision model (policy as
maximum social gain): this model of policy
Detailed analysis of the mental health of
prisoners reveals mental illness is steadily
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Model Example
making utilises a problem-solving approach
that is characterised by rationality,
impartiality, fairness and analysis.
rising within this population. It is
recognised that preventing early onset of
mental health problems among this cohort
will produce significant cost savings over
time. A policy response that includes a
spectrum of interventions in place in
community, court and custodial settings is
endorsed.
Table 3 Overview of models for the law and order policy-making process. Source: adapted
from Hobbs and Hamerton 2014.
introduced in the United States. These policies are aimed at limiting judicial
discretion and increasing consistency in sentencing. For example, there are
mandatory life sentences for the murder of police officers (e.g. Crimes Act 1900
(NSW), section 19B) and repeat child sex offenders (Penalties and Sentences Act
1992 (Qld), section 161E).
• Political law and order slogans: law and order style rhetoric from the USA and
UK has been often transferred into the Australian context. Examples include:
▪ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of
crime’ political slogan and rhetoric
▪ US President Ronald Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ political campaign.
Intergovernmental interactions
The process of law and order policy formulation and implementation in Australia
is further complicated by the country’s constitutional and jurisdictional structure.
State and territory governments have predominant control over law and order
policy, but the Commonwealth government has gradually encroached upon these
traditional state-based responsibilities. Additionally, international agreements and
guidelines for best practice may be considered in the policy formulation and
implementation process.
Commonwealth–state
Historically, law and order policy was solely under the jurisdiction of the six self-
governing British colonies that later formed the Commonwealth of Australia. Since
the conception of federation in 1901, the Australian Constitution has provided
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a framework for the way in which powers and responsibilities are shared and
distributed between federal and state levels of government.
The Constitution gives state and territory governments the power to enact,
implement and enforce law and order policy within their borders. The Comm-
onwealth is responsible for law and order policy that extends beyond state and
territory borders or crosses those borders – for example, drug importation, customs
fraud and illegal immigration. The significant overlap between Commonwealth and
state responsibilities can be a source of tension.
State and territory governments are heavily reliant on Commonwealth funding
– more than half of their funding is provided by the Commonwealth government.23
Often Commonwealth funding will be conditional, or tied to a certain project,
policy area or outcome. This has the effect of enabling the Commonwealth to in-
fluence the way in which resources are allocated in the criminal justice system.
International–national
United Nations (UN) resolutions, declarations and treaties promote universal hu-
man rights and can be employed as tools to protect against punitive law and order
policy.24 Australia, as a UN member state, has ratified a number of UN treaties
and is accountable to the international community in its compliance with its treaty
obligations.
Below are examples of UN treaties and resolutions that have the potential to
protect against punitive law and order policy:
• Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules)
(2015) https://bit.ly/2pc54bg
• Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990)
https://bit.ly/2r2c6zY
• Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) https://bit.ly/2pRZE52
• Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the
Beijing Rules) (1985) https://bit.ly/2Nem4Wn
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1985) https://bit.ly/2WjtR9y
While Australia has ratified several UN treaties, for the most part the government
does not recognise these treaties to be legally binding and often treaty obligations
are not enforceable. However, even without legal status, these treaties have an effect
– they can influence and guide law and order policy and provide an antidote to
punitive policies.
23 Parliamentary Education Office 2018.
24 Hogg 2008.
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Conclusions
In recent decades, law and order policy in Australia has become excessively
punitive despite the consistent decline in crime. Numerous policies have been
introduced in the name of community safety and social order, but, when applied
in practice, they unnecessarily criminalise a broad range of behaviours and impose
disproportionately harsh penalties upon those who engage in (some forms of)
criminal behaviour. Punitive policies can cause undue harm to some of the most
vulnerable people in society – this is particularly evident by the overrepresentation
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the prison system.
The formulation of law and order policy is fraught with complexities,
contestations and political power plays. It involves an array of actors with diverse
and often conflicting perspectives, all seeking to influence the direction of law
and order policy. Amidst these debates, politicians have been able to exploit the
public’s (somewhat irrational) fear of crime, which has been predominantly driven
by sensationalistic media coverage, to elicit popular support for ‘tough on crime’
policies.
Punitive law and order policy is costly – in both human and financial terms.
Consequently, it is important to ask whether the benefits gained from ‘getting
tough’ on the supposed crime problem can justify the damage it creates.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise the disproportionate adverse effects of
punitive policies on the most vulnerable groups in society. Law and order policy, as
it currently stands, has the effect of excessively criminalising and punishing poverty
and desperation. More needs to be done to ensure that there is equality before the
law and punishments imposed are proportionate to offences committed.
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Regional policy
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Regional Development Commissions
Australia’s regions are the backbone of the nation’s exports sector. The major ind-
ustries of regional Australia – agriculture, forestry, fishing and resources extraction
– accounted for nearly 60 per cent of Australia’s exports in 2017.1 However, despite
its consistent economic contribution to the country’s prosperity, regional Australia
– like regional areas in other First World economies – has experienced significant
social shifts over the last 50 years.
The influence of globalisation, trade liberalisation and the application of neo-
liberal policies since the 1980s have accelerated urbanisation, and ageing po-
pulation trends are apparent in most, although not all, non-metropolitan regions.
Rapid technological change and capital investment in industry have amplified these
trends, which have both driven and been driven by rationalisation and centralis-
ation of services and infrastructure. This has consequently compromised liveability
Haslam McKenzie, Fiona (2019). Regional policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds.
Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 Reserve Bank of Australia 2018.
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in regional areas and pushed people into cities. These changes have had profound
impacts on rural, regional and remotely located businesses, communities and
people.
Regional policy has the potential to shape economic, social and environmental
outcomes by setting priorities and developing initiatives to achieve outcomes.
Depending on government goals, policy frameworks can facilitate or impede
community and regional development. The implementation of regional policy over
the last 70 years has been haphazard, with many shifts in policy direction.
Consequently, the outcomes have been uneven, often causing considerable angst
and even voter backlash.
This chapter commences by outlining the spatial boundaries of rural and
regional Australia and how data about non-metropolitan Australia is recorded.
Regional policy is then explained, followed by its practical application in Australia,
focusing particularly on the decades since the Second World War. The discussion
of policy highlights the often blurred responsibilities of the different spheres of
government. The following section examines the reorientation of Australian
political and economic policies in the later decades of the 20th century, shifting
from Keynesian influenced initiatives, the hallmark of which is government
intervention and regulation to policies that reoriented Australian industries to
global markets and reduced the role of government as the source of infrastructure
investment and provider of services in rural, regional and remote communities.
Australian regional development policy in the opening decades of the 21st century
is then examined, framed by increasing regional voter dissatisfaction but also by
considerable national wealth from regionally based industries, which saved
Australia from being drawn into the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Concessions
given to the National Party and to regionally based independent politicians by
the major parties have avoided the real threat of hung parliaments and redirected
spending to regional areas. The chapter concludes with an assessment of current
regional policy arrangements.
Defining rural and regional Australia
Unlike other jurisdictions, in Australian political and public policy discourse
‘regions’ and ‘regional’ are often understood as synonyms of ‘rural areas’.2 In most
other countries, cities are considered discrete regions and regional development
policies usually address their needs in the same way as farming, mining and other
non-metropolitan regions. In Australia, regional policy focuses on non-
metropolitan places.
Regional Australia is not homogenous; it includes a large, spatially diverse
area with considerable economic, climatic, social, environmental, population and
2 Brown and Bellamy 2007; Paül and Haslam McKenzie 2015, 10.
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settlement diversity. However, regions are generally assumed to have something
in common, such as topographical features (for example, the Snowy Mountains)
or industry (like the Wheatbelt, known for its agricultural products, or the wine
region of South Australia). Territorial boundaries are usually politically significant
and may influence the distribution of power and resources. For example, state
boundaries often delineate particular funding arrangements or policies.
From a policy perspective, there are a variety of regional administrative de-
signations. There are multiple agencies, such as the Commonwealth government
Regional Development Australia (RDA) committees, Western Australian Regional
Development Commissions, local government regional zones and local govern-
ment areas, each of which have defined roles with particular boundaries and
funding arrangements.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census of Population and Housing is
held every five years. Because participation is compulsory, it provides a consistent
range of information about the economy and populations for all Australia. ABS
boundaries occasionally change with population fluctuations but are consistent
enough to provide useful baseline information about places and people. The data
are divided into geographic areas, defined by the Australian Standard Geographical
Classification (ASGC). The ASGC determines statistical areas based on population
densities, geographical structures, such as remoteness, and urban/rural definitions.3
Most states have multiple regions.4
The ABS divides Australia into five classes of remoteness (Remoteness Areas
[RAs]) based on the Accessibility and Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA). This
employs road distance measurements to the nearest service centres. The RAs are:
• major cities
• inner regional
• outer regional
• remote
• very remote.
Regions and regional Australia are not static; there is constant change, driven by
market forces, climatic conditions, social trends and even political arrangements.
These influence where people live and what livelihoods they pursue. Policy
decisions are also fluid but influential; how and where public and private
investment is directed impacts job prospects, liveability and accessibility and
therefore the links between people and places.
3 ABS 2018.
4 With the exception of Tasmania. The Northern Territory is also counted as one region.
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A Commonwealth Government Standing Committee5 noted that, from a nat-
ional perspective, regions in Australia have been defined in a number of ways,
including as:
• 85 biogeographic regions, identified co-operatively by federal and state
government scientists
• 69 statistical divisions, based on agreed definitions of a ‘region’ and identified
co-operatively by federal and state statisticians and used by the ABS
• 64 regions identified by the formation of voluntary Regional Organisations of
Councils (ROCs), which are groupings of approximately 560 local governments
• 57 regions of the federal–state natural resource management regional bodies
administering the Natural Heritage Trust and National Action Plan on Water
Quality and Salinity
• 54 regions of the nation’s RDA committees (formally ‘Area Consultative
Committees’).
Regions can also be functional economic areas with specialisations and competitive
advantage, meaning that they have physical or resource attributes that give them
advantages over competitors. Another type of functional region is defined by
natural resources, such as a water catchment or natural endowments. However,
even though rural and regional Australia can be defined in many ways, in broad
policy terms, regional Australia is assumed to be all the towns, cities and
communities outside Australia’s six largest capital cities.6
Regional policy: what is it?
Collits explains that regional policy ‘typically responds to regional disparities and
often focuses on economic development, jobs and investment’.7 This focus is not
particular to Australia. In most international jurisdictions, regional policy is viewed
as economic policy with the objective of setting policy levers to avoid regional
disparities and uneven development.8 In its Europe 2020 Strategy,9 the European
Commission states that regional policy is an investment policy, supporting and
promoting job creation, competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life
and sustainable development. In Australia, in addition to its strong economic focus,
regional policy also seeks to address liveability and ensure comparable services for
those living outside the large cities.
5 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government 2009.
6 Productivity Commission 2017.
7 Collits 2012, 206.
8 Harrison 2006.
9 European Commission 2010.
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In the current Australian context, neoliberal policy settings encourage capacity
building and economic growth through harnessing regional attributes, rather than
through external investment and government-led initiatives. Where there is
recognised regional disadvantage, it is expected that regional policy has the
potential to be a strategic intervention, rather than directly investing in initiatives.
Policies impacting regional Australia
Traditionally, the Commonwealth has viewed regional development as a state
responsibility because the states have constitutional responsibility for transport,
resource management, infrastructure, land use activities, planning, the
environment and local government, all of which are important to rural, regional
and remote places. The distinction between regional policy and other general
policies that have impacts on regional Australia is often blurred. Some national
policies have more of a regional impact or focus than others, but they are not
necessarily referred to as regional policies. For example, water and climate policies,
energy and transport policies and National Competition Policy have all had a
considerable influence on regionally based industry sectors and, in some cases,
the liveability of rural, regional and remote communities, but their influence is
not limited to the regions. Aboriginal interests, for example, are rarely specifically
articulated in regional policy, partly because of the different ways these interests
are incorporated into institutional structures. Generally, there is a separation of
responsibilities and governance structures for regional development and
Aboriginal affairs.
Even at the state level, regional policy has had decreasing prominence as
businesses and populations have gravitated to the capitals. However, there have
been some exceptions when, for political or market reasons, governments have re-
focused their policy and investment attentions on the regions. Perhaps the most
outstanding example of this was the introduction of the Royalties for Regions
program by the Western Australian government in 2008, which will be discussed
below.
Postwar period
There have been periods when the Commonwealth has taken a more overt regional
policy position, imposing policies that have had significant influence on regional
Australia. The post–Second World War period was the first time the
Commonwealth specifically used regional policy as an economic mechanism to
assist Australia to transform from a wartime to a peacetime economy through
domestic reconstruction and a national regional development program. The
Commonwealth encouraged postwar migrants to relocate to regional areas by
sponsoring jobs on major infrastructure projects such as the Snowy Mountains
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Scheme and hydro-electricity projects in Tasmania. Returned servicemen were
incentivised to take up soldier settlement blocks throughout rural areas to
repopulate the hinterlands and reinvigorate Australia’s agricultural industry.
At the same time, the Australian government encouraged particular sectors to
develop, which had both direct and indirect impacts on regional areas and local
economies. This was done through various reconstruction policies, rather than
specific regional development policies. For example, tariff protection and import
controls in the postwar period enabled manufacturing and new factory jobs, some,
but not all, of which were in regional towns, such as Geelong, Newcastle, Whyalla
and Gladstone. This significantly boosted the populations of those towns and their
role as regional centres.
From about 1950 Keynesian economics (promoting government’s role in
sponsoring economic growth through government expenditure and lower taxes
to stimulate demand) became the principal ideology in Western nations.10 In
Australia, public investment in regions was justified as it stimulated growth and
sought to achieve spatially equitable development.11 This was not necessarily
viewed as regional policy, but rather as regional development for the benefit of the
entire nation. The Ord River irrigation scheme in Western Australia, regulation of
production and protection of commodities, fuel subsidies and cross-subsidisation
of transport and communications infrastructure are examples. Until the mid-1970s,
Australian industry was largely protected through subsidies and state regulation.
The agricultural sector was a particular beneficiary with a range of subsidies and
bounties to protect and support farmers. In addition, many regulatory authorities,
statutory marketing and price support schemes were in place that shielded the
agricultural sector from market fluctuations. Regional towns and communities
were strongly supported by government-funded infrastructure on the principles
of equity rather than market forces. Costly services such as transport networks,
schools, health centres and other facilities were established throughout rural,
regional and remote Australia, boosting communities and primary industry
development. Despite the small and scattered towns and communities, the
investment in rural, regional and remote places was justified by the notions of ‘state
paternalism’12 and ‘countrymindedness’, which Lockie describes as the ‘association
of Australianness with rurality and the broad acceptance of the importance of rural
activities for the Australian economy’.13
As early as 1890, the rural population was lamenting the ‘evil of centralisation
which would seek to advance the capital city … at the expense of the country
districts’.14 From the 1920s, countrymindedness was manifested politically through
10 Tonts and Jones 1997.
11 Haslam McKenzie and Tonts 2005.
12 Tonts and Jones 1997, 173.
13 Lockie 2000, 17.
14 Black, quoted in Davies and Tonts 2007, 211.
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the formation and electoral success of the Country Party, now National Party.
Despite the dominance of the coastal cities since European settlement, the
egalitarian notion of the archetypal, usually male, Australian who ‘had a go and
built the nation’ had considerable electoral cache throughout Australia, with broad
acceptance of ‘agrarian socialist policies’.15 As a result, voters in rural, regional
and remote areas had a disproportionate advantage at the ballot box in many
jurisdictions. It was only in 2005 that Western Australian finally secured one-vote-
one-value legislation; until then rural votes were worth almost twice the urban
vote,16 much to the chagrin of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) whose electorate
was traditionally urban-based.17
In 1972, the Whitlam Labor government established the Department of Urban
and Regional Development (DURD) and, once again, the Commonwealth overtly
engaged in regional development policy. DURD’s initiatives were based on specific
policies aimed at improving co-ordination between the Commonwealth, states and
local government. DURD formalised planning regions and developed a population
distribution plan identifying growth centres.18 However, the Commonwealth’s
regional policy focus was short lived. The Fraser government’s election in 1975
ended the federal regional development policy foray, leaving it to the states to
look after regional matters until the 1990s. Since then, the importance of regional
policy at the Commonwealth level has waxed and waned. As noted by Eversole, ‘the
imperative to act in favour of Australian regions ebbs and flows with the political
climate, creating a fragmented landscape of regional policy initiatives’.19 Politics,
therefore, has considerable influence over what policies are implemented and where
they are applied.
The late 20th century and neoliberalism
Until the late 1970s, Australia’s regional policy was framed by a commitment to
equity, which supported communities throughout rural, regional and remote
Australia but did not necessarily elicit efficient industries. The 1980s saw significant
restructuring of policies and entire industry sectors after the election of the Hawke
Labor government in 1983. Australia began to engage with global conditions and
the international marketplace, and the broad government policy was reoriented to
efficiency and market forces, which underpin neoliberal principles. The hallmarks
of neoliberal policy principles are privatisation and state deregulation, increased
reliance on market forces, rather than government intervention, to drive change,
and devolution of responsibilities and functions from governments to the private
15 Lockie 2000, 19.
16 Davies and Tonts 2007.
17 van Staden and Haslam McKenzie 2019a.
18 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005.
19 Eversole 2016, 5.
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and community sectors. Government, therefore, began to withdraw from its trad-
itional role as a source of infrastructure investment and provider of services.
The shift to neoliberal principles was not limited to regional Australia, but its
impacts were deeply felt in rural, regional and remote communities. The viability
of regional communities came under scrutiny and government services and
infrastructure expenditure began to be rationalised and/or centralised, shaped by
user-pays and self-help ideals. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, rural, regional
and remote communities experienced reduced service delivery and infrastructure
investment, as government responded to market demands rather than equity
considerations. Communities were increasingly expected to more self-reliant. At a
government level, the Commonwealth began to devolve responsibility to the states,
and the states shifted many service provision responsibilities to local government –
the least resourced tier of government.
Australia’s industries are now some of the most globally engaged and efficient
in the world, but there are fewer people involved due to greater dependence on
technical and capital investment, often at the expense of the labour force. Farmers,
for example, use capital-intensive methods to maximise outputs; their farms are
bigger to take advantage of economies of scale, but they often employ fewer people.
The shift towards neoliberal principles in government policy boosted Australian
gross domestic product but had a catastrophic impact on many rural, regional and
remote communities as people left to access services in larger population centres
or were squeezed out by the scale of many of the businesses left behind. This
began a prolonged period of depopulation across all Australian rural, regional and
remote communities, with the exception of those either on, or very close to, the
coastline. By 2000, more than 80 per cent of the Australian population lived within
50 kilometres of the coast.20
The Hawke and Keating Labor governments (1983–96) implemented com-
prehensive neoliberal reforms, deregulated many sectors, including the finance
industry, and sold off government entities such as Telstra, Qantas and the Com-
monwealth Bank to the private sector, all of which had immediate impacts on
services at the local level, with many withdrawn because the private sector was
not prepared to underwrite unviable businesses. Commonwealth and state govern-
ments were keen to re-orient the economy to capture the perceived benefits of
an increasingly deregulated global marketplace. The Commonwealth government
initiated several different regional development programs, purportedly to assist
regional businesses and communities, but the emphasis was on economic efficiency,
competitiveness and entrepreneurialism. The expectation was that self-directed
and largely self-funded regional development programs would drive change. The
commitment to laissez-faire (market-led) policies also led to the sale of state
government assets, the privatisation of public services and the devolution of some
20 Salt 2004.
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public services to local governments. By selling off, contracting out or shifting the
responsibility to private consultants and local government for inefficient publicly
owned and operated assets and services, governments were able to reduce overall
levels of expenditure and emphasise the role of markets in achieving an ‘efficient’
allocation and provision of services. In effect, neoliberalism privileged economic
efficiency above social equity or, as Stilwell argued, ‘structural efficiency first, re-
distribution later’.21
Australia was in recession in the early 1990s, and ‘interest in regional de-
velopment policies … experienced somewhat of a resurgence’ due to two
interrelated causes.22 First, the neoliberal reforms’ contribution to regional socio-
economic disadvantage was becoming apparent, and second, the government was
forced to consider the adverse implications of their reforms on the 1993 federal
election.23 Government was increasingly challenged by regional voter dissatisfac-
tion as services and infrastructure were rationalised or withdrawn and local
capacity in the regions was compromised.
The Hawke and Keating governments prepared numerous regional de-
velopment reports between 1990 and 1993, emphasising bottom-up, local
entrepreneurship but with limited funding support. The Kelty Report (Develo-
ping Australia: a regional perspective) on regional economic development24 was
launched in December 1993 by the federal government, with high hopes that
employment difficulties and low incomes being experienced in many regional
communities would be addressed. The report proposed the establishment of
Regional Economic Development Organisations (REDOs) (later Regional Develop-
ment Organisations [RDOs] and Area Consultative Committees [ACCs]) across
Australia to develop individual regional strategies, promote regional development
and improve policy co-ordination between federal, state and local governments,
a strategy that was subsequently taken up in the federal government’s Working
Nation program in 1994.
Working Nation was a departure from previous approaches as it viewed
‘government as facilitator, rather than the driving force’,25 but the overarching
message was still self-reliance. Australia’s geography, its spatial imbalances and
the high concentration of its populations on the coastal fringes raised particular
problems for government. In the absence of a coherent national policy for urban
and regional development, jointly implemented by federal and state governments,
there was limited manoeuvrability for the redress of regional inequality.
The agricultural sector was particularly hard hit by the transition from a
favoured, government-supported industry sector to one that was expected to
21 Stilwell 1994, 61.
22 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005, 187.
23 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005.
24 Taskforce on Regional Development 1993.
25 Kelly, Dollery and Grant 2009, 181.
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compete internationally without government subsidies or other protection.
Economies of scale, technological primacy and increased harnessing of scientific
and economic efficiencies demanded capital investment, and inevitably caused
the failure of inefficient operations. These changes, over a relatively short period
of time, accelerated a process of decline in parts of regional Australia that had
historically been economically and socially dependent on agricultural production.
Regional environmental policy
One new area of policy that did attract broad political and funding commitment
was the environment. Since the early 1970s, environmental issues have increas-
ingly come to the forefront of discussion regarding sustainability. Debates regarding
the conflict between economic and environmental sustainability gained political
traction. The Brundtland Report26 crystallised the debates highlighting unsust-
ainability in terms of a threat to survival. The report overtly linked environmental
sustainability and the uneven distribution of economic benefits.27
After the Brundtland Commission emphasised the importance of sustainable
development and pushed it to the top of the agenda of the United Nations and
the multilateral development banks,28 environmental protection became a major
Australian government policy objective. In the late 1980s, the federal government
embarked on a series of sectoral ecologically sustainable development investi-
gations, which culminated in the adoption of the National Strategy for Ecologically
Sustainable Development in 1992.29
A national land care program was jointly proposed by the National Farmers’
Federation and the Australian Conservation Foundation, and in 1989 then Prime
Minister Bob Hawke, in the Statement on the Environment, announced the Decade
of Landcare. Water catchment and the management of salinity were two key areas.
Programs included in the Decade of Landcare focused on implementing
ecologically sustainable land use around Australia, promoting research and action
regarding land degradation throughout rural, regional and remote Australia, and
raising awareness of the importance of conservation and sustainable practices.
Regional development policy in the 21st century
The policies driving regional development at the conclusion of the 20th century
aimed to maintain economic and social vibrancy through regional-scale
governance and place-based solutions, in line with the ‘new’ paradigm that gained
considerable traction in the first decade of the 21st century. The ‘new’ paradigm
in regional policy has been strongly driven by the Organisation for Economic Co-
26 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987.
27 Ekins and Jacobs 1995; Kane 1999.
28 Daly 1990.
29 Godden 1997.
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operation and Development (OECD) since about 2006. It emphasises area-specific
or place-based approaches, rather than whole-of-government arrangements.
Much like other Liberal–National (Coalition) governments, the Howard
government (1996–2007) showed little inclination to drive a national regional
development agenda, maintaining ‘that local and regional development was a State
responsibility’ and that the Commonwealth was often a ‘competitor, rather than
a partner of the States’.30 The place-based approaches, framing the regional
development ‘problem’ as the lack of regional competitiveness and underused
potential, was a convenient reason for the Howard government not to pursue a
national regional policy agenda.
Despite the rhetoric that regional policy should be shaped by the regions
themselves, the control mechanisms of power and resources resided in the federal
and state parliaments and resources flowed according to political and centralised
policy commitments. Almost counterintuitively, the ALP has traditionally been
more committed to implementing regional policy than its more conservative
Liberal/Country/National Party opposition, continuing its long tradition of
bypassing the states. Between 1996 and 1998, the Howard government distanced
itself from ‘the Keating Government’s regional interventionism’31 and dismantled
the Regional Development Program. The REDOs and RDOs, were scrapped
although some RDOs survived as local corporations. The ACCs remained and
were restructured for the purpose of channelling federal funds to regional
communities,32 but they were usually small organisations with limited regional
impact.
Structural changes in the financial, transport, manufacturing and trade sectors
affected the geographic distribution of people, industries and wealth in regional
Australia, inducing new configurations. Under the Howard government, labour
and employment conditions were deregulated and flexible work arrangements such
as fly-in/fly-out (FIFO) and drive-in/drive-out (DIDO) became increasingly
popular. Long-distance commuting practices were used by many private and public
sector organisations, enabling employees to choose where they live, often in the
capital cities and larger, better-resourced regional centres, and travel to work in
other places, usually accommodated in employer-paid accommodation.33 Flexible
work arrangements reduced the need to continually invest in smaller, less resourced
communities, causing many benefits, such as income expenditure and housing
investment, to flow to the bigger centres instead.
Continued orientation of the Australian economy towards global markets
intensified the effect of market mechanisms, causing continual change in techn-
ologies, products, markets and modes of distribution. The impact of technological
30 Tomaney 2010, 29.
31 Collits 2008, 295.
32 Paül and Haslam McKenzie 2015.
33 Haslam McKenzie 2016.
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change was double-sided: it increased demand and employment, but it also dis-
placed workers and made some jobs obsolete, particularly in the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors.
From a social perspective, restructuring was not achieved without pain and a
sense of loss for many in regional Australia. The consistent paring back of regional
development investment continued to incur voter backlash. This was particularly
evident in the rise of One Nation in the 1998 Queensland election. One Nation
received 23 per cent of the primary vote, and won 11 of 89 seats in the 1998
Queensland state election.34 The party’s success was generally attributed to its
appeal to rural voters, who were increasingly disillusioned with the major parties
and felt their lifestyles were under threat.35 The Commonwealth responded with
attempts to soften the non-interventionist policy direction, but once again there
was limited time and investment, resulting in policy fragmentation,36 and the
electorate was not convinced.
The resources boom
From 2001 onwards, Australia experienced a decade of outstanding growth and
prosperity, principally on the back of a resources boom, fuelled by almost insatiable
demand from China for resources, including coal, iron-ore, energy and agricultural
products. Many did not see this boom period coming and many rural, regional
and remote communities were unprepared, especially those at the centre of the
mining boom, in regions such as the Pilbara in Western Australia and the Surat and
Bowen basins in Queensland. This boom period continued unabated for more than
a decade, despite the GFC (2007–09) dragging down the major global economies.
The boom had broad impacts across all of Australia, with many people and
communities, especially in the cities, where most long-distance commuting miners
resided and businesses and mining service providers were located, enjoying the
benefits. The outcomes for people living in rural, regional and remote communities
were mixed. For those communities close to mining activities, the impacts were
not always beneficial, with intense demand for housing, infrastructure, services
and labour driving up prices and displacing many who could not compete with
the wealthy mining companies. Furthermore, the decades-long neglect of regional
services and infrastructure impeded responsive development,37 causing housing
shortages and inadequate utility services.
The outcomes of the boom are a classic example of uneven growth and the
two-speed economy. Regional Queensland and Western Australia bore the con-
sequences of the boom conditions; the former due to its large coal mining
34 McManus and Pritchard 2000.
35 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005.
36 Beer 2007.
37 Haslam McKenzie and Rowley 2013; Lawrie, Tonts and Plummer 2011.
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operations and the emerging coal seam gas industry, and the latter principally due
to its huge and rich iron-ore resources, but also its offshore oil and gas reserves.
In the Pilbara, at the height of the boom, the overall cost of living was 37 per cent
higher38 than that in Perth.
While the majority of Australia’s rich mining resources tend to be in remote
locations, some are located where agriculture is also well established and highly
productive – for example, the Darling Downs in Queensland, the Hunter Valley
in New South Wales and the Peel region in Western Australia. Land use conflict,
access to land and water resources and pressure on services caused considerable
antagonism between farmers and mining companies,39 and many state agencies and
local governments did not have the capacity and were not properly resourced to
deal with the issues.
Critics of the status quo
Communities and industry leaders looked to government for regional policies that
would support towns and communities and help them retain the benefits from
boom economic conditions. Beer,40 along with others,41 contends that regional
development in Australia was hampered by a lack of long-term strategic directions
and the outcomes of the system of federalism.
Beer is particularly critical of political ideologies grounded in neoliberalism
that were wary of direct intervention in regional economies and emphasised short-
term political responses, rather than long-term strategic interventions. As
explained by Tiley, ‘the Australian Government had the financial capacity to
empower an effective regional development network; the state and territory
governments had the constitutional power; while local government had neither
the funding nor the power, but had the commitment needed to deliver change’.42
Beer claims that the division of powers between the three tiers of government
contributed to a clouding of the lines of responsibility and accountability, and
that the importance and role of regional development were not understood or
recognised.43 Consequently, resources and responsibilities are still abrogated by
the spheres of government with superior power, which instead focus on short-
term ‘political point scoring’. This was particularly evident in the Rudd and Gillard
governments.
In 2007, the Rudd ALP government sought a return to interventionism and
established Regional Development Australia (RDA) committees to administer
regional funds through local government authorities, rather than through state
38 Department of Regional Development and Lands 2011.
39 Hoath and Pavez 2013; Zhang and Moffat 2015.
40 Beer 2007.
41 Collits 2012.
42 Tiley 2013, 12.
43 Beer 2007.
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government agencies,44 once again reverting to the traditional ALP practice of
bypassing state governments. RDA committees replaced REDOs (later RDOs and
ACCs), which were Commonwealth-funded offices in locations across regional
Australia. The committees’ purpose has generally remained the same since the
REDOs were established during the Keating government in 1993: identify key
regional economic and industry development issues, investigate the prospects for a
more even distribution of regional development and employment, examine actors
influencing regional investment and suggest appropriate policy changes.
The REDOs, RDOs and ACCs were ineffectual, however, because they did
not have the capacity to make a significant difference, lacking both resources and
political continuity. The RDA committees were no different, although under Rudd
the budget allocation was reduced and the community members working on the
committees providing overarching governance were unpaid. The rhetoric of
support for regional Australia was familiar, but the electorate was disgruntled, and
the 2010 election returned a hung parliament. The ALP finally formed government
after three independent, rural-based politicians gave their support in return for
generous concessions to regional Australia.
Royalties for Regions
The Rudd and Gillard governments were not the only governments responding
to voter backlash. As van Staden and Haslam McKenzie observe, ‘under the right
conditions, compounding socio-political and economic change can dramatically
alter government policy’.45 The intensity of the mining boom in Western Australia
and the ill-preparedness of the state and communities for its social and economic
impacts caused considerable criticism to be directed at the ALP state government.
In the 2008 state election, neither of the major parties won a majority, and the
National Party, a then minor party traditionally representing the non-metropolitan
constituency, became kingmaker in order to avoid a hung parliament
The National Party’s powerbrokers negotiated the implementation of the
Royalties for Regions program in a last-minute deal with the Western Australian
Liberal Party. This was a significant departure from a non-interventionist,
neoliberal and ‘new paradigm’ policy agenda. The Royalties for Regions program
allocated a further 25 per cent of the state’s resources royalty income to non-
metropolitan regions, over and above existing regional allocations. It transformed
regional development into a billion dollar effort, dwarfing previous government
investment since the 1960s.46 While more $1 billion was allocated to upgrading
facilities, infrastructure and planning capacity in the Pilbara, the Royalties for
44 Sotarauta and Beer 2017.
45 van Staden and Haslam McKenzie 2019b, 1.
46 van Staden and Haslam McKenzie 2019b.
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Regions largesse was spread throughout rural, regional and remote communities in
Western Australia.
Importantly, the National Party, in its negotiations with the Liberal Party after
the 2008 election, chose not to formalise a ‘coalition’, but rather argued that it was
an ‘alliance’,47 putting the Liberal Party on notice that the support of the National
Party could not be assured unless rural, regional and remote communities were
adequately looked after.
In 2017, the ALP won government again in Western Australia, and while the
Royalties for Regions program has not been revoked, investment in rural, regional
and remote Western Australia has been significantly pared back and the National
Party’s parliamentary influence has significantly reduced.
The Abbott and Turnbull governments’ regional policy agenda
Little changed with regard to regional policy under the Abbott and Turnbull
Coalition governments (2013–18). As noted, the hallmarks of 21st-century regional
development are intermittent commitment, blame-shifting, poorly resourced
policy and rebadging of old initiatives. In 2016, under the Turnbull government, the
Commonwealth reviewed the RDA committees, recommending their cessation.48
The review supported regional-specific solutions and the alignment of regional
development boundaries with those of states and territories. It also recommended
‘strengthening regional economies by promoting economic investment opp-
ortunities in regional Australia to the national and international market’,49 in line
with the global reorientation policies espoused since the 1980s.
However, the author of the review, Warwick Smith, considered the
Commonwealth commitment to regional Australia as piecemeal at best and
perhaps even tokenistic: ‘the Australian Government, along with most state and
territory governments, have not shown total commitment to the RDA
programme’.50 Smith identified a range of structural inefficiencies that hindered
the functionality of RDA committees, but perhaps the most fundamental weakness
of the program was the lack of appropriate funding or support to enable the
committees to deliver the Australian government’s regional agenda: ‘The Australian
government delivers its broader policy and programs, even regional programs, in
isolation to, and separately from, the RDA programme.’51
The budget allocation for RDA committees has not changed for a decade,
despite costs increasing over that time. In large jurisdictions such as Western
Australia and the Northern Territory, additional challenges such as the high costs
of doing business in many rural, regional and remote places, travel time over large
47 Phillimore and McMahon, 2015.
48 Commonwealth of Australia 2016.
49 Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 7.
50 Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 2.
51 Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 2.
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distances, poor connectivity and problematic telecommunications services, further
undermining the efficacy of RDA committees. The annual budget of $18 million
is expected to fund the entire national RDA program, across 52 committees. This
essentially pays the salaries of the executive directors, with little left to achieve
the central purpose of the committees: to support the development of regional
Australia. Funding allocations available for projects, and decisions regarding how
and where the funds will be spent, are often determined by other Commonwealth
government commitments or local federal politicians’ agendas, rather than the local
RDA committee or agreed funding priorities.
The arrangements reflect the ‘new’ paradigm of regional development,
exhibiting ‘the familiar mixture of unconnected regional programs; inadequately
resourced regional structures … and an unflinching faith that spending large
amounts on infrastructure projects big and small across most regions is the best
way to fund regional development’.52
In 2017, the Commonwealth released its ‘Regions 2030 – Unlocking
Opportunity’ policy.53 Despite its new name, the policy includes elements of many
of its predecessors and of the ‘new’ paradigm, focusing on local decision making,
tailor-made regional solutions and unlocking regional economies, all without a
new funding model. Despite various experiments, regional bodies with political
power have never become a fixed part of the regional administrative landscape and
Commonwealth regionalisation, in particular, has always been controversial.54
The lack of stable leadership in the federal ministry has undermined
commitment and policy coherence. Federal leadership changes since 2010 and
major political disruptions associated with citizenship credentials of politicians
have meant that regional development has not been a focus of successive
governments, and the portfolio has lacked ministerial and hence leadership
consistency. Since 2010 there have been ten ministers with responsibility for the
RDA network. Not surprisingly, regional development policy has been described as
‘fragmented’ by a range of commentators and researchers.55
Conclusions
Regional Australia is, as you would expect, unique. However, many of Australia’s
current regional development policies are not dissimilar to those of other First
World nations, despite Australia’s significant climatic, political, geographic,
environmental and economic differences. Nonetheless non-metropolitan areas are
often viewed as the policy periphery, struggling to maintain population, vibrancy
52 Collits 2012, 28.
53 Commonwealth of Australia 2017.
54 Kelly, Dollery and Grant 2009, 181–2.
55 Beer, Maude and Pritchard 2003; Commonwealth of Australia 2016; Dollery, Buultjens and
Adams 2011.
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and viability as businesses and people are drawn to the political and economic
centres located in capitals.
While Australian regional development policy dictates that the regions should
have considerable autonomy because they understand local context, conditions and
potential opportunities, the resources and decision-making power tend to reside
in Canberra or the respective state capitals. Despite the Commonwealth claiming
that regional development is the remit of the states for most of the last 120 years, it
dictates overarching national policy by virtue of its fiscal dominance. Furthermore,
it has considerable power over the other spheres of government and the outcomes
for rural, regional and remote communities. The states also play a significant role
in regional development, dictating how resources will be spent and where; ‘thus
regional Australia’s organisations, institutions and governance mechanisms remain
structurally on the periphery’.56 It is not surprising then that regional development
initiatives and policies have lacked consistency, causing duplication and widening
service gaps across multiple government levels.
According to Sotarauta and Beer, ‘to most observers, the regional development
system in Australia appears chaotic and underfunded relative to needs’.57 The lack
of uniformity and consistency of both Commonwealth and state regional
development agencies have contributed to a national regional framework that is
without coherence.58 Consequently, ‘fragmentation’ in regional development has
been a major problem, with policy responsibility frequently shared between the
federal, state and local spheres of government’59 and a slew of organisations,
including many from the private sector, involved in the delivery of regional
development programs. There are no signs that these trends are likely to change
while Australian regional development policy is characterised by ‘modest
government investment and locally provided inducements’.60
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Social policy
Greg Marston and Zoe Staines
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Social policy is guided by questions of distributive justice: who gets what in society,
under what circumstances, and how. Social policy is generally considered to be
synonymous with the ‘welfare state’, which sees government as a direct provider or
regulator of private and not-for-profit social welfare services including education,
health, community services, social housing, occupational welfare and income
support. These forms of welfare are usually underwritten by social insurance
schemes, which redistribute funds accumulated through taxes and levies to those
in need of support. They can also take other forms, like the provision of tax
expenditures and informal care provided through civil society.1
The various forms of welfare, provided through a combination of direct
government service delivery, markets, non-profits and civil society, are referred to as
a mixed economy of welfare. Social policies tend to interact and intersect in a number
of different ways, forming a complex web of enabling and disenabling structures
and systems. For example, the right to access and engage in meaningful education is
deeply linked with other areas of social policy, because policy structures can either
establish the architecture that enables or denies this access and engagement (like
Marston, Greg, and Zoe Staines (2019). Social policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014.
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promoting access to quality early childhood care).2 Social policy can, therefore, have
direct and substantial impacts on how people live their lives, the choices available to
them, and their overall standard of living. Social policy decisions are also often highly
politicised and deeply contested as the meeting of human needs has both a moral and
material dimension.
This chapter explores some fundamental characteristics of social policy
including a brief history of social policy in Australia, how it is made, by whom,
and key debates. As you will see, social policy plays a powerful role in shaping
how society operates, how it redistributes wealth, how it cares for and controls its
most disadvantaged members, and provides tax breaks for middle and upper income
Australians. Summing up the role of the conflicted welfare state in an essay titled
‘What is social policy?’, the pioneering scholar of social administration Richard
Titmuss wrote that ‘what is “welfare” for some groups may be “illfare” for others’.3 In
this chapter we seek to draw out these dilemmas and contradictions.
Social policy in Australia: recent history
Prior to Federation in 1901, social welfare in Australia was largely the purview
of non-government charitable organisations. Smyth described Australian colonial
society as being ‘cool’ when it came to government-provided welfare, but ‘hot’ on
promoting equal opportunity.4 The focus was on supporting citizens to be self-
sufficient rather than looking to government for poverty relief. This represented a
contrast to the (often stigmatised) provision of state welfare under the Poor Laws in
Britain.5
Dickey described the years following Federation as being characterised by a
transition away from an age of charity to an age of rights.6 The Harvester Judgement,
handed down by Justice Higgins of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in
1907, established the first minimum ‘living wage’ for Australian workers.7 In 1908,
the new Australian government also introduced a fixed-rate old-age pension, though
this was not universal. For example, only those who passed the means test qualified
and some groups, like Indigenous Australians, were explicitly excluded.
Thereafter, around the Second World War, Australia’s welfare system was dram-
atically redefined and expenditure increased exponentially.8 As Shaver explained,
‘Australia entered World War II with only fragmentary welfare provision: by the
end of the war it had constructed a “welfare state”’.9 This was partly prompted by
2 Gupta and Simonsen 2016; Lamy 2012.
3 Titmuss 1974, 4.
4 Smyth 2012, 2.
5 Smyth 2011.
6 Dickey 1980.
7 Lloyd 2017.
8 Watts 1999; Watts 1987.
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the formation in 1941 of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security by
the Menzies government (1939–41), which reviewed existing social policies and
recommended new measures to improve postwar life.10
A series of new social policies were introduced during and in the aftermath
of the Second World War, including widows’ pensions, uniform income tax in
1942, and the National Welfare Fund in 1943–44, which funded the national
unemployment benefit.11 The provision of national unemployment benefits was,
at least in part, a response to the anticipated demobilisation of military personnel
in the post–Second World War period.12 However, the benefits were means-tested
rather than universal – a contrast to the approach then taken in Britain.13
In 1945, then-Treasurer (and later prime minister from 1945–49) Ben Chifley
referred to Australia’s growing social security system as a safety net much like that
used by a trapeze artist: ‘The net is not, of course, part of the main show … The
more competent the performer, the less the net will be used’.14 The underpinning
belief was that the best form of welfare was a job and, thus, the emphasis was on
ensuring equal access to fair employment. The social security system was perceived
as a ‘fall-back’ measure only. It is for this reason that Australia’s postwar welfare
state came to be characterised in the literature as ‘a wage earner’s welfare state’, or
more precisely given the nature of the labour market during this period ‘a white,
male wage earner’s welfare state’.15
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was only incremental social policy reform,
perhaps in part because of very strong employment throughout the period.16 This
preceded further widespread expansion of the welfare state during the 1970s, when
unemployment rates began to increase with the 1974 global recession.17 A series of
inquiries was also initiated to examine social welfare, including the Commission
of Inquiry into Poverty in Australia, or the ‘Henderson Inquiry’, established by the
McMahon Coalition government (1971–72) and whose terms of reference were
later expanded under the Whitlam Labor government (1972–75). Following this
(and other) public inquiries, a raft of changes were implemented, which had the
effect of moving welfare from being viewed as residual, as per Chifley’s description,
to becoming a fundamental aspect of citizenship.18
The Whitlam government’s reforms were undertaken on the basis that
domestic social policy should focus on achieving a more ‘just’ and ‘liveable’
Australia.19 They involved an extensive program, including increased expenditure
9 Shaver 1987, 411.
10 Shaver 1987.
11 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014; Watts 1999, 92.
12 Dollery and Webster 1995.
13 Smyth 2011.
14 Chifley in Smyth 2012.
15 Bryson 1992; Castles 1985.
16 Regan 2014.
17 Gregory 2004.
18 Smyth 2011.
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on public housing, a revision of school funding rules to recognise level of need, the
removal of all fees for tertiary students, and the introduction of the country’s first
universal health care, Medibank.20 Whitlam also established an Indigenous land
rights scheme in the Northern Territory and announced an explicit shift in social
policy focus for Indigenous Australians from ‘protection’ to self-determination.21
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australia experienced some further fund-
amental social policy shifts, including major pension reforms and the introduction
of the Working Nation policy, which signalled a transition away from the public
provision of unemployment support services to a quasi-market model.22 This was
coupled with the introduction of ‘active labour’ policies from 1986 onwards, which
placed increased conditions on unemployment benefits.23 Social policy under
recent Australian governments has been comparatively conservative and routinely
underpinned by neoliberal arguments about reciprocity, the benefits of market
provision and individual responsibility.24 However, the overall size of Australia’s
welfare expenditure envelope has nevertheless increased.
Recent social welfare expenditure in Australia
Australia’s welfare expenditure increased from $117 billion in 2006–7 to $157 bill-
ion in 2015–16, representing a growth of 3.4 per cent per annum.25 Simultaneously,
expenditure on health between 1989 and 2014 increased from 6.5 per cent to 9.7
per cent of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).26 In 2015–16, the Australian
government also lost a total of $47 billion in tax expenditures, which is additional
to the total welfare expenditure reported above.27 Finally, the sheer number of
people involved in delivering welfare services has also increased, with the ‘welfare
workforce’ growing by 84 per cent since 2005 and representing 4.1 per cent of the
total Australian workforce in 2015.28
Klapdor and Arthur frame these increases as being largely a result of ‘popula-
tion growth, population ageing, labour market changes and economic circum-
stances as well as policy changes relating to eligibility requirements’.29 They are also
partially due to the addition of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS),
19 McDougall 2015.
20 McDougall 2015. Medibank was later weakened under the Fraser government (1975–83) before
being revitalised as Medicare under Hawke (1983–91).
21 Sanders 2013.
22 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014; van Hooren, Kaasch and Starke 2014.
23 Deeming 2016.
24 For example, see Johnson 2011; Ryan 2005.
25 AIHW 2017.
26 AIHW 2016.
27 AIHW 2017.
28 AIHW 2017.
29 Klapdor and Arthur 2015.
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which is expected to increase expenditure on disability services from $4.7 billion in
2015–16 to around $24 billion in 2019–20.
Notwithstanding these overall increases, Australia’s social welfare expenditure
as a percentage of GDP continues to be comparatively lower than most other
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).30 Welfare in Australia, in the form of income support payments, is also
highly targeted. In 2017, about 80 per cent of Australia’s spending on cash welfare
benefits was means tested, making Australia the highest means-testing country in
the OECD.31
Against this backdrop, the gap between rich and poor in Australia is growing.
The wealthiest 20 per cent of households accounted for 59 per cent of total
household wealth in 2004–5 and 63 per cent of total household wealth in
2015–16.32 In contrast, the poorest 20 per cent of Australian households only
accounted for around 1 per cent of total household wealth in 2004–5 and also in
2015–16. (The gap did, however, remain largely stable from 2013–14 to 2015–16.)
Wealth also tends to be distributed unequally across geographical regions and for
different groups. For instance, median disposable household income for Indigenous
households in urban areas between 2011–16 increased by $57 per week, but fell
by $12 per week in very remote areas where incomes were already far lower.33
In general, Indigenous Australians are more likely to experience absolute
poverty (where income is not sufficient to support a minimum standard of living)
as opposed to relative poverty (where income is not sufficient to support the
minimum standard of living enjoyed by the majority).34 Addressing these
disparities requires political and policy change. Ongoing policy debates about the
means and ends of welfare are underpinned by competing moral arguments, as the
following section illustrates.
How is social policy made, and by whom?
The question of who is involved in making social policy is important, because
different policy actors will have different worldviews, moral beliefs, experiences
and agendas. This is particularly apparent when thinking about the different goals
and objectives of state actors (i.e. bureaucrats and elected politicians) and non-state
actors (e.g. individuals, collectives, not-for-profit and private-sector organisations).
State actors shape social policy through their direct role in the policy-making
process. Policy advisers in the public service or in ministerial offices have the role
of exploring social policy ‘problems’ or ‘issues’ as they arise, gathering research
30 OECD 2016.
31 AIHW 2017.
32 ABS 2017; ABS 2005.
33 Markham and Biddle 2018.
34 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014.
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and evidence around different options, undertaking consultation, and providing
information and advice to elected officials about possible courses of action. In
Australia, elected officials then have the final decision-making power over
government social policy; it is up to members of parliament and Cabinet to decide
which policies are to be pursued, how, when and why.
Non-state actors also have an important role to play in shaping, delivering and
sometimes also designing social policy. For instance, they may:
• seek to influence the focus and development of government social policy
through advocacy, lobbying, and participation in consultation
• deliver government-led/designed social policy, particularly through new public
management (NPM) contracting arrangements
• initiate and develop social policy themselves, either with or without the
involvement of the state.
Processes for making social policy will inevitably differ between these groups.
There are, however, recognised standard processes for policy making in the pu-
blic sector – often articulated through the concept of policy ‘cycles’.35 Althaus,
Bridgman and Davis’ Australian ‘policy cycle’ proposes eight stages of policy
development: (1) issue identification, (2) policy analysis, (3) policy instruments, (4)
consultation, (5) co-ordination, (6) decision making, (7) implementation, and (8)
evaluation. The authors argue that policy makers do not necessarily step through
these stages consecutively, but that the policy process may instead be haphazard: a
kind of ‘policy dance’.36
Others have critiqued the Australian ‘policy cycle’ on the basis that it represents
an overly technocratic view of policy making and does not adequately grapple with
the complexities of real life, including political dimensions and other constraints.37
Indeed, the process of identifying and framing social policy ‘issues’, choosing which
issues demand a response (and which do not), identifying and interpreting
evidence and making recommendations is inevitably political, demanding a series
of subjective and collective value judgements. Below, we turn to some key debates
and non-agenda issues in social policy making that help to draw out some of these
complexities.
Debates and non-agenda issues
Social policy is often highly contested. Debates regularly invoke questions about
who is deserving of different forms of welfare, and the overall size of Australia’s
welfare funding envelope. There is also widespread debate about the nature and
35 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018; Lasswell 1951.
36 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018; Edwards 2017.
37 For example, see Colebatch 2006; Howlett and Ramesh 2003.
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strategy behind welfare in Australia, including disagreement concerning the ‘social
engineering’ objectives of some social policies in line with behavioural economics.
This is particularly apparent in unemployment policies, which embed productivist
assumptions about the pre-eminence of paid work over all other forms of work,
such as informal care and unpaid domestic labour. An ethics of care is
marginalised, while the paid work ethic is eulogised in these debates.
Who are the ‘deserving’ beneficiaries of social policy?
Social policy is an avenue through which goods and services, both tangible and
intangible, can be provided to some members of society, while simultaneously
being denied to others. Decisions about the distribution of government-funded
welfare resources frequently require governments to draw boundaries around
identities and social groups, labelling some as deserving and others as less so. These
boundaries are sometimes arbitrary and are often fraught.
The concept of legal citizenship provides an example, as it opens the door for
individuals to access a range of social resources that are otherwise unavailable to
non-citizens. Whether this is always fair or just is debateable. For example, before
being recognised as citizens in the 1967 constitutional referendum, Indigenous
Australians were largely denied basic rights on the basis of their non-citizen status.
This included being denied access to many forms of social welfare that were enjoyed
by settler Australians. Instead, Indigenous Australians were (and arguably still are)
subject to domestic policies and practices that problematised them as requiring
heavy modification and intervention to conform to the standards of settler society.
Who is deemed to be deserving of social welfare thus depends on how social
policy ‘problems’ are framed, and which individuals or groups are problematised
as a result of that framing. Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem?’ approach recognises that
policy ‘problems’ are not objective truths, but are instead socially and discursively
constructed and reproduced.38 According to Bacchi’s approach, social policy
responds to ‘problems’ that, just as they have been socially constructed, can also be
questioned, contested and disrupted.
With regard to gender equality, Bacchi and Eveline stated, ‘policies do not
simply “deal with” the “problem” of “gender inequality”. Rather, policies create
different impressions of what the “problem” of “gender equality” entails.’39 Bacchi
later discussed policy responses intended to address the pay gap between men and
women, focusing on one response that provided additional training to women.40
Bacchi argued that the response placed the blame for the gap on women’s shoulders,
implying that it was women’s lack of training that had caused the pay gap. This
38 Bacchi 2009.
39 Bacchi and Eveline 2010, 112.
40 Bacchi 2017.
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framing, however, ignores other fundamental structural and historical issues that
also play a critical role.
Discourses around ‘welfare dependency’ also provide a pertinent example of
how framing can directly impact social policy responses. For instance, recent
discourse tends to frame welfare as being innately problematic, with dependency
on the state perceived as a moral bad, while dependency on markets is celebrated as
a marker of success and independence. Welfare ‘poison’ is now perceived as a core
contributor to long-term social disadvantage, rather than a potential solution.41
Therefore, the policy ‘problem’ shifts from claims that there is not enough welfare
to pull people out of poverty, to claims that there is too much welfare for people to
pull themselves out of poverty. This refocusing of the issue shifts discussion away
from historical, social and structural causes of poverty to the individual themselves,
and leads to responses that focus on overcoming perceived individual deficits such
as laziness, lack of skills and moral hazard. This sets the foundations for policies
that involve behavioural interventions to ‘correct’ perceived individual deficits, as
we discuss below.
Social policy as a behavioural tool
Social policy can be used to enable and empower, but also to govern, coerce and
control. Social policies inevitably embed normative assumptions about suitable or
desirable ways of living and behaving, which can serve to restrain each individual’s
power over their own lives and identities. They can also explicitly contain
behavioural objectives, seeking to influence the ways that social policy ‘subjects’
view and interact with the world, including through behavioural economics and
‘nudge’ interventions.42 For instance, social policies often seek to influence how
individuals address their health, spend their time, grow their wealth, and more.43
Thaler and Sunstein discuss ‘nudge’ interventions as being grounded in a
libertarian-paternalist framework, which recognises the critical importance of
personal liberty, but which also acknowledges the potential benefits of ‘soft’
paternalism in influencing behaviour without restraining individual choice. ‘Choice
architects’ – those responsible for devising nudge interventions – seek to subtly
manipulate the context within which choices are made so as to encourage, but not
to require, certain choices over others. Thaler and Sunstein provide the example
of placing fruit at eye-level in school cafeterias to encourage students to choose
healthy food options. While this policy does not restrain their ability to choose
other options, it nevertheless subtly influences the likelihood that their choices will
be healthier than if the fruit was placed elsewhere.
41 Pearson 2009; O’Connor 2001.
42 Thaler and Sunstein 2009.
43 Deeming 2016.
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At the other end of the scale are policies driven by hard paternalism. These
policies tend to limit individual freedom and choice, instead coercing individuals to
conform to particular standards of behaviour or ways of being. Extending Thaler and
Sunstein’s example, a hard paternalist approach to improving school students’ diets
might involve regulating the food options available in school cafeterias to exclude
unhealthy foods, thereby restricting choice and removing individual discretion.
Over the past decade, there has been an intensified interest in translating
behavioural economics theory into public policy development.44 Bonoli has
referred to this as the ‘active social policy paradigm’: one in which governments
routinely use social policy instruments to pursue the health and wellbeing of their
populations.45 In Australia, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet now
has a dedicated behavioural economics team, ‘BETA’, established to enhance the
ability of the Australian public service to, among other things, ‘apply behavioural
insights to public policy and administration’.46 The team has worked on a range
of policy projects to date, including in relation to tax compliance, influencing
consumers’ energy choices, and ensuring compliance with labour laws.47 Though
there are arguments for and against the use of behavioural economics, behavioural
objectives are apparent in a range of social policies in Australia. Income
management (discussed in the below case study) provides one example.
Case example: income management in Australia
Compulsory income management involves ‘quarantining’ proportions of an
individual’s welfare income and diverting the quarantined amount to a ‘BasicsCard’,
a type of debit card where funds cannot be converted to cash, nor used to purchase
certain items that are deemed (by the state) to be morally hazardous, including
alcohol, tobacco, pornography and/or gambling services.
Having been first introduced in 2007 under the Northern Territory Emergency
Response, income management now operates in discrete jurisdictions across
Australia, including across the Northern Territory, and in parts of Western
Australia, Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria. By March
2018, there were around 25,270 participants across Australia (though this excludes
participants in the areas added since this time).48
These schemes operate differently, quarantining between 50 and 80 per cent
of an individual’s welfare income, and taking different approaches to the adminis-
tration of income management. For example, individuals who live in Bankstown
(New South Wales) can have 50 per cent of their welfare income managed for at
least 12 months if they are referred by a social or child protection worker, are less
44 Oliver 2013.
45 Bonoli 2013; Deeming 2016.
46 DPM&C 2018a.
47 DPM&C 2018a. See also DPM&C 2018b for case studies of BETA projects.
48 DSS 2018.
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than 25 years of age and considered to be a ‘vulnerable welfare payment recipient’,49
and/or if they volunteer.50
Alternatively, under a more recent form of income management being trialled
in other parts of Australia – the cashless welfare card – individuals are not referred.
Instead, up to 80 per cent of an individual’s welfare income is automatically
redirected to a debit card, which can only be used to purchase approved items (i.e.
not alcohol, gambling products or for withdrawing cash).
Although the models differ in their design and administration, they all involve
behavioural objectives, which seek to coerce certain behaviours by restricting or
removing individual choice over expenditure – a form of hard paternalism. In this
way, welfare income is used as a lever for behavioural compliance with selected
social norms. Welfare conditionality of this nature is also supported by broader
discourses around welfare dependency and, thus, it is hoped that by increasing
conditionality, individuals will ultimately be incentivised away from long spells on
welfare. There is, however, little regard for broader structural factors that also play
a central role in whether or not individuals will draw on welfare throughout their
lives.
Conclusions
Social policy is a way of describing the actions and configuration of governments,
the family, markets and civil society in meeting the wellbeing of citizens and
residents. The formal and informal rules and regulations governing access to goods
and services create forms of inclusion and sites of exclusion. Invariably, the design
and implementation of social policies reflects and embeds value judgements about
the good life and the good society. As discussed throughout this chapter, the means
and ends of social policy are often controversial and highly contested. Political
debates frequently revolve around the overall size of the welfare funding envelope,
the shape of the welfare system, the forms of delivery and the identities of
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ beneficiaries. Although Australia has a long history
of welfare conditionality, there has been an intensification of this in recent decades.
This has coincided with changing discourses around the role and impacts of
welfare, including an increased focus on the perceived toxic impacts of long-term
‘welfare dependency’. Where welfare was once viewed as an acceptable safety net
or fallback measure for alleviating poverty, it is now regularly described as a core
contributing factor to moral decay and decline.
The framing and reframing of welfare in Australian society has had, and
continues to have, a direct influence on how social policies are constructed,
49 That is, if they are in receipt of certain categories of welfare, live within a specified income
management area, experience financial hardship, fail to undertake ‘reasonable self-care’ and more.
50 Australian Government 2018; DHS 2018.
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implemented and monitored. Social policies themselves both reflect and are active
in the construction of these dominant narratives. They can be used as tools to unite,
enable and empower, but also to divide, govern and coerce. The history and case
study contained in this chapter provide examples of this variability. Debates around
these aspects of social policy will likely continue into the future, as Australia rapidly
defines and redefines its national identity in both domestic and international
contexts. Being alert to the changing contexts within which social policy is
discussed, designed and implemented is an important first step in being able to
deconstruct and question social policy objectives – critical factors in ensuring
robust democratic debate among students and scholars of social policy, but also
among practitioners, beneficiaries and the wider public.
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Urban policy
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As urbanists from around the world often remind us, about 55 per cent of the
world’s population lives in cities. By 2030, that figure is likely to be over 60 per cent.1
Cities, therefore, will be increasingly important sites for managing the prosperity
of the world’s population. Since colonisation, Australia has had a strong urban
focus. This is partly the result of the physical geography of the continent, with a
rugged desert core surrounded by sections of agriculturally productive coastline.
For example, a little over 5 million people live in Sydney – Australia’s first city –
which is about 20 per cent of the nation’s population. But this is likely to grow by
one and a half million people over the next 20 to 30 years. While each Australian
state faces its own growth challenges, four common themes are emerging in every
city: How and where will we house everyone? How will we source enough food and
water for the city? Where will people work? And how will we move everyone into
and out of – and around – the city? In short, the four big and interrelated urban
Pill, Madeleine, and Dallas Rogers (2019). Urban policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: junior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326701
1 United Nations 2015.
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policy challenges that confront Australian cities are housing, jobs, food security and
transport. A key task of urban policy is to build a network that allows different
people, sectors and organisations to work together, across their differences, to plan
and build a better city for every citizen. This raises critical questions about what a
city is and who a city is for.
This challenge is complicated by the urban policy domain itself, which is
shaped by the constitutional and statutory arrangements between federal, state/
territory and local governments in Australia. These arrangements determine how
‘the state’ (federal, state and local governments and their agencies) intervenes in ‘the
urban’, as an arena for the formulation, implementation and contestation of policies.
The development and realisation of effective urban policy is further challenged by
the complexities of urban governance and the messiness of urban space.
Urban governance is the process through which a city is governed. It involves
different government agencies at different levels with diverse interests and respon-
sibilities in relation to the urban arena, which they may pursue (such as major
infrastructure provision) or disregard (such as ensuring access to safe, secure
affordable housing). It also involves other, non-governmental actors and interests in
the private and third (non-profit or community) sectors. Urban policy is therefore
characterised by the ‘search for co-ordination’2 as the policy challenges cities face
are cross-cutting and multi-level and require multi-agency, cross-sector responses.
Policy co-ordination across the government portfolios of transport, infrastructure,
environment, housing, finance, education, health and social services would be
required to build a ‘multi-dimensional policy perspective’ on cities.3
The urban space of cities is also complex. In terms of politics and public policy,
we need to know who is responsible for what (where infrastructure is provided
and services delivered) and who has a say (who is involved in policy formulation
and delivery, who gets to vote). But this is complicated too. For example, urban
regions might comprise more than one local government area, so it makes sense
that public service provision, such as public transport, is co-ordinated at a higher
level to ensure there is a transport network that serves residents who live in one
local government area, work in another and use services or access amenities like
public open space in a third. In Australia, there is a renewed focus on long-term
metropolitan planning, with periodic discussion of a national, federal government-
driven urban agenda. But Australia does not have an elected metropolitan (between
local and state) level of government responsible for planning and co-ordination of
its urban regions. In turn, we know that people’s strongest attachments tend to be to
local places, rather than urban regions. Furthermore, while some policies explicitly
target ‘the urban’ in terms of the place or the people who live there, many policies
that are not urban-targeted have urban effects. Finally, cities are part of wider, often
2 Cochrane 2007.
3 Dodson 2015.
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global, socio-economic processes and flows of people, finance, goods and services.
Policy makers can seek to resist the effects of or capture the benefits of these flows.
In this chapter, we first establish why urban policy matters and then consider
the major theories that help us to understand urban policy. We then examine how
urban policy has evolved in Australia, particularly in relation to changing federal
emphasis on a national urban policy and in terms of the strategic planning and
governance arrangements for the metropolitan regions of the capital cities, in which
the vast majority of Australians live.
Urban policy matters in an urban society
Australia is a majority urban society. Over two-thirds of the population live in the
metropolitan regions of the state and territory capital cities (Table 1). Increases
in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane accounted for 70 per cent of Australia’s
population growth in 2016–17. These patterns reflect both the concentration of
economic opportunities and growth in urban areas and Australia’s unique urban
system, the pattern for which was set during European settlement, when the
majority of each colony’s population was concentrated in its capital city. During
the 20th century, the capitals continued to claim an ever-increasing population
share due to rapid suburban growth.4 Australia’s two largest cities, Sydney and
Melbourne, now have global city5 status, meaning they are significant nodes in
international networks of economic, political and cultural exchanges.
Australia’s urban concentration points to the policy challenges that affect
the quality of life in cities, such as congestion and the need for better public
transport, and gentrification and the need for greater housing availability and
affordability. These problems affect different parts of urban areas in different ways,
producing and reinforcing patterns of inequality across numerous domains, such
as income, health and mobility. Many of these challenges can be characterised as
spatial mismatches – for example, between where housing is affordable and where
jobs are located. But there is also often a mismatch between the local scale –
‘where people live’ – and the realms and flows that affect residents (which may
be global, national or metropolitan). These can range from the location decisions
of globally operating corporations to national imperatives to sustain and grow
economic productivity, or the need for co-ordination across local government
areas that make up the metropolitan region about the availability and accessibility
of housing, jobs and other services and amenities. Such policy challenges draw
attention to strategic planning focused on mobility and land use (for housing, for
employment, for open space) as a framework for and expression of urban policy.
4 Gleeson and Steele 2012.
5 Sassen 1991.
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GCCSA total State total % of state total
NSW: Greater Sydney 5,131,326 7,861,068 65
Vic: Greater Melbourne 4,850,740 6,323,606 77
Qld: Greater Brisbane 2,408,223 4,928,457 49
SA: Greater Adelaide 1,333,927 1,723,548 77
WA: Greater Perth 2,043,138 2,580,354 79
Tas: Greater Hobart 226,884 520,877 44
NT: Greater Darwin 146,612 246,105 60
ACT 410,301 410,301 100
TOTAL Greater Capital Cities 16,551,151 24,598,933 67
Table 1 Resident population of Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSAs),6 June
2017. Source: ABS 2018.
Urban policy matters because most people live in urban areas, and the policy
challenges we experience in these areas affect our quality of life. This gives rise to
questions about the extent to which urban policy tackles these challenges. Some
argue that urban policy is part of the problem, prioritising private investment
activities over efforts to tackle socio-spatial inequalities and create a more equitable
or just city. Others contend that private activities, assisted by state intervention,
ultimately create more opportunities for all.
Urban policy is politics
Urban policy lacks a singular definition. Its defining feature is state intervention in
the urban.7 While mainstream accounts regard such state intervention as a tech-
6 GCCSAs are geographical areas delimited to represent the functional extent of each of
the eight state and territory capital cities. The functional extent is defined using travel
to work data from the 2011 Census as a proxy for the labour market of each capital
city, its bounds containing the majority of the commuting population. This definition
includes the population within the built-up urban area of the city, as well as people
who regularly socialise, shop or work within the city and live in small towns and rural
areas surrounding the city.
7 Edwards and Imrie 2015.
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nical process of making and implementing plans, or as part of an administrative,
managerial function of government, a critical approach to urban policy entails
understanding that (as with all forms of state intervention) it is inherently political.
Policy, planning and governance arrangements for the urban reflect political
contestation and conflict between actors and interest groups with different levels of
power and different stakes in the city. These actors and interest groups, comprising
the federal, state and local levels of government, corporate interests and landowners,
as well as social movements, residents and community-based organisations, shape
urban policy.
Urban policy requires understanding of the underlying rationales for state
interventions and how these are contested by different interests seeking to assert
their vision for a city and to create and implement policy agendas guided by this
vision. In other words, while urban policy is characterised by policy objectives that
purportedly seek to enhance the quality of life of those living in cities, it propagates
specific values and visions for the city. In turn, the social construction of ‘the
urban problem’ that policy makers are trying to address has implications for what
policies are developed and implemented. Two kinds of challenges remain constant:
enabling the social reproduction of urban residents (the ability to reproduce the
means for people to live) and managing growth (including planning, land use
and redevelopment). Much debate occurs around what should be the overriding
priority of urban policy: equity (social redistribution) or efficiency (economic
growth).8 Equity goals suggest that everyone ought to be provided with equal
opportunity to access jobs, goods, services and amenities. Efficiency goals justify
urban policies that support urban economies by making the best use of land and
infrastructure to enhance productivity and wealth creation.
From 1945 until the late 1970s, equity concerns shaped policy in many Western
countries, with high levels of state intervention in the economy and society, including
provision of public housing, education, transport and infrastructure, along with
redistributive income support programs. But since the late 1970s, urban policy has
been primarily influenced by efficiency criteria, with a shift towards the pursuit
of private-sector-led strategies of wealth creation, or what David Harvey9 terms
urban entrepreneurialism. Thus political commitment has shifted from government
investment in public infrastructure and public control of significant assets to the
sale of assets and their control and management by quasi-governmental and private-
sector agencies as well as the outsourcing of service delivery to private or third-
sector providers. What some term a neoliberal political agenda, which aligns with
the practices of new public management, has promoted policies of privatisation,
fee-based services and a general rollback of government’s social welfare function.
For example, in terms of major urban redevelopment of former industrial areas, a
common approach is the creation of special purpose districts managed by arms-
8 Edwards and Imrie 2015.
9 Harvey 1989.
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length state agencies, which distance major projects from local accountability. The
influence of international examples such as the redevelopment of Baltimore’s Inner
Harbor in the USA and London’s Docklands in the UK are evident in Australia.
In Sydney, the redevelopment of Darling Harbour was overseen by a development
authority established in 1984, and the current central city waterfront redevelopment
is being led by a New South Wales (NSW) state agency, the Barangaroo Delivery
Authority, created in 2009.
Theories of urban policy
The ongoing tension between equity and efficiency goals is fundamental to debates
about urban politics and policy. Two broad theoretical positions aid understanding.
The first focuses on the role of cities in processes of social reproduction, and the
second emphasises cities’ role in processes of production or in realising profits from
property development.
Neo-Marxist debates of the 1970s stressed the role of cities in social reproduction
and collective consumption, or the delivery of services and goods – including those
which are or can be collectively consumed, such as transport, education, health care
and housing – by the state to support the reproduction of labour power. Politics stems
from the struggle between those propagating profit-seeking and those favouring
welfare via state support for collective good provision. For Manuel Castells,10 the lives
of many poor people in urban society are shaped by crises of collective consumption,
referring to the unaffordable nature of many goods and services necessary for their
sustenance. Collectively consumed goods and services, such as public transport and
policing, which involve the majority of households and especially wealthier groups
able to mobilise and be heard, tend to generate more public awareness. In contrast,
those allocated on the basis of need, such as public housing, and reliant on poorer
groups’ and their advocates’ ability to mobilise and be heard, tend to figure lower on
the political agenda.11
A second set of theories originating in the USA argues that the focus of urban
politics is economic growth and the realisation of profit through land and property
development. Growth coalition theory12 sees policy as part of the exercise of elite
power around economic growth objectives, with the city as ‘growth machine’. Urban
regime theory13 refines this, arguing that power is fragmented and that regimes
arise between local governments and private actors that need to combine power
and resources to be able to devise and enact a policy agenda. These theories, wh-
ich identify urban policy as a mechanism that seeks to promote economic growth
10 Castells 1978.
11 Cochrane 2007.
12 Logan and Molotch 1987.
13 Stone 1989.
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and boost urban competitiveness, are consistent with the shift towards a neoliberal
political agenda.
Globalising the city
Another perspective on the shift from equity to efficiency goals is provided by
considering policy as attempting to globalise cities by positioning them within global
flows of people, finance, goods and services. Such understanding has been used to
justify major investment and infrastructure projects, accompanied by place branding
and marketing and the provision of incentives, including land and tax breaks, to
attract major global investors. The changing urban economy, characterised by the
proliferation of advanced services and knowledge-based industries, has resulted in
bifurcation between highly skilled, well-paid professional work and low-paid,
unstable, unskilled service jobs in those cities clamouring for or seeking to retain
global city status, including Sydney and Melbourne. By the late 1990s, in such cities,
house prices had already risen beyond the incomes of many people. Gentrification,
or the process by which urban neighbourhoods, usually the home of low-income
residents, become the focus of reinvestment and (re)settlement by higher-income
residents, is framed by some as urban renewal, but others see it as displacement of
poorer, vulnerable city residents and a reduction in their opportunities to gain access
to good quality urban areas.14 Rising house prices and rents also attract property
speculation, which fuels further inflation. In turn, ‘the urban problem’ has been
socially constructed as one of poor city residents lacking the skills to compete in job
markets and generate the means to look after themselves – a justification for cutting
social welfare provision by promoting the moral imperative of self-improvement.
Others critique this construction as a form of social pathology, where people are
blamed for their problems, rather than relating these to inequities resulting from
global processes, compounded by state withdrawal of social welfare. In contrast, the
public goods and services consumed by the wealthier are rarely framed as welfare
benefits.15 For example, both public housing for those in need and negative gearing
tax concessions for the wealthy are benefits, but the ways in which these are socially
constructed indicates the dominance of efficiency goals given public subsidy to
encourage profit-making from private property ownership.16
Certainly the city needs to be considered as part of wider processes. Flows
(such as of investment and people), intervention by higher levels of government
(targeted at urban areas or not) or international policy transfer shape what goes
on within urban areas. But the urban remains distinctive as a political realm, with
its everyday struggles about public services, housing and infrastructure, along with
conflicts about urban renewal and redevelopment. These struggles focus attention
14 Lees 2003.
15 Cochrane 2007.
16 Holden 2018.
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on the planning and governance of cities and on the scope for more equitable
alternatives that resist the increasing intrusion of private interests into the urban
public realm.
Existing urban policy
These theoretical accounts of the shift in the state’s role, from helping to secure social
reproduction to assisting in capital accumulation, highlight key aspects of today’s
existing urban policy, under which economic success, rather than the existence of
an extensive welfare state, tends to be framed as the necessary precondition for the
wellbeing (or welfare) of citizens. Urban policy now seems predominantly shaped
by the pursuit of economic growth, and land and property development as a means
to boost profits and wealth creation. These objectives follow the logic promoted in
political rhetoric that people’s wellbeing is best secured by disciplining individuals
into accepting the efficacy of the market, from which they will benefit due to the
‘trickle down’ of growth.
For some, this understanding constitutes the basis of normative policy making,
the ‘new conventional wisdom’,17 which, due to rapid policy transfer, has been applied
globally. For others, it forms the basis of a critique of urban policy visions and values
that do not represent or respond to the needs of the many. This leads to questions
regarding the right to the city:18 who is the city for, and what is the role of policy
in facilitating people’s access to, and uses of, the goods, services and spaces of the
city? Critical urbanists boil this down to the core question of whether urban policy
(and indeed the city) is for people or for profit.19 They argue that people’s inhabitance
of the city, rather than access to money, should form the basis for holding the right
to remake and remain in the city. These scholars stress that there are progressive
possibilities within urban policy, in terms of the locally specific and flexible ways in
which policies can be implemented and in terms of the scope for development of
alternative visions for the city that may lead to more equitable urban policy goals and
outcomes.
At what level of government?
In Australia, urban policy is further complicated by a federal system of govern-
ment that has tended to overlook the significance of cities and metropolitan regions,
which, as ‘orphans of public policy’,20 are ‘caught between the three tiers of Australian
government, hardly registering on the agenda of many politicians’.21 Although
17 Gordon and Buck 2005, 1.
18 Lefebvre 1996.
19 See, for example, Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2009.
20 Harley 2014.
21 Kelly and Donegan 2015, 3.
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Australia is a vastly urban nation, attempts by the federal government to articulate a
national urban policy have been episodic. Urban planning is a key tool in the urban
policy toolkit. The intra-governmental arrangements around urban planning are
therefore important. In this context, it is important to note that: 1) local government
is not referred to in the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth – local
governments' responsibility for managing regulatory planning at the local level is
deferred from the states/territories; 2) in the absence of a national urban policy, the
federal government does not have any direct political oversight over urban planning
at the state/territory level; but 3) the federal government may provide funding to
the states/territories for large-scale infrastructure in cities, either as block funding
or through one-off arrangements (such as City Deals, below). Therefore, the states/
territories are powerful actors in urban and regional planning in Australia, but urban
policy and infrastructure funding tensions are present between the federal
government and the states/territories.
National urban policy
Globally, interest in formulating national urban policy peaked in the 1970s, with
high levels of government intervention aimed at realising equity goals through
provision of public housing and other public goods. The highpoint in Australia was
the Whitlam government's (1972–75) urban and housing development initiatives,
which focused on the rapidly growing suburbs. During the 1972 election campaign,
Gough Whitlam famously explained that:
a national government which cuts itself off from responsibility for the nation’s
cities is cutting itself off from the nation’s real life. A national government which
has nothing to say about cities has nothing relevant or enduring to say about the
nation or the nation’s future.22
Following the shift to efficiency goals, the most notable federal interest in cities
was expressed in the Hawke–Keating government’s ‘Building Better Cities’ program
(1991–96), which focused on the renewal of former industrial sites in the inner
city to provide higher density housing (in Pyrmont and Ultimo in inner Sydney,
inner Melbourne and inner north-eastern Brisbane) as well as the redevelopment
of mainly government-owned land in East Perth.
However, more recently, cities have crept back up the national policy agenda,
reflecting growing understanding of their role as the underpinning drivers for
national economies. In 2011, the Rudd–Gillard government launched a national
urban policy, ‘Our Cities, Our Future’,23 which sought to guide public intervention
and private investment around four themes that remain widely deployed in
22 Whitlam 1972.
23 Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011.
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metropolitan strategic planning rhetoric: productivity, sustainability, liveability and
governance. In 2016, the Liberal–National Coalition government launched the
‘Smart Cities’ plan with the ambition to ‘rethink the way our cities are planned,
built and managed’.24 The plan, not a substantive policy document, reflects
internationally shared (and poorly defined) ‘common sense’ tenets that productive
cities are smart, innovative, connected and liveable. In the same year, the
government announced the Australian Infrastructure Plan, asserting that ‘the
Australian government should drive change in the planning and operation of
Australia’s cities’.25 Federal commitments comprise funding for infrastructure
planning and provision and seeking partnerships with state and territory
governments via City Deals, which are ‘bespoke’ place-based funding agreements
presented as boosting urban productivity while enabling the ‘value capture’ of
enhanced tax revenue from development. The deals are described as ‘driv[ing]
national priorities tailored to local needs’.26
Questions arise about the federal government’s engagement in matters that are
generally regarded as the states’ prerogative – metropolitan strategic planning and
infrastructure investment. The resurgence of national urban policy in Australia
contrasts with the approach in other Western countries, where intergovernmental
decentralisation is leading to the creation of institutions at the metropolitan level,
justified on the basis of enhancing metropolitan regions’ global competitiveness
while increasing democratic accountability. In the UK, where the City Deals
approach originated, the funding agreements are ‘devolution deals’ premised on the
creation of metropolitan governments that include representatives of constituent
local governments and a directly elected ‘metro mayor’.27 Australian conceptions
of national urban policy do not envisage representative, revenue-generating
metropolitan governments, perceived as a threat to state and federal power and
influence.
Australia’s exceptionalism can be related to its extreme vertical fiscal
imbalance.28 This imbalance is based on which level of government has the power
to make decisions about public spending and taxation. Australia is atypical, given
the power of the federal level in collecting most taxation revenue before making
transfers to the states and territories in the form of general and tied grants. The
states/territories can levy limited taxes but derive nearly half their revenue from
federal grants.29 This imbalance enables the federal government to assert power
over planning for and infrastructure investment in cities, when it chooses to do so.
Major road projects such as the East West Link in Melbourne, Perth’s Roe 8 highway
extension and Sydney’s WestConnex have been highly contested but exemplify the
24 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2016, 4.
25 Infrastructure Australia 2016, 175.
26 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2016, 5.
27 Sandford 2018.
28 OECD 2016.
29 Galligan 2014.
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influence of funded federal priorities on state priorities. The projects are insulated
from local accountability as they are managed by public–private partnerships that
operate like private corporations but are authorised to use public funds to leverage
private investment. For example, WestConnex is managed by the Sydney Motorway
Corporation, a private company established by NSW government in 2014.
This poses questions about what level of government is best placed to resolve
contested urban policy challenges, how projects are funded and which urban actors
should be involved. Some argue that urban policy should locate responsibility
and funding for urban intiatives in the level of government where they are most
effectively addressed; urban scholars often conclude that this will be at the level of
metropolitan regions. In Sydney, bodies such as the Greater Sydney Commission
evidence the state government’s commitment to metropolitan city governance (but
not government).
Metropolitan planning and governance
Currently, state and territory governments have responsibility for creating strategic
plans for Australia’s metropolitan regions. Strategic planning at a metropolitan level
is a framework for and expression of urban policy. As such, it is highly political
and is subject to a great deal of contestation – such as debates over whether new
developments should replace farmland on the urban fringe, the provision and
location of public and social housing, and the gentrification of neighbourhoods and
displacement of poorer residents.30 Recent and ongoing struggles in inner Sydney
provide pertinent examples, such as the private transport-led redevelopment of
government-owned land and public housing in Waterloo and the sale of public
housing in Miller’s Point.
Metropolitan planning for Australia’s capital city regions is longstanding but
is increasingly subject to debates about whether it can meet the challenges posed.
Reflecting the shift from equity to efficiency goals, market-driven development has
led to rising socio-spatial inequality since the 1980s. In Sydney, the term ‘latte
line’31 has been used to describe the divide between the well-connected, affluent
and skilled jobs-rich inner suburbs and the poorly connected, highly car dependent
outer suburbs, which lack employment opportunities. In turn, the phrase ‘new
urban divide’ was coined to describe the spatial mismatches that strategic planning
seeks to address:
The housing market and transport systems in Australian cities [are] creating an
increasing divide between people and jobs, forcing people into trade-offs between
financial security and family time, and making social connection much harder.32
30 Howe, Nichols and Davison 2014.
31 Saulwick 2016.
32 Kelly and Donegan 2015, 76.
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Metropolitan plans tend to share a commitment to urban consolidation, seeking
compact cities by restricting new land released for development on the urban fringe
and implementing plans for densification within the existing built environment,
based around centres providing jobs and services and corridors of public transport.
High-rise apartments are increasingly evident in the inner city. But metropolitan
plans have generally failed to provide affordable housing. Plans do not meet their
goals of higher public transport use due to inadequate investment in infrastructure.
Where public transport use has increased, this has mostly involved radial journeys to
the CBD or within the better-served inner suburbs. Employment in middle and outer
suburbs remains sparse. Poor access to job opportunities in these areas has generally
added to labour market inequalities.33 Clive Forster describes:
the existence of parallel urban universes: one occupied by metropolitan planning
authorities and their containment-consolidation-centres consensus; the other by
the realities of the increasingly complex, dispersed, residentially differentiated
suburban metropolitan areas most Australians live in.34
Reasons cited for the relative failure of metropolitan plans relate to their frequent
revision due to changes in state government, leading to a lack of policy certainty
and consistency. The process is also often captive to private property, infrastruc-
ture and financial interests. Strong representation from the property industry has
led to the perception of urban consolidation policies as raising land and housing
costs, to the detriment of housing affordability, which encourages release of new land
for development on the urban fringe.35 Calls for the deregulation of planning to
‘streamline’ the system are also common,36 heightening concerns about the downgra-
ding of planning as a profession with ‘a weakening of the influence of planning
agencies in shaping metropolitan policy’.37 This is combined with the lack of
accountability in privately financed infrastructure schemes, such as road tunnels
in Sydney.38 Though the need for more affordable housing is recognised in policy
debates, policy change has not occurred to redress inequalities. In considering why
this is the case, Nicole Gurran and Peter Phibbs conclude that the ‘busy work’ of
policy discussion and review acts to defer any substantial change. They describe
this as an ‘expedient strategy for politicians beholden to home-owning electorates,
industry sponsors, or ideological interests’.39 It is also a ready tactic to shift blame to
another level of government.40
33 Hamnett and Freestone 2017.
34 Forster 2006, 180.
35 Bunker 2015.
36 Ruming and Gurran 2014.
37 Dodson 2009, 110.
38 Haughton and McManus 2012.
39 Gurran and Phibbs 2015, 718.
40 Milligan and Tiernan 2012.
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Here, it is useful to return to our consideration of the underpinning rationales
for state interventions in shaping urban economy and society. Metropolitan
strategies are an expression of urban policy and thus of urban politics. As such, the
strategies underline the shift from equity to efficiency and have made little progress
towards rectifying the spatial mismatches and inequities described above. However,
actually existing urban policy has an imperative (to an extent at least) to address the
key underlying tension between equity and efficiency. For example, in considering
strategic planning for the Sydney metropolitan region, Pauline McGuirk finds that
though its planning broadly reflects a neoliberal commitment to furthering Syd-
ney as a global city, redistributive compromises are necessary to achieve this. She
describes strategic planning as ‘an institutional site of negotiation’41 between
demands for economic development and redistribution. Other forces that shape the
urban realm, such as immigration policies and tax and finance policies like negative
gearing, underline the urban impacts of federal policies not explicitly targeted at
urban areas, which are not within the purview of metropolitan strategic planning.42
Much debate has occurred about how Australia’s metropolitan regions should be
governed. The current complex and fragmented governance arrangements are per-
ceived as lacking clear and effective institutional arrangements for strategic planning
and the co-ordination of urban services, including infrastructure. Co-ordinating
policy in a fragmented system of governance dilutes policy efficacy because it can
be unclear who has responsibilities for the different elements of policy development,
delivery and implementation. Advocates for metropolitan government see it as able
to rectify the perceived democratic deficit which enables private interests to exert
undue influence.43 Government at this level is viewed as giving metropolitan regions
a collective voice in debates about planning, resource allocation and major strategic
issues, such as immigration, economic development and sustainability. Metropolitan
governments are also perceived as being able to better tackle the perennial challenge
of urban policy co-ordination – across government policy siloes and government
levels (including local government areas) and between the public, private and third
sectors. But the introduction of a fourth level of government in Australia would face
considerable opposition from vested interests, including state and federal govern-
ments unwilling to cede power and responsibilities.
Greater Sydney, which has a population of 5.1 million and comprises 35 local
government areas, and Greater Melbourne, which has a population of 4.9 million
and 32 local government areas, are Australia’s two largest cities. Since 2015, metro-
politan planning for Sydney has been the responsibility of an independent
organisation created and funded by the NSW government, the Greater Sydney
Commission. Greater Melbourne does not have an equivalent agency. The extent to
which such a metropolitan planning commission comprises a step towards metro-
41 McGuirk 2007, 184.
42 Tomlinson 2012.
43 Gleeson 2017.
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politan government, with directly elected members or members elected by regional
local governments, clear responsibilities (such as for public transport) and tax
raising powers, remains to be seen.
Conclusions
The key tension in thinking about cities – as ‘where people live’ or as ‘growth
machines’ – plays out constantly in urban politics and urban policy. Urban policy
is redefined accordingly, ‘combining its elements in different ways at different times
and in different places’.44 A key debate in Australia is around the level at which
the state can best intervene to co-ordinate urban policy, but the debate tends to be
dominated by conventional understandings of state intervention as technical and
managerial rather than political, underlining the normative power of neoliberal
ideologies in shaping public policy. Debates about citizens’ role in the processes
of planning and governance seem subdued, perhaps because ‘many residents are
unwilling to consider the possibility that cities could get better’.45 However, cities
are also sites of struggle over social justice and equity that may lead to rebalancing
of priorities and redefining of policies.
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The employment relationship – that between employer and employee – is at the
heart of capitalism and a core issue for public policy. Governments create rules,
policies and institutions within which employees and their representatives, and
employers and their representatives, operate. The interest to governments when
creating policy includes the form that bargaining takes, wage and employment
levels, the nature and effects of contracting and the rights of workers – much
of this boiling down to issues of power. In recent decades, major policy issues
have included the federal Labor government’s Prices and Incomes Accords in the
1980s and 1990s, the Coalition government’s ‘WorkChoices’ legislation, the shift
to enterprise bargaining, and developments in such areas as minimum wages and
pay equity. In this chapter we outline the matters at stake, the players, the policy
processes and some of the key issues.
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What’s at stake?
Central to policy decisions is the political ideology of the decision maker, and
the implications of that ideology for whose interests should prevail within the
employment relationship. Put simply, is the priority for government the interests of
business or the advancement of worker interests? Approaches to the management
of labour may be described as being ‘unitarist’ or ‘pluralist’ and these concepts are
manifested in policy and practice.
The imprecision of the employment relationship – the heart of capitalism
At the beginning of the employment relationship the worker agrees to sell their
labour to the employer in the form of an ongoing market transaction. However, it
is almost impossible for the contract of employment to specify everything that the
employee does in their work. In the service sector, where measurement of employee
output is harder, the imprecision of the employment relationship is especially high.
The power of capital and labour
The study of work and employment relations policy is also the study of power. The
groups and individuals with power are those who benefit most from policy making.
Public policy may also affect the power that various groups and individuals have.
The relative power of employers and unions at the workplace is not easy to
measure. A pluralist approach ‘accepts the rights of employers, employees and
unions to bargain over their separate interests’.1 It also recognises that the conflict
that occurs in the workplace is to be expected and managed. In a capitalist economy,
governments who wish to advance the interests of workers tend to create policy from
a pluralist perspective. Governments, seeking to implement a policy that protects
business interests, often adopt a unitarist perspective. This assumes that employers
and employees have the same objectives and any conflict that might occur in the
employment relationship is unusual. Unitarist policies often do not support the
existence of an independent umpire to provide arbitration of workplace disputes.
Conservative or ‘right-wing’ approaches of the state to industrial relations are often
associated with unitarist conceptions of this field. There are other perspectives on
employment relations (e.g. radical, Marxist, postmodern or feminist approaches)2
but these are analytical perspectives, sometimes also held by workers, but not by
employers and rarely by government.
Governments, regardless of whether they espouse a unitarist or pluralist
perspective, claim to be interested in improved economic outcomes. This is an
objective that can appeal to everyone, and productivity growth, for example, affects
1 Alexander, Lewer and Gahan 2008, 22.
2 Peetz 2019.
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the level of resources available to distribute to capital and labour. However, there
is no agreement about how improved economic outcomes should be achieved,
and this objective is often just a guise for realigning the balance of power in the
workplace. Where policies, for example, support capital at the expense of labour,
they are more likely to entrench inequality. With unions being formally tied to
the Australian Labour Party (ALP), Coalition parties have long sought to discredit
the ALP through reducing the credibility of unions. Indeed, the conflict between
capital and labour is the core conflict within capitalism, so it should not surprise
us that it is also central to political conflict in Australia, though usually it is not
articulated this way.3 It is, though, common to think of and depict people, interest
groups or parties as being somewhere on a spectrum from ‘left’ (pro-labour) to
‘right’ (pro-capital). It is an idea that voters somehow manage to relate to in survey
questions, and surveys over the past two decades using this measure have detected a
gradual leftward shift, from the right towards the centre, in people’s self-assessment
of their political positioning.4
How the system works
Patterns of policy need not reflect patterns of public opinion. The ideology of
people in positions of power, the organisational ability of interest groups and the
nature of the institutional framework all shape the direction of policy and may do
so contrary to directions in public opinion.
There are three parties (groups) with a particular interest in the employment
relationship:
• employees and their representatives (commonly unions)
• employers and their representatives (employer associations)
• the state.
Each affects rule-making associated with the employment relationship.
Unions
The shape of the union movement today reflects how unions have developed over
the past 100 years. The trade union movement enables workers to act collectively, to
influence policy decisions affecting workplaces, and enables workplace negotiations
on pay and conditions of work.
The focus of trade unions is on the needs of members. However, their involve-
ment in decision making is not limited to the workplace level – it can also be seen
in their involvement in the community and in political lobbying. The Australian
3 Peetz 2018.
4 McAllister and Cameron 2014.
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Figure 1 Union density. Source: ABS Cat. No. 6310.0, 6323.0, 6325.0, 6333.0.
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) has been the sole peak body for unions since
the early 1980s, and it undertakes broad political and policy-based work as part of
its activities. It has initiated various equal pay and other wage cases to the body
now called the Fair Work Commission (FWC), and lobbied or negotiated with
governments. Outcomes achieved over many years include ‘occupational health
and safety laws, annual holidays legislation, superannuation, Medicare, the award
system, penalty rates for overtime and weekend work, and workplace amenities’.5
Under conciliation and arbitration, union density (the share of employees who
are members of a union) went from 6 per cent in 1901 to around 60 per cent by the
early 1950s.6 From the 1980s, union density declined (see Figure 1), beginning with
structural changes in the economy that favoured industries and occupations with
low density but were not met with effective union responses, such as organising in
new areas.7
In the 1990s, unions began a process of large-scale amalgamations to capitalise
on economies of scale, but union density continued to decrease in the face of attacks
by employers and various state and national governments. With the move to
enterprise bargaining, the focus of industrial relations shifted to the workplace, but
this was a level at which unions were often weakly organised, after focusing for many
5 Balnave et al. 2009, 126.
6 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018; Peetz and Bailey 2012.
7 Peetz and Bailey 2012, 529.
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years on advocacy in tribunals and action in a small number of ‘hot spots’. By 2018
density was around 15 per cent and, with a delay, collective bargaining also declined.8
Employers and employer associations
Employers also form collective organisations. Employer associations are often
regarded as the equivalent of unions for employers. Moreover, employers of most
people are themselves corporations, which are collectives of capital. Thus, employer
associations are industry-based collectives of collectives, formed to counter the
associational power of unions.
The roles of employer associations vary, depending on the way they developed
and the industry or region in which they traditionally operated. These roles have
evolved through amalgamations, but have largely centred around the representation
of political parties and developing responses to industry or national issues raised
by unions. Their activities have changed as employment relations has become
increasingly decentralised. They may provide services to their members to assist
specifically with managing their employment relations issues.
The state
The term ‘state’ is used here to describe the various institutions used to regulate the
employment relationship. These institutions include the legislature, executive and
judiciary. The legislature consists of the parliament and is responsible for creating
legislation. The judiciary interprets and applies legislation and can be responsible
for ensuring that the executive and legislature act within the Constitution. The
executive consists of the elected government as well as the various institutions that
form part of the public bureaucracy.
The state’s role has substantially varied over time. For most of the 20th century,
Australian industrial relations operated within the conciliation and arbitration
system. That system originated in the 1890s, before the nation was federated, in
response to bitter and costly disputes in several industries. Unions had strongly,
but unsuccessfully, resisted cuts to wages and conditions. Employers had been
unwilling to participate in voluntary conciliation or arbitration, and bloodshed had
occurred when employers, workers and law enforcement clashed.
By 1904, federal legislation was introduced to formally regulate and provide
a system for the negotiation of workers’ wages and conditions, and unions were
recognised as registered entities. This centralised system of multilateral rule-
making involved trade unions as representatives of workers, employer associations
representing employers, and the industrial labour courts and tribunals. Federal
and state governments did not directly determine labour standards at this time,9
8 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018.
9 McCallum 2011.
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but they did regulate some internal affairs of unions and employer associations, as
these were part of the system (some saw them as virtually an arm of the state10).
Tribunal decisions around wages and conditions became binding, and the details
were contained within instruments known as ‘awards’.
The central agency, originally the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, was split
in the 1950s into a court and a tribunal. The latter, the Australian Conciliation
and Arbitration Commission (ACAC), became the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (AIRC) and then Fair Work Australia (subsequently the FWC). In the
long run, the decisions of the tribunals, although often contested, appeared to be
similar to outcomes that the market would have delivered, apart from a tendency to
produce a more egalitarian distribution of earnings, which also included progress
towards equal pay for women.11
At the parliamentary level, there are deep divisions between the major political
parties. In some ways these parties are the political manifestation of capital and
labour. The unions created the ALP, and still have a formal role in it, though there
are often wide political gulfs between them. The Liberal Party was established in
the 1940s in an attempt to reorganise the then non-Labor parties (i.e. the parties of
capital) to better fight the ALP, then in government. Its creation was facilitated by
the newly established Institute of Public Affairs.
Elements determining pay and conditions
The legal ‘safety net’ for employees – the minimum conditions which should govern
their work – has several components: a minimum wage, National Employment
Standards (NES) set out in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and modern awards. On
top of these sit, for a substantial minority of workers, enterprise agreements.
The minimum wage is set by the Fair Work Commission’s Expert Panel, taking
effect from 1 July each year. The National Employment Standards are required
by law to be provided to all employees. The NES and minimum wage applies to
all employees as a ‘bottom floor’ set of minimum conditions. The NES includes
provisions regarding:
• maximum weekly hours
• requests for flexible working arrangements
• parental leave and related entitlements
• annual leave
• personal/carer’s leave, compassionate leave, and family and domestic violence
leave
• community service leave
• long-service leave
• public holidays
10 For example, Howard 1977.
11 Peetz 2016a.
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• notice of termination and redundancy pay
• provision of a fair work information statement to employees.12
Although seemingly detailed and prescriptive, there are loopholes in some of these
provisions, so it is not as robust a list as it might initially appear. Employees who
are employed under a modern award are entitled to minimum pay and other
conditions outlined in the relevant award. Where an organisation has negotiated
an enterprise agreement, pay and conditions for employees will be outlined in
the enterprise agreement, which can be different to the award but should leave
employees better off overall than if they were employed under the award. In
addition, employees and employers may negotiate an individual flexibility
arrangement (IFA) that can be used to implement more flexible work practices,
particularly on hours of work. An IFA, in theory, cannot be used to erode the
minimum rights of employees. Again, the employee should be better off overall
when compared to the modern award or enterprise agreement that the IFA varies.
Modern awards protect a number of entitlements and these can include:
• minimum wages
• types of employment (e.g. full-time, part-time or casual)
• overtime and penalty rates
• work arrangements (e.g. rostering or variations to working hours)
• annual wage or salary arrangements
• allowances (e.g. for employees required to clean their uniform)
• annual leave loading and arrangements for taking leave
• superannuation
• procedures for consultation, representation and dispute settlement.13
Most modern awards are based on a designated industry or an occupation within
a group of industries of employment. A miscellaneous award attempts to cover all
remaining workers. Any who might not be covered, however, are still entitled to the
minimum wage and the NES.14
The federal dimension
Federal industrial legislation in the 20th century relied on varied parts of the
Constitution. Principally, the conciliation and arbitration power in section 51(xxxv)
of the Constitution was used to encourage the settlement of disputes through
bargaining at the enterprise level. Residual powers rest with the states, so at times
30 to 40 per cent of Australian employees were under state awards. While, in 1993,
the external affairs power (section 51[xxix]) was used to provide for redress against
unfair dismissal and unequal remuneration between men and women, this was
12 Fair Work Ombudsman 2018a.
13 Fair Work Ombudsman 2018b, 4–5.
14 Fair Work Ombudsman 2018b, 4–5.
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historically unusual. That year, the corporations power (section 51[xx]) was used
to allow the negotiation of enterprise flexibility agreements between incorporated
employers and groups of employees without any representation by trade unions
or employer associations. This use was widened in 2005 to form the basis for the
entirety of the Howard government’s ‘WorkChoices’ legislation. The High Court
validated this, and so responsibility for most industrial relations matters moved
from the states to the federal government. To make this work, it was still necessary
for the states to refer power on non-corporate employers to the federal government,
which all states except Western Australia did. Most states retained the responsibility
for their own employees (such as state employed teachers and nurses).
After that time, much of the WorkChoices legislation was wound back
(especially regarding dismissal and individual contracts), and the Fair Work Act
2009 that replaced it has itself been amended several times, albeit in mostly minor
ways. Regardless, the federal government has largely maintained responsibility for
industrial relations.
Issues
We now turn to policy matters that have featured in political debates in recent
Australian history. These include matters concerning wages policy, collectivism and
individualism, union power and industrial conflict.
Wages policy, ‘the Accord’ and enterprise bargaining
Through the first half of the 20th century, awards became central to setting pay and
conditions. They provided a framework for employers to adhere to for rewarding
employees with wages and conditions of employment in return for their work
effort. The award system was seen as offering stability to the economy and perhaps
restraining strike activity. The number of awards grew as they covered an increasing
range of industries. The number of award conditions contained within awards also
grew.
However, by the late 1970s to early 1980s, economic circumstances were
complex and changing. Most countries were experiencing simultaneous high
inflation and unemployment. In 1983, the ALP introduced the Prices and Incomes
Accord, more commonly referred to as ‘the Accord’, that had been negotiated with
the ACTU. It was a system of highly centralised wage determination and a means
by which state intervention restructured the industrial relations system. The main
logic was for labour to co-operate with the state to reduce both unemployment
and inflation, through wage restraint (at or below inflation) supported by social
expenditures such as the introduction of Medicare and tax cuts.15 A secondary
15 Dabscheck 1989; Hancock 2016; Willis and Wilson 2000.
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logic was for labour to co-operate with corporate management in finding ways of
improving productivity at the workplace level. The Accord was renegotiated several
times.
By 1991, employers, unions and the Labor government had all decided, for
varying reasons, to move away from centralised wage fixing, and this was reflected
in Accord Mark V. In the April 1991 National Wage case, the arguments of the
parties for this move to ‘enterprise bargaining’ (EB) were rejected by the AIRC,
but by October 1991 it reluctantly endorsed the move.16 This was backed by 1992
legislation reducing the AIRC’s capacity to reject certified agreements and by
wholesale legislative changes in 1993 (the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993
[Cth]).17 These formally established a right to strike in negotiation of a new
enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) – but nothing else – whereas previously,
strikes had occurred in a legal grey zone with few restrictions. EBAs had to satisfy a
‘no disadvantage’ test, meaning workers on them should be no worse off than they
would be under awards.
With decreasing involvement in workplace matters, the role of the AIRC shifted
to maintaining an appropriate safety net of minimum award wages and conditions.
Changes in the safety net were meant to take account of inflationary pressures, the
level of workforce participation and productivity growth, industrial action, broader
social objectives and community expectations of fairness.
After 1996, when the Coalition government came to office, the Accord ended.
The inherently difficult circumstances of people who relied on award wages at
or near the minimum wage led unions to lodge ‘Living Wage’ claims, seeking a
large increase in minimum and award wages to deal with the problems facing the
low paid, albeit with little success. While increases in award minimum rates may
presently be above growth in the Consumer Price Index,18 wage growth overall in
2018 was historically at very low rates in Australia and overseas.19
Pay equity
The concept of equity is concerned with fairness, derived from social justice
principles of equal rights and access to, and full participation in, society. The
difference between high and low wage earners is one aspect of pay equity. While
a minimum wage aims to provide some standard of living to safeguard against
poverty,20 other inequities may persist due to other historical, systemic and social
factors. For example, the 1907 Harvester court decision set the male basic wage to
support a wife and five children.21 This social norm of the time viewed the male
16 Willis and Wilson 2000.
17 Pekarek et al. 2017.
18 Oliver and Yu 2018.
19 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018; Stewart, Stanford and Hardy 2018.
20 Brown 2011.
21 Ex parte H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (Harvester).
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as the worker and the female as the homemaker. This has been seen as reflec-
ting a breadwinner/homemaker model, and perpetuating gender discrimination,
manifesting in the issue of the gender pay gap.
Even after explicit pay discrimination based on gender was ended by the ACAC,
traditionally male forms of work such as manual and heavy work have attracted
a higher value than female forms of work, which embodied ‘softer’ skills, in
occupations like nursing or child care. Whitehouse and Rooney22 highlight the
undervaluation of work performed by women, and Baird23 reinforces this view,
citing that our industrial relations system has had an ‘uncomfortably ambivalent
relationship’ to women, casting women as either ‘ungendered’ workers (or
equivalent to the male worker ideal type), or the ‘other’ type of worker (encumbered
with care responsibilities outside of work). While this undervaluation affects
specific jobs, other systemic biases also damage a woman’s position. For example,
a policy focusing on promotion linked to length of service may inadvertently
discriminate against women, due to the taking of maternity leave.
Individualism and collectivism
One of the key left–right differences in industrial relations policy is the emphasis on
collectivism versus individualism. For example, statutorily providing for individual
contracts, known as Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), was a focus of
amendments to federal legislation of the Howard Coalition government, through
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). Lack of control in the Senate saw a watering
down of the Coalition’s original intentions.24 However, this changed in 2005 when
the Coalition gained control of the Senate and enacted the Workplace Relations
Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 (Cth), more commonly known as the
‘WorkChoices’ legislation.
The powers of the AIRC were further limited. WorkChoices gave AWAs
supremacy over EB agreements or awards, and moved the role of fixing minimum
wages and casual loadings to the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC). Only
five minimum working conditions needed to be included in awards and AWAs.
The ‘no disadvantage’ test was abolished.25 AWAs frequently reduced penalty rates
(wage premiums for anti-social working hours), overtime and shift allowances.
Small and medium businesses (with less than 101 employees) became exempt from
unfair dismissal laws, giving employers ‘greater freedom over the terms of which
they can hire and fire workers’.26 There were publicised examples of people given a
choice between a pay cut and losing their job.27
22 Whitehouse and Rooney 2011.
23 Baird 2016, 85.
24 McCallum 2011; Stewart 2016.
25 McCallum 2011; Stewart 2016.
26 Stewart and Williams 2007, 33.
27 Peetz 2007.
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The issue was central to the 2007 federal election. The unions’ ‘Your Rights @
Work’ (YRAW) campaign substantially helped the ALP return to power at the 2007
election.28 The ALP subsequently reinstated unfair dismissal protections and phased
out AWAs. Its Fair Work Act 2009 re-established the integrity of awards, with some
changes, in particular a reduction in their number and overlap and an increase in
their ability to be varied at the workplace level by ‘agreement’ – hence the new term
‘modern awards’.29 It replaced the AIRC with Fair Work Australia (FWA) – it was, after
all, the ‘Fair Work Act’ – and replaced or renamed several other Coalition-established
institutions. However, not all aspects of WorkChoices were changed. Unions did not
achieve full reinstatement of workplace entry rights.30 In addition, industrial action
by trade unions remained unlawful in many contexts, and requirements for a secret
ballot were modified but largely retained. Good faith bargaining requirements were
introduced for negotiating EB agreements (section 228 of the Fair Work Act 2009). The
Fair Work Act 2009 reintroduced a stronger version of the ‘no disadvantage’ test called
the ‘better off overall’ test, or ‘BOOT’,31 designed to ensure that a worker is better off
overall under an agreement when compared to the equivalent industry award. The ten
minimum NES conditions, discussed earlier in this chapter, must be satisfied. The ALP
also initiated a process leading to the introduction of universal paid parental leave.
Flexibility and insecurity
The basic architecture of the Fair Work Act 2009 had, by 2019, changed little
since its introduction, despite six years of Coalition government from 2013. The
Coalition found it difficult to get radical changes through the Senate, and a broader
agenda had been stymied since 2008, by the 2007 election result.
Nonetheless, pressures for change continued, because of the ongoing employer
urge for flexibility since the Accord days. It was usually controversial because
increased flexibility for employers would be mirrored in increased insecurity for
employees. Over the period from 2013, matters affecting pay and conditions
became controversial, because of actions of institutions promoting flexibility. The
FWC in 2017 decided to reduce Sunday penalty rates in retail and hospitality,
following employer submissions focusing on the need for greater flexibility in those
industries and the employment opportunities it would allegedly create, a report by
the Productivity Commission that made similar recommendations and statements
from individual Coalition politicians favouring such a cut.32
The issue was particularly salient because of its impact on low-income workers
and, implicitly, the potential for eventual flow-on to other workers. Soon, ‘insecurity’
became a major issue, with unions focusing on high rates of casualisation, labour
28 Cooper 2016; Muir and Peetz 2010.
29 Bukarica and Dallas 2012; Stewart 2016.
30 Muir and Peetz 2010.
31 Bukarica and Dallas 2012; Cooper and Ellem 2011.
32 Kaine and Boersma 2018; Oliver and Yu 2018; Peetz 2016b.
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hire, franchise employment, the use of ‘independent’ contractors, and continuing
growth in underemployment, with academic attention focusing on several of these
issues.33 The emergence of changing business models and the growth of the
‘platform’ or ‘gig’ economy heightened focus on these issues.34 As such, individual
jurisdictions have introduced legislation aimed at specific issues such as labour hire
or occupational health and safety.35
Unions and industrial conflict
Despite lower density, unions attract a lot of political attention. This is because they
still wield considerable political mobilising ability (few other union movements
would be able to claim the impact Australian unions’ 2007 YRAW campaign had on
an election result), they are the largest organised part of civil society, and they are
formally linked to the Coalition’s political enemy, the ALP. Their influence on Labor
in government is much less now, however, with the relationship having shifted from
one of being an ‘equal player’ during the Accord years, to that of an ‘interest group’
in political negotiations over the Fair Work Act 2009.
After losing status during the WorkChoices years, unions are again recognised
as bargaining representatives within collective bargaining processes, under the Fair
Work Act 2009,36 but both union internal affairs and the undertaking of industrial
conflict are regulated in extensive detail, especially by comparison with almost all
other industrialised nations. The level of industrial conflict has been much lower in
recent years than in the 20th century (see Figure 2).
The government as employer
A quite different aspect of industrial relations public policy is the government’s
role as employer. Sometimes it has led the way in advancing labour interests –
for example, the Whitlam Labor government took a ‘pace setter’ role in increasing
annual leave and introducing maternity leave. As public sector work is highly
regulated, the gender pay gap is lower in the public sector than in the private
sector.37 On the other hand, public sector employers also experience the budgetary
cost of wage increases, and so governments at the federal and state level, both
Coalition and ALP, may impose caps on negotiated wage increases or even attempt
to reduce conditions, leading at times to major industrial action.38
33 Campbell and Burgess 2018, 51; Healy, Nicholson and Pekarek 2017.
34 Healy, Nicholson and Pekarek 2017; Lansbury 2018.
35 Rawling and Schofield-Georgeson 2018.
36 Bukarica and Dallas 2012.
37 Kaine and Boersma 2018; Peetz and Murray 2017.
38 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018.
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Figure 2 Working days lost per 1000 employees. Source: ABS Cat. No. 6321.0; RBA 1997, table 4.21.
Conclusions
Most public policy in industrial relations, particularly since the 1990s, has been
driven by two things: political ideology and each political party’s perception of what
the political environment will permit. For the ALP, there is an urge to improve the
position of labour (and no love of ‘the big end of town’), but it is constrained by
what it considers the business sector and the media will accept. For the Coalition,
there is an urge to improve the position of capital (and no love of unions), but it is
constrained by what it considers the electorate will allow.
Although all areas of public policy are influenced by ideology and politics, this
phenomenon is particularly marked in industrial relations policy. While ‘evidence-
based policy’ may be a phrase that haunts many other areas of public policy, its
ghost is barely evident here.
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